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Abstract
The thesis consists of two main divisions. The first presents an original interpretation 
of Martin Heidegger’s philosophy. The second -  premised on die first -  presents a 
fundamental and internal critique of his philosophy.
The interpretative division demonstrates the way in which the history of being is 
structurally grounded in the ontological conformation of Dasein. This amounts to evincing 
die unity of Heidegger’s development of his basic philosophical project: the raising of the 
question of being, and requires an original account of both the philosophy of the history of 
being and die existential analysis of Dasein, as well as of the so-called Kehre.
The critical division, which is founded upon the conclusions of the interpretative 
division, focuses on the structural grounding that Heidegger attempts to provide, within the 
existential analysis of Dasein, for his ontological demand for the overcoming of the epoch of 
metaphysics. This grounding is the cornerstone with which Heidegger’s philosophy as a 
whole stands or falls. It is shown that, for internal reasons, Heidegger’s grounding fails, and 
that the existential structures of Dasein found an essentially different ontological imperative. 
The most basic consequences of this failure and substitution are subsequentiy drawn out both 
for Heidegger’s philosophy in particular and more generally.
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Preface
What follows is an essay on the structure of the philosophy of Martin Heidegger. 
Structure here (sometimes Structurality) refers to a particular configuration of relations 
abstracted from their particular relata.
The essay's initial aim is to develop an original interpretation of Heidegger's 
thinking, guided by the task of bringing to light its inner unity. Amongst Heidegger's 
interpreters it is commonly held that his thought passed through a number of disparate and 
chronologically determinable phases or periods. Little has it been considered, however, 
whether and how these might structurally concatenate in the light of what is allegedly the 
inner problematic of them all: die question of being; how they might all systematically 
affiliate to that problematic’s internal organisation.
We shall begin with the premise that there are only two diachronic phases to 
Heidegger’s thinking. Later it will become clear how these are made structurally necessary -  
only these two and in so far as they are two -  by the question of being itself. It will also be 
seen that the project to raise the question of being and the nature of the question of being do 
not themselves transfigure at all.
The two phases of Heidegger's thinking are that of the existential analysis of Dasein 
and that of the philosophy of the history of being. The texts considered here to constitute the 
former are most notably, of course, Sein und Zeit, but also the lecture courses leading up to 
the publication of the magnum opus and those held immediately afterwards, as well as the 
individual lectures up until Vom Wesen der Wahrheit, first given in 1930. We shall freely 
move between these texts in appropriating citations. The works considered to constitute the 
later phase are all those written after 1930, beginning with the latter named lecture and 
extending up until Heidegger's death in 1976, although die latest text that will be of 
importance to our purposes is Das Ende der Philosophic und die Aufgabe des Den kens, which 
first appeared in 1964.
In accounting for the structural necessity of these two phases of Heidegger’s thinking 
to the original project o f raising the question of being, we shall be presenting an interpretation 
of the unity of his thought. At the same time -  and precisely thereby -  we shall be providing 
a thoroughgoing account of that thorn in the side of Heidegger-scholarship, the so called 
Kehre. The Kehre, at least as it has traditionally been conceived in the secondary literature,
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will be recast in very concrete terms as the transition between the existential analysis of 
EkMsein and the philosophy of die history of being. Laid out in this way, we shall be able to 
provide an account, not only of exactly what it amounts to, but also of its inner grounds, its 
inner necessity and motivation, within the architectonic of Heidegger's initial question. It 
will turn out that the Kehre is die necessary result of the unfolding of the inner structurality of 
the question of being.
As to the question of being itself our interpretation of Heidegger's philosophy will 
also expressly amount to a wholesale reconsideration of its meaning. Giving a final account 
of what the question of being is, what it means to raise the question of being, what its 
motivations are, will constitute the final conclusion of our interpretation.
At that point we will be prepared to turn to criticism. In order to level a charge 
against Heidegger one must first locate him. This holds for every thinker, but the difficulties 
are compounded in die case of Heidegger because, on the one hand, the status of his claims is 
very much open to question, and, on the other, die terrain on which he is moving is, for 
essential reasons, unfamiliar to the objector. In so far as Heidegger’s philosophy amounts to 
an “overcoming” of traditional, “metaphysical”, modes of thought, any criticism itself 
grounded in these metaphysical modes of thinking begs the question against him, and is 
thereby rendered innocuous. Correspondingly, only criticisms which function internally to 
the structural configuration of Heidegger's philosophy, can be potent. Our critique will be 
internal in this sense -  immanent to that configuration which we shall map out in the 
interpretative parts of the essay. The interpretative and critical parts will thus be seen to 
belong intimately together.
In essence, we shall level just one charge against Heidegger, one directed towards the 
very project of raising the question of being, and therefore towards the entirety of his 
philosophy. In the face of that single charge the whole considerable edifice of his thinking 
will stand or fall. However, in the course of our exposition we shall, where relevant, make 
reference and respond to other criticisms which have been directed towards Heidegger's 
thinking by his commentators.
In his recent book on Heidegger, Herman Philipse writes: ‘I... argue that, for specific 
reasons pertaining to the nature of Heidegger’s thought and to his highly innovative use of the 
resources of the German language, it is impossible to translate his texts without destroying 
their structure, their power, their magic. ' 1 With this we agree. And we shall therefore retain 
the original German for quotation. This avoids the further problem of having to standardise 
the translations of Heidegger's locutions into the English language. Outside of the context of 
citations we shall translate only those concepts of Heidegger’s which, on the one hand, can be
1 Herman Philipse, Heidegger's Philosophy of Being, p. xvii
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unproblematically translated into English, that is, which find more or less equivalents in the 
English language such that, in the process of translation, the meaning of the original German 
is not significantly lost, and, on the other, where this makes for a better English text. 
Typically the latter point will apply to those concepts which function both substantially and 
adjectivally. Inserting German adjectives into an English text leads to grammatical impasses. 
Those concepts which find no equivalent whatsoever in English, so that contriving a 
translation would put die non-German reader into no better a position than would the original, 
will be rendered in German. By these means we do not at all presume to clear up all the 
difficulties inherent in writing about Heidegger in English.
In the first part, we shall delineate the historical structures which configure the 
history of being. In the second part, we shall outline the existential structures of Dasein. In 
the third part, we shall demonstrate the way in which these structuralities connect to one 
another, and thus the way in which the two phases of Heidegger’s thinking are related, and we 
shall subsequently trace this bipartite conformation back into die basic structurality of die 
project of raising the question of being. We shall then, in the fourth and final part, develop 
our fundamental and internal critique of this project, which amounts to an ultimately decisive 
attack on the total construction of Heidegger’s philosophy. In conclusion, we shall pursue the 
consequences which follow from our objection, both for Heidegger’s legacy itself, as well as 
more generally.
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Part I:
The History of Being
Chapter 1: 
First Beginnings
In his lecture entitled “Vom Wesen der Wahrheif’ Heidegger writes: ‘Die Ek-sistenz 
des geschichtlichen Menschen [ftngt] in jenem Augenblick an, da der erste Denker ffagend 
sich der Unverborgenheit des Seienden stellt mit der Frage, was das Seiende sei. In dieser 
Frage wird erstmals die Unverborgenheit erfahren... Erst wo das Seiende selbst eigens in 
seine Unverborgenheit gehoben und verwahrt wird, erst wo diese Verwahrung aus dem 
Fragen nadi dem Seienden als solchem begriffen ist, beginnt Geschichte. ’ 1 This beginning, 
which Heidegger came to refer to as “the first beginning” [der erste Anfang], is the beginning 
of the history of being.
The history of being [Geschichte des Seins] is no history in the usual 
historiographical sense (for which Heidegger reserves the name Historie); it does not have 
simply to do with a temporally related system of events. Nor is it merely one history among 
others. Despite -  for essential reasons, of course -  being a peculiarly Occidental 
phenomenon, the history of being is the ground of the possibility of all fundamental historical 
reality as such. It is, Heidegger tells us, the Ereignis of being as such, the unfolding of being 
itself  ^ die time, or essential temporal determination, that belongs essentially to being. ‘Die 
Seinsgeschichte ist weder die Geschichte des Menschen und eines Menschentums noch die 
Geschichte des menschlichen Bezugs zum Seienden und zum Sein. Die Seinsgeschichte ist 
das Sein selbst und nur dieses. ’2 But grounded in the history of being is the history of the 
relationship of being to die human essence, and, what amounts to the same thing, the history 
of truth.
In this first part we shall attempt to sketch out the basic epochal structures of this 
history. In his preface to The Question o f Language in Heidegger's History o f Being Robert 
Bernasconi writes: ‘[The history of being] is not a story and cannot be retold as one’. -  But 
Geschichte means just as much “story” as it does “history”. And so in what follows we are 
going to retell the story of Heidegger’s history of being, and that will sufficiently prove that it
1 Vom Wesen der Wahrheit, Wegmarken, pp. 189-190
2 Nietzsche II, p. 447
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can be retold as one. It is of course an unusual story, perhaps the story of all stories; but it has 
a beginning, perhaps even a happy ending (or at least another beginning), and that is surely 
the mark of a story. Indeed it is even to be thought eschatologically: ‘Das Sein selbst ist als 
geschickliches in sich eschatologisch. ’3 But we are not going to tell this story 
chronologically, that is, historically; we are going to tell it structurally.
The torch of being’s history was lit in ancient Greece by the inceptual questioning of 
the pre-Socratic philosophers. Close attention to the nature of this beginning was always 
crucial to Heidegger’s seinsgeschichtliches Denken\ for, he thought, only by understanding its 
beginning is it possible to understand what the history of being is; but understanding what the 
history of being is, is a necessary presupposition for understanding what is really happening 
in the world over two millennia of history later, and therefore, most importantly of all, for 
appropriately responding to it.
Heraclitus and Parmenides are the most important of the pre-Socratic philosophers for 
Heidegger. He charges them with bringing a particular experience of being as such to 
language, with drawing being up into unconcealment for the first time in a way which was 
fundamentally determinative for die entire history of the West. To understand this, the very 
beginning of Western history, we shall consider in turn three fundamental concepts of the 
ancient world that form the kernel of Heidegger’s interpretation of pre-Socratic thought.
<Pvois
The word used by the Greeks to refer to beings as such and as a whole was <f>vms. 
This named not merely the agglomeration of everything that is, but the law or order of beings 
as a whole. Qvois is usually rendered into modem languages according to its Latin 
translation: natura, English: nature. Natura originally means birth, to be bom, but with this 
translation the primary sense of the Greek word has already been lost, and once, after two 
thousand years, <f>vois is understood in terms of a modem concept of nature, it has entirely lost 
its inceptual meaning. Indeed, it was the translation of the thought of the ancient Greeks into 
Latin that, claims Heidegger, ‘ist nichts Beliebiges und Harmloses, sondem der erste 
Abschnitt des Verlaufs der Abriegelung und Entfremdung des urspriinglichen Wesens der 
griechischen Philosophic. ’4 Still, a scarcely audible echo of the original Greek determination 
of ^ vois comes down to us when we speak of the “nature” of man, the “nature” of things.
According to Heidegger, <j>vois originally said ‘das von sich aus Aufgehende . das 
sich erbfthende Entfalten, das in solcher Entfaltung in die Erscheinung-Treten und in ihr sich
3 Der Spruch des Anaximander, Holzwege, p. 302
4 EinfUhrung in die Meiaphysik, pp. 10-11
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Halten und Verbleiben, kurz, das aufgehend-verweilende Walten’5. <Pvais means “emerging 
sway” {aufgehende Walten). It stems from <f>vo>, meaning to bring forth, to produce, to put 
forth, also to beget, to procreate, and also to grow, to arise, to spring up. But Heidegger 
insists that it does not refer to a particular “natural” process; rather, it is that by virtue of 
which beings first become and remain observable at all, that is, unconcealed. <Pvots named 
being as such; but this insofar as it named ‘das Seiende als solches im Ganzen’.
However, this inceptual sense of <f>vais began immediately to be narrowed down, in 
particular by its being contrasted with the concept of -rtyy1) ~ a generating or producing that 
involves knowing and skill.6 Only an echo of it remains in Aristotle’s treatise on the concept 
in his Physics B, 1, in which it is brought into essential connection with the concepts of 
Kirrjois, the state of “movedness”, motion (the state of rest being here also implicated) -  
although removed from the modem mathematical conception of movement as merely change 
of position through time7 -  and *apxn* origin, beginning; and limited to only one specific 
region of beings: those that “grow”, as opposed to those that are made (those beings that are 
in movement, die origin of that movement residing within than selves). Heidegger sums up 
the Aristotelian understanding of the essence of <f>vats as follows: ‘die ansgdngliche 
VerfUgung Uber die Bewegtheit des von ihm selbst her und auf sich zu Bewegten’ .8 A sense of 
<j>vais as emergence into presence remains in this characterisation, but in so far as it is used to 
characterise the mode of presencing of a particular region of beings, it is no longer taken to be 
the fundamental determination of beings as such and as a whole.
As a mode of presencing of a particular region of beings, <f>vois in Aristotle’s sense is 
a particular determination of ovala. Ova la is formed from the feminine participle of the 
Greek verb to be, flpU, and could be used to refer to the “beingness” [Seiendheit] of beings, 
the determination as which beings are in so far as they are.9 Determined according to <j>vais, it 
refers to the beingness of the region of beings which have the character ofapxri Kivrjaeuts, a 
source (within themselves) of movement. Ovala was first coined as a technical term by 
Aristode. Its originaiy meaning, claims Heidegger, is thrust aside when it is translated with 
Roman ears into “substance”. An appropriate modem translation for its inceptual Greek 
sense is however available, he claims, in the German word An-wesen, which can be rendered
5 Einfiihrung in die Metaphysik, p. 11
6 Cf. chapter 4.
7 And fundamentally determined by the crucial Aristotelian concepts of evre\exeia *nd p^ ra^ oX-q.
* Vom Wesen und Begriff der &vot$ Aristoteles, Physik B, 1, Wegmarkert, p. 261 Aristotle writes, for 
example: ‘Of things that exist, some exist by nature [^vat?], some from other causes By nature the 
animals and their parts exist, and the plants and the simple bodies (earth, fire, air, water) -  for we say 
that these and the like exist by nature All the things mentioned plainly differ from things which are 
not constituted by nature. For each of them has within itself a principle of motion and of stationariness 
(in respect of place, or of growth and decrease, or by way of alteration).’ [Physics, B, 1, 192b 9-16] 
And. ‘Nature is a principle of motion and change.’ [Physics, r , 1, 200b 12]
9 It also has the meaning of property, what is one’s own-most
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into English as “coming-to-presence”. In the Aristotelian concept of ovala, Heidegger also 
finds a sense of abiding in presence (not to be understood in terms of mere duration), and 
accordingly determines the late Greek understanding of beingness to be fundamentally: 
constant presence [bestdndige Anwesungj. He claims: ‘Diese Auslegung des Seins wird 
weder begrOndet, noch wird gar der Grund ihrer Wahrheit erfragt. Denn wesentlicher als 
dieses bleibt im ersten Anfang des Denkens, dafi Qberhaupt das Sein des Seienden begriffen 
wird. ’ 10
The fact that Aristotle comes to understand <f>vats as merely a particular determination 
of ovala betrays a subtle shift in Hellenic thinking, a repositioning beyond die thinking that 
constituted the inception of philosophy. The original sense of <f>vois, emerging sway, 
becomes subordinated to ovala, constant presence, which thereby replaces it as the 
fundamental Greek determination of being as such. The shift from <f>vats to ovala is made 
possible by a meaning shared between the two concepts: <f>vois as coming-to-presence, ovala 
as constant presence. This inner core of the understanding of being in terms of presence, 
Heidegger will claim, remains decisive throughout die development of Western philosophy.
After Aristode the meaning of <f>vots was further narrowed down eventually to the 
concept of the physical and the contemporary notion of nature (whereby it is understood 
merely in terms of what naturally is). These developments, signifying fundamental changes 
within the Western understanding of being, are determined by the deep structures of the 
history of being. Their grounds will become clearer in what follows.
Aoyos
This word occurs very often in Heidegger's writings. He devotes to it an essay-length 
treatment in the volume Vortrdge und Aufsdtze in relation to a saying of Heraclitus. Aoyos 
comes from Acyctv, Latin legere, from which the German word legen, “to put”, “to lay down”, 
derives. Legen, however, is the same as the German lesen, English: “to collect”, “to gather” 
(fruit or firewood, for example), perhaps “to glean”, but also “to read”. Lesen, as regards its 
etymology, is to be understood in terms of “gathering” [versammeln], “bringing together** and 
“putting-forth into unconcealedness”. “Reading” is merely a variant application of this 
authentic sense of gathering. In this notion of gathering and putting-forth into 
unconcealedness lies the essence of the Greek understanding of Aoyos: ‘o Aoyos, das Legen: 
das reine beisammen-vor-liegen-Lassen des von sich her Vorliegenden in dessen Liegen. So 
west der A6yos als das reine versammelnde lesende Legen. Der Aoyos is die ursprilngliche 
Versammlung der anf&nglichen Lese aus der anffinglichen Lege. V  Aoyos ist: die lesende
10 Vom Wesen und Begriff der <Pvois Aristoteles, Physik B, 1, Wegmarkert, p. 266
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lege und nur dieses. ’ 11 Aoyos is the gathering together that puts forth into unconcealedness 
[vor-liegen-Lassen], into presence; that which gathers into oneness \Ev IJavra] all that 
presences. This account of the Greek conception of Aoyos dates from 1951, but its basic idea 
is also to be found in Sein und Zeit’s brief characterisation of the concept in relation to the 
determination of the concept of phenomenology. Here Heidegger writes for example: ‘Aoyos 
als Rede besagt vielmehr soviel wie 817Aow, offenbar machen das, wovon in der Rede “die 
Rede” ist... Der Aoyos lfiBt etwas sehen (faCveoOat) . . . ,12
It should be expected that according to Heidegger there is to be found an inner 
connection between the concepts of <f>vots and Aoyos. Such a connection is discussed in the 
1935 lecture course EinfUhrung in die Metaphysik under the heading Die Beschrdnkung des 
Seins: Sein und Denken. Here, again in the context of a discussion of the philosophy of 
Heraclitus, Aoyos and <j>vois are claimed to be the same. Aoyos as constant gathering, as the 
gatheredness of beings that stand-forth in presence, is the same as being itself, that is, the 
same as <f>vois, the emerging sway. Emerging sway and gathering mean the same: the being 
of beings -  gathered-coming-to-presence. ‘Das Sein, die (j>vois, ist als Walten ursprungliche 
Gesammeltheit: Aoyos’13. The ground of the sameness of <f>vois and Aoyos rests in the 
revealing character of Aoyos. Aoyos, as gatheredness, puts forth into unconcealment, that is, 
lets beings presence, present themselves.
It is precisely this sense of Aoyos that grounds its determination as the essence of 
language.u The Greeks, Heidegger would like to say, conceived of language in terms of this 
originary opening up of beings. Aoyos came to be understood in terms of language, only by 
virtue of its originary meaning in terms of the revealing of beings. 15 Language itself gathers 
and puts-forth beings into unconcealedness, reveals beings. Heidegger writes: ‘Die Erdfthung 
des Seienden geschieht im Logos als Sammlung. Diese vollzieht sich ursprOnglich in der 
Sprache. ’ 16 Heidegger kept to this supposedly Greek conception of language throughout his 
philosophical career.
Insofar as Aoyos determines the essence of the Greek understanding of language, it 
also determines the Greek conception of the essence of the human. In terms of his capacity 
for language, as the speaker, man, to whom beings are revealed, become present in their
11 Vortrdge und Aufsdtze, pp. 207-8
13 Sein und Zeit, p. 32
13 Emfbhrung in die Metaphysik, p. 123
14 A^ yeiv means not merely “to lay down” and “to gather” but also “to say”, “to speak”.
15 Cf, for example, the accepted translation of the beginning of the Gospel according to John: ‘[l]In the
beginning was the word, and the word was with God and the word was God. [2]He was in the 
beginning with God. [3]All things came into being through him, and without him not one thing came 
into being that has come into being. [4]In him was life, and the life was the light of all people. [5]The 
light shines in the darkness, and the darkness did not overcome it.’ [New Revised Standard Version] 
The word, A6yos, is here placed into essential connection with beginning, with coming into being, with 
life, and with light.
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being, is understood as die “preserver” and “governor” of the open region as such, that is of 
being as such. ‘Menschsein heifit: die Sammlung, das sammelnde Vemehmen des Seins des 
Seienden, das wissende Ins-Werk-setzen des Erscheinens iibemehmen und so die 
Unverboigenheit verwalten, sie gegen Verborgenheit und Verdeckung bewahren.'11
This understanding of die essence of man, however, was quickly covered over in 
subsequent thought and with it the inceptual meaning of Aoyos. Man became eventually the 
animal rationale, and Aoyos merely one of his “faculties”, albeit still the one that 
fundamentally determined his essence, and this definition subsequently became a basic 
supposition of Western thinking, the prevalence of which still remains unshaken. In this 
development, Aoyos was taken out of its essential belonging together with <j>vots and became 
instead juxtaposed to it: reason came to preside over being, thinking and being were rendered 
asunder. Being was set across and apart from thinking as something that is to be re-presented 
by thinking, as object to a subject The inner grounds of this transformation will become 
clearer in what follows; it can, however, here be stated that in this historical division between 
4>vots and Aoyos, Heidegger sees die fundamental determination of the history of the Western 
world.
AXfjOeia
AArjSfia is traditionally translated into English as “truth”, or “reality”. It is not with 
these translations as such that Heidegger takes issue, but with the fact that they are understood 
without Greek ears. For oAi/fcia, originally at least -  perhaps even pre-originally -, meant 
something fundamentally different from that which is understood by us modems under the 
tide “truth”. Heidegger translates aA^deta with “unconcealment” [Unverborgenheit]. This 
translation captures the etymology of the word and therefore, for Heidegger, its originary 
meaning. Arjdrj means forgetting, forgottenness, originary concealedness, place of oblivion. 
The addition of the Greek a-privativum implies its opposite: un-concealedness, dis-closure. 18
But defining truth in terms of its opposite in this way means that untruth is 
determinative of truth. Unconcealment is possible only on the basis of a prior concealment; 
indeed, only possible on die basis of an emergence into unconcealment. This determination 
of truth in terms of its opposite introduces a binary opposition on which, as we shall see, the 
whole structurality of Heidegger’s thinking hangs.
16 EinfUhrung in die Metaphysik, p. 141
17 EinfUhrung in die Metaphysik, p. 133 Heidegger presents an in depth discussion of the Greek 
understanding of the being of man in relation to the Greek concept of tragedy from p. 106.#!
11 There is, of course, some debate surrounding this etymological derivation of aAydcta. We shall 
assume, with the majority of scholars, that it is correct. In anycase, Heidegger’s thinking here does not 
stand or fall with the etymology.
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Now truth and being belong essentially together for Heidegger. Being is “what” is 
true. The Greek concept of truth is thus, according to him, intrinsically connected to the 
Greek understanding of being. Indeed, Heidegger claims: ‘das griechische Wesen der 
Wahrheit ist nur in eins mit dem griechischen Wesen des Seins als <f>vots mdglich. ’ 19 We 
have characterised <j>vois in terms of emerging sway, as the coming into appearance as such, 
emerging into presence. It is not difficult to see the connection between this understanding of 
the being of beings and die understanding of truth in terms of unconcealment: coming to 
presence, presencing, is precisely to be understood in terms of emerging out of concealment 
into unconcealment, in terms of the relationship between concealment and unconcealment. 
‘Unverborgenheit ist der Grundzug dessen, was schon zum Vorschein gekommen ist und die 
Verborgenheit hinter sich gelassen hat... [D]as Unverborgene [wird] unmittelbar nur als das 
zum-Vorschein-Gekommene, Anwesende erfahren’20. Thus unconcealment is a basic 
determination of the Hellenic understanding of being as such. ‘Indem Seiendes als ein 
solches ist, stellt es sich in die und steht es in der Unverborgenheit, ’aXrjdeia.'21 The essence 
of <f>vats and the essence of 'aXrjdfia mutually imply one another.
But as the emergence into unconcealment, being is also essentially to be understood 
in terms of concealment: ‘Der Grundzug des Anwesens selbst ist durch das Verborgen- und 
Unverborgenbleiben bestimmt. ’22 Heidegger frequently discusses the notions of concealment 
and unconcealment in relation to a saying of Heraclitus known as Fragment 123: <f>vois 
Kpvrrrtodax <f>iAcZ, conventionally translated: “nature loves to hide”. Heidegger translates it: 
‘Sein [aufgehendes Erscheinen] neigt in sich zum Sichverbergen. ,23 He takes this fragment to 
express the thought that concealment -  or self-concealment -  is a fundamental determination 
of being as such. Indeed, only once it is understood that, for the Greeks, concealment belongs 
essentially to being, does it become understandable why they expressed their concept of truth 
negatively, a-AiJ0«ta.
Insofar as truth as 'aXrjOfia has an intrinsic connection to being as 4>vois, and being as 
<f>vois has an intrinsic connection to Aoyos, there must also be an intrinsic connection between 
’aXrjdfia and Aoyos. Aoyos is the “happening of unconcealment”, the gathering putting-forth 
into unconcealment, that is, into truth, ’aXrjdaa. Truth as unconcealment is the basic 
determination of the essence of Aoyos. ‘Die lesende Lege hat als der Aoyos  Alles, das
19 EjnfOhrvng in die Metaphysik, p. 78 Also: ‘Weil, griechisch erfahren, das Seiende als solches <f>vois, 
Aufgang, ist, gehOrt zum Seienden als solchem die ’aArfdeta, die Unverborgenheit.’ [Grundfragen der 
Philosophic, p. 97]
20 Vortrdge und Aufsdtze, p. 251 And further: ‘Mit dem Unverborgenen und seiner Unverborgenheit 
ist jeweils das genannt, was in dem Aufenthahsbezirk des Menschen jedesmal das offen Anwesende 
ist. ’ [Platons Lehre von der Wahrheit, Wegmarken, p. 219]
21 Einfbhrung in die Metaphysik, p. 77
22 Vortdge undAufsdtze, p. 254
23 EJnfbhrung in die Metaphysik, p. 87
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Anwesende, in die Unverborgenheit niedergelegt... Der Aoyos legt ins Anwesen vor und legt 
das Anwesende ins Anwesen nieder, d. h. zurQck. An-wesen besagt jedoch: hervorgekommen 
im Unverborgenen wdhren. Insofem der Aoyos das Vorliegende als ein solches vorliegen 
lfiBt, entbirgt er das Anwesende in sein Anwesen. Das Entbergen aber ist die AXrfdtta. Diese 
und der Aoyos sind das Selbe. Das Xeytiv ldfit aAijfo'a, Unverborgenes als solches 
vorliegen. ’24 This determines the relation of language to truth: language, as the opening up of 
beings as such, is grounded in truth as ’aXrjdcia; and it also determines the essence of the 
human implicated therein: the essence of the human must be understood as intrinsically 
related to truth as such; the human must be conceived as standing in the truth, which says die 
same as: standing in the open presence of being -  but this in the sense of revealing, un- 
concealing being.
Insofar as both Aoyos and <j>vois are mutually determined essentially by revealing, by 
emerging into presence, truth as oAjOcia is the ground of their essential belonging together, 
their inner equivalence. ‘Die Unverborgenheit nSmlich ist jenes Innere, d. h. der waltende 
Bezug zwischen <f>vms und Aoyos im urspriinglichen Sinne.’25. This is expressed beyond the 
horizon of the interpretation of the Greeks as follows: ‘Die Unverborgenheit ist gleichsam das 
Element, in dem es Sein sowohl wie Denken und ihre Zusammengehdrigkeit erst gibt. ’26 It is 
precisely a change in the ^^scaolo{ truth that determines the subsequent juxtaposition of 
<f>vois and Aoyos at the end of the great Greek inception of philosophy, the juxtaposition of 
being and thinking that is decisive for the history of the West.
24 Vortrdge und Aufsdtze, p. 212
25 Ejnfilhrung in die Metaphysik, p. 145
26 Zur Sache des Denkens, p. 76
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Chapter 2: 
An Ambiguity in Plato: the Changing of the Essence1 of Truth
The great inception of Western philosophy culminated with the thought of Plato and 
Aristotle. Between them, they defined the horizon, according to Heidegger, for all subsequent 
philosophical and, more broadly, “cultural” developments in the West. But nevertheless Plato 
and Aristotle, for him, already mark a falling away from their origins. What determined the 
history of die West was not the inception of thinking in its originariness, but in its decline. 
Restricting our view for the time being, we shall examine how this falling away from the 
inception took place, and the sense in which it was determinative for the history of the West, 
by focusing on Heidegger’s discussion of Plato’s philosophy in his famous essay Platons 
Lehre von der Wahrheit.
In this essay Heidegger presents an interpretation of Plato’s so called simile of the 
cave.3 In the first place it should be pointed out that with this simile, Plato is, explicidy at 
least, giving an account of muScto, meaning something like “education” (Heidegger claims 
that it is untranslatable), as he states right at the beginning of Book VII.4 The cave dweller 
who is led out of the cave corresponds to one who goes through a process of naiScla. The 
result is die seeing, or knowledge, of things as they really are, not just as they seem. In 
Heidegger’s view, this account of the concept of naiStia rests upon a certain way of 
conceiving truth, 'aAi^eta, unconcealment. It is clear that AXrjOaa and naibcla are, in Plato’s
1 One might initially wonder what Heidegger can possibly mean by a change in the essence of truth, 
since truth itself, one thinks, is always unchanging, even if oik wishes to claim that what is true 
changes in the course of history. At the very most what can change is the way in which truth is 
understood, or the way in which truth is implicitly or explicitly conceptualised. But this would be to 
take Heidegger’s usage of essence [Wesen] to mean the same as essentia. And this would be 
erroneous. For Wesen, for Heidegger, is to be understood verbally, as the way in which truth, in this 
case, holds sway, that is: the way in which it is as truth. When he speaks of a change in the essence of 
truth, Heidegger is speaking of a historical change in the holding sway of truth, which is the same as to 
say, in the destiny of being itself. Nevertheless, for the sake of clarity we shall for the most part speak 
of a change in the understanding of truth. For, in any case, the way in which truth is understood and 
the way in which truth holds sway ultimately amount to the same thing.
2 In Wegmarken, pp. 203-238.
3 Republic VII, 514a, 2 -  517a, 7
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simile, intimately and essentially connected: natStia is described as a process involving 
fundamental changes in the way in which beings are unconcealed: the things taken to be real 
are at first merely shadows projected on the wall by the light of a fire, next they are things lit 
up by the light of the fire itself, and finally things revealed by the light of die sun; and thus in 
the sorts of things that can appear: first the shadows, then the things of which they are 
shadows, then the fire, then real things, and finally the sun itself. Indeed, Plato’s simile is 
only decipherable on the presupposition that truth is to be understood in terms of 
unconcealment, and only then does something like the image of a cave become structurally 
possible: ‘Uberhaupt kann dieses “Gleichnis” nur deshalb ein auf den Anblick der HOhle 
gebautes “Gleichnis” sein, weil es im voraus von der fbr die Griechen selbstverstdndlichen 
Grunderfahrung der ’aX-qdtia, der Unverborgenheit des Seienden, mitbestimmt wird. ’5
However, Heidegger claims that Plato’s simile introduces a subtle modification into 
the basic understanding of truth as unconcealment, a change, which, although barely 
perceptible, had the deepest ramifications for die subsequent thinking of the West. This 
change fundamentally hinges on Plato’s concepts of etSos and ffica. EtSos (from etSco, to see, 
Latin, vi-deo) means that which is seen, a form, a shape, a figure. 7Sca, from which €?8os 
takes its root, i8, means the look of a thing, the outward or surface appearance. ‘t’Sta ist... der 
Anblick, den etwas bietet, das Aussehen, das es hat und gleichsam vor sich her zur Schau 
trflgt, fZSos.*6 Thus ctSos and 184fa have to do with the see-able-ness of that which is see-able, 
the visibility of that which is visible:
Im “Hohlengleichnis” entspringt die Kraft der Veranschaulichung nicht aus dem Bilde der 
Verschlossenheit des unterirdischen Gewdlbes und der Verhaftung in das Verschlossene, auch nicht 
aus dem Anblick des Offenen im Aufierhalb der HOhle. Die bildgebende Deutungskraft des 
“Gleichnisses” sammeh sich fhr Platon vielmehr in der Rolle des Feuers, des Feuerscheins und der 
Schatten, der Tageshelle, des Sonnenlichtes und der Sonne. Alles liegt am Scheinen des Erscheinenden 
und an der ErmOglichung seiner Sichtbarkeit. Die Unverborgenheit wird zwar in ihren verschiedenen 
Stufen genannt, aber sie wird nur daraufhin bedacht, wie sie das Erscheinende in seinem Aussehen 
(f?8os) zug&nglich und dieses Sichzeigende (i&e'a) sichtbar macht. Die eigentliche Besinnung geht auf 
das in der Helle des Scheins gew&hrte Erscheinen des Aussehens. Dieses gibt die Aussicht auf das, als 
was jegliches Seiende anwest. Die eigentliche Besinnung gilt der ISt'a. Die “Idee” ist das die Aussicht 
in das Anwesende verleihende Aussehen.7
4 This discussion is, of course, embedded within a wider one that is ultimately political in bearing. 
Perhaps importantly, Heidegger completely ignores the political contextualisation of Plato’s simile of 
the cave.
5 Wegmarkert, p. 224
6 Grundfragen der Philosophie, p. 62
7 Wegmarken, p. 225
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Evidence for this can be found, for example, in the following passage in which 
Socrates is speaking of the man freed from his fetters, who, dragged out of the cave, is at first 
blinded by the light: ‘Then there would be need of habituation, 1 take it, to enable him to see 
the things higher up. And at first he would most easily discern the shadows and, after that, 
the likenesses or reflections in water of men and other things, and later, the things themselves, 
and from these he would go on to contemplate the appearances in the heavens and heaven 
itself more easily by night, looking at the light of die stars and the moon, than by day the sun 
and the sun's light. ' 8
The focus of this passage is on not the degree of unconcealment as such that is 
brought about by the exit from the cave, but rather on the visibility of the things themselves 
revealed in this unconcealment, their visible appearance, what the former prisoner can see, 
even though it is precisely the degree of unconcealment that determines in advance the 
visibility of the things.
Fundamentally, this is the meaning of the sun as the image for the form that gives 
reality to all forms: t o  ayaOov. The sun, as the source of light, is, of course, that which 
determines the highest unconcealedness, that in reference to which unconcealedness as such is 
to be understood.9 But in so far as the sun is the source of light, that which gives visibility to 
everything that it shines upon, unconcealment here is to be understood in terms of the 
becoming visible of things, that is, in terms of Ibta. Fundamentally, unconcealment, ’aXrjOeia, 
is, after Plato, to be understood in terms o f visibility, seeing: ‘ “Unverborgenheit” meint jetzt 
das Unverborgene stets als das durch die Scheinsamkeit der Idee Zugdngliche. Sofem aber 
der Zugang notwendig durch ein “Sehen” vollzogen wird, ist die Unverborgenheit in die 
“Relation’’ zum Sehen eingespannt, “relativ” auf dieses. ’ 10 To drop the metaphor, in Plato’s 
metaphysics, it is the idea of the “good” that is the source of all that is seen: ‘in the region of 
the known the last filing to be seen and hardly seen is the idea of good, and that when seen it 
must needs point us to the conclusion that this is indeed the cause for all things of all that is 
right [6pda>v] and beautiful, giving birth in the visible world to light, and the author of light 
and itself in the intelligible world’ . 11
Insofar as it is the IBta that determines unconcealment, Plato attributes to it a priority 
over ’aArjdcia. This determines a shift in the understanding of truth, whereby unconcealment 
ceases to be grasped as its fundamental determination. Instead, since the possibility of our 
apprehension of beings is now to be understood, not in terms of their unconcealment as such,
* Republic VII, 516a, 5 -  516b, 2
9 Likewise, the idea of the good is to be understood as being the source of all knowledge: ‘This reality, 
then, that gives their truth to the objects of knowledge and the power of knowing to the knower, you 
must say is the idea of good, and you must conceive it as being the cause of knowledge, and of truth in 
so far as known.’ Republic VI, 508e, 1 -  508e, 3
10 Wegmarken, p. 226
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but in terms of their visibility, in terms of the seeing of their visible form, the view that they 
offer, what comes to be understood as the fundamental determination of truth is die adequate 
or correct seeing of diem -  opdorrfs. In Plato's simile, what is essentially important for 
naiBtia is the securing of the possibility of this correct seeing. The journey out of the cave is 
not to be understood primarily in terms of the progressive unfolding of unconcealment, but 
rather in terms of the becoming more correct of the seeing of die former prisoner, whereby the 
respective things that he takes to be real become realer, that is, more in being. Further, the 
centrality of the concept of opdonjs explains Plato's emphasis on the necessity that the eyes of 
the released prisoner adapt themselves to the particular level of unconcealment in order to see 
or identify properly the things that surround him. This adaptation is the conforming to the 
thing of the seeing, which thereby becomes correct. ‘Zufolge dieser Angleichung des 
Vemehmens als eines IfeTv an die tSca besteht eine opoiwois, eine Obereinstimmung des 
Erkennens mit der Sache selbst. So entspringt aus dem Vorrang der iSca und des IScTv vor der 
’aXrfdeia eine Wandlung des Wesens der Wahrheit. Wahrheit wird zur 6p66rr)sy zur 
Richtigkeit des Vemehmens und Aussagens. ' 12
The possibility of this change in the essence of truth rests upon an ambiguity in 
Plato's thinking. While he speaks of aAi/feta, he understands unconcealment in terms of 
visibility, that is, in relation to the eyes, and thus it is the correctness of die seeing rather than 
unconcealment as such that it implicitly understood to be what is most essential to the 
determination of truth. The ambiguity consists in the fact that ’aArjdeia is understood both in 
terms of unconcealment (visibility) and in terms of correctness, in so far as the particular 
determination of correctness, appropriately adjusted seeing, is grounded in unconcealment as 
visibility. The exposition of the levels of unconcealment is throughout determined according 
to the visible form of things, and consequently according to the correctness of the gaze. We 
can see the ambiguity manifest clearly in the quote above [Republic VII, 517b, 8  -  c, 3] where 
the idea, or form, of die good is said to be both the cause of all that is 6p6<bv (translated by 
Paul Shorey as “right”, but in the sense of right-ness {“Richt-ig-keit”), the correctness of 
knowing), and of light, of the unconcealment of things as such. Truth, grounded in the form 
of all forms, is here, at one and die same time, both unconcealment and correctness, although 
correctness already has the priority in the determination of the way in which it holds sway.
It is precisely the presence of this ambiguity that allows the change in the essence of 
truth to take place. Perhaps the most fundamental aspect of this change is the shift in the 
locus of truth: conceived in terms of unconcealment, truth is a basic trait of things
11 Republic VII, 517b, 8  -  c, 3
12 Wegmarken, pp. 230-31
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themselves13; as the correctness of die gaze it is located on the side of the human 
comportment This conception finds its first clear expression in Aristotle who writes in Book 
VI of the Metaphysics: Tor falsehood and truth are not in actual things... but in thought'14. 
Thus judgement or assertion becomes die locus of truth, which is subsequently determined 
according to whether the judgement or assertion conforms, accords or corresponds with the 
object or state of affairs that it purports to be about; if so, it is correct, if not, it is false. 
Unconcealment, die emergence into presence, has completely dropped out of the picture for 
this determination of truth, it has retreated into oblivion, forgottenness, concealment, and 
truth is understood entirely without recourse to it. The essence of truth has decisively 
changed. 13
Essentially connected to the changing of the understanding of truth is a corresponding 
change in the Hellenic understanding of being. We have seen how intimately being as <f>vats 
is entwined with truth as aXrfdeia. Plato understands being in terms of t'Sca, more precisely, in 
terms of i? i&ca rov ayadou, die form of the good, and die ambiguity in his understanding of 
truth cannot be divorced from this particular understanding of being. The difference between 
understanding being as <f>vois on the one hand and as 184a on the other is fundamental:
<Pvois ist das aufgehende Walten, das In-sich-dastehen, ist Standigkeit IBta, Aussehen als 
das Gesichtete, ist eine Bestimmung des St&ndigen, sofem es und nur sofem es einem Sehen 
entgegensteht Aber als aufgehendes Walten ist doch auch schon ein Erscheinen. Allerdings. 
Nur ist das Erscheinen doppeldeutig. Erscheinen besagt einmal: das sich sammelnde, in der 
Gesammehheit Sich-zura-Stand-bringen und so Stehen. Dann aber heiBt Erscheinen: als schon Da- 
stehendes eine Vorderfl&che, Oberflache darbieten, ein Aussehen als Angebot fur das Hinsehen. 16
13 ‘Die ’oAijfoia ist fur die Griechen eine, ja die Grundbestimmung des Seienden selbst’. [Grundfragen 
der Philosophies 130]
14 Metaphysics E, 4 ,1027b, 25
15 It might be wondered how much the supposed change in the implicit understanding of truth testified 
by Plato’s parable hangs on what is allegedly its key theme: naiSeia, education. Does not the 
possibility of a process of education essentially require that truth be conceived in terms of correctness? 
Is not the process of education precisely that of routing falsehood and cultivating correctness? At least 
for Plato, this is not the case. For his simile does not have to do with correctness and falsity, but 
merely with the progressive unfolding of degrees of reality, both as a consequence of taking up, 
literally, a higher standpoint and of the adaptation of the eyes, the cognitive faculty. What the 
prisoners see (shadows) is nothing false, but rather something with only a marginal degree of reality. 
They see the shadows correctly after all, and even have competitions and honours for he ‘who is 
quickest to make out the shadows as they pass and best able to remember their customary precedences, 
sequences and coexistences, and so most successful in guessing at what was to come’ [516c 8  -  d 2 ]. 
As far as nath*(a is concerned, the simile has to do with the progressive unfolding of the 
unconcealment of reality as such. In which case Heidegger’s claim does not seem to hang on the 
central place accorded to iraiSela. For him, Plato’s process of naiSda has finally to do with a change in 
the essence of the human. Later we shall see that this change means entering into the unconcealment of 
being as such.
16 Einftihrung in die Metaphysik, p. 139
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For Plato the fundamental determination of being as «Sca is see-able-ness. ‘Die Idee 
ist das Gesicht, wodurch jeweils etwas sein Aussehen zeigt, uns ansieht... Aus diesem 
Aussehen her sieht es uns an.* 17 This corresponds to the determination of truth as correctness 
in so far as see-able-ness grounds the normativity of an adequate seeing, a seeing that 
conforms to that which it sees. Adjustment to the light and adjustment to the dark, metaphors 
determined according to being as see-able-ness, are necessary in order that man perceive the 
things as they are, no matter for the degree of their being.
Heidegger claims that something fundamental has changed here concerning the 
understanding of both truth and being. One might wonder, however, whether that really is so, 
and whether Plato has not merely refined the understanding of truth as unconcealment; made 
it more precise by determining it in terms of visibility, and provided it with an explanation. 
But for Heidegger, Plato’s attempt to identify a source of unconcealment -  at the forms, 
more precisely, the form of the good -  marks a radical displacement away from the inceptual 
questioning at the origin of philosophy. On the one hand, shifting the terms across, being is 
no longer the process of unconcealment itself; it is now the ground of it. On the other hand, 
shifting them back again, Plato has here attempted to explain being as such in terms o f beings. 
By doing this he establishes what Heidegger calls a priority [Vorrang] of beings over being. 
This determines beings to be the proper objects of philosophical thought; at the origin of 
philosophy it was being itself understood in terms of <t>vots, which was the matter for 
thinking. Thus Plato inaugurates a forgottenness of being [Seinsvergessenheit]. As we shall 
see, Seinsvergessenheit subsequently holds sway over the entire history of the West.
Plato attempts to explain unconcealment in terms of beings, determining being as see- 
able-ness and inaugurating die implicit understanding of the essence of truth in terms of the 
correctness of die gaze. In doing this Plato disperses the elements which once comprised the 
inceptual understanding of being: <f>vois, aXrjdfta and A6yos. These three, <f>vots as emerging 
sway, aArjdcta as unconcealment and Aoyos as gathering putting-forth, all arise from the same 
experience. But once being is understood as see-able-ness and truth is understood as 
correctness, subjectivity is introduced, which amounts to the falling away of the inceptual 
sense of Aoyos. Subjectivity is that which stands across and opposed to beings determined in 
their being as see-able. Subjectivity is that which sees. The three elements that once formed 
a simple unity are dispersed, for see-able-ness, correctness and subjectivity say not at all the 
same thing. This is apparent from the fact that truth as correctness is understood in terms of a 
relation of conformance or correspondence between subjectivity and beings. To this
17 Was Heift Denken?, p. 135
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dispersion of truth, subjectivity and being belongs essentially the forgetting of being as such -  
die inceptual unity of them all.
The change in the essence of truth from unconcealment to correctness marks a 
fundamental event in the history of being: it inaugurates the epoch of metaphysics, which 
endures fundamentally unchanged in its essence throughout Occidental history until its 
essential culmination [Vollendung] in Nietzsche’s philosophy. Metaphysical thinking is 
wholly grounded upon the understanding of truth in terms of correctness. What is decisive 
for the history of being is that the particular understanding of being corresponding to the 
reinterpretation of truth in terms of correctness thematises being as such only in terms of 
beings (e.g. Plato’s forms), which amounts to saying that it replaces being as such with beings 
as causes, higher beings}1 The understanding of being in terms of beings -  in terms of t'Sca -  
becomes the sole and definitive understanding of being remaining thenceforth determinative 
throughout the history of the West, even up until Hegel, who explicidy conceives being, the 
actuality of the actual, as “idea”.
Whilst die transformations of these original Greek concepts are all mutually 
implicatory, Heidegger insists that it is the change in the essence of truth that is most 
fundamental of all: ‘Der Wandel von <j>vois und A oyos zu Idee und Aussage hat seinen inneren 
Grund in einem Wandel des Wesens der Wahrheit als Unverborgenheit zur Wahrheit als 
Richtigkeit. ’ 19 Only once the remainder of Heidegger’s philosophical architecture is in place 
will the meaning of this claim become transparent.
At this point we should mention Heidegger’s famous “retraction” of his essay on 
Plato’s doctrine of truth. In Das Ende der Philosophic und die Aufgabe des Denkens (first 
published in French in 1964) Heidegger writes:
Der natiirliche Begrifif von Wahrheit meint nicht Unverborgenheit, auch nicht in der 
Philosophie der Griechen. Man weist Offer und mit Recht darauf hin, daft schon bei Homer das Wort 
aXt)d*s immer nur von den verba dicendi, vom Aussagen und deshalb im Sinne der Richtigkeit und 
Verl&filichkeh gebraucht werde, nicht im Sinne von Unverborgenheit. Allein dieser Hinweis bedeutet 
zun&chst nur, dab weder die Dichter noch der allt&gliche Sprachgebrauch, daB nicht einmal die 
Philosophie sich vor die Aufgabe gestelh sehen zu fragen, inwiefem die Wahrheit, d. h. die Richtigkeit 
der Aussage nur im Element der Lichtung von Anwesenheit gewtthrt bleibt
18 To this extent, following Plato in attempting to identify a source of unconcealment, metaphysical 
thinking is essentially theological. ‘Die Metaphysik ist in sich Theologie.’ [Nietzsche //, p. 313] For 
an extended discussion of this implication see Die Onto-theo-logische Verfassung der Metaphysik, 
Jdentitdt und Differem.
19 Einfuhrung in die Metaphysik, p. 145
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Im Gesichtskreis dieser Frage muB anerkannt werden, daB die AAr/dtui, die Unverborgenheit 
im Sinne der Lichtung von Anwesenheit sogleich und nur als opOorris, als die Richtigkeit des 
Vorstellens und Aussagens erfahren wurde. Dann ist aber auch die Behauptung von einem 
Wesenswandel der Wahrheit, d. h. von der Unverborgenheit zur Richtigkeit, nicht haltbar20
This statement should be read against the context of Heidegger’s well-known dispute 
over Plato’s understanding of truth with the German classicist Paul FriedlBnder.21 Aside from 
etymological issues (which will not concern us here), Friedlflnder points out that aXrjdeia was 
being used in the sense of the correctness of utterance much earlier than Plato, for example, 
already in Homer, and that therefore it cannot be the case that Plato somehow introduced this 
new understanding of truth. Heidegger’s statement here is commonly taken by commentators 
to be a simple retraction of his essay. But how much of a retraction is it?
In the first place it should be noted that Heidegger is only discussing the “natural” 
usage of the concept of truth. In regard to the Greeks, he points out that the fact that this 
concept was not used in the sense of unconcealment proves only that everyday usage, poets 
and even philosophers had failed to see that die correctness of the assertion is only possible 
given the clearing of presence, that is, unconcealment. Nevertheless he maintains that 
unconcealment as such was experienced; he claims, for example, a few pages earlier: 
‘Parmenides [muBte] erfahren: die AArjOcta, die Unverborgenheit. ’22 This experience is, after 
all, fossilised in the Greek language. But it was experienced immediately and only in terms 
of truth as correctness. The claim, then, that before Plato the Greeks understood truth in 
terms of unconcealment and after Plato in terms of the correctness of assertion, the claim that 
the essence of truth went through a chronological transmutation, must in consequence be 
false. But was this the claim that Heidegger wanted to make in his essay on Plato’s doctrine 
of truth?
Only a superficial reading would suggest the chronological account; on closer 
analysis, Heidegger’s text is drawing attention to a structural ambiguity within Plato’s 
ontology; and not just any ambiguity, but one essential to the conceptuality he employs. 
Rather than chronologically, Heidegger’s essay is to be understood structurally; and 
consequently, Heidegger’s supposed retraction turns out only to concern a particular and 
superficial reading of his text. The primary focus of Heidegger’s essay is the way in which 
truth understood as unconcealment essentially transmutes into truth as correctness, that is, the 
way in which unconcealment is inherently prone to fall out of its essence, not the
20 Zur Sache des Denkens, pp. 77-78
21 See his Platon, and for an overview of the debate see Bemasconi’s The Question of Language in 
Heidegger's History of Being, pp. 19-23.
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identification of a precise historical moment in which this took place. The change is a 
structural transfiguration; not a chronological metamorphosis. Thus Heidegger can write:
Platons Lehre von der “Wahrheit” ist nichts Vergangenes Sie ist geschichtliche 
“Gegenwart”, dies aber nicht nur als historisch nachgerechnete “Nachwirkung” eines Lehrstiickes, auch 
nicht als Wiedererweckung, auch nicht als Nachahmung des Alterums, auch nicht als bloBe Bewahrung 
des Oberkommenen. Jener Wandel des Wesens der Wahrheit ist gegenwfirtig als die 1 angst gefestigte 
und daher noch unverruckte, alles durchherrschende Grundwirklichkeit der in ihre neueste Neuzeit 
anrollenden Weltgeschichte des Erdballs 23
Of course there is nevertheless a reason for tracing out this essential transfiguration of 
truth within the philosophy of Plato. On the one hand, Plato stood close enough to the 
wonderful eruption of die first beginning to still catch a faint echo of the original experience 
of unconcealment -  die experience with which history begins. Although not unambiguously, 
not unadulteratedly, for him, this was still the meaning of ’aX^Oeia. On the other hand, it was 
Plato’s conception of being, decisive for all subsequent Western history, upon which the 
transformation of truth hinges, and to which it owes its ensconcing, its entrenchment. 
Heidegger writes: ‘Der Wandel selbst vollzieht sich in der Bestimmung des Seins des 
Seienden...als ISea. ’24 And: ‘Indem Platon von der ISea sagt, sie sei die Herrin, die 
Unverborgenheit zulasse, verweist er in ein Ungesagtes, dafi nSmlich fortan sich das Wesen 
der Wahrheit nicht als das Wesen der Unverborgenheit aus eigener WesensfUlle entfaltet, 
sondem sich auf das Wesen der i8ta verlagert. ’25 If we are to speak of a chronological 
transmutation occurring through the work of Plato, then we must refer to his determination of 
being as i&*a. For it was with this determination that what Heidegger will call onto-theology 
begins, which was hitherto unknown: the attempt to explain being in terms of beings. Indeed, 
this transmutation amounts to an evagination. Whilst for the pre-Socratics, unconcealment as 
such, ’aXrjdfia, was the ground of possible visibility, for Plato, the visibility of something, 
ISta, first makes its unconcealment possible. But as such it concerns a happening of the 
fundamental structurality of being, the structural unfolding of being itself which is not at all 
“in” history but which rather first gives history its basic determination, and thus no mere 
chronologically definable event.26
22 Zur Sache des Denkens, p. 75
23 Wegmarken, p. 237
24 Wegmarken, p. 233
23 Wegmarken, p. 230
26 We are in substantial agreement with Caputo on this issue of Heidegger’s supposed retraction. See 
his Demythologizing Heidegger, pp. 23/
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It might seem extraordinary that Heidegger places so much philosophical weight on a 
single allegory. Why should we take it to be paradigmatic for Plato’s philosophy as a whole, 
or, at any rate, for the theory of forms? Is it not perhaps a fortunate coincidence that visibility 
plays such a decisive role here? Could Plato not perhaps have made his philosophical point 
by means of an allegory that did not employ such a notion?
Heidegger might have responded to such worries by pointing out that they miss the 
import of his interpretation. It is not the case that he is concerned to convict Plato of 
propounding through a single apologue a particular metaphysical theory employing 
ungrounded and problematical conceptions of being and truth, which hold for his philosophy 
as a whole; that is, Heidegger is not, or at least not simply, taking Plato’s simile to be 
paradigmatic of his drought as a whole; rather he is taking it to be symptomatic of Plato’s 
thought as a whole. For the conformation of the simile of the cave is only possible given the 
tectonic of Plato’s basic metaphysical picture; this is to say that Plato’s thinking constitutively 
implicates an ambiguity in its concept of truth.
Further, it is not the case drat the simile only contingendy employs the notion of 
visibility, as Plato’s basic ontological vocabulary attests. The metaphor works so well 
precisely because Plato’s metaphysic already employs visional concepts: etSos and I8ea. 
Indeed, in an important sense there is no metaphor involved here, at least not in the same way 
as is involved in the other similes to be found in the Republic. Plato merely retells the 
metaphysical story in a greater degree of concreteness. We only have to realign the levels, to 
shift the captives in the cave into the position of those who perceive things in the light of the 
sun, to get the metaphysical story itself.
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Chapter 3: 
The Epoch of Metaphysics
The majority of commentators have taken the meaning of metaphysics in Heidegger's 
sense to be something essentially determined and understood historically. But for us this is 
not so. Our aim here is not to present a historical account of the epoch in the history of being 
which Heidegger characterises as metaphysical, our interest is not in the details of the 
succession of metaphysical thinkers, for example; our aim is rather to determine die structure 
of the essential categorial constellation of this epoch, that structurality which defines the 
thinking of all metaphysical thinkers in so far as they are metaphysical. But this is not to say 
that we take metaphysics to be merely defined in terms of a particular structure of thinking, as 
many other commentators do. For die determination of metaphysical thinking is itself to be 
grounded in something utterly primordial: a basic structural possibility of being itself.
Heidegger characterises what he calls the epoch of metaphysics in three fundamental, 
contrasting but interrelated ways: firsdy, as the epoch in which truth as correctness reigns -  
coupled together with a misunderstanding of die being of man; secondly, as the epoch of the 
forgottenness of being [Seinsvergessenheit]; thirdly, as the historical epoch which comes to its 
essential fulfilment in the development of modem science and, more importantly for our 
concerns, modem technology. The first of these amounts to a particular conception or 
understanding of die relation between man and being; the second, to die characterisation of 
this relation as such; the third, to the analysis of their essential historical manifestations. In 
this chapter we shall deal only with the first two, reserving an exposition of Heidegger’s 
thinking concerning technology for the following chapter.
The epoch of metaphysics begins with a change in the way in which truth holds sway; 
over two millennia later it has reached its essential fulfilment or culmination [ Vollendung], it 
has exhausted the historical possibilities structurally available to it, but this does not mean it 
has reached its end.
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Truth, Time, and the Being of Man
Metaphysics, in Heidegger’s sense, can be in the first place characterised as a 
particular conception of the relation that holds between man and beings. Truth is the name of 
this relation, and therefore metaphysics, in Heidegger’s sense, is to be initially understood in 
terms of a particular conception of truth. We have already seen how a particular conception 
of truth corresponds to a particular conception of being. 1 In so far as a particular conception 
of truth corresponds to a particular conception of being, and in so far as truth is the relation of 
man to beings, a particular conception of truth also corresponds to a particular conception of 
man. Finally, in so far as truth corresponds to a particular conception of being, and Heidegger 
determines time to be the horizon of any possible understanding of being, a particular 
conception of truth must also correspond to a particular conception of time. It is this 
constellation of interrelated conceptions -  which are in a certain sense mis-conceptions -  of 
truth, being, man, and time that forms the core o f and horizon for, what Heidegger calls 
‘‘metaphysical dunking”. It should be stressed at the outset that these misconceptions are not 
limited to the familiar history of philosophy; rather, in so far as they involve categories basic 
to all human dealings with the world, they pervade and determine all forms of human 
comportment and understanding, all modes in which human beings relate to beings, 
throughout an entire historical epoch, from ancient Greece to the modem Western world.
We saw ’aXrjdeia, the original determination of truth, fall away from its inceptual 
sense, testified by an ambiguity in Plato’s theory of forms, to become understood in terms of 
the correctness of the gaze. This conception of truth crucially implies a relation, in a way in 
which the original determination does not, a relation conceived in terms of the 
“correspondence”, or “agreement” pertaining between a matter, state of affairs, or object and 
a drought, judgement, proposition about or in some sense directed or orientated towards it 
(sich richten nach). The familiar definition of truth that supports the tradition is thus 
formulated: veritas est adaequatio intellectus ad rent. Truth is die correspondence of the 
intellect to the thing. If  and only if, the intellect in actual fact does correspond to the thing -  
that is, if what it purports to say, think, etc., about the thing really does accord with the thing 
- , then the intellect has die property of being true. Truth in this sense belongs to the side of 
the human comportment. In so far as it is paradigmatically in propositions that the intellect is 
related to things, truth in this sense is often referred to as propositional truth, and understood 
to be intrinsically linguistic. The property of being true belongs to propositions. 
“Correctness” is the name of the particular relation of correspondence that holds between true 
propositions and things. A proposition is correct if it states how it really is with things. The
1 Heidegger states this explicitly as early as Sein und Zeit §44: ‘fur die Aufkl&rung der 
Wahrheitsstruktur gemigt es nicht, dieses Beziehungsganze einfach vorauszusetzen, sondern es muB in 
den Seinszusammenhang zuruckgefragt werden, der dieses Ganze als solches tr&gt.’ [P. 216]
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diametric opposite of correctness is falsity. This conception of truth as prepositional 
correctness is the one basically definitive of metaphysics, and is that in which all other 
determinations of metaphysical thinking are grounded.
The traditional problem of truth, which is at the same time the central philosophical 
problematic of metaphysical thinking as such, concerns the way in which the relation that 
pertains to this determination of truth as correctness should be understood. How exactly is 
the intellect supposed to “correspond” to the thing? The two are, after all, very different sorts 
of things. The epistemological problematics that form the core of modem philosophy are 
perhaps best seen as rooted in the obscurity of this relation. In Einfuhrung in die Metaphysik 
Heidegger places it between being and thinking, and describes it as that in which ‘wir 
miissen...jene Grundstellung des Geistes des Abendlandes erkennen’2. The “division” 
[Scheidung] between being and thinking corresponding to this relational conception of truth 
is, for him, the historically necessary and essentially determining ground of the history of the 
West, prepared already in the inception of philosophy in ancient Greece, and reaching its 
fulfilment in the epistemological thinking that has dominated philosophy since Descartes. It 
has essential consequences for the ways in which being and man are respectively understood, 
and makes man's history, conceived as the history of the relation between man and beings, 
first possible. 4 Art und Richtung des Gegensatzes von Sein und Denken sind... so einzigartig, 
weil hier der Mensch dem Sein ins Angesicht tritt. Dieses Geschehnis ist die wissende 
Erscheinung des Menschen als des geschichtlichen. ’3
The cleavage of being and thinking distends historically at that moment in which 
being is interpreted as ISta, and no longer as <f>vcns. The originary connection of <f>vois and 
Xoyos is sundered and Xoyos loses its inceptual sense. In accordance with the essence of truth 
as correctness -  within the relationality of which, the scission of being and thinking 
outspreads -  it comes to be understood in terms of assertion, as that which stands over 
against, across from beings, relating to them in their visual presence. Truth as correctness is 
the correctness of assertion, and thus becomes a property of Xoyos -  a very different nexus to 
that original bond which united Xoyos and aA^feia; Xoyos is no longer the gathering together 
that puts forth into unconcealment, into presence. Being itself comes to be determined from 
the perspective of assertion and ultimately in terms of the modem concept of rationality4; and 
correspondingly, Xoyos becomes “externalised” as the “faculty” of reason. This grounds a
2 EinfUhrung in die Metaphysik, p. 89
3 Einfuhrung in die Metaphysik, p. 108
4 Again the importance for this process of the translation of Xoyos into ratio by the Romans should not 
be understated.
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subservience of being to Xoyos'. on the basis of Xoyos as assertion, being becomes determined 
according to categories, Karr/yopiat5, which delimit all the possibilities of being as such.
The severance of being and thinking determines being to be understood as that which 
stands over and against thinking, that which is re-presented by thinking In so far as Xoyos 
comes to mean assertion, beings come to be understood in terms of die categories of the 
object, grounded ultimately in the Platonic understanding of being as tSe'a, the objectivity of 
objects consisting precisely in their offering of a view, of a visible form.
The object offers a view to die subject, the subiectum. This word, according to 
Heidegger, must be understood as a translation of the Greek mroKtipevov (meaning that which 
underlies, the ground which gathers something upon it). The subject, which directly 
corresponds to die interpretation of being in terms of the object, grounded in the cleaving of 
being and thinking that is rooted in the relational conception of truth, is to be understood as 
that interpretation of the being of man that is essential to die constellation of the categories of 
metaphysical thinking. This understanding of die being of man lies at die ground of that 
locution which entities man the rational animal and of the modem notion of reason, which 
determines the subservience of being to man. For as subject, man is that being in reference to 
which the being of all other beings conceived in terms of objects is determined, that before 
which beings must stand in order that they be beings; for being as the objectivity of objects is 
being as Vor-gestelltheit.
The object is re-presented by the subject. This relation is necessarily conceived as an 
epistemological relation, that is -  and this will turn out to be crucial -, one concerned with the 
theoretical knowledge of objects: the metaphysical subject is essentially detached from any 
practical involvement with things in the world. Accounting for this theoretical knowledge of 
objects and determining its scope and limits, its certainty7, becomes the fundamental task of 
modem metaphysics, which is thus to be understood as essentially epistemology. Strung 
between the obverse poles of the epistemological relation, competing idealisms and realisms 
respectively collapse objectivity into subjectivity and subjectivity into objectivity, whilst 
leaving the basic categorial scheme of subject and object itself necessarily uninterrogated.
Intrinsically connected to this epistemological understanding of the relation of man to 
being is the metaphysical conception of the phenomenon of time. As Heidegger writes: ‘Die
5 From KdTTfyofHw, which originally meant “to signify”, “to indicate”, “to prove”, in which Heidegger 
finds the meaning “to assert”.
6 From obiectus, a placing against, putting opposite. Cf. also the etymologically equivalent German 
Gegen-stand, literally that which stands against.
7 Heidegger sometimes characterises the metaphysical concept of truth primarily in terms of certainty 
[Gewissheit] (see, for example, Nietzsche II, pp. 383-391). The relation of certainty to correctness is 
manifest very clearly in the metaphysical philosophy of Descartes, where the method of doubt is used 
to vet the certainty of beliefs. Certainty is understood as the “subjective” determination of the 
“objective” relation of correctness, anything that is a certainty is thereby also a truth.
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Geschichte des Seins ist in der Epoche der Metaphysik von einem ungedachten Wesen der 
Zeit durchwaltet’8 The centrality of this thought to Heidegger’s philosophy cannot be over­
emphasised, for it is only on the basis of a re-consideration of the phenomenon of time that 
that fundamental event in the history of being can take place which is the raising of the 
question of being.
This re-consideration of the phenomenon of time is exposited in the second division 
of Sein und Zeit, where Heidegger develops a phenomenologically grounded existential 
hermeneutic of primordial temporality. That which Heidegger calls the “vulgar” 
understanding of time, which is at the same time its metaphysical determination, is shown to 
be the result of an essential distortion of primordial temporality. For the vulgar 
understanding, time is to be interpreted as a succession or series of extant “nows”. This view 
finds its first formulation in Aristotle, whose thematisation of the phenomenon remains 
decisive for all subsequent philosophical -  that is, metaphysical -  treatments.
Aristotle’s account of time is encapsulated in the following: Tor that is what time is: 
number of change in respect of the before and after. ’9 For Aristotle, time is essentially 
connected with motion (change, including change of place). It is not the same thing as 
motion, however, even though time also does not exist without motion; rather, it is connected 
with motion in so far as it determines motion quantitatively, in so far as it determines motion 
with respect to the possibility that it can be enumerated, counted, in respect of which it has a 
number. Clearly, the interpretation of time as the enumerability of motion is only possible as 
the interpretation of time on the basis of the now, t o  w ,  for the nows just are those things 
that are counted in so far as motion is enumerated in connection with time. Aristotle writes: 
‘It is the now that measures time, considered as before and after. [...] The now is the before 
and after, considered as countable. [...] Time is the number of the motion, and the now 
is... like a unit of number. ’ 10
The now, for Aristotle, also makes possible the continuity of time, that is, its unity, 
which consists of a continuous sequence of nows. Time is continuous ‘for it is a number of 
what is continuous’11, namely, die now. All the determinations of time, all modes of past, 
present and future, earlier and later, before and after, Aristotle wants to claim, are essentially 
related to and determined by the now. The temporal dimension of the future is conceived 
merely as the not-yet-now, and that of the past as the no-longer-now. Time is thus a 
unidirectional, that is, irreversible, succession of nows. ‘Die Zeit, wie sie Aristoteles 
herausstellt und wie sie dem gemeinen BewuBtsein bekannt ist, ist eine Abfolge der Jetzt aus
* Einleitung zu: “Was ist Metaphysik?”, Wegmarken, p. 377
9 Physics, A, 11,219b 1
10 Physics, A, 11,219b \2ff
n Physics, A, 11, 219b 25
30
dem Jetzt-noch-nicht in das Jetzt-nicht-mehr, eine Abfolge der Jetzt, die keine beliebige ist, 
sondem in sich die Richtung aus der Zukunft in die Vergangenheit hat. ’ 12
On this model, time, and each of the successive nows that constitute it, is understood 
to exist as objectively present for a theoretical gaze, something that is in being in much the 
same way perhaps as an objectively present ruler with its marks of measurement. This is the 
essence of “clock-time”, time determined according to the circular movement of a pointer 
around a face, on which the nows are counted out in advance. According to this model: ‘Die 
Jetzt sind...als freischwebenend, bezuglos, in sich selbst aneinandergeklammeTt und in sich 
selbst abfolgend gedacht. ’ 13 Crucially this conception overlooks two particular characteristics 
of time, which Heidegger grounds phenomenologically: its significance and its datability.
Significance here can be briefly characterised as that property of time which grounds 
die possibility that utterances such as ‘it is the right time to ...\  or, ‘he arrived at the wrong 
time for... etc, make sense; that is, that time can be appropriate or inappropriate for certain 
actions, incidents, states of affairs, etc. ‘Die Zeit als rechte Zeit und Unzeit hat den Charakter 
der Bedeutsamkeit. ’14 This concept of significance is grounded in the phenomenological 
exposition of Heidegger's concept of world, upon which the entire existential analysis of 
Dasein offered in Sein und Zeit rests. It is discussed in detail below.
The datability of time consists in the fact that to every now belongs a “when”: ‘Wenn 
ich “jetzt” sage, sage ich immer unausgesprochen mit “jetzt, da das und das”. Wenn ich 
“dann” sage, meine ich immer “dann, wann”. Wenn ich “damals” sage, meine ich “damals, 
als”. Zu jedem Jetzt gehdrt ein “da”: jetzt, da das und das. Wir bezeichnen diese 
Bezugsstrucktur des Jetzt als Jetzt-da, des Damals als Damals-als und des Dann als Dann- 
wann als die Datierbarkeit. Jedes Jetzt datiert sich als “jetzt, da das und das passiert, 
geschieht oder besteht” . ’ 15
The common conception of time, which means at the same time the Aristotelian 
conception, is not able to incorporate these notions of significance and datability. ‘In der 
vulgfiren Auslegung der Zeit als Jetzt-folge fehlt sowohl die Datierbarkeit als auch die 
Bedeutsamkeit. Die Charakteristik der Zeit als pures Nacheinander l&fit beide Strukturen 
nicht “zum Vorschein kommen”. Die vulgdre Zeitauslegung verdeckt sie. ’ 16 This is because 
time as a succession of nows is ontologically conceived on the horizon of objective presence, 
that is, according to the categories of die object apprehended in the purely theoretical gaze of 
the subject, and these categories are essentially insufficient to ground the existential 
dimension in which something like the structures of significance and datability can first
12 Die Grvndprobleme der PhOnomenologie, p. 368
13 Die Grundjprobleme der PhOnomenologie, p. 371
14 Die Grundprobleme der PhOnomenologie, p. 370
15 Die Grundprobleme der PhOnomenologie, p. 370
16 Sein und Zeit, p. 422
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appear. Why does die common conception interpret time according to the categories of 
objective presence?
The common conception, which is not to be distinguished from the metaphysical 
conception, interprets the phenomenon of time according to the categories of objective 
presence because it interprets beings as a whole exclusively according to the categories of the 
object. It interprets beings exclusively according to the categories of die object because these 
are the only categories of being available to the metaphysical constellation of truth as 
correctness and subjectivity. The mode of being of the now is in this respect no different for 
metaphysical thinking than the mode of being of the numbers on the clock, or of the clock 
itself.
To anticipate our discussion of Sein und Zeit, we can at this point intimate that the 
metaphysical understanding of time essentially and necessarily fails to grasp die existential 
character of time, in which its significance and datability are grounded. This means at the 
same time that it fails to grasp the essentially existential character of man’s understanding of 
being, thereby fundamentally distorting the relation of man to being. Time, Heidegger will 
claim, is the ground of the possibility of existentiality as such, and is therefore the ground or 
horizon of this relation. Intrinsically connected to the non-existential-metaphysical 
understanding of time, and thus the radically non-existential-metaphysical understanding of 
die relation of man to being -  the subject-object relation is also the therein implicated 
radically non-existential characterisation of the being of man as rational subjectivity and the 
radically non-existential understanding of beings exclusively in terms of the categories of the 
object17
Seinsvergessenheit
Heidegger characterises the epoch of metaphysics as the epoch of Seinsvergessenheit, 
the epoch of die forgetting of being. Being is forgotten beneath a precedency of beings. 
What are we to understand by “Seinsvergessenheit*, and in what connection does it stand to 
metaphysical thinking?
Seinsvergessenheit is in fact the essence of metaphysical thinking. To see this it is 
necessary to examine more closely the metaphysical understanding of being and the way it 
first arises. We have seen how the rupture of being and thinking is essential to the structure 
of metaphysical thought and how, in accordance with the transformation of the essence of 
truth, the corresponding categories of object and subject ensue. The metaphysical
17 The relations of dependence here, between, for example, the interpretation of the being of man as 
subject and the vulgar interpretation of the being of time, are not an issue; as we have seen, all are
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understanding of being is grounded in the category of the object. It has two interrelated 
aspects. The first is as follows: according to the metaphysico-epistemological 
characterisation of the relation of man and being in terms of representation, the objectivity of 
die object -  objective presence -  is understood to consist in its Vorgestelltheit 
[“representedness” ] . 18 But Vorgestelltheit is a determination of what Heidegger calls 
“Vorhandenheit\  This concept, meaning something like being objectively available, 
objectively extant, will become a focal theme in the next part. It will suffice at this point 
merely to say that Vorhandenheit is the basic metaphysical determination of the beingness of 
beings. It determines the being of the subject just as much as the being of the object, and it 
also determines the being of the relation between them, although, for reasons we shall return 
to, it originally stems from the categories of the objectivity of the object.
The second aspect follows from this. Vorhandenheit is a determination always only 
of beings. Only beings can be extant in the sense of Vorhandenheit. Being as such is 
precisely never anything extant in this sense; it is never anything at all. This implies what 
Heidegger calls a “ Vorrang' [“priority”] of beings in metaphysical thinking.
Putting these two aspects together, in so far as metaphysics only ever understands die 
relation of man to being in terms of the subject-object relation, and in so far as this relation 
necessitates an understanding of the beingness of beings in terms of Vorhandenheit, which is 
only applicable to beings and never to being as such, the thinking of being as such is in 
principle not a possibility for metaphysical thinking. Being is forgotten. ‘Denkt die 
Metaphysik das Sein selbst? Nein und niemals. Sie denkt das Seiende hinsichtlich des Seins. 
Das Sein ist das zuerst und zuletzt Antwortende auf die Frage, in der stets das Seiende das 
Befragte bleibt. Das Sein ist als solches nicht das Befragte. Darum bleibt das Sein selbst in 
der Metaphysik ungedacht, und zwar nicht beil&ufig, sondem ihrem eigenen Fragen gemafi. ’ 19 
Put another way, in so far as the subject-object relationship is the only conception of the 
relation of man to being available to metaphysics, and given that the object is always 
conceived as a being, man can never be conceived to stand in a relation to being on the basis 
of which being itself might expressly be drawn into unconcealment. ‘Weil die Metaphysik 
das Seiende als das Seiende beffagt, bleibt sie beim Seienden und Kehrt sich nicht an das Sein 
als Sein. ’20 But why and how does this particular metaphysical understanding of being arise?
A satisfactory answer to this question can only be given after we have elucidated the 
existential analysis of Dasein in Sein und Zeit. At this point we can account only for its
embedded, fixed in place, within the basic categorial constellation of metaphysical thinking that is 
grounded on the relational conception of truth.
‘Das Sein des Seienden wird in der Vorgestelltheit des Seienden gesucht und gefunden.’ [Die Zeit 
des Weltbildes, Holzwege, p. 83]
19 Nietzsche II, p. 311
20 Einleitung zu. “Was ist Metaphysik?”, Wegmarken, p. 366
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structural possibility. Truth is to be understood in terms of concealment and unconcealment; 
being holds sway as a clearing [Lichtung] in which beings presence. In so far as beings 
presence they are unconcealed as regards their being; but with the unconcealment o f beings, 
the concealment [ Verbergung] of being holds sway. In the presencing of what presences, that 
which presences is unconcealed but the presencing as such, presence itself, the clearing, is 
concealed. ‘[D]ie Unverborgenheit und gerade sie...bleibt im Unterschied zum 
unverborgenen Anwesenden verborgen. ’21 This concealment of being, the concealment of the 
clearing, of presence itself -  whose essential possibility belongs to the essence of truth -, and 
the corresponding unconcealment of that which presences, beings, is rooted in the particular 
distrait way that Dasein is, which will become thematic below. It is because of the way that 
Dasein is that ‘der ek-statische Aufenthalt des Menschen in der OfYenheit des Anwesens nur 
dem Anwesenden und der vorhandenen Gegenwfirtigung des Anwesenden zugekehrt ist’22 
and being is forgotten; that is, concealed. In so far as man is turned only towards what is 
present, i. e., beings, he takes the mode of his understanding of being exclusively from beings, 
i. e., determines it according to the extant. The thinking necessary to think being as such is 
necessarily and essentially excluded from metaphysical thinking: metaphysical thinking is 
precisely Seinsvergessenheit. Beings have precedency; being as such is disbarred from the 
metaphysical mode of enquiry.
Further, Seinsvergessenheit is always at the same time its own forgottenness: ‘durch 
die Metaphysik wird das Vergessen des Seins in die Vergessenheit gestoBen’23. And: ‘Das 
Ereignis der Vergessenheit lfifit nicht nur in die Verborgenheit entfallen, sondem dieses 
Entfallen selbst entf&llt mit in die Verborgenheit, die selber noch bei diesem Fallen 
wegftllt’24
‘Die Seinsvergessenheit bekundet sich mittelbar darin, dafi der Mensch immer nur 
das Seiende betrachtet und bearbeitet. ’25 Being is forgotten in a similar way to the common 
overseeing of what lies nearest of all; nearest of all -  because granting nearness in the first 
place -  is the clearing of being. It is also, however, the clinging to beings, to what is most 
readily available and familiar, in the midst of what Heidegger calls “Heimatlosigkeif, 
homelessness.26 It is also essentially the failure to raise the Seinsfrage, the question of being. 
Instead, metaphysics determines the category of being as the most general [allgemeinste] and 
the emptiest [leerste] of all categories, that without any content, and that without any need or
21 Was Heifit DenJcen?, p. 144
22 Zur Sache des Dertkens, p. 78
23 Besinnung, p. 218
24 Die Technik und die Kehre, p. 44
23 Brief liber den Humanismus, Wegmarken, p. 339
26 Importantly related to Sein und Zeit’s concept of Unheimlichkeit and the later concept of the 
Geheimnis.
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possibility of questioning.27 Fundamentally, Seinsvergessenheit consists in the failure to draw 
the ontological difference between beings and being: ‘Die Seinsvergessenheit ist die 
Vergessenheit des Unterschiedes des Seins zum Seienden’28, and: ‘Die hier zu denkende 
Vergessenheit ist die von der Arjdrj (Verbergung) her gedachte Verhiillung der Differenz als 
solcher, welche Verhhllung ihrerseits sich anffinglich entzogen hat. Die Vergessenheit gehdrt 
zur Differenz, weil diese jener zugehdrt. ,29 This failure to draw the difference belongs to the 
essence of metaphysics itself: ‘Die Metaphysik stellt zwar das Seiende in seinem Sein vor 
und denkt so auch das Sein des Seienden. [I.e., metaphysics attempts to determine the way in 
which beings are as beings.] Aber sie denkt nicht das Sein als solches, denkt nicht den 
Unterschied beider. Die Metaphysik fragt nicht nach der Wahrheit des Seins selbst. ’30 -  For 
only in so far as the ontological difference is recognised can the truth of being as such be 
asked about. But: ‘Insofem die Metaphysik das Seiende als solches im Ganzen denkt, stellt 
sie das Seiende aus dem Hinblick auf das Differente der Differenz vor, ohne auf die Differenz 
als Differenz zu achten. ’31
Seinsvergessenheit is itself however, grounded in something more primordial: 
Seinsverlassenheit. We have already noted that the structural possibility of 
Seinsvergessenheit is rooted in the belonging of concealment, AtjOtj, to the essence of truth. 
Earlier we saw how this concept of concealment determined the Greek understanding of being 
as <f>vais -  emerging sway. On this point we quoted Heraclitus: <f>vois KpvnTtodai tfuXtT. From 
this it becomes apparent that as regards the concealment that determines the forgetting of 
being, it is being itself that conceals itself, being itself withdraws itself leaving beings alone 
unconcealed. ‘Das Seyn ist nicht einfach nur verborgen -  sondem es entzieht und verbirgt 
sich. ' 32 The withdrawal [Entzug] of being from beings is the abandonment [Verlassenheit] of 
beings by being: ‘Das Sein hat das Seiende verlassen. ’33 Being abandons beings in so far as 
beings presence, are unconcealed, other than in the light of being’s truth, other than in the 
light of that presence, that unconcealment itself. Beings presence without regard for being, 
without regard for their presencing; being refuses itself [verweigert sich]. This refusal is not 
to be conceived as a departure of being; beings still are after all; rather, being refuses itself, 
withdraws, in so far as it conceals itself amidst beings, perhaps beneath beings, perhaps
27 Cf. Sein und Zeit, pp. 3-4.
28 Der Spruch des Anaximander, Holzwege, p. 336 Originally italicised.
29 IdentitOt und Differenz, pp. 40-41
30 Brief Qber den Humanismus, Wegmarken, p. 322
31 IdentitOt und Differenz, pp. 62-63
32 Grundfragen der Philosophic, p. 210 What does Heidegger mean to imply with his archaic spelling 
“Seyn”? It is usually supposed that this has something to do with the way in which the ontological 
difference holds sway in any given epoch of the history of being. Much more simply put, though, Seyn 
is used when Heidegger’s ontological perspective is that of the history of being. There is no contentful 
difference between Sein and Seyn, only one of perspective: Seyn is the “seinsgeschichtliche 
Bestimmung” of Sein.
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within beings. Of course, this abandonment of beings by being is at the same time the 
withdrawal of being from thinking. Seinsverlassenheit is thus the ground of 
Seinsvergessenheit.
Seinsverlassenheit is the seinsgeschichtliche essence of metaphysics: ‘Die
Seinsverlassenheit: sie mufl als das Grundgeschehnis unserer Geschichte erfahren und ins 
Wissen gehoben werden. ’34 At the very beginning of Western history -  just at that very 
moment when, we are told33, unconcealment as such was first experienced -  being withdrew 
itself and beings took on their priority. This was the beginning of the epoch of metaphysical 
thinking, which thinks only beings and never being in its truth; that is, die beginning of the 
epoch of Seinsvergessenheit. But this is the beginning of die history of being: ‘Die 
Geschichte des Seins beginnt und zwar notwendig mit der Vergessenheit des Seins.136
It is on the basis of Seinsverlassenheit that beings reveal themselves as mere objects, 
extant entities for a subject, without regard to their presencing as such, which is therefore the 
ground of the mode of the revealing of beings essential to metaphysical representation. Being 
has withdrawn itself from beings, concealed itself in their openness, and beings appear as if 
being did not hold sway. This character of self-withdrawing-concealing belongs to the 
determination of being as such, and only on the basis of it can we understand the sense in 
which truth is 'aAr/Otta. Being's essential withdrawal is the ground of the determination of 
truth in terms of correctness and certainty, and for the determination of the human essence in 
terms of the subject.
But as that which grounds Western history, as the essential movement of the history 
of being, the withdrawal of being from beings is to be conceived in terms of what Heidegger 
calls a Geschick. What does Geschick mean? Ge-schick is a sending. In the counter­
movement of its withdrawal, being sends to mankind a historically specific way in which 
beings come to unconcealment, a mode of revealing in which everything that is comes to 
presence. This underlies the succession of interpretations of beingness throughout the 
historical course of metaphysics -  as, for example, substantia, extension, position, spirit, will, 
will-to-power, will-to-will, etc. Whilst Heidegger is unclear on this, it is possible to conceive 
of each of these as grounded in a different Geschick of being.
In this case there is, for Heidegger, a plurality of Geschicke. Nevertheless, Heidegger 
is quite clear, contrary to the view of the majority of his commentators, that there is only one 
epoch in the history of being: the epoch of metaphysics. When Heidegger writes in the 
Einleitung zu ‘Was ist Metaphysik?” that: ‘Die Geschichte des Seins ist in der Epoche der 
Metaphysik von einem ungedachten Wesen der Zeit durchwaltet’, he appends to the word
33 Die Geschichte des Seym, p. 36
34 Beitrdge zur Philosophie, p. 112
33 Vom Wesen der Wahrheit, Wegmarken, p. 189
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“Metaphysik” the following note: ‘Diese Epoche ist die ganze Geschichte des Seins. ’37 As we 
shall see, there are essential reasons why there can only be one epoch in the history of being. 
But what does Heidegger mean by Epoch?
Clearly his use of this word is very different to that of Husserl; nevertheless, the root 
meaning is the same. Eiroxn comes from meaning to keep in, to hold back, to check.
'Eiroyy has, accordingly, as its root meaning something like refusal. The inoxrj is the 
withdrawal of being. This withdrawal -  as the finitude of being’s unconcealment -  is what 
grounds history. There couldn’t be history if being gave itself all at once in its truth. This is 
why, as we shall see, history aids with the ending of the epoch of metaphysics. The epochal 
character of being -  which is the same as the essentially temporal character of being -  is what 
first makes the Geschick possible. The Geschick is what is historically sent by being 
precisely in so far as it withdraws in its truth; a way of revealing is sent, but not revealing 
itself, not revealing in its truth.
We say a way of revealing is sent. This is almost always taken by commentators to 
imply a sort of agency on the part of being. One point at which the significance of our 
structural reading of Heidegger comes out very strongly is in our denial of this view. The 
sending of being is not to be understood as agental38 in any sense whatsoever. To begin with, 
being does not do anything; how can it if it is not a being? With the sending of being, nothing 
is done. If we are begging die question in characterising die common view in this way, then 
we can state our charge more generally by saying that the Geschick is in no way a product, 
result or effect of any spontaneity. Rather, it is the simple consequence of the necessary 
temporal unfolding of the ontological structurality which presides necessarily over all that is 
in so far as it is. That being can send anything can only be understood once this sending is 
conceived wholly in terms of the unfolding of the essential structure of being. How this 
structure is finally to be characterised will become clearer below.
The progression of die metaphysical determinations of being through history is not at 
all to be understood in terms of a causal nexus; one Geschick does not cause the next: ‘Sein 
verldufr nicht und nie in einem kausalem Wirkungszusammenhang. Der Weise, wie es, das 
Sein selber, sich schickt, geht nichts Bewiikendes als Sein voraus und folgt keine Wirkung als 
Sein nach. ’39 But this does not make them random or arbitrary; rather, as the unfolding of the 
structure of being’s withdrawal, their progression is to be determined as an increasing 
SeinsvergessenheitAs Heidegger affirms in the protocol to the seminar on Zeit und Sein:
36 Nietzsches Wort “Gott ist tot”, Holzwege, p. 243
37 Wegmarken, p. 377
38 From Latin ago, to set in motion, to drive.
39 Die Technik und die Kehre, p. 43
40 Our structural reading of Heidegger’s history of being does not allow the thesis shared by perhaps 
the majority of commentators that this history is to be understood as a series of diachronic, spontaneous
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‘Innerhalb des DaB und in seinem Sinne kann das Denken auch so etwas wie Notwendigkeit 
in der Abfolge, so etwas wie eine Gesetzlichkeit und Logik feststellen. So lfiBt sich sagen, 
dafi die Seinsgeschichte die Geschichte der sich steigernden Seinsvergessenheit ist. ’41
In so for as die Geschick is sent to mankind as the withdrawal of being, it is not 
possible to attribute to him the culpability for metaphysical thinking. It is important not to 
read Heidegger as somehow blaming Western mankind for some sort of mistake or neglect. 
‘Die Metaphysik selbst wfire...kein bloBes Versiumnis einer noch zu bedenkenden Frage 
nach dem Sein. Sie wdre vollends kein Irrtum. Die Metaphysik ware als Geschichte der 
Wahrheit des Seienden als solchen aus dem Geschick des Seins selbst ereignet. ’42 
Nevertheless, as we shall see, metaphysics is itself the history of error as such in so for as it is 
the history of the withdrawal of being in its truth. As epochal, i. e., having to do with the 
withdrawal of being, history is essentially the history of error. ‘Jede Epoche der 
Weltgeschichte ist eine Epoche der lire’43, claims Heidegger. This is so, in so far as error is 
essential to the structure of truth. ‘Die Irre ist das wesentliche Gegenwesen zum anfonglichen 
Wesen der Wahrheit. ’44 This becomes focused below.
In Beitrdge zur Philosophic Heidegger characterises Seinsverlassenheit as 
determining the unconcealment of beings in three ways: in terms of Berechnung, 
Schnelligkeit, and the Aufbruch des Massenhaften. These three determinations of 
Seinsverlassenheit belong to what Heidegger designates as the nihilism of the modem world: 
‘Die Seinsverlassenheit ist der Grund und damit zugleich die urspninglichere 
Wesensbesdmmung dessen, was Nietzsche erstmals als Nihilism us erkannt hat. ’45
Nihilism, for Heidegger, is the necessary result of over two millennia of metaphysical 
thinking. Western history essentially tends towards nihilism: ‘Der Nihilismus ist, in seinem 
Wesen gedacht,...die Grundbewegung der Geschichte des Abendlandes. ’46 Its essential 
ground lies in metaphysical thinking itself; metaphysics is itself in essence nihilistic. ‘Die 
Metaphysik ist als Metaphysik der eigentliche Nihilismus. ’47 It is first brought to 
philosophical consciousness in Nietzsche’s proclamation that “Gott ist to f\ Nietzsche 
understands die essence of nihilism to be the loss of value of the highest value -  namely, God
and arbitrary “aletheiological constellations”. This is Reiner Schurmann’s phrase, whose Heidegger on 
Being and Acting is posited upon this conception. Once it is understood in this way no sense can be 
made of Heidegger’s first beginning, in contradistinction from his other beginning or indeed any other 
episodic transmutation, and consequently the history of being dissipates. In Schiirmann’s terminology 
there would be no historical difference between the “original” and the “originary”. Instead the history 
of being must be taken to be the structural unfolding of being’s withdrawal.
41 Zur Sache des Denkens, p. 56
42 Nietzsches Wort “Gott ist tot”, Holzwege, p. 244
43 Der Spruch des Anaximander, Holzwege, p. 338 Nothing hangs here on the fact that Heidegger
appears to use Epoche in the plural.
Vom Wesen der Wahrheit, Wegmarken, p. 197 
43 Beitrdge zur Philosophic, p. 119
46 Nietzsches Wort “Gott ist tot”, Holzwege, p. 201
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-  and thus ceasing to be determinative, and for him, just as for Heidegger, nihilism is the end 
result of the inner logic, the metaphysics, or rather the Platonism, of Western history.
We have already seen in what sense metaphysics is essentially theological.48 The 
nihilistic completion of the history of metaphysics comes when the belief in God is no longer 
a possibility, when, as Heidegger puts it, “the gods have fled” -  when the dimension of the 
holy has closed itself up. At this point metaphysical thinking has exhausted its historical 
possibilities and revealed its essentially nihilistic essence. This essence consists in placing all 
value beyond the world, that is, in emptying the world of value (a figure of thought that is 
first recognisable in Plato), and by attributing all value to a being, albeit the “highest” being. 
But for Heidegger, the inevitable loss of value of the highest value, which historically 
grounds nihilism, is only possible in the first place upon the basis of an understanding of the 
world in terms of this concept of "Value”, which is intrinsically grounded in the central 
categorial constellation of metaphysical -  and therefore nihilistic -  thinking. The possibility 
of nihilism rests paradoxically in the concept of value.
In his Zur Seinsfrage, Heidegger writes: ‘Das Wesen des Nihilismus...beruht in der 
Seinsvergessenheit. ,49 Nihilism comes to hold sway over Western history in so far as the 
truth o f being is forgotten., that is, in so far as being has withdrawn itself in its truth. ‘Aus 
dem Geschick des Seins gedacht, bedeutet das nihil des Nihilismus, dafi es mit dem Sein 
nichts ist. Das Sein kommt nicht an das Licht seines eigenen Wesens. Im Erscheinen des 
Seienden als solchen bleibt das Sein selbst aus. Die Wahrheit des Seins entfillt. Sie bleibt
*50vergessen.
Nihilism is, for Heidegger, the completion of die history of metaphysics manifested 
as an absolute Seinsvergessenheit. In so far as it is first diagnosed by Nietzsche, he is to be 
understood, according to Heidegger, as the last metaphysical thinker. S1 He is the last
47 Nietzsche II, p. 309 Originally italicised.
48 The theological essence of metaphysics is ultimately to be understood as grounded in 
Seinsverlassenheit: '‘Seinsverlassenheit des Seienden: daB das Seyn vom Seienden sich zuriickgezogen 
und das Seiende zun&chst (christlich) nur zu dem von anderem Seienden Gemachten wurde. Das 
oberste Seiende als Ursache alles Seienden ubemahm das Wesen des Seyns.’ [Beitrdge zur 
Philosophie, p. Ill]
49 Wegmarken, p. 422
50 Nietzsches Wort “Gott ist tot”, Holzwege, p. 244
51 ‘Nietzsche ist im wesentlichen Sinne das Ende der abendl&ndischen Philosophie.’ [Grundfragen der 
Philosophie, p. 133] What then is the place of Heidegger’s teacher Husserl? Heidegger no doubt 
considered Husserl’s thinking to mark no advance on that of Nietzsche; it is after all expressly 
orientated according to the Cartesian programme, which Heidegger saw as the hall-mark of 
metaphysical thinking. Nevertheless, for the length of his life, Heidegger never abandoned the claim 
that philosophy must be phenomenological. He located phenomenology, however, beyond the 
programme of his mentor. According to Heidegger’s understanding of it, phenomenology is post­
metaphysical, and therefore a crucial historical contribution to thinking. Indeed, whilst always 
hermeneutically understood, phenomenology provides Heidegger with an entry-point into history; that 
necessary entry-point which allows him to formulate a theory of history in the first place. Whilst it 
does not stand beyond the structures of history altogether, phenomenology first makes possible an
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metaphysical thinker because with his decisive reaction against metaphysical philosophy he 
fulfils the last of the possibilities intrinsic to metaphysical thought. For Heidegger, however, 
metaphysical thinking is the same as philosophical thinking; thus: ‘Mit Nietzsches 
Metaphysik ist die Philosophie vollendet. Das will sagen: sie hat den Umkreis der 
vorgezeichneten Mdglichkeiten abgeschritten. ’ 52 In the next chapter we shall look in more 
detail at the ways in which the nihilism of the modem world manifests itself and the nature of 
the danger it poses to historical man before examining Heidegger's conception of the 
continuation of the history of being and the possibilities lefi to thinking -  the possibilities 
essential to thinking -  beyond the epochal fulfilment of metaphysics.
authentic understanding of these structures The question of the extent to which Heidegger recognises 
the historicity of his own thought is a complicated one and shall be returned to.
52 Uberwindung der Metaphysik, Vortrdge und Aufsdtze, p. 79
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Chapter 4: 
The Danger: das Ge-stetl
In 1949 Heidegger presented a series of four lectures in Bremen under the title 
Einblick in Das Was Ist. Much of the material of these lectures was subsequently re-worked 
and published in Vortrdge undAufsdtze1 and Die Technik und die Kehre, although the original 
text has now been published in volume 79 of Heidegger's Gesamtausgabe. More than any 
other texts, these have been taken to define the work of the “later” Heidegger. 
Fundamentally, these lectures attempted to determine the essence of the current stage of 
Western European history and to root this essence within die context of the unfolding of the 
history of being. In part this attempt took the form of a reflection on modem technology. 
Throughout this section we shall focus almost exclusively on the text of the lecture Die Frage 
nach der Technik.
This lecture attempts to bring to light the essence of modem technology, to determine 
the way in which it is a “danger”, and to show in what sense there is the possibility of being 
saved from the danger. In this chapter we shall investigate die first two points.
What is technology? In the first instance it might be characterised as something 
having to do with instrumentality, with means and ends. In order to grasp the essence of 
technology, then, it might be thought that one must first consider what instrumentality is. 
Fundamental to instrumentality is causation: means relate to ends only in virtue of causes, 
perhaps a series of causes. Traditionally four causes have been recognised, in origin traceable 
to Aristode’s analysis of the four curia: causa mate rial is, causa formalis, causa final is, and 
causa efficiens. Ainov refers to that which is responsible for something -  that which is 
responsible for bringing something forth into appearance. It is this “bringing something forth 
into appearance” which determines the unity of these ‘vier Wei sen des Verschuldens’, that 
which defines each of them as atnov, and therefore defines the essence of the Greek 
understanding of “cause”. As we shall see, for Heidegger, this connection of coming into 
appearance, of coming into presence, with instrumentality, with means and ends, runs very 
deep indeed. Bringing forth into appearance is to be understood in terms of an emerging out
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of concealment into unconcealment. The Greek word denoting the structure of emergence 
into unconcealment is *aArjd€ta, “truth”.
Technology is something having to do with instrumentality. Instrumentality, 
grounded in means and ends, is something having to do with causality. But, as we have now 
seen, causality is something having to do with emergence into appearance, with revealing. 
Heidegger therefore makes the claim that: ‘Die Technik ist eine Weise des Entbergens. Die 
Technik west in dem Bereich, wo Entbergen und Unverborgenheit, wo ’aAr/deia, wo Wahrheit 
geschieht. ’2 This accords the meaning of technology with the originary meaning of 
from tiVtw, meaning to bring into the world, to bring forth, to beget, to generate, to produce. 
T*xyy is a revealing, one qualified according to nolrjois, to make, to create.
In what sense is modem technology a way of revealing? ‘Das in der modemen 
Technik waltende Entbergen ist ein Herausfordem, das an die Natur das Ansinnen stellt, 
Energie zu liefera, die als solche herausgefordert und gespeichert werden kann. ’3 This, 
Heidegger wants to say, contrasts modem technology with all previous types of technology. 
The difference concerns the character of modem technology as a “setting-upon” [stelleri] 
nature, which is perhaps best captured by the notion of exploitation. All previous 
technologies may have used nature, but they did not, could not, exploit it in the way in which 
mechanised modem technology can do. The ancient farmer would place his seeds in the care 
of the processes of growth, not force by manipulation and violation these processes to work 
necessarily for his advantage. That he could not do. He was subject to the natural processes, 
rather than the natural processes themselves being made subject to him. The character of 
setting-upon nature, in the sense of “challenging-forth” [herausfordem], determines the way 
of revealing of modem technology. It involves the unlocking of the energy concealed in 
nature, its transformation into other energy forms, its being stored, its being distributed, and
finally its being put to use in myriad ways. According to it, beings are unconcealed in terms
of what Heidegger calls Be stand, a good translation being “resource” or even better “stock” or 
“inventory”. Bestand is the material kept in the store rooms of a factory, for example, for 
future use in production. ‘Er [“Bestand>'r\ kennzeichnet nichts geringeres als die Weise, wie 
alles anwest, was vom herausfordemden Entbergen betroffen wird. ’4 Heidegger’s thought is 
that in the modem technological world all beings are understood, that is, revealed as Bestand, 
as mere material on hand for technological use. Indeed, man himself is not exempt from this 
way of the revealing of beings. He is something to be measured in terms of human resources.
The way of revealing on the basis of which what is unconcealed is determined 
according to Bestand Heidegger names das Ge-stell. ‘Ge-stell heifit das Versammelnde jenes
1 Cf. the essays Die Frage nach der Technik and Das Ding.
2 Die Technik und die Kehre, p. 13
3 Die Technik und die Kehre, p. 14
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Stellens, das den Menschen stellt, d. h. herausfordert, das Wirkliche in der Weise des 
Bestellens als Bestand zu entbergen. Ge-stell heifit die Weise des Entbergen s, die im Wesen 
der modemen Technik waltet und selber nichts Technisches ist. ’ 5
In the word “Ge-stelF, Heidegger insists, should not only be heard the “stelleri*, the 
“setting-upon”, which we introduced earlier; another “stellerT should also be heard, one that 
also sounds in the German dar-stellen and her-stellen,, namely, that “stelleri" that echoes 
irofyms -  die bringing into unconcealment of what presences in creating and making. Ge-stell 
is a mode or way of unconcealment, of aAiffota, and to this extent it signifies the being of 
beings: ‘Das Wesen der Technik ist das Seyn selber in der Wesen sgestalt des Ge-stell s ’78
As Heidegger famously claims, the essence of technology is not itself technological. 
Nor is it anything of human making. Man is not related to the essence of technology as any 
other object might be, of course: technology has something essentially to do with human 
doings and practices. But Heidegger insists that it is not reducible to these. Rather, the way 
of revealing according to which the actual is brought to unconcealment as Bestand, is to be
4 Die Technik und die Kehre, p. 16
3 Die Technik und die Kehre, p. 20, which in the original lectures was expressed in terms of ‘die 
Verwahrlosung des Dinges als Ding’, conceived as the ‘Verweigerung von Welt’. See below.
6 Generalised absolutely with the Ge- prefix.
7 Die Gefahr, Bremer und Freiburger Vortrdge, p. 62 The progenitor of Ge-stell was the concept of 
Machenschaft [Cf. Nietzsche II, p. 445, footnote a: ‘“Machenschaft” der vorlftufige Name fur das Ge- 
Stell.’] Heidegger writes. ‘Dieses Wort nennt jenes Wesen des Seins, das alles Seiende in die 
Machbarkeh und Machsamkeit entscheidet... Metaphysikgeschichtlich erlftutert sich die Machenschaft 
durch die Seiendheit als Vor-gestelltheit’ [Die Geschichte des Seyns, p. 46], It designates thus the 
metaphysical interpretation of the being of beings, grounded in Seinsvergessenheit and 
Seinsverlassenheit. At the apogee of metaphysical thinking all beings are interpreted in terms of 
Machenschaft. In this word is not only to be heard the German machen [to make] as the human 
comportment that grounds modem technology (‘Technik ist die Herstellung des Seienden selbst. . . in 
die berechenbare Machbarkeit, die Machsamkeit durchmachtende Machenschaft.’ [Besinnung, p. 
173]); the German Macht [power] is also to be implicated. Heidegger writes: ‘Die Machenschaft ist die 
unbedingte Vollendung des Seins als des Willens zur Macht.’ [Metaphysik und Nihilismus, p. 150] 
We shall not pursue the reference to Nietzsche here, nor the pre-eminent position accorded to him by 
Heidegger within the history of metaphysics. The interpretation of beings in terms of Machenschaft is 
connected to the Christian conception of the creator God: beings are understood as made-beings: ‘In 
der Machenschaft liegt die christlich-biblische Auslegung des Seienden als ens creatum’ [Beitrdge 
zur Philosophie, p. 132]. It is also necessarily connected, claims Heidegger, to the traditional concept 
of experience [Erlebnis], the two concepts together naming that formation of thought which we 
introduced before as the fundamental separation of being and thinking that holds sway across the entire 
sweep of Western history.
8 Importantly, but unsurprisingly, Ge-stell, in so far as it primarily determines the revealing of nature in 
terms of Bestand, also determines the way of revealing that holds sway in modem mathematical 
physics. ‘Die neuzeitliche Wissenschaft griindet im Wesen der Technik.’ [Was Heifit Denken?, p.
155] Indeed, one further essential difference of modem technologies from all previous technologies is 
the fact that they employ mathematical physics as an exact science. The relation between modem 
technology and mathematical physics is at one level reciprocal: modem technology is of course 
founded on developments in the mathematical sciences, but equally developments in the mathematical 
sciences often rest upon technological progress. They both, however, share the same essence, 
Heidegger wants to claim: ‘das herausfordemde Versammeln in das bestellende Entbergen waltet 
bereits in der [neuzeitlichen] Physik.’ [Die Technik und die Kehre, p. 21]. Indeed, the possibility of 
modem mathematical science rests on the revealing of nature in terms of Ge-stell, which is therefore 
something earlier than the manifestations of modem technology.
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understood according to what we previously introduced under the name Geschick. The 
Geschick is the determination of die truth of being, that is, the way in which beings are 
revealed, that holds sway as the epoch of the history of being. The Geschick is something 
sent to man: historical man himself does not determine the ways in which unconcealment 
holds sway; rather, man is himself claimed by the particular revealing determined at any time 
in terms of the Geschick. Ge-stell is a Geschick of being. ‘Als die Herausforderung ins 
Bestellen schickt das Ge-stell in eine Weise des Entbergens. Das Ge-stell ist eine Schickung 
des Geschickes wie jede Weise des Entbergens. Geschick in dem genannten Sinne ist auch 
das Her-vor-bringen, die W ^ot; . ’9 Indeed, Ge-stell is the Geschick of being that holds sway 
in the fulfilment of the epoch of Seinsvergessenheit-. ‘Das Wesen des Ge-stells ist das Sein 
selber des Seienden; nicht iiberhaupt und nicht von jeher, sondern jetzt, da sich die 
Vergessenheit des Wesens des Seins vollendet. ’ 10 Ge-stell and Seinsvergessenheit belong 
essentially together.
Now Heidegger describes Ge-stell, in so far as it is a Geschick, as a “G efahf\ a 
danger, in fact “die hdchste Gefahr”. He means that man is endangered by Ge-stell in his 
essence. What does this mean and why is this? Heidegger writes:
Das Wesen der Technik beruht im Ge-stell. Sein Walten gehdrt in das Geschick. Weil dieses 
den Menschen jeweils auf einen Weg des Entbergens bringt, geht der Mensch, also unterwegs, 
immerfort am Rande der Mdglichkeit, nur das im Bestellen Entborgene zu verfolgen und zu betreiben 
und von da her alle Masse zu nehmen. Hierdurch verschlieBt sich die andere Mdglichkeit, dafi der 
Mensch eher und mehr und stets anf&nglicher auf das Wesen des Unverborgenen und seine 
Unverborgenheit sich einl&Bt, um die gebrauchte Zugehdrigkeh zum Entbergen als sein Wesen zu 
erfahren.
Zwischen diese MOglichkeiten gebracht, ist der Mensch aus dem Geschick her gefkhrdet. Das 
Geschick der Entbergung ist als solches in jeder seiner Weisen und darum notwendig Gefahr.
In welcher Weise auch immer das Geschick der Entbergung walten mag, die Unverborgenheit, 
in der alles, was ist, rich jeweils zeigt, birgt die Gefahr, daB der Mensch sich am Unverborgenen 
versieht und es miBdeutet.11
9 Die Technik und die Kehre, p. 24
10 Die Gefahr, Bremer und Freiburger Vortrdge, p. 51
11 Die Technik und die Kehre, pp. 25-26 Compare also with this passage:
Vorerst allerdings -  wissen wir nicht wie lange -  befindet rich der Mensch auf dieser Erde in 
einer gefhhrlichen Lage. Weshalb? Nur deshalb, weil unversehens ein dritter Weltkrieg ausbrechen 
kOnnte, der die vdllige Vemichtung der Menschheit und die Zerstdrung der Erde zur Folge hfitte? 
Nein. Es droht im anbrechenden Atomzeitalter eine Weit grdBere Gefahr -  gerade dann, wenn die
Gefahr eines dritten Weltkrieges beseitigt ist. Eine seltsame Behauptung. Allerdings, aber nur solange
seltsam, als wir nicht nachdenken.
Inwiefem gilt der soeben ausgesprochene Satz? Er gilt insofem, als die im Atomzeitalter 
anrollende Revolution der Technik den Menschen auf eine Weise fesseln, behexen, blenden und
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We are told that ‘Das Geschick der Entbergung ist als solches in jeder seiner Weisen 
und darum notwendig Gefahr.’ The essential structure of Geschick is in itself endangering. 
In what sense is it endangering? In the sense that in virtue of any possible Geschick ‘[die 
Mdglichkeit] verschlieBt sich..., daB der Mensch eher und mehr und stets anffcnglicher auf 
das Wesen des Unverborgenen und seine Unverborgenheit sich einlaBt, um die gebrauchte 
Zugehttrigkeit zum Entbergen als sein Wesen zu erfahren.' Geschick is a danger because in 
terms of its very structure as a way of revealing it grounds die possibility that revealing as 
such is concealed from man and only what is unconcealed, in the specificity of the Geschick, 
is revealed; that is, in its very nature it grounds the possibility that unconcealment as such is 
concealed from man and therefore that man does not experience his essence as a belonging to 
unconcealment as such. But: ‘Das Geschick der Entbergung ist in sich nicht irgendeine, 
sondem die Gefahr.' We can therefore characterise the essence of danger for Heidegger to be 
the concealment of unconcealment as such from the historical experience of man. 12
‘Waltet jedoch das Geschick in der Weise des Ge-stells, dann ist es die hdchste 
Gefahr. ' 13 This claim is clarified by three considerations. The first is that what is revealed as 
Bestand is not even experienced in terms of die object. This implies that man cannot even be 
taken as a subject. Instead, there is the danger that he too is understood exclusively as 
Bestand. The second is that at the same time, in virtue of the instrumentality characterising 
Bestand, man comes to lord it over all beings, that is, over the whole of what is unconcealed 
as such, and comes to understand all things as merely products of his construction. This gives 
rise to the illusion that he everywhere encounters only himself, when it is rather the case, as 
Heidegger insists, that ‘indessen begegnet der Mensch heute in Wahrheit gerade nirgends 
mehr sich selber, d. h. seinem Wesen. ’ 14 The final consideration is that, ‘Wo [das Ge-stell] 
herrscht, vertreibt es jede andere Mdglichkeit der Entbergung. Vor allem verbirgt das Ge- 
stell jenes Entbergen, das im Sinne der noirjo is das Anwesende ins Erscheinen her-vor- 
kommen lfiBt.’ The way of revealing of Ge-stell drives out all possibility of other ways of 
revealing. But this has the fundamental consequence, most importantly of all, that, ‘So 
verbirgt denn das herausfordemde Ge-stell nicht nur eine vormalige Weise des Entbergens,
verblenden kOnnte, daB eines Tages das rechnende Denken als das einzige in Geltung und Ubung 
bliebe.
Welche groBe Gefahr zdge dann herauf? Dann ginge mit dem hdchsten und erfolgreichsten 
Scharfsinn des rechnenden Plannens und Erfindens -  die Gleichgultigkeit gegen das Nachdenken, die 
totale Gedankenlosigkeit zusammen. Und dann? Dann hatte der Mensch sein Eigenstes, daB er 
n&mlich ein nachdenkendes Wesen ist, verleugnet und weggeworfen. Darum gilt es, dieses Wesen des 
Menschen zu retten. Darum gilt es, das Nachdenken wach zu halten. [Gelassenheit, pp. 24-25]
12 As we shall see, this is to be associated with “error'’, die Irre. ‘Das Wesen der I ire beruht im Wesen 
des Seyns als der Gefahr.’ [Die Gefahr, Bremer undFreiburger Vortrtige, p. 54]
13 Die Technik und die Kehre, p. 26
14 Die Technik und die Kehre, p. 27 Originally italicised.
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das Her-vor-bringen, sondem es verbirgt das Entbergen als solches und mit ihm Jenes, worin 
sich Unverborgenheit, d. h. Wahrheit ereignet.’
The way of revealing of Ge-stell blocks out the holding sway and the shining-forth of 
truth as such. 15 It is therefore the supreme danger, and it itself conceals itself as a danger. 
Thus the danger is not technology itself not its destructive atomic capacities for example; 
rather, the essence of technology as a Geschick of a way of revealing is the danger. ‘Die 
Bedrohung des Menschen kommt nicht erst von den mdglicherweise tttdlich wirkenden 
Maschinen und Apparaturen der Technik. Die eigentliche Bedrohung hat den Menschen 
bereits in seinem Wesen angegangen. Die Herrschaft des Ge-stells droht mit der Mdglichkeit, 
daB dem Menschen versagt sein kdnnte, in ein urspriinglicheres Entbergen einzukehren und 
so den Zuspruch einer anftnglicheren Wahrheit zu erfahren. ’ 16 This amounts, Heidegger 
claims in the second volume of his Nietzsche lectures, to the danger of the annihilation 
[ Vemichtung] of the essence of die human. 17
To every danger belongs a need [Not]. In the case of Ge-stell, the need conceals 
itself, just like the danger -  the need is not experienced as a need. Of course, in the age of 
modem technology one experiences and learns about many needs and sufferings, but the 
need, die one correlative with the greatest danger, is not experienced, and instead 
“needlessness”[Wo//a?/gfe/7] holds sway. Heidegger writes: ‘In Wahrheit, jedoch verhullter 
Weise, ist die Nodosigkeit die eigendiche Not. ’ 18 But in so far as the withdrawal of being is 
the holding sway of being itself, the need is itself the holding sway of being. ‘Diese Not 
gehdrt zur Wahrheit des Seyns selbst. ’ 19 Being holds sway as the need. At the same time, in 
accordance with the greatest danger, the need is the need of the human essence. For, as we 
shall see more clearly below, the essence of man is to disclose being as such for the 
safeguarding of its truth: mankind is essentially the guardian [Wdchter] of being, the 
shepherd of being.
15 In so far as truth here is to be conceived in terms of the truth of being it is in this sense that Ge-stell 
is the fulfilment of Seinsvergessenheit.
16 Die Technik und die Kehre, p. 28
17 Cf. Nietzsche II, pp. 355 ff.
18 Die Gefahr, Bremer und Freiburger VortrOge, p. 56
19 Grundfragen der Philosophie, p. 153
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Chapter 5: 
Other Beginnings
Ge-stell is the Geschick of being in the age of technology. It is the fundamental 
danger. Heidegger claims that we can be saved from this danger but that salvation requires a 
radically new beginning in the history of being, a fundamental turn or reversal, Kehre, of 
history. What does this Kehre amount to and how might it come about?
Ge-stell determines the revealing of beings in the epoch of Seinsvergessenheit; 
Seinsvergessenheit is grounded in Seinsverlassenheit, the refusal of being of itself. The Kehre 
is die turn in being itself whereby it no longer refuses itself but instead grants or sends itself 
in its truth to hold sway over all revealing. Beings presence in the light of the truth of being 
rather than in the darkness of being’s absence. As the turn out of Seinsverlassenheit, the 
Kehre is the overcoming of Seinsvergessenheit.
The Kehre is the Kehre of being itself. Heidegger insists that it cannot be conceived 
to be a human doing or achievement. He writes: ‘Wenn das Wesen der Technik, das Gestell 
als die Gefahr im Sein, das Sein selbst ist, dann l&Bt sich die Technik niemals durch ein blofi 
auf sich gestelltes menschliches Tun meistem, weder positiv noch negativ. Die Technik, 
deren Wesen das Sein selbst ist, l&Bt sich durch den Menschen niemals uberwinden. ’ 1 It 
cannot be brought about as an effect of anything else, and cannot be calculated in advance: 
‘Wenn in der Gefahr sich die Kehre ereignet, kann dies nur unvermittelt geschehen. Denn das 
Sein hat nicht seinesgleichen neben sich. Es wird nicht von anderem bewirkt, noch wirkt es 
selbst. Sein verl&uft nicht und me in einem kausalen Wirkungszusammenhang. ’2 And when 
it happens, it happens suddenly.
But although the Kehre is no human doing, nevertheless man as historical, as the 
preserver of presence, is implicated in it, and plays, claims Heidegger, a necessary role in its 
preparation: ‘Weil jedoch das Sein sich als Wesen der Technik in das Gestell geschickt hat, 
zum Wesen des Seins aber das Menschenwesen gehftrt, insofem das Wesen des Seins das 
Menschenwesen braucht, um als Sein nach dem eigenen Wesen inmitten des Seienden
1 Die Technik und die Kehre, p. 38
2 Die Technik und die Kehre, pp. 42-43
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gewahrt zu bleiben und so als das Sein zu wesen, deshalb kann das Wesen der Technik nicht 
ohne die Mithilfe des Menschenwesens in den Wandel seines Geschickes geleitet werden. ’3 
Being needs [braucht] the essence of man. ‘Das grofie Wesen des Menschen denken wir 
dahin, daB es dem Wesen des Seins zugehttrt, von diesem gebraucht ist, das Wesen des Seins 
in seine Wahrheit zu wahren. ’4
‘Der Branch ist... selber der Anspruch, daB etwas in sein Wesen eingelassen werde 
und das Brauchen nicht davon ablasse. Brauchen ist: Einlassen in das Wesen, ist Wahrung im 
Wesen. ’5 In so far as it is die essence of man to be the guardian of being, the Kehre of being 
itself and the turn of historical mankind into his essence can only take place together. Thus 
before the Kehre can take place, before being can be unconcealed in its truth, mankind must 
be fully prepared for his distinguished role as being’s shepherd.
The catalyst is the recognition of Ge-stell as the danger that it is -  effected explicidy 
through Heidegger’s thinking; for this implies both the unconcealment of being as such -  and 
thus die overcoming of Seinsvergessenheit -  and the unconcealment of the essence of man as 
being’s requisite guardian. It also grounds the recognition of the being-historical essence of 
Ge-stell as a Geschick of die revealing of being itself. In so far as it is precisely the 
recognition of the danger as the danger that grounds the possibility of die Kehre, Heidegger 
claims that Ge-stell conceals within itself die possibility of its own overturning.
Das Wesen des Gestells ist die Gefahr. Als die Gefahr kehrt sich das Sein in die 
Vergessenheit seines Wesens von diesem Wesen weg und kehrt sich so zugleich gegen die Wahrheit 
seines Wesens. In der Gefahr waltet dieses noch nicht bedachte Sich-kehren. Im Wesen der Gefahr 
verbirgt sich darum die MOglichkeit einer Kehre, in der die Vergessenheit des Wesens des Seins sich 
so wendet, daB mit dieser Kehre die Wahrheit des Wesens des Seins in das Seiende eigens einkehrt6
Further, Heidegger writes: ‘Die Gefahr selber ist, wenn sie als die Gefahr ist, das 
Rettende. ’7 The danger itself is the saviour that initiates the Kehre out of Seinsvergessenheit 
into the truth of being. Again: ‘Im Wesen der Gefahr west und wohnt eine Gunst, namlich die 
Gunst der Kehre der Vergessenheit des Seins in die Wahrheit des Seins. Im Wesen der 
Gefahr, wo sie als die Gefahr ist, ist die Kehre zur Wahmis, ist diese Wahmis selbst, ist das 
Rettende des Seins. ’8 Fundamentally, it is thinking that is important here, and above all that
3 Die Technik und die Kehre, p . 38
4 Die Technik und die Kehre, p. 39
5 Was Heifit Denken?, p. 114
6 Die Technik und die Kehre, p. 40
7 Die Technik und die Kehre, p. 41
8 Die Technik und die Kehre, p. 42
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the danger, die truth of being come to language? ‘Sprache ist die anfhngliche Dimension, 
innerhalb deren das Menschenwesen uberhaupt erst vermag, dem Sein und dessen Anspruch 
zu entsprechen und im Entsprechen dem Sein zu gehdren. Dieses anfiSngliche Entsprechen, 
eigens vollzogen, ist das Denken.’10 But what is called thinking? ‘Das ekstatische lnnestehen 
im Ofifenen der Oitschaft des Seins ist als das Verhaltnis zum Sein, sei es zum Seienden als 
solchem, sei es zum Sein selbst, das Wesen des Denkens. ’ 11
In what sense does the Kehre amount to our salvation? We saw that the essence of 
the danger as Ge-stell is the preclusion of man from experiencing the truth of being. For 
mankind to be saved from this danger means simply for him to be propelled into his essence 
by the bringing forth of the truth of being expressly into unconcealment, into disclosure. The 
prolusion of this event is the revealing of the danger as the danger that it is.
But what is most dangerous about die danger, Heidegger tells us, is that it does not -  
for the most part -  reveal itself as the danger; that is, that it conceals its own essence. ‘Das 
Geffchrlichste der Gefahr besteht...darin, dafi die Gefahr sich als die Gefahr, die sie ist, 
verbirgt. ’ 12 Indeed, it is all the more concealed die more the various merely technological 
threats become apparent. How then, one may ask, is it possible at all that, at a particular point 
in the unfolding of being as history, Heidegger himself brings Ge-stell to light as the danger 
that it is? This amounts to the question of how, by its own lights, Heidegger’s philosophy is a 
historical possibility at all, a question which has been raised by many commentators, 
including Ute Guzzoni in a recent series of unpublished papers. It is, of course, a question 
which perhaps every philosophical thesis faces, and all the more so when it expands to the 
breadth of the edifice of Heidegger’s philosophy, although it usually goes unrecognised -  for 
it can only become thematic to a philosophy conscious of its historicity. It is also related, in 
virtue of die structure of Heidegger’s philosophy itself, to an extremely important objection, 
which we raise below, concerning the structural possibility, again by Heidegger’s lights, of 
die unconcealment of the truth of being as such.
Guzzoni argues that Heidegger never suffidendy accounts for the possibility that he 
can raise the question of being at the historical moment in which Ge-stell governs the 
revealing of all that is. For his thinking of the history of being is apparently ambiguous 
between, on the one hand, being only preparatory for the Kehre and, on the other, telling us
9 Heidegger also suggests that art is a domain in which the truth of the essence of modem technology 
can show itself, and therefore a domain in which the possibility of salvation can be cultivated. Art, for 
Heidegger, is a way of unconcealment, a way of the revealing of truth. He points out that the Greeks 
had understood art as a form of -  a bringing forth. He suggests that revealing the essence of 
technology is the great post-metaphysical, post-aesthetical possibility of art in the epoch of Ge-stell. 
Within the technical world-order, art -  in particular poetry -  remains capable of a mode of revealing 
other than that of Ge-stell.
10 Die Technik und die Kehre, p. 40
11 Nietzsche II, p. 323 Originally italicised.
12 Die Gefahr, Bremer und Freiburger Vortrdge, p. 54
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what in fact is, namely, Ge-stell. If Heidegger's thinking is preparatory then it must also be, it 
would seem, provisionary, for how can Heidegger tell us what is before being has disclosed 
itself in its truth. But this throws the status of the claims that Heidegger makes, indeed his 
whole philosophy -  as the raising of the question of being -  as such, into question. On the 
other hand, if his thinking is not provisionary, it is not preparatory of the thinking beyond the 
Kehre. At this point we wish merely to flag this important issue. Only once the conceptuality 
of die existential analysis is in place may an appropriate response be found.
In the Beitrdge zur Philosophie Heidegger speaks of the Kehre as the “other 
beginning” [andere Anfang]. Here the emphasis is on what he calls the overcoming 
[Qberwindung] of metaphysics. 13
We have seen that the metaphysical epoch in the history of being is characterised 
fundamentally by Seinsvergessenheit. Seinsvergessenheit is so called because being as such 
is forgotten and a precedency of beings establishes itself. That the epoch of metaphysics is 
overcome means first and foremost that being as such is again raised for questioning, that the 
truth of being is unconcealed, and thus that Seinsvergessenheit is overcome. Heidegger 
articulates this structure in terms of two basic philosophical questions. The first, the 
Lei frage, is the fundamental question that defines metaphysical thinking as what it is. This is 
the question about beings, as regards their beingness (‘was ist das Seiende?, Frage nach der 
Seiendheit, Sein'14). It is this question that guides philosophy from its very beginning -  from 
that which Heidegger calls the “first beginning’' [erste Anfang]. Set apart from this is the 
Grundfrage (‘was ist die Wahrheit des Seyns?'), which, he claims, articulates the other 
beginning. This is the Seins frage, the question concerning the truth of being, first broached in 
Sein und Zeit. The first beginning and the other beginning are distinguished as follows: ‘Der 
erste Anfang erf&hrt und setzt die Wahrheit des Seienden, ohne nach der Wahrheit als solcher 
zu fragen...Der andere Anfang erfiihrt die Wahrheit des Seyns und fragt nach dem Seyn der 
Wahrheit, um so erst die Wesung des Seyns zu grOnden und das Seiende als das Wahre jener 
urspriinglichen Wahrheit entspringen zu lassen. ’ 15
Heidegger insists that the other beginning cannot be characterised simply in terms of 
a reaction against metaphysics, a simple opposition to metaphysics. Such a reaction is 
already to be found in Nietzsche's thought, which, whilst understanding itself to be the 
overturning of Platonism, remains metaphysical in essence because it is still determined by 
the basic metaphysical question concerning beings -  although Heidegger accords Nietzsche 
the honour of accomplishing the completion of the possibilities of metaphysical thinking.
13 ‘Was heiBt Uberwindung? Uberwinden bedeutet: etwas unter sich bringen und das so unter-sich- 
Gelassene zugleich hinter sich bringen als dasjenige, was fortan keine bestimmende Macht mehr haben 
soil.’ [Nietzsche II, p. 330]
14 Beitrdge zur Philosophie, p. 171
15 BeitrOge zur Philosophie, p. 179
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Indeed, any mere reaction to metaphysics, being thereby wholly determined by metaphysics, 
inevitably fails to move outside of the metaphysical domain of questioning. As another 
example we could cite logical positivism, which, according to Heidegger, represents the 
‘Grflbste aller “metaphysischen” Denkweisen’16. Heidegger’s other beginning is considered 
to be, on die other hand, an absolutely decisive and fundamental historical fracture that leaps 
beyond all mere reaction into a domain that first and finally brings the essence of 
metaphysical thinking -  the questioning concerning beings and the forgetting of the truth of 
being -  to light in its history; a radical “Scheidung”, scission, from the history of the first 
beginning. ‘Der andere Anfang ist nicht die Gegen richtung zum ersten, sondera steht als 
anderes auBerhalb des Gegen und der unmittelbaren Vergleichbarkeit. ’ 17 However, this 
precisely involves being-historical “Besinnung” -  reflection, pondering -  on the essence of 
the history of die first beginning, the history of philosophy itself, which precedes it, for the 
awakening of the experience of the need for the other beginning. Indeed, Heidegger writes: 
‘Der Einsprung in den anderen Anfang ist der Riickgang in den ersten und umgekehrt. ’ 18 This 
does not at all amount to mere criticism and rejection in die usual -  metaphysical -  sense, 
and, importantly, does not simply label metaphysics mistaken. But metaphysical thinking 
becomes essentially impossible, Heidegger affirms, once the truth of being is raised to, and 
held in unconcealment.
We have seen that the history of metaphysics reaches its fulfilment in modem 
nihilism. The overcoming of metaphysics is thus at the same time the overcoming of 
nihilism. We saw above that the possibility of nihilism lies in the fact that the truth of being 
refuses itself, that is, is forgotten in Seinsvergessenheit. The other beginning, as the raising of 
die question of being, and thus the overcoming of Seinsvergessenheit, is therefore at the same 
time die overcoming of nihilism.
We saw that die metaphysical concept of value lies paradoxically at the heart of 
nihilism. This concept is tied essentially to the constellation of categories that configure 
metaphysical thinking. Unconcealment of the truth of being obviates this constellation of 
categories and with it the metaphysical concept of value, thereby overcoming the very 
essence of nihilism. We saw, further, that nihilism is theological in essence, since 
metaphysics is onto-theology. The theological essence of metaphysics resides in 
Seinsvergessenheit, in the attempt to answer the question of the being of beings with an 
appeal to a “highest” being. Being itself remains essentially beyond the theological frame of 
questioning. The overcoming of metaphysics is thus at the same time the overcoming of 
metaphysical theology. Indeed, Heidegger is prepared to tie the god of theology to the danger
16 Beitrdge zur Philosophie, p. 172
11 Beitrdge zur Philosophie, p. 187
18 Beitrdge zur Philosophie, p. 185
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in which the essentially theological epoch of metaphysics culminates: ‘Gesetzt aber, Gott sei, 
zwar nicht das Seyn selbst, aber das Seiendste, wer durfte jetzt schon wagen, zu sagen, daB 
dieser so vorgestellte Gott die Gefahr sei fur das Seyn? ’ 19
We saw that die ground of Seinsvergessenheit is Seinsverlassenheit, the withdrawal 
of being in its truth, the concealment of unconcealment. Fundamentally, the Kehre is to be 
understood as the turn out of Seinsverlassenheit. Seinsverlassenheit is the self-refusal of 
being in its truth, the turning of being away from beings. The Kehre is thus the “Einkehr■” of 
being back into beings, which is to say the raising of being itself into unconcealment prepared 
for by the raising of the Seinsfrage.
But what does it mean to say that the Kehre is the Einkehr of being back into beings? 
In a handful of his later essays, Heidegger develops the concept of what he calls “das 
Geviert'. We are unable to offer any more than the bare minimum of exegesis of this concept 
here. The Geviert is the “fourfold”, the unitary belonging together of Erde, Himmel, 
Sterblichen and Gdttlichen: ‘Erde und Himmel, die Gdttlichen und die Sterblichen gehdren 
von sich her zueinander einig, aus der Einfalt des einigen Gevierts zusammen. ’20 Their 
mutual quadripartite interrelationship Heidegger calls the “Spiegel-Spier, mirror-play. He 
writes: ‘Wir nennen das ereignende Spiegel-Spiel der Einfalt von Erde und Himmel, 
Gdttlichen und Sterblichen die Welt. Welt west, indem sie weltet.’ World is to be conceived 
in terms of die being of all that presences as such, in terms of the truth of being: ‘Die Welt ist 
die Wahrheit des Wesens von Sein. ’21 Heidegger relates this concept of world to the concept 
of a “thing” [Ding]. He writes: ‘Das Ding dingt’22; and: ‘Das Ding dingt Welt. ’23 The thing 
things world in so far as it gathers [versammelt] the four of the fourfold.
But in the age of modem technology, the gods have fled, the mortals have forgotten 
their mortality, the skies are polluted, and the earth is exploited. Heidegger writes: ‘Im 
Wesen des Ge-stells ereignet sich die Verwahrlosung des Dinges als Ding. [...] In der 
Verwahrlosung des Dinges ereignet sich Verweigerung von Welt. ’24 The “refusal” of world 
is the “refusal” of the truth of being: ‘Die Wahrheit des Seins dachten wir im Welten von 
Welt als das Spiegel-Spiel des Gevierts von Himmel und Erde, Sterblichen und Gdttlichen. ’25 
But the Kehre means the no longer refusing itself of die truth of being, the overcoming of
19 Die Gefahr, Bremer undFreihurger Vortrdge, p. 55
20 Das Ding, Vortrage undAufsdtze, p. 172
21 Die Gefahr, Bremer und Freiburger Vortrage, p. 48 Indeed, Heidegger claims that world is being 
itself and that, in so far as Ge-stell is being itself, world and Ge-stell are the same. ‘Welt und Ge-Stell 
sind das Selbe. Sie sind unterschieden das Wesen des Seins. Welt ist die Wahmis des Wesens des 
Seins. Ge-Stell ist die vollendete Vergessenheit der Wahrheit des Seins.’ [Die Gefahr, Bremer und 
Freiburger Vortrage, p. 53]
22 Das Ding, Vortrage und Aufsdtze, p. 166
23 Das Ding, Vortrdge und Aufsdtze, p. 173
24 Die Gefahr, Bremer und Freiburger Vortrdge, p. 47
23 Die Technik und die Kehre, p. 43
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Seinsvergessenheit. Thus: ‘Wenn die Vergessenheit sich kehrt, wenn Welt als Wahmis des 
Wesens des Seins einkehrt, ereignet sich der Einblitz von Welt in die Verwahrlosung des 
Dinges’26; this happens in so far as the four of the fourfold gather together to relate to one 
another in ways befitting the essence of each. Thus the Kehre is fundamentally to be 
conceived as the turn of the truth of being into beings, by virtue of which things first come to 
be as things; they first “thing” in so far as they first gather together in the unity of the 
fourfold. World is no longer refused to diem. Things are no longer verwahrlos, “neglected”, 
“untended”, as they are under the domination of the mode of revealing of Ge-stell, rather, 
they presence in so far as in than the truth of being comes to unconcealment.
This fundamentally alters man’s comportment towards beings. We saw above that 
metaphysical thinking understands man to be the animal rationale. This conception 
corresponds to an interpretation of beings in terms of objects. In so far as beings are 
understood as things in terms of die gathering of the fourfold as the “worlding” of world, man 
-  the mortal -  is to be understood, as we saw above, as the guardian of the truth of being, of 
unconcealment as such, as the shepherd of being; ‘Der Mensch ist der Hirt des Seins. ’27 But 
this only in so far as he enters his essence as mortal. Together with the Kehre goes a 
fundamental metamorphosis of the essence of the human.
What are we to make of Heidegger’s sweeping vision of Western history? Are we to 
accept it as it stands? A final answer will have to wait until after we have considered the 
grounding of the history of being in the existential analysis of Dasein, but we might at this 
point draw attention to a number of possible worries. The most important of these concern 
perhaps its totalising tendencies.28 Why is the histoiy of being supposed to have begun in 
ancient Greece, when, prior to the earliest Greek texts, a literature emerged that has had just 
as much if not more influence on Western history than the Hellenes? I am mentioning, of 
course, the Hebraic scriptures. When does the Judeo-Christian step onto being’s historical 
stage? Indeed, why does Heidegger’s history leap from Greece to Germany with only so 
much as a cursory glance at the Latinate Medievals? The Graeco-Germanic axis that 
Heidegger draws as with a ruler through Western history seems to exclude all English 
literature, all French literature; Spinoza doesn’t get a look in, and even Kierkegaard is quietly 
dismissed. The only exception is Descartes, who, on the one hand, is saddled with the burden 
of responsibility for all the ills of modernity, whilst, on the other, whose position as the true 
torch-bearer of the history of being at the instigation of modem philosophy is supplanted by 
Leibniz. And what happened to all profound non-philosophical influences on Western 
history? After all is it not hopelessly naive to imagine that the historical situation only comes
26 Die Technik und die Kehre, pp. 43-44
27 Brief iiber den Humanismus, Wegmarken, p. 331
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to language in the words of “essential thinkers” and not in the words of the economists, the 
political thinkers, scientists, theologians, artists, etc.?
In Heidegger’s defence it can be pointed out that philosophy really did begin with a 
particular form of questioning in ancient Greece, and that the Torah and the prophetic 
scriptures of the Hebrew Bible are theological in orientation, and are therefore, for now 
familiar reasons, disqualified from its first beginning. But it is not entirely clear why being 
thereafter favoured the German language for its epiphanies. It is true that German words 
wear their etymologies on their sleeves, so to speak, in a way in which the Romance 
languages and English cannot, and so presumably to a greater extent preserve, or are at least 
very transparent as regards, their inceptual meanings. But that feature alone does not seem 
sufficient to ground the supposed being-historical pro-eminence of the Germanic as a whole. 
And this is of course to side-step the autarchism of this Heideggerian motif!
Nevertheless the unilateralism of the history of being need concern us no further, for 
we are concerned purely with its structurally. The history of being is a structural history, the 
history of a structure, and the geo-ethnics in terms of which it is played out stand beyond the 
periphery of its central structurality. For our purposes at least it is fundamentally unimportant 
where the flag of the history of being flies.
Finally, to contribute to an ongoing debate29: How Hegelian is Heidegger’s history of 
being? More precisely: is the history of being merely an inversion of Hegel’s history of 
spirit? In the first place it must be said in response to this question that the comparison often 
tends to obscure the very significant differences between the thinkers. For there is a sense in 
which any systematic theory of history can be called “Hegelian” -  even those of Foucault and 
Derrida. I suggest that in only two respects is the comparison enlightening: Firstly, for 
Heidegger as for Hegel a single principle -  radically different in the two cases -  unifies all 
history, constitutes history, makes history history. Secondly, history culminates at the point at 
which this principle itself is drawn up into its essential truth. Precisely because of this second 
consideration, the history of being cannot be simply an inversion of the history of spirit.
28 This is the fundamental target of Caputo’s book Demythologizing Heidegger, as well as, I take it, 
much of Derrida’s commentary on Heidegger. Cf., for example, his On Spirit.
29 Discussed by Heidegger himself in, among other places, the Protocol to the seminar “Zeit und Sein”, 
Zur Sache des Denkens, pp. 51 ff. Cf. also, in no particular order: Robert Bemasconi, The Question of 
Language in Heidegger's History of Being, Chapter One; Herman Philipse, Heidegger's Philosophy of 
Being, § 10; Stanley Rosen, The Question of Beings Chapter Eight; David Farrell Krell, Intimations of 
Mortality, Chapter Seven.
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Part II:
The Existential Analysis
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Chapter 6: 
Existentiality
In this and the subsequent part we aim to demonstrate that the philosophy of the 
history of being is made structurally possible by Heidegger’s concept of Dasein.
To this end we shall, in the next four chapters, trace the central structurality of 
Dasein, leaving certain -  at least for our purposes -  tangential characteristics to one side. 
Although we will first be able to understand what Heidegger means by Dasein only once this 
has been completed, we can, before commencing, venture a provisional, working definition of 
our target concept: Dasein is the structurality in virtue of which there can be concealment and 
unconcealment, in virtue of which truth happens -  that means also, in virtue of which there is 
being and in virtue of which, and as which, Ereignis ereignet. Dasein is the ground of the 
truth of being: ‘Das Wesen des Da-seins und damit der auf es gegrundeten Geschichte ist die 
Bergung der Wahrheit des Seins’1. And: ‘Das Da-sein ist die Grttndung der Wahrheit des 
Seins’2. And: ‘Da-sein ist das Wort fiir die Grundung der Wahrheit des Seyns. ’3 Thus the 
analysis of Dasein is the analysis of those conditions that make something like unconcealment 
-  which always also implies concealment -  that is, the clearing [Lichtung] of being, possible 
at all. But if the history of being is the history of the clearing, of the truth of being, as 
Heidegger tells us, and if Dasein is the possibility, the ground of the clearing itself, then 
Dasein is the ground of the history of being. This it is, as we shall see, as the ground of the 
belonging of man to the truth of being.
Heidegger writes at die outset of his analysis of Dasein in Sein und Zeit that: 'Das 
“ Wesen ” des Daseins liegt in seiner Existenz. ’4 The use of “Existenz” here is nomenclatorial, 
and its meaning will only be fully grasped once the analysis has been carried through. 
However, it is precisely on the basis of this concept that the concept of Dasein is to be
1 Beitrdge zur Philosophie, p. 308
2 Besinmmg, p. 144
3 Die Geschichte des Seyns, p. 149
4 Sein und Zeit, p. 42
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understood. Thus die analysis of Dasein is an existential analysis, an analysis of die 
existential structures of Dasein. In so far as an existential analysis has to do with the being of 
a being, the analysis is also ontological.5 Existence is the name of the being of Dasein.
Provisorily, we can state die following concerning the meaning of the word 
“Existenz” as it functions in the existential analysis of Dasein: it is used only in application to 
the being of Dasein -  only Dasein exists. Dasein is a being; but no being other than Dasein 
exists. Heidegger's “existence” is not then to be understood in the traditional sense (which in 
German can be synonymous with “Dasein"). In Heidegger’s vocabulary the “existence” of 
the tradition is renamed Vorhandenheit. It designates, for him, one mode of the being of 
beings ontologically unlike Dasein. The distinction might preliminarily be put like this: 
Things -  beings ontologically unlike Dasein -  just are; but Dasein has to be. (“Has” from 
have: Dasein has its being, owns its being.) That is, whilst mere things are static, inert and 
mute, Dasein is itself die dynamic (ec-static) determining ground of its own being.6 ‘Dieses 
Seiende ist nicht einfach nur, sondem sofem es ist, geht es ihm um sein eigenes Seinkdnnen. ’7 
The existence of Dasein is given over to itself  ^ responsible for itself in terms of the way in 
which it is, and must at every moment define its being with its comportment towards 
possibilities of its being. Heidegger also expresses this with the thought that Dasein is a 
being with an understanding of being, and therefore is in a constant state of relating to itself 
as such. Dasein can, after all, decide whether “to be or not to be”.
If the existence of Dasein is not to be understood in terms of the traditional -  which is 
the same as to say metaphysical -  understanding of existence (existentia in distinction to 
essentia) this further implies that the ways in which Dasein exists, the determinations of its 
existence are not to be taken, in the sense traditional, as properties or attributes of a thing. 
For this would be to attribute the mode of being of Vorhandenheit to Dasein's existence. 
Rather, die determinations of the being of Dasein are to be understood in terms of existential 
possibilities. One way of expressing the difference between Heidegger’s existential analysis 
and a traditional ontology -  and thus at die same time between being as existence and being 
as Vorhandenheit -  would be to say that, whereas for the tradition reality takes precedence 
over mere possibility, for Heidegger possibility is ontologically “higher” than actuality.
Accordingly, the analysis of existence cannot proceed with the classification of 
exemplars and species and a tabulation of their essential properties, etc.; rather it is concerned
5 In contrast to ontic. The horizon of an ontic analysis maintains itself at the level of the particular 
determination of beings, without asking after their ontological foundations.
6 Where do animals enter into this categorisation? Heidegger recognises, most especially in the Winter 
Semester 1929/1930 lecture course Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik, that animals are ontologically 
some way between mere things and Dasein, the being of man. Nevertheless, he affirms that they are 
separated from man by an “abyss of essence”. This grounds an important line of criticism, but one we 
shall not pursue here.
7 Die Grundprobleme der Phdnomenologie, p. 242
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to delineate the structures that make the existentiality of Dasein possible. It is a structural 
ontology, and this thought perhaps most clearly encapsulates its contribution to the 
overcoming of metaphysical thinking. Deliberately echoing Kant’s achievement, we can call 
the initiation of this ostensibly new mode of analysis the “existential turn”. The existential 
turn is the inauguration of the turn out of metaphysics.
The existential analysis begins by analysing the compound concept that Heidegger 
calls In-der-Welt-sein [being-in-the-world]. The existence of Dasein is such as to be 
essentially constituted as being-in-the-world. Heidegger analyses the three structural 
moments of this compound concept in turn: World, self, and being-in. Only once these three 
have become clear individually and in their interconnection is the structure of the existence of 
Dasein able to be laid bare.
World
The concept of world re-appears in varying contexts throughout Heidegger’s entire 
Denkweg, as we have already borne testimony to. It cannot be denied that at first it seems to 
fulfil differing functions in these contexts. But this does not at all imply that Heidegger’s 
concept of world in any way fundamentally changed. In the context of the existential analysis 
of Dasein, Heidegger is concerned to bring to light what he calls the Weltlichkeit 
[worldliness] of the world. ‘“Weltlichkeit” ist ein ontologischer Begriff und meint die 
Struktur eines konstitutiven Momentes des In-der-Welt-seins. ’8 World is therefore a 
determination of the being of Dasein, an “ExistenziaH, as Heidegger puts it. ‘Die Welt ist 
etwas Daseinsmfifiiges. Sie ist nicht vorhanden wie die Dinge, sondem sie ist da, wie das Da­
sein, das wir selbst sind, ist, d. h. existiert. Die Seinsart des Seienden, das wir selbst sind, des 
Daseins, nennen wir Existenz. Es ergibt sich rein terminologisch: Die Welt ist nicht 
vorhanden, sondem sie existiert, d. h. sie hat die Seinsart des Daseins. ’9 World here is, then, 
not at all to be conceived as the simple enumeration of all that is, for example, whether this be 
of facts, states of affairs, or things; rather, world is the contoured and gradated substructure of 
existence within which there can first be facts, states of affairs and things.
The attempt to grasp the worldliness of the world takes, nevertheless, the form of an 
analysis of the ontological determinations of the beings that Dasein encounters within the 
world. The ontological determination of worldliness can only be laid bare once it has become 
clear in what sense the beings are that are in the world. Again, this analysis of “inner- 
worldly” beings does not take the form of an enquiry into the particular or essential properties 
of such beings; rather, the concrete aim of the analysis is to determine the ontological
8 Sein und Zeit, p. 64
9 Die Grundprobleme der Phtinomenologie, p. 237
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structure of these beings. This structure is to be determined fundamentally out of the way in 
which Dasein understands the being of inner-worldly beings.
Further, the understanding of the being of inner-worldly beings is to be analysed 
according to the horizon of what Heidegger calls the Alltdglichkeit [everydayness] or 
Durchschnittlichkeit [averageness] of Dasein. This determinant initially remains tied to a 
methodological consideration: in case there are special modes of the existence of Dasein into 
which it seldom enters, these should not function as guides for the interpretation of the 
ontological constitution of Dasein: precisely because of their special nature, they cannot be 
taken to be representative modes for the proper determination of the being of Dasein. What is 
die ontological structure of die beings that everyday Dasein encounters in the world?
Heidegger’s basic guiding insight here is that Dasein is not primarily related to inner- 
worldly beings in terms of a “theoreticar comportment, but rather in terms of a making use, a 
producing, a taking care of things. The sort of being that is encountered in this making use of 
inner-worldly beings Heidegger calls a tool [Zeug10]. Thus the interpretation of the being of 
inner-worldly beings in the first place takes the form of an analysis of the way of being of 
tools.
The most important aspect of the ontological determination of tools concerns the fact 
that they are used. Use means employed for the sake of some end. Used for die sake of some 
end, tools always stand already within a network of relationships, a network which 
incorporates other tools as well as the work that is to be done. ‘Jedes Zeug hat den 
immanenten Bezug auf das, wozu es ist, was es ist. Es ist immer etwas um-zu, verweisend auf 
ein Wozu. Die spezifische Struktur des Zeugs ist durch einen Zusammenhang des Um-zu 
konstituiert. ’ 11 Heidegger names this relational structure that belongs to the constitution of 
tools Verweisung [best translated perhaps as “reference”; the bearing of indication to 
something else]. ‘Das Weltliche [Zeug] begegnet als es selbst immer in und als Verweisung 
au f ein anderesf2
The non-theoretical understanding at work when tools are used typically does not 
disclose or uncover any tool explicidy or thematically at all. Heidegger writes: ‘Als im 
Besorgen Begegnendes wird das Werkzeug nicht auf sein Aussehen untersucht, sondem der 
genuine Bezug zu ihm ist der gebrauchende Umgang mit ihm; es geht in der Verweisung auf. 
Darin liegt aber etwas Wesentliches: Das Besorgen sieht in gewissem Sinne weg vom 
Werkzeugding, es ist als solches Ding primfir gar nicht da, sondem als Werkzeug -  “Zeug-zu” 
-  verwendet.'n What is rather understood in the use of tools is grounded in the end for the
10 “Zevg” has a somewhat broader application in German than the English “tool” respectively. Any 
sort of thing that is used for some purpose is a Zeug.
11 Die Grundprobleme der PhOnomenologie, p. 233
12 Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs, p. 252
13 Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs, p. 259
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sake of which the tool is employed. The tool itself is subsumed in the relational context 
which is itself grounded or constituted by this end. Heidegger names the way of being of 
tools in terms of which they are employed without being explicitly revealed Zuhandenheit. 
Zuhandenheit names the basic ontological constitution of inner-worldly beings: 
‘Zuhandenheit ist die ontologisch-kategoriale Bestimmung von Seiendem, wie es “an sich ”
It is helpful to grasp this thought in terms of the traditional problem of the principium 
individuationis, die principle according to which beings are first individuated one from 
another. For Heidegger, beings are only individuated, only determined as the beings they are, 
within a network of relations of usefulness. Beings are ultimately individuated according to 
their use, where “use” is taken in the widest sense of a sort of basic existential 
appropriateness. Thus only within existential structurality do beings first receive their 
determination as beings; there could not be beings outside of an existential structurality. This 
is the essential thought of die existential turn. But beings can only be existentially 
appropriate, that is, can only be useful, in so far as they have that ontological constitution 
which Heidegger names Zuhandenheit. Of course, die Zuhandenheit of inner-worldly beings 
never comes to light in any non-phenomenological traditional analyses precisely because it 
determines the being of beings that do not explicidy reveal themselves in their being. It is 
precisely a condition of encountering beings in the mode of being of Zuhandenheit that they 
do not become thematic in their constitution of being at all. 15
14 Sein und Zeit, p. 71
15 Methodologically, of course, it is incumbent on Heidegger to account for the possibility that Dasein 
have at least some thematic understanding of Zuhandenheit. It must be remembered that Dasein is a 
being that has an understanding of being. The being of Dasein has been characterised in advance as 
being-in-the-world. Thus to Dasein’s being must belong something like an understanding of world, 
and therefore of the mode of being of inner-worldly beings. For hermeneutic reasons it is also 
necessary to give an account of the form that such thematic understanding must take.
Heidegger shows that it is precisely in the breakdown of the relational context in which 
Dasein is otherwise embedded that something like world first becomes thematic. Tools can break, “get 
in the way”, or, perhaps most importantly for Heidegger’s concerns, they can be missing, ab-sent 
They are now no longer zuhanden but instead vorhanden. They are vorhanden in that they have 
become explicit to Dasein’s understanding in so far as they have become conspicuous in causing the 
inconspicuous relational context to breakdown. In such Vorhandenheit, however, precisely the whole 
relational context itself -  the job for which the tool is being used, the work that is to be done, the 
interrelations to other tools in the workplace, the workplace itself in which it is being used, etc., in 
short: Verweisung itself, ontically considered -  becomes thematic, and thereby also Zuhandenheit as 
the being of those beings embedded within it. With Zuhandenheit, however, as the basic mode of 
inner-worldly beings, world itself is also thematised.
That the relational context can become conspicuous here is determined by the possibility that 
inner-worldly beings can become vorhanden to the understanding of Dasein. We shall return to this 
concept repeatedly. There are, however, two important things that we should note here. The first is 
that it is in terms of the going wrong of the relational context in which zuhanden inner-worldly beings 
are embedded that these beings become vorhanden. This implies on the one hand that Vorhandenheit, 
as a determination of the being of inner-worldly beings, is no less grounded on Dasein’s involvement 
with the world in terms of taking care, making use of beings, as Zuhandenheit, and, on the other, that it 
determines a deficient mode of Dasein’s intercourse with inner-worldly beings. The second, which
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Zuhandenheit, as the constitution of being belonging to tools, is fundamentally 
determined by Verweisung. Verweisung is the relational or referential being of tools whereby 
something like their use or serviceability is first possible. ‘Die Verweisung “Dienlichkeit zu” 
is t.e in e  ontologisch-kategoriale Bestimmtheit des Zeugs als Zeug. ’ 16 This fundamental 
character of the being of tools is shown most explicitly in the use of tools of signification. 
For the serviceability of signs precisely consists in their ability to explicitly refer Dasein to 
other elements of its relational context within which its involvement in the world moves, 
such that it can thereby orient its involvement for the sake of an end of its being. Making 
explicit the referential connections of Verweisung, signs serve as a pre-eminent example of 
innerworldly beings ontologically determined as zuhanden, bringing the being of tools, 
Zuhandenheit, and thereby Verweisung, and indeed worldliness itself, explicitly to light. 
‘Zeichen ist ein ontisch Zuhandenes, das als dieses bestimmte Zeug zugleich als etwas 
fungi ert, was die ontologische Strukur der Zuhandenheit, Verweisungsganzheit, und 
Weltlichkeit anzeigt. ’ 17
Verweisung is not yet the worldliness of the world. It is an ontical determination of 
the constitution of inner-worldly beings encountered as tools. The being of tools has a 
relational structure; tools always belong to a relational context and a relational totality. What 
is still necessary is to determine what the ontological determination of the world must be in 
order that beings can first become manifest within such a relational context, that is, in order 
that beings first and foremost reveal themselves as zuhanden, for it is on the ground of world 
that beings are to be primarily encountered as zuhanden.
Heidegger names the constitution of being whereby inner-worldly beings are able to 
be encountered as zuhanden, that is, are able to support the determination of Verweisung, 
Bewandtnis. ‘Bewandtnis ist das Sein des innerweltlichen Seienden, darauf es je schon 
zunftchst freigegeben ist. Mit ihm als Seiendem hat es je eine Bewandtnis. ' 18 This word as it 
is employed by Heidegger cannot be rendered into English. It stems from the verb bewenden 
which in contemporary German is used only idiomatically and always in conjunction with 
lassen. Here it means approximately “to be finished with something”, “to let something be as 
it is”, “to let something rest at that”. Bewenden is a prefixation of wenden, the core meaning 
of which is “to turn”, but which also forms the root of the German verb “to use”: verwenden. 
Bewenden meant originally “to turn towards”. Bewandtnis itself means a property, state, or 
condition of something, or a peculiarity, circumstance, or situation of something. What
follows on from this, is that therefore Dasein’s “theoretical” comportment within the world, in so far as 
it uncovers beings as vorhanden, is itself determined by the structures grounded in Dasein's taking care 
and making use of beings. In this sense, Vorhandenheit is to be understood as a derivative mode of 
Zuhandenheit.
16 Sein und Zeit, p. 78
17 Sein und Zeit, p. 82
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Heidegger means to be heard in his employment of this word are all of these meanings: the 
notion of turning towards something, the crucial notion of letting something, the notion of the 
condition or situation of something.
‘In Bewandtnis liegt: Bewenden lassen mit etwas bei etwas. ’ 19 In so far as beings are 
able to be encountered at all as zuhanden, they must, in the constitution of their being, be such 
as to be related to other beings, to be “turned towards” other beings. This is an ontological 
determination of the being of inner-worldly beings. The particular relations that a being has -  
its WofQr and its Wozu -  are determined by what Heidegger calls a Bewandtnisganzheit, 
which is in turn constituted by what he calls a Worum-willen, a possibility of the being of 
Dasein, to whose constitution of being -  being-in-the-world -  worldliness itself belongs. To 
this constitution of being belongs also an understanding of being. This understanding of 
being involves a concern of Dasein for its being. Out of this concern for its being 
possibilities of its being are determined which ground the Worum-willen, itself grounding a 
Bewandtnisganzheit, which in turn determines the encounter with inner-worldly beings. The 
possibility that inner-worldly beings are encountered as zuhanden rests in the constitution of 
the being of Dasein whereby in its being it is concerned about that being. As Heidegger puts 
it, Dasein existiert Umwillen seiner, “Dasein exists for the sake of itself’. This is the essence 
of existence.
However, in order that inner-worldly beings be encountered, they must in the first
place, according to Heidegger, be “let be” [sein lassen]. This letting-be is not to be 
os
understoodAan ontical “attitude” that Dasein can take towards beings; it is rather to be 
conceived ontologically. It refers to the fact that beings must be allowed to be uncovered in 
their Zuhandenheit (in their possibilities of use and serviceability within a relational context) 
in order that they can be encountered as inner-worldly beings at all. It is an “a priori” letting- 
be that is meant here, which is the condition of possibility that Dasein can let a being be, or 
not let it be, in the ontic sense. Heidegger writes: ‘Das auf Bewandtnis hin freigebende Je- 
schon-haben-bewenden-lassen ist ein apriorisches Perfekt, das die Seinsart des Daseins selbst 
charakterisiert. Das ontologisch verstandene Bewendenlassen ist vorgSngige Freigabe des 
Seienden auf seine innerumweldiche Zuhandenheit. ’20
That on the horizon of which beings are “freed” for their Zuhandenheit by this 
letting-be, in terms of a total relational context in which they have their Bewandtnis, is 
determined by a possibility of Dasein’s being. This horizon is what Heidegger means by 
world. World, as the totality of Bewandtnis relations within which alone inner-worldly beings 
can be encountered, is constituted by the projection of Dasein onto a possibility of its being, a
18 Sein und Zeit, p. 84
19 Sein und Zeit, p. 84
20 Sein und Zeit, p. 85
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Worum-willen. In so far as Dasein is, according to the essence of its existence, always related 
to a possibility of its being, Dasein is always already in the world and inner-worldly beings 
have always already been encountered. The encounter with inner-worldly beings is only 
possible on the basis of already being in the world. ‘Auf innerweltliches Seiendes kbnnen wir 
einzig deshalb stoBen, weil wir als Existierende je schon in einer Welt sind. ’21
In so far as Dasein is already in a world, Dasein already moves within an 
understanding of die total relational context grounded by the possibilities of its being. 
Corresponding to this understanding, Heidegger characterises these relations in terms of 
Bedeutsamkeit [“meaning”]. Bedeutsamkeit is what Heidegger means by the worldliness of 
the world -  the determination of the structure of die being of the world. It is to be understood 
as the particular mode of presence [Anwesenheit] of the world. ‘Bedeutsamkeit ist zun&chst 
Modus der Anwesenheit, auf die alles Seiende der Welt hin entdeckt ist. ’22 Accordingly, the 
referential relations and contexts which we have discussed up until now are finally to be 
grasped as relations and contexts of meaning. Bedeutsamkeit is the necessary condition of die 
encounter with inner-worldly beings, which also means that every encounter with inner- 
worldly beings, indeed Dasein’s comportment within the world as such, is always one of 
understanding. It is also of course the condition that Dasein can understand something like 
linguistic meanings and therefore of language itself as a basic possibility of Dasein.
Being-in
Like worldliness, being-in is an existential; a way of being of Dasein. It is not to be 
understood in terms of the way in which a vorhanden thing can be “in” another vorhanden 
thing, for example, a book in a bag, or a chair in a room. Nor does it describe the way in 
which a subject is among objects. ‘[D]as In-Sein [ist] alles andere als ein nur betrachtendes 
oder handelndes Gegenfiberstehen, das heifit Zusammenvorhandensein eines Subjekts und 
eines Objekts. ’23 Da-sein is itself its Da, its “there”. It is this determination of the being of 
Dasein that Heidegger wishes to draw attention to with the designation being-in. Only on the 
basis of this original “there” can there first be a “here” and an “over there”; that is, that 
something like spatiality in general can characterise Dasein's being-in-the-world, and thus 
that vorhanden beings can be encountered as in other vorhanden beings.
The being-in of Dasein is the “there”-being of Dasein in virtue of which it is always 
already in -  at a particular locality -  its world. The analysis of being-in takes the form of an 
analysis of the constitution of the “there”. The “there” is constituted or determined by what
21 Die Grundprobleme der PhOnomenologie, p. 235
22 Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs, p. 287
23 Sein und Zeit, p. 176
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Heidegger calls Beflndlichkeit and by what he calls Verstehen [understanding] . 24 We shall 
employ die first of these terms untranslated.
Beflndlichkeit is the ontological determination of that which is known ontically as 
mood [iStimmung], as well as of the multifarious phenomena of affection in general. It is the 
ground of the possibility that Dasein can “be in a mood” [Gestimmtsein], and, indeed, in so 
far as it is an existential, it implies that Dasein is always “in a mood” of some kind or another, 
even if perhaps only an entirely indifferent one. Dasein is its “there” -  which is to say 
nothing other than that Dasein is in-the-world. But this “there” has always already been 
discovered in a certain way; Dasein has always already found itself. But Dasein is its “there” 
in having to be it; it is responsible for its “there”. Mood refers to the way in which the 
“there” is discovered in the understanding that Dasein is responsible for it. ‘In der 
Gestimmtheit ist immer schon stimmungsmSBig das Dasein als das Seiende erschlossen, dem 
das Dasein in seinem Sein uberantwortet wurde als dem Sein, das es existierend zu sein hat. ’25 
The “there” is determined in so far as Dasein is always already confronted by its existence in 
its responsibility for it. So determined, the “there” is always “mooded”. It will become 
clearer by die end of the existential analysis why such confrontation should ground the 
phenomena of mood. At this stage it might merely be added that mood determines the being 
of Dasein in so far as it is concemfully related to itself.
In being responsible for its “there” in having to be it, Dasein is delivered over to its 
“there”. In being delivered over to its “there” Dasein encounters the mere fact that it is. This 
“that-it-is” Heidegger names Dasein’s Geworfenheit [“thrownness”]. Dasein is thrown into 
its “there” in such a way as to be responsible for it, without ever having first chosen to be 
responsible for it. ‘Der Ausdruck Geworfenheit soil die Faktizitdt der Uberantwortung 
andeuten. ’26 In so far as Dasein is existentially determined by responsibility for its that-it-is, 
the that-it-is peculiar to Dasein is not at all analogous to the unresponsive that-it-is of 
something vorhanden. Geworfenheit, as a determination of its being, indicates that Dasein 
has always already found itself in so far as it is delivered over to its “there” in such a way as 
to be responsible for it, and this ontological finding of Dasein of itself is referred to by 
Heidegger as Dasein's Beflndlichkeit.
Beflndlichkeit has a disclosive function; it discloses to Dasein its being in its 
Geworfenheit. Being-in, and therefore being-in-the-world as such as the being of Dasein, is 
disclosed in Beflndlichkeit. We saw above that Dasein's encounter with inner-worldly 
beings is always concemful in so far as it is always grounded in a Bewandtnisganzheit 
constituted by a possibility of Dasein's being. It is never in the first place a mere
24 Along with language, which we shall leave out of our exposition.
25 Sein und Zeit, p. 134
26 Sein und Zeit, p. 135
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disinterested staring at something. This concemful encounter is only possible in so far as 
inner-worldly beings are constituted in such a way as to be capable of affecting Dasein in 
some way or another. Inner-worldly beings are able to affect Dasein only in so far as they 
matter to Dasein in regards to its concern for its own being. This mattering is grounded in 
Befindlichkeit -  in Dasein’s being delivered over to its being in having to be it. In so far as 
inner-worldly beings as zuhanden are always such as to be of concern to Dasein, 
Befindlichkeit determines the disclosure of world as such. ‘In der Befindlichkeit liegt 
existenzial eine erschliefiende Angewiesenheit auf Welt, aus der her Angehendes begegnen 
kam.’2’
Befindlichkeit grounds the affectation of Dasein in general, and therefore the various 
emotional phenomena that determine being-in-the-world. Paradigmatically perhaps,
Befindlichkeit grounds the possibility that Dasein can find something in the world 
threatening, and therefore the various manifestations of fear. In these phenomena the 
existential concern Dasein has for its own being is brought clearly to light. Heidegger also 
claims that Befindlichkeit is the ground of die possibility that Dasein can be affected in a 
sensory way. Perhaps here the phenomena of beauty and the possibility of cerjpoiWpain are 
paradigmatic examples of what Heidegger has in mind.
As well as by Befindlichkeit, the “there” is existentially structured by what Heidegger 
calls Verstehen [understanding] . 28 Befindlichkeit always has its understanding; understanding 
is always determined by Befindlichkeit. What Heidegger means by understanding here, it 
should be emphasised again, is removed from the epistemology of a mere cognitive grasping 
of something. Heidegger conceives it as an existential. Dasein can only enter into some 
epistemological understanding of something because Dasein’s being is already essentially 
determined by understanding as such. ‘Das Verstehen ist keine Art des Erkennens, sondem 
die Gnmdbestimmung des Existierens. ’29
The conception of understanding that Heidegger has in mind already played a role in 
the discussion of Bewandtnis and Bedeutsamkeit, the worldliness of the world. The existence 
of Dasein is always for the sake of itself. World is disclosed structured according to the 
relations of Bedeutsamkeit that are constituted by the possibility for the sake of which Dasein 
at any time exists. Disclosed according to Bedeutsamkeit, world is always already 
understood. Understanding, as an existential characterising the being of Dasein, is ontically 
determined or structured according to that for the sake of which Dasein at any specific time 
exists.
27 Sein und Zeit, pp. 137-138 Originally italicised.
28 One decisive difference between the existential analysis of Dasein and the later philosophy of the
history of being, is the omission in the latter of this concept of understanding. Why this is so and what
this amounts to should become clearer in the following part.
29 Die Grundprobleme der PhOnomenologie, p. 393
65
Das Dasein ist existierend sein Da, besagt einmal: Welt ist “da”; deren Da-sein ist das In-Sein. 
Und dieses ist imgleichen “da” und zwar als das, worumwillen das Dasein ist. Im Worumwillen ist das 
existierende In-der-Welt-sein als solches erschlossen, welche Erschlossenheit Verstehen genannt 
wurde Im Verstehen des Worumwillen ist die darin grundende Bedeutsamkeit miterschlossen. Die 
Erschlossenheit des Verstehens betrifft als die von Worumwillen und Bedeutsamkeit 
gleichurspriinglich das voile In-der-Welt-sein. Bedeutsamkeit ist das, woraufhin Welt als solche 
erschlossen ist. Worumwillen und Bedeutsamkeit sind im Dasein erschlossen besagt: Dasein ist 
Seiendes, dem es als In-der-Welt-sein um es selbst geht.30
Dasein exists in the world for the sake of itself, in such a way that it is given over to 
itself delivered over to its “there**. Existence is given over to Dasein itself such that Dasein 
is responsible for it in its capacity to be. In so far as Dasein, always existing for die sake of 
itself  ^ is given over to itself in its capacity to be, Dasein’s being is structured according to 
possibility [Mdglichkeit].31 The existence of Dasein is itself, as Heidegger puts it, 
Mdglichsein. 'Dasein ist je das, was es sein kann und wie es seine Mdglichkeit ist. ’32 Indeed 
Heidegger writes: 'Die Mdglichkeit als Existenzial...ist die urspriinglichste und letzte 
positive ontologische Bestimmtheit des Daseins’ .33
Possibility here concerns the way in which Dasein is in the world for the sake of 
itself. In virtue of possibility, inner-worldly beings are first revealed in their usefulness and 
serviceability for the sake of Dasein’s being. ‘E)ie Bewandtnisganzheit enthiillt sich als das 
kategoriale Ganze einer Mdglichkeit des Zusammenhangs von Zuhandenem. ’34 Possibility in 
this sense is not at all something arbitrary. In virtue of its Geworfenheit and Beflndlichkeit 
Dasein has always already found itself within a determinate sphere of possibilities. Dasein is 
“geworfene Mdglichkeif\
Understanding in the existential sense is to be understood as that determinant of 
Dasein ’s being whereby, in its capacity to be, it is always already related to possibilities of its 
self, of its being, for the sake of which it is, such that world is disclosed in its corresponding 
structures.35 'Das eigenste SeinkOnnen selbst sein, es tibemehmen und sich in der 
Mdglichkeit halten, sich selbst in der faktischen Freiheit seiner selbst verstehen, d. h. das sich
30 Sein und Zeit, p. 143
31 Heidegger is keen to distinguish possibility in the existential sense from mere logical possibility in 
the sense of something not real and no necessity.
32 Sein und Zeit, p. 143
33 Sein und Zeit, pp. 143-144
34 Sein und Zeit, p. 144
35 Heidegger points out that “theoretical” understanding is also structured by the category of possibility. 
In order to theoretically understand something it suffices to grasp the conditions of its possibility. The 
question “why such and such?” always finds its answer once the conditions of the possibility of such 
and such have been given.
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selbst Verstehen im Sein des eigensten Seinkdnnens, ist der urspriingliche existenziale Begriff 
des Verstehens. ,36
Heidegger's existential concept of possibility necessarily implies a further concept: 
project, or projection [Entwurf\. Projection is the existential structure o f Dasein’s 
understanding, in virtue of which Dasein projects itself onto a possibility for the sake of 
itself  ^ and therefore onto its world. "Verstehen besagt genauer: sich entwerfen auf eine 
Mdglichkeit, im Entwurf sich je in einer Mdglichkeit halten. ’37 And: ‘Der Entwurfcharakter 
des Verstehens konstituiert das In-der-Welt-sein hinsichtlich der Erschlossenheit seines Da 
als Da eines Seinkdnnens. ’38
Projection here is an existential and should not be conflated with something like the 
mere making of plans according to which Dasein can subsequently comport itself. Plans are 
merely ontical; on the other hand, in so far as it is, Dasein has always already projected itself. 
"Dasein hat... sich je schon entworfen und ist, solange es ist, entwerfend. Dasein versteht sich 
immer schon und immer noch, solange es ist, aus Mdglichkeiten. ’39 As an ontological 
determination of Dasein, the structure of projection is rather the condition that Dasein can 
make plans at all. Further, in so far as possibilities are levelled down to the onticity of mere 
plans they lose their character as possibilities, for they then become understood according to a 
conception of being as Vorhandensein -  they become simply given existences of the future. 
For: ‘Der Mdglichkeitscharakter wird nur im Entwurf offenbar und ist nur offenbar, solange 
die Mdglichkeit im Entwurf festgehalten ist. ' 40
Understanding as projection always concerns the whole of being-in-the-world in so 
far as being-in and world are themselves structured according to the possibilities in terms of 
which Dasein understands itself. Thus Dasein ’s projection onto any given possibility always 
involves an existential modification of the whole of being-in-the-world. Understanding is 
always self-understanding: ‘Das Wesentlich des Verstehens als Entwurf liegt darin, daB in 
ihm das Dasein sich selbst existenziell versteht. ’41 But self-understanding is always in terms 
of existential possibility, and, reciprocally, is thus always already understanding of world: "Im 
Sichverstehen als In-der-Welt-seinkdnnen ist gleichurspriinglich Welt verstanden. ’42
As Heidegger makes clear in his introduction to the book, the existential analysis of 
Sein und Zeit is intended to reach a horizon of understanding from which the meaning of 
being can be asked after. Heidegger’s development of an existential conception of 
understanding is central to this task. That Dasein has an understanding of being is one of the
36 Die Grundprobleme der Phdnomenologie, p. 391
37 Die Grundprobleme der Phdnomenologie, p. 392
38 Sein und Zeit, p. 145
39 Sein und Zeit, p. 145
40 Die Grundprobleme der Phdnomenologie, p. 392
41 Die Grundprobleme der Phdnomenologie, p. 393
67
presuppositions that gets die existential analysis of Dasein going in the first place. Only once 
the structures of this understanding in general are worked out phenomenologically can it first 
become understandable in what Dasein’s understanding of being must necessarily consist, 
and only upon that basis is the horizon reached for enquiring into the meaning of being 
according to this understanding. In so far as Heidegger has now shown that something like an 
understanding of being-in-the-world belongs necessarily to the existential constitution of 
Dasein ’s being and being itself is included in being-in-the-world as the being or existence of 
Dasein*3, Heidegger has now established his incipient presupposition -  that Dasein has -  
indeed, essentially -  an understanding of being. Of course, this understanding is unthematic. 
In so far as Dasein's understanding concerns for the most part existentiell possibilities of 
itself it is for die most part a merely ontic understanding. The genuine possibility of 
ontological understanding and the relation of this understanding of being to the meaning of 
being in general will become clearer below.
The existential constitution of being-in has been characterised in terms of 
Befindlichkeit and understanding. It must be remembered that these two existentials jointly 
and reciprocally characterise the disclosure of being-in-the-world: ‘In der Weise der 
Gestimmtheit “sieht” das Dasein Mdglichkeiten, aus denen her es ist. Im entwerfenden 
ErschlieBen solcher Mdglichkeiten ist es je schon gestimmt. ’44
Selfhood
Despite the fact that Selbstheit [selfhood] is an essential concept for the existential 
analysis of Dasein, it plays, in Sein und Zeit, litde explanatory role, and Heidegger’s brief 
discussions of it are for the most part restricted to negative characterisation. What we shall 
say about it here will presuppose some of the discussion to come, in particular, the existential 
concepts of Sorge, authenticity and inauthenticity.
As to his negative characterisation, Heidegger distinguishes the existential concept of 
the self of Dasein from die traditional concepts of the “I” of the “I think”, of the subject 
whether as vkokcChcvov, substance or the logical subject, and consciousness. All of these 
conceptions, he claims, based on the metaphysical understanding of the being of beings, take 
the self to be something vorhanden. For example: ‘...der ontologische Begriff des Subjekts 
charakterisiert nicht die Selbstheit des Ich qua Selbst, sondem die Selbigkeit und
42 Die Grundprobleme der Phdnomenologie, p. 394
43 ‘In der Entworfenheit seines Seins auf das Worumwillen in eins mit der auf die Bedeutsamkeit 
(Welt) liegt Erschlossenheit von Sein uberhaupt. Im Entwerfen auf Mdglichkeiten ist schon 
SeinsverstAndnis vorweggenommen. Sein ist im Entwurf verstanden, nicht ontologisch begriffen. 
Seiendes von der Seinsart des wesenhaften Entwurfs des In-der-Welt-seins hat als Konstitutivum seines 
Seins das SeinsverstAndnis.’ [Sein und Zeit, p. 147]
44 Sein und Zeit, p. 148
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Bestdndigkeit eines immer schon Vorhandenen.,45 In contrast, in so far as selfhood belongs 
essentially to Dasein, and Dasein is existential, the self can only adequately be thematised on 
the model of existence. All of the above conceptions must be merely ontic and ultimately 
derivative characterisations. Dasein is not a “what”, but a “who”; and “who” is an existential 
determination.
The selfhood of Dasein is constituted by the fact that it is related to its self. Selfhood 
is self-relation. This notion of self-relation does not yet, of course, distinguish Heidegger’s 
concept of selfhood from the traditional accounts from Kant, for example, or from Locke.46 
Rather, the distinction of Heidegger’s account lies in the existential thematisation of this self­
relation. Dasein is related to itself in so far as it is existential, since existentiality is grounded 
in the fact that Dasein is always concerned about its being, that is, concerned about its self 
that is, exists always in relation to its self. When Heidegger writes that “Das Dasein existiert 
umwillen seiner** he means that Dasein exists for the sake of its self This has two original 
consequences. On the one hand, it is this “umwillen seinerf\  as we have seen, that determines 
die whole existentiality of being-in-the-world. For it is Dasein’s projection of itself onto a 
possibility of its being for the sake of itself that determines the Bewandtnisganzheit and 
therefore the structure of Bedeutsamkeit that constitutes the worldliness of the world in which 
Dasein finds and understands itself as geworfen amidst its possibilities. Determinative of 
existentiality as such, selfhood is therefore the ground of the possibility of the disclosure of 
world and of inner-worldly beings, which is to say, as we shall see below, that it is itself the 
ground o f the possibility o f disclosure, unconcealment, o f truth as such. Only in so far as 
Dasein is a self can it comport itself to beings at all. ‘So fern... das Dasein als Selbst existiert 
-  und nur insofem -  kann es “sich” verhalten zu Seiendem’47.
On the other hand, it grounds the fact that, existing for the sake of its self, Dasein can 
either be its self that is, be truly who it authentically is, or also not be its self, that is, 
abandon or lose its self. These two possibilities correspond to twin concepts that together 
configure -  as we shall attempt to show -  the epicentral substructure of Heidegger’s 
philosophical architectonic: authenticity and inauthenticity. These are fundamental modes of 
Dasein's existential constitution of being. Their shared etymological root, eigen, means “to 
own”. The existentiality of Dasein, as concern for itself, is, we are told, essentially 
determined by what Heidegger calls Jemeinigkeit -  Dasein is in each case my own. 
Authenticity is that mode of being in which Dasein owns itself by being its self; inauthenticity 
is that mode of being in which Dasein has lost itself by abandoning its self. Inauthentic
43 Sein und Zeit, p. 320
46 Cf. Locke: 'Selfis that conscious thinking thing,. . .which is sensible, or conscious of Pleasure and
Pain, capable of Happiness or Misery, and so is concern’d for it self as far as that consciousness
extends. ’ [An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Book n, Chapter XXVII, § 17]
47 Vom Wesen des Grundes, Wegmarken, p. 138
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Dasein has rather die self of what Heidegger calls das Man, an entirely neutralised self that is 
not really owned by anyone. Nevertheless, this is the self of Dasein initially and for the most 
part, the self of Dasein's everydayness. Thus Heidegger writes: ‘Die “natiirliche” Ich-Rede 
vollzieht das Man-selbst. Im “Ich” spricht sich das Selbst aus, das ich zun&chst und zumeist 
nicht eigentlich bin. ' 48 Instead ‘Die Selbstheit ist existenzial nur abzulesen am eigentlichen 
SelbstseinkGnnen, das heifit an der Eigentlichkeit des Seins des Daseins als Sorge.149
This remains a preliminary account of the all-important distinction between 
authenticity and inauthenticity. In subsequent chapters we shall attempt to unfold the 
structurality constituted by these concepts and the way in which it is determinative for 
Heidegger's philosophy as a whole.
Before continuing, however, and in anticipation of much of the discussion to come, it 
is pertinent to insert a consideration of the way in which selfhood functions on the horizon of 
the history of being. For the concept of selfhood indicates to a certain extent the way in 
which the relation of die existential analysis to the philosophy of the history of being is to be 
conceived.
In Beitrdge zur Philosophie it is emphasised on the one hand that: ‘Selbstheit 
entspringt als Wesung des Da-seins aus dem Ursprung des Da-seins’50, and, on the other, that 
it is: ‘der Grund fhr die ZugehOrigkeit [des Menschen] zum Seyn. ’ 51 As we saw above, being 
needs historical man for the safe guarding of its truth. Heidegger thus continues: ‘Die 
ZugehOrigkeit zum Seyn aber west nur, weil das Sein in seiner Einzigkeit das Da-sein braucht 
und darin gegriindet und es grdndend den Menschen. Anders west keine Wahrheit.’ In what 
sense is selfhood, grounded in the essence of Dasein, the ground of man’s “Zugehdrigkeit 
zum Seyn™?
Heidegger writes that: ‘der Ursprung des Selbst ist das Eigen-tum’52 as the 
‘Herrschaft der Eignung im Ereignis.’ Thus selfhood as “Eigen-tum” is explicitly related to 
Ereignis53. The self-relational character of the existentiality of Dasein grounded in Sorge is 
the ground of Dasein’s “owning” itself the ground of the being of Dasein being given over to 
itself. This “owning-itself’, is the ground of Dasein’s belonging to Ereignis, which is to say 
the ground o f the belonging o f Dasein to the truth o f being. In so far as die relation of 
historical man to being is first grounded in the structures of Dasein, however, it is also the 
ground o f the belonging o f historical man to the truth o f being.
48 Sein und Zeit, p. 322
49 Sein und Zeit, p. 322
50 Beitrdge zur Philosophie, p. 319
51 Beitrdge zur Philosophie, p . 317
52 Beitrdge zur Philosophie, pp. 319-320
53 The etymological relation between the verb eigen [to own] from which Heidegger derives Eigen-tum, 
and Er-eignis is clear. Although cf. our discussion of this in chapter 9.
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Heidegger continues: ‘Sofera das Da-sein sich zu-geeignet wird als zugehdrig zum 
Ereignis, kommt es zu sich selbst,54. We saw above that Dasein is its self only in so far as it 
is in the existential mode of authenticity. Inauthentic Dasein is precisely not its self That 
Eigen-tum, as the origin of selfhood, is grounded in Ereignis means that historical man, 
whose essence it is to belong to the truth of being, only comes to its self in so far as it “takes 
up” or “takes over” its belonging to the truth of being. Heidegger writes: ‘Die Inst&ndigkeit 
in [dem] Geschehnis des Eigentums ermdglicht erst dem Menschen, geschichtlich zu “sich” 
zu kommen und bei-sich zu sein...Aber das Zu-sich-kommen ist eben nie eine zuvor 
abgeldste Ich-vorstellung, sondem Ubemahme der Zugehdrigkeit in die Wahrheit des Seins, 
Einsprung in das Da. Das Eigentum als Grund der Selbstheit griindet das Da-sein. Eigentum 
aber ist selbst wieder das Bestflndnis der Kehre im Ereignis. ’ 55 The coming to its self of 
historical man as the explicit “taking up” of its belonging to the truth of being, which is to say 
the explicit bringing of the truth of being itself to unconcealment, is what we have previously 
discussed under the name die Kehre; that is, it is the fundamental turning in the history of 
being out of die nihilistic epoch of metaphysics that is grounded in Seinsvergessenheit, and 
into the truth of being. This is possible only on die basis of the mode of being of Dasein of 
authenticity as a fundamental possibility of its ontological constitution. For, in coming to its 
self Dasein encounters the truth of (its) being as such. ‘Das Dasein ist es selbst aus seinem 
wesenhaften Bezug sum Sein iiberhaupt. ’ 56
Sorge
Worldliness, being-in, and selfhood are the constitutive moments of the existential 
structure that Heidegger calls being-in-the-world -  the existential constitution of Dasein. 
Being-in-the-world is, however, to be grasped as a unitary phenomenon; it is not to be 
understood as the result of a progressive connecting together of its constitutive moments. 
Once he has presented a phenomenological thematisation of each of its constitutive moments, 
Heidegger puts himself to the task of thematising the unity of being-in-the-world as such, 
upon which each of its constitutive moments is ontologically grounded. This amounts to the 
attempt to grasp the ground of the entirety of the phenomenon.
54 Beitrdge zur Philosophie, p. 320
55 Beitrdge zur Philosophie, p. 320
56 EirrfUhrung in die Metaphysik, p. 22 These considerations refute the central thesis of Michael 
Zimmerman’s book Eclipse of the Self Zimmerman argues, as the title of the work suggests, that the 
self becomes less important to Heidegger’s philosophical concerns after Sein und Zeit. This is, 
according to him, because of perceived short-comings involving the notion of authenticity, which in 
Sein und Zeit remained too “voluntaristic” to overcome the philosophy of the subject. Clearly, though, 
given its important place in Beitrdge zur Philosophie, there was no eclipse of the self, and this is no 
doubt because the way in which the self was conceived, from the very beginning, was as an existential 
self-relation, and thus nothing to do with the Vorhandenheit of the philosophy of the subject.
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Heidegger names this ontological ground of existentiality Sorge [care]. 
Fundamentally -  and this cannot be over emphasised -  Sorge is to be understood in terms of 
the belonging together of existentiality and facticity. He writes: ‘Das Dasein existiert 
faktisch. Gefragt wird nach der ontologischen Einheit von Existentialit&t und Faktizit&t, bzw. 
der wesenhaften ZugehOrigkeit dieser zu jener. ’57
However, before Heidegger can outline the phenomenal content of Sorge as the 
unitary constitution of being-in-the-world, it is methodologically incumbent on him to secure 
an appropriate mode of access to the phenomenon. One might presume that Heidegger should 
have done this right at the start of his analyses, but before the existential structure of 
disclosure as such was laid bare, that is, before the existential s of understanding and 
Befindlichkeit were outlined, the requisite ground for securing the appropriate mode of 
phenomenological access was unavailable. The analysis of Sorge begins the second 
revolution o f the hermeneutic wheel. From now on Heidegger is explicitly moving within the 
existential structures of disclosure that he has outlined. In what follows we shall not pursue 
any further the methodological issues raised by Heidegger’s hermeneutic phenomenology.
The unitary ground of the totality of being-in-the-world is the ontological ground of 
die existentiality of Dasein. As we saw above, understanding always has its Befindlichkeit, 
and understanding and Befindlichkeit taken together determine what Heidegger calls the 
Erschlossenheit [disclosedness] of the “there”. Heidegger asks therefore: ‘Gibt es eine 
verstehende Befindlichkeit im Dasein, in der es ihm selbst in ausgezeichneter Weise 
erschlossen ist? ’58 According to Heidegger such a Befindlichkeit is understood under the 
name Angst. ‘Die Angst gibt als Seinsmdglichkeit des Daseins in eins mit dem in ihr 
erschlossenen Dasein selbst den ph&nomenalen Boden fiir die explizite Fassung der 
ursprtinglichen Seinsganzheit des Daseins. ’ 59 We shall follow Heidegger’s methodologically 
requisite phenomenological analysis of this mode of Befindlichkeit in order to be in a position 
to fully grasp the sense of Heidegger’s claim that the fundamental ontological determination 
of Dasein is to be understood as Sorge and other important analyses still to come.
The first important consideration is that the phenomenon of Angst is essentially 
connected to the existential modes of authenticity and inauthenticity, which shall be discussed 
in more detail below. More specifically, the phenomenon of Angst is determined as the 
ground of what Heidegger calls Verfallen. ‘Die Abkehr des Verfallens griindet...in der 
Angst’60. For the purposes of the following discussion, and in anticipation of a more 
thorough treatment, we shall define the phenomenon of Verfallen to be the flight [Flucht] of
57 Sein und Zeit, p. 181
58 Sein und Zeit, p. 182
59 Sein und Zeit, p. 182
60 Sein und Zeit, p. 186
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Dasein from  its authentic self to the self of das Man, to the mode of being of inauthenticity.61 
This amounts to a flight towards inner-worldly beings ,; that is, beings of a type which Dasein 
is not.
The flight of Verfallen is the flight of Dasein from its self. In order for this flight to 
be possible, Dasein’s being must in a certain non-conceptual sense always already be 
disclosed to Dasein. This disclosure is the accomplishment of the basic Beflndlichkeit of 
Angst, and it is on the basis of this pre-conceptual disclosure of the being of Dasein to itself in 
the flight of Dasein from its self that Heidegger aims to conceptualise the being of Dasein in 
its totality and unity. ‘Die existenziell-ontische Abkehr gibt auf Grund ihres 
Erschlossenheitscharakters phenomenal die Mdglichkeit, existenzial-ontologisch das Wovor 
der Flucht als solches zu fassen. ’62
The second important consideration is expressed in Heidegger's insistence that Angst 
is not to be confused with fear. Whereas fear is always fear before this or that inner-worldly 
being, that which Angst is Angst before is nothing determinate at all. In his inaugural address 
Heidegger characterises that which Angst is Angst before as precisely nothing. ‘Die Angst 
offenbart das Nichts. ’63 But not being determinate, Angst cannot ground a 
Bewandtnisganzheit of any kind. What Angst is Angst before is therefore not “relevant” in 
any sense, claims Heidegger. Indeed, it is precisely in the Beflndlichkeit of Angst that the 
significance-structures of the worldliness of the world within which Dasein is “being-in” 
evanesce: ‘Die innerweltlich entdeckte Bewandtnisganzheit des Zuhandenen und
Vorhandenen ist als solche iiberhaupt ohne Belang . Die Welt hat den Charakter vdlliger 
Unbedeutsamkeit. ’64 And: ‘Alle Dinge und wir selbst versinken in eine Gleichgultigkeit. ’65 
This is because: ‘das Wovor der Angst ist die Welt als solche. Die vbllige 
Unbedeutsamkeit... bedeutet nicht Weltabwesenheit, sondern besagt, dafi das innerweltlich 
Seiende an ihm selbst so vdllig belanglos ist, dafi auf dem Grande dieser Unbedeutsamkeit 
des Innerweltlichen die Welt in ihrer Weltlichkeit sich einzig noch aufdrSngt. ’66 The 
irrelevance of the world in Angst will become important to our concerns in subsequent 
chapters.
In so far as Angst is Angst before the world as such, it is more precisely Angst before 
the being-in-the-world of Dasein; that is, before the being of Dasein itself. On the other hand, 
that for the sake of which Dasein has Angst is not any particular possibility of its being; 
rather, Dasein has Angst for the sake of its being as such, that is, for the sake of being-in-the-
61 As we shall see, however, Verfallen is in the last place to be conceived as determinative of the basic 
structure of truth as unconcealment.
62 Sein und Zeit, p. 185
63 Was ist Metaphysik?, Wegmarken, p. 112
64 Sein und Zeit, p. 186
65 Was ist Metaphysik?, Wegmarken, p. 111
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world as such. Being-in-the-world is thus both that for the sake of which Dasein has Angst 
and that before which Dasein has Angst. The basic Beflndlichkeit of Angst is therefore 
disclosive, albeit non-conceptually or non-thematically, of the being of Dasein.67
In so far as Angst is wholly indeterminate, it has to do with the whole of the being of 
Dasein, the being of Dasein as such, and it is for this reason that it is, for Heidegger, 
methodologically significant. Brought before itself as such, Dasein is “vereinzelf\ 
individuated. Angst therefore brings Dasein before its possibility for authenticity. It is for 
this reason that the flight of Verfallen, grounded in Angst, is to be characterised as the flight 
away from the possibility of authenticity -  away from Dasein in so far as it is its self -  
towards inner-worldly beings.
The fundamental Beflndlichkeit of Angst grounds the fundamental determination of 
the being of Dasein as such as Sorge. In what sense does the fundamental Beflndlichkeit of 
Angst accomplish this? What does Heidegger mean by Sorge?
Angst grounds die fundamental determination of the being of Dasein as Sorge in two 
ways. On the one hand, Angst as a fundamental Beflndlichkeit is only a possibility for the 
being of a being whose being is to be characterised as Sorge; on die other hand, die being of 
Dasein that is disclosed in Angst is fundamentally determined as Sorge.
We saw that that before which and that for the sake of which Dasein has Angst are the 
same: being-in-the-world. Nevertheless, we saw that that before which Dasein has Angst is 
the world as such bereft of the meaning structures that otherwise determine it, that is, the 
world in the simple fact that it is; and we also saw that that for the sake of which Dasein has 
Angst is its being but not in regard to any particular possibility of its being; rather: in regard to 
its possibility-of-being as such; that is, in regard to its basic character of existing for the sake 
of itself  ^ its “being-possible” as such. Therefore Heidegger determines the basic character of 
Angst as follows: ‘Das sichdngsten ist als Beflndlichkeit eine Weise des In-der-Welt-seins; 
das Wovor der Angst ist das geworfene In-der-welt-sein; das Worum der Angst ist das In-der-
66 Sein und Zeit, p. 187
67 It might be wondered whether the Beflndlichkeit of Angst is really distinguished by its capacity to 
disclose the being of Dasein as such. Perhaps depression might be thought to reveal the “unbearable 
lightness of being” as such; and Heidegger himself recognises that boredom -  a special mode of the 
disclosure of time -  can perform the same function. (Cf. especially Die Grundbegriffe der 
Metaphysik) Indeed, Haar notes that whilst Angst is the revelation of being, boredom is the correlative 
revelation of time. [Empty Time and Indifference to Being in Heidegger Toward the Turn, ed. Risser, 
p. 306] Why then is the Beflndlichkeit of Angst of such importance to Heidegger’s purposes? The 
answer lies in the fact that Angst concerns the disclosure of existence as possibility (rather than as 
meaningless or tedious, etc.), and of course it is precisely existence as possibility that Heidegger wishes 
to outline in the existential analytic. Indeed, Angst could be characterised as the fear of possibility as 
such, and that would be why it is always indeterminate. In so far as it is the fear of possibility, Angst 
bears a distinguished relation to the mode of Dasein's being of authenticity -  as that mode of being 
defined by the choice of Dasein’s own-most possibility and thus to the corresponding determination 
of Verfallen. And it is as the ground of Verfallen that Angst is indispensable to the elaboration of the 
Sorge structure.
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Welt- sein-k6 nnen. Das voile Phfinomen der Angst demnach zeigt das Dasein als faktisch 
existierendes In-der-Welt-sein. Die fundamentalen ontologischen Charaktere dieses Seienden 
sind Existenzialitdt, Faktizit&t und Verfallensein. ,68 These three fundamental ontological 
characteristics of Dasein taken together constitute the ontological structure that Heidegger 
names Sorge.
Existentiality concerns the character of the being of Dasein whereby, in so far as in 
its being it is always concerned about its being, and therefore exists always for the sake of 
itself  ^ it is always already related to a possibility of its being. That Dasein is always already 
related to a possibility of being is to say that Dasein is always already “vorweg”, as Heidegger 
puts it, already beyond itself Dasein is vorweg in relation to a possibility of its being; Dasein 
is, Heidegger writes, “Sich-vorweg-sein”.
Facticity refers to the character of the being of Dasein whereby it is always already 
geworfen into a world, and is thereby given over to responsibility for itself in its capacity to 
be. This always already fundamentally determines existentiality, which can therefore be more 
fully grasped as “Sich-xorweg-im-schon-sein-in-einer-Welf\ This is to say that existence is 
always factical, or that existentiality is essentially determined by facticity.
Verfallensein refers to a ontological determination which we have yet to adequately 
thematise -  that Dasein, in its factical existentiality, has always already become “absorbed” 69 
in a world among inner-worldly beings. Verfallensein is the flight of Dasein towards inner- 
worldly beings and away from its fundamental existential possibility of authenticity, and is 
thus to be understood dynamically; Heidegger characterises it as an Absturz, a “plunge” into 
inner-worldly beings. In so far as it is always already absorbed amidst inner-worldly beings, 
Dasein, as Verfallensein, is always already “Sein-bef. But to “Sein-bei” necessarily belongs 
that Dasein is already in a world engaged with a possibility of its being, and thus existentiality 
and facticity.
The three fundamental ontological characteristics comprising the being of Dasein are 
to be taken together in their structural unity: ‘Das Sein des Daseins besagt: Sich-vorweg- 
schon-sein-in-(der-Welt-) als Sein-bei (innerweltlich begegnendem Seienden). Dieses Sein 
erfllllt die Bedeutung des Titels Sorge, der rein ontologisch-existenzial gebraucht wird. ’70
Sorge is the basic existential constitution of the being of Dasein, the unity of the 
moments of being-in-the-world -  world, being-in and selfhood.71 It cannot be derived from
68 Sein und Zeit, p. 191
69 Perhaps also: “entangled”, “enmeshed”.
70 Sein und Zeit, p. 192
71 In what sense is Sorge different from the metaphysical category of the will? And, correspondingly, 
in what sense is Heidegger’s account of human existence fundamentally different from that of 
Schopenhauer or Nietzsche? The existential analysis belongs to the overcoming of metaphysics, as we 
have already suggested, and therefore to the overcoming of the philosophy of the subject. The category 
of the will belongs essentially to the philosophy of the subject. Thus the will is in fact, Heidegger
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any more primordial existential element of the being of Dasein. Nevertheless, in so far as it is 
itself structured in its unity, it remains to grasp the possibility of this structuring; that is, it 
remains to grasp the more primordial phenomenon which first makes the wholeness and the 
unity of the Sorge structure possible. This is to be determined as primordial temporality.
would say, the metaphysical interpretation (according to the categories of Vorhandenheit) of the 
phenomenon of Sorge. Will is an essential distortion of Sorge according to the categories of 
metaphysical thinking and Sorge is the ground of the metaphysical category of the will. Heidegger’s 
account of human existence is, then, on the one hand, absolutely different from that of Schopenhauer 
and Nietzsche, and, on the other, essentially connected to theirs through a shared concern with what is 
uhimately the same phenomenon.
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Chapter 7: 
Temporality
The primary task of Sein und Zeit, we are told, is to determine the ontological horizon 
from which the question of being can be raised, that is, the horizon of any understanding of 
being as such. According to Heidegger, to understand something always requires that it be 
projected [entworfen] onto a horizon, conceived, roughly, as that which determines the 
illuminated arena within which the matter can be understood. He refers to Plato for whom the 
form of die good -  the sun in his cave allegory -  first makes knowledge possible in so far as it 
illuminates the domain of what can be known. In Heidegger’s sense, the form of the good 
would be the horizon for all possible knowledge.
Time -  or more precisely what he calls in Die Grundprobleme der Phdnomenologie 
“Temporalitdt” -  is, for Heidegger, the horizon for any understanding of being whatsoever. It 
is die horizon for any understanding of being whatsoever in so far as it forms the most basic 
structural determination of the being of Dasein, to which an understanding of being belongs. 
Accordingly, it first makes ontology as a science possible.
To anticipate the discussion to follow, we might say that, forming the horizon of any 
possible understanding of being, time constitutes the structural possibility of unconcealment 
and concealment as such; that is: constitutes the structurality of unconcealment and 
concealment. Time is itself truth, for Heidegger: ‘So wird Zeit der erst zu bedenkende 
Vomame fiir die allererst zu erfahrende Wahrheit des Seins. ’ 1 And: ‘Zeitlichkeit ist der 
Vomame fur die Wahrheit des Seyns’2. Thus it is itself the clearing of being: ‘[D]as Wesen 
der Zeitlichkeit bestimmt sich aus dem Seyn als die mit dem Seyn wesende, in ihm er-eignete
1 Einleitung zu “Was ist Metaphysik?”, Wegmarken, p. 377
2 Die Geschichte des Seyns, p. 95 Thus the withheld third division of Sein und Zeit, which was 
supposed to outline the temporality of being as such, should be understood as having the task of the 
thinking of the truth of being. All of Heidegger’s later thinking moves within its orbit. For the 
temporality of being temporalises itself as its history. It is for the same reason that the history of being 
is at the same time the history of truth.
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Lichtung der Ereignung. ’3 And of course being is itself unconcealment; thus: ‘Zeit ist der 
Name fiir das als Unverborgenheit selbst wesende Sein. ’4 And: ‘“Sein” ist in “Sein und Zeit” 
nicht etwas anderes als “Zeit”, insofem die “Zeit” als der Vomame fiir die Wahrheit des Seins 
genannt wird, welche Wahrheit das Wesende des Seins und so das Sein selbst ist. ’ 5 As the 
structurality of unconcealment and concealment, time is the structure of truth, and thus of 
being itself. Indeed, we might say that, for Heidegger, time is the structure par excellence; 
that structurality, which makes all other structure first possible: structurality as such.
Our first task will be to clarify Heidegger’s claim that time is the basic ontological 
constitution of Dasein. We have already examined, in connection with Aristotle,
that which Heidegger calls the everyday or vulgar concept of time. Heidegger distinguishes 
from this vulgar concept of time what he calls Zeitlichkeit -  primordial temporality -, the 
ontological time that he outlines as the basic constitution of the being of Dasein. We have 
seen that the being of Dasein in its totality is grounded in the structure of Sorge. Heidegger’s 
first task is to show the way in which the structural unity of Sorge, or its ontological 
possibility, is grounded in primordial temporality. This means to show how primordial 
temporality is that which makes something like the constitution of the being of Dasein in its 
factical existence first possible (and therefore something like an understanding of being, 
which belongs essentially to die constitution of this being, first possible).
Temporality and Sorge
We outlined Heidegger’s Sorge structure as follows: Sich-vorweg-schon-sein-in-(der- 
Welt-) als Sein-bei (innerweltlich begegnendem Seienden). Heidegger claims that the three 
constituents of this structure, Sich-vorweg, Schon-sein-in, and Sein-bei, correspond to, and, in 
their essential structural unity, are first made possible by, the three constituents of the 
structure of temporality: future, past and present. Temporality is what first makes possible 
the unitary structure of Sorge. He writes: ‘Zeit ist nichts, was drauBen irgendwo vorkommt 
als Rahmen fiir Weltbegebnisse; Zeit ist ebensowenig etwas, was drinnen im BewuBtsein 
irgendwo abschnurrt, sondem sie ist das, was das Sich-vorweg-sein-im-schon-sein-bei, d. h. 
was das Sein der Sorge mdglich macht. ’6
The Sich-vorweg of Dasein is grounded in its existentiality. We have seen that 
Dasein is always concerned about its being in so far as it is always already related to a 
possibility of its being. Related to a possibility of its being, Dasein always exists “for the 
sake of itself’ [Umwillen seiner selbst]. The Sich-vorweg of the structure of Sorge aims to
3 Zur Auslegung von Nietzsches II unzeitgemdsser Betrachtung, p. 94
4 Metaphysik und Nihilismus, p. 130
5 Einleitung zu “Was ist Metaphysik?”, Wegmarken, p. 376
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capture the character of Dasein’s being whereby it is always already related to a possibility of 
its being for the sake of itself. Being related to a possibility of its being is only possible in so 
far as Dasein is futural [zukiinftig] in its being.
The Schon-sein-in of Dasein is grounded in its facticity. Dasein is always already 
geworfen into a world in which it finds itself. Finding itself already geworfen into a world is 
only possible in so far as Sorge, the constitution of being of Dasein, is essentially determined 
as past [gewesen; better translated as “has-been”]. As long as it still factically is, Dasein is 
gewesen; that is, essentially determined by “has-been-ness” in the constitution of its being. 
‘[Dasein] ist nur, wie es faktisch ist, in der Weise, dafi es das Seiende, das es ist, je  schon 
gewesen ist.'1
The Sein-bei of Dasein is grounded in its Verfallensein. Dasein is always already in a 
world encountering beings. Such absorption in the world is made possible only in so far as 
beings are present [anwesend\ to Dasein, which in turn is possible only in so far as Dasein’s 
existential constitution is determined by the present [Gegenwart].
Heidegger concludes: ‘Die Zeitlichkeit ermdglicht die Einheit von Existenz, 
FaktizitSt und Verfallen und konstituiert so ursprtinglich die Ganzheit der Sorgestruktur. ’ 8 
Just as it is important not to conceive of die Sorge structure as being constructed from the 
putting together of its constitutive moments, so is it important not to conceive of temporality 
as being constructed from the conjunction of its elements. This would be to conceive of these 
elements as vorhanden, and therefore temporality itself as in some sense a being; but 
Heidegger is emphatic: ‘Wir nennen die urspriingliche Zeit mit Absicht Zeitlichkeit, um 
auszudriicken, dafi die Zeit nicht ilberdies noch vorhanden ist, sondem dafi ihr Wesen zeitlich 
ist. Das heifit: Zeit “ist” nicht, sondem zeitigt sich. ’9 This differentiates primordial 
temporality from the vulgar understanding of time, which understands “future”, “past” and 
“present” in terms of Vorhandenheit -  as determinations of the “now”. What is in the future 
is the not-yet now, what is in the past is the no-longer now. Nows are determined as either 
earlier or later than other nows. Temporality, on the other hand, is to be conceived -  and this 
cannot be emphasised enough -  as an essential unity. Each of its moments is only possible on 
the basis of the other two; each of its moments “contains” already the other two within it. 
This means that temporality itself is, in its unity, temporal [zeitig] -  whereas time in the 
vulgar sense is itself nothing temporal. ‘Die Zeitlichkeit ist selbst die in der ekstatischen 
Zeitigung sich einigende ekstatische Einheit. ’ 10 Each of its moments “temporalises itself’ 
from out of the other two, in terms of their basic unity. It itself is therefore not determined by
6 Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs, p. 442
7 Die Grtmdprobleme der PhOnomenoIogie, p. 375
8 Sein und Zeit, p. 328
9 Metaphysische Anfangsgriinde der Logik, p. 264
10 Metaphysische A nfangsgriinde der Logik, p. 266
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the earlier or later; that is, original temporality is not to be conceived on the model of 
succession. ‘Die Zeitigung bedeutet kein “Nacheinander” der Ekstasen. Die Zukunft ist nicht 
sptiter als die Gewesenheit und diese nicht friiher als die Gegenwart. Zeitlichkeit zeitigt sich 
als gewesende-gegenwartigende Zukunft. ’ 11 (And note the emphasis on the future in the last 
sentence here). If it were, Sorge would have to be understood on the model of the mode of 
being of Vorhandenheit. Instead, it makes such temporal determinations as earlier and later, 
before and after first possible in so far as it organises Dasein’s dealings in the world. 12 Thus 
the ecstasy of having-been is not to be conceived as somehow earlier than the other two and 
the ecstasy of the future somehow later. Temporality refers to the way in which Dasein is in 
its existential structures, and in this sense is no simple replacement for the vulgar concept of 
time as successive. Rather, as we shall see, it is the primordial phenomenon that, by virtue of 
an essential disfigurement, first makes this vulgar concept possible. Temporality provides the 
structurality by which Dasein can existentially -  and that means factically -  be as Sorge. It is 
the inner constitution of Dasein’s factical existentiality, and therefore grounds every one of 
the individual phenomena that have been unearthed in the course of the existential analytic. 13
Instead of being understood in terms of Vorhandenheit, the structural elements of 
temporality are to be understood, according to Heidegger, as “ecstases” [Ekstasen]. This 
word comes from the Greek Ik oraais meaning “displacement”, or “movement outwards”. 
With it, Heidegger wants to capture the intrinsic “beyond-ness” or “outside-ness” that he 
attributes to each of the structural elements of temporality, which themselves first ground the 
possibility of a beyond-ness or outside-ness as such, that is an openness. This is their 
essential character of Entriickung, “carrying-off”, “removal”. He writes: ‘Die urspriingliche 
Zeit ist in sich selbst...aufier sich...das AuBer-sich schlechthin. Sofem dieser ekstatische 
Charakter die Zeitlichkeit kennzeichnet, liegt im Wesen jeder Ekstase, die sich nur in der 
Zeitigungseinheit mit den anderen zeitigt, eine Entriickung nach..., auf etwas hin in einem 
formalen Sinne. Jede Entriickung ist in sich selbst offen. Zur Ekstase gehdrt eine
11 Sein und Zeit, p. 350
12 Note: ‘Das Rechnen mit der Zeit ist konstitutiv fur das In-der-Welt-sein.’ [Sein und Zeit, p. 333]
13 These thoughts make a nonsense of William Blattner’s book Heidegger's Temporal Idealism. 
Nothing could distort the thrust of Heidegger’s thinking any more than the casting of him as an idealist. 
If Heidegger fails to overcome the realist-idealist dichotomy then his whole thought collapses without 
further ado. Indeed, as we have seen, Heidegger characterises the metaphysical understanding of 
being as idea. To label him an idealist, then, would whitewash the very proposal of raising the question 
of being, as the attempt to step beyond such an understanding of being. Blattner encapsulates 
Heidegger’s temporal idealism in the following proposition: ‘I f Dasein did not exist, time would not 
obtain. ’ [p. 232] But in so far as Dasein is nothing more than time -  understood as original 
temporality -, it is hard to see what relation of dependence that could amount to idealism is supposed to 
apply here! Indeed, it would be closer to the truth to call Heidegger a temporal realist in so far as time 
is the truth of being. Nevertheless all such categorisations take Dasein and time to be things of the 
mode of being of Vorhandenheit. For Blattner, Dasein is simply the metaphysical subject, temporality 
its way of organising its experience. Only within the orbit of this framework can talk of realism and
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eigentiimliche Offenheit, die mit dem AuBer-sich gegeben ist. ’ 14 In the unity of its ecstases, 
temporality is intrinsically openness. ‘[Zeit] ist wesentlich ein Sich-dffnen’15.
It is the character of Entriickung that opens a horizon. To temporality belongs 
essentially an ecstatic horizon, opened, or, perhaps better, traced out by the displacement that 
characterises each of its ecstases as a beyond- or outside-itself, and within which openness 
itself in the broadest sense, is first possible. Heidegger writes: ‘Der Horizont ist die offene 
Weite, wohinein die Entriickung als solche aufier sich ist. Die Entriickung dffhet und htilt 
diesen Horizont offen. Als ekstatische Einheit von Zukunft, Gewesenheit und Gegenwart hat 
die Zeitlichkeit einen durch die Ekstase bestimmten Horizont. ’ 16
In its character of Entriickung,, temporality is intrinsically directional, it has an 
intrinsically directional momentum [Schwung17]. It is an ecstatic-horizontal directionality 
“towards” the future. ‘Die Zeitlichkeit zeitigt sich primSr aus der Zukunft. ’ 18 We have seen 
that the existentiality of Dasein in general is constituted in the projection of Dasein onto 
possibilities of its being for the sake of which it is. This understanding projection determines 
the Bedeutsamkeitganzheit that itself structures Dasein’s world. Such a projection is 
intrinsically futural; the existentiality of Dasein, determined as Sich-vorweg, is a projection 
towards futural possibilities of its being. The futural determination of Dasein ’s existentiality 
is grounded in the directionality of temporality, which is therefore itself to be determined as 
primarily futural -  although such a priority of the future in the constitutive ecstases of 
temporality in no way breaks up their fundamental unity.
A further characteristic of temporality that Heidegger emphasises is its finitude. As 
we shall see below, Dasein is in its being always already related to its death. The finitude of 
existence is constituted by the mortality of Dasein. But the existentiality of Dasein is 
determined by mortality not merely at that moment when Dasein factically dies, but rather 
always in so far as Dasein still is. Existentially conceived, death is not an event that will 
happen at some point in Dasein’s future; Dasein ’s existentiality is always already related to 
the utmost possibility o f its non-being. It is the finitude of temporality that makes this relation 
to its death, its understanding projection onto the utmost possibility of its non-being, possible 
for Dasein. It does this in so far as the primary ecstase of the future closes Dasein's 
projection onto possibilities of its being, thus making the understanding of the eventual 
possibility of its non-being first possible, and thus grounding Dasein's existential relation to 
its death. It does this in so far as it is itself closed; that is, intrinsically and already determined
idealism make sense. There could be no cruder misunderstanding of Sein und Zeit, and this cripples 
Blattner’s animadversion as a whole.
14 Die Grundprobleme der PhOnomenologie, p. 378
13 Metaphysische Anfangsgriinde der Logik, p. 271
16 Die Grundprobleme der PhOnomenologie, p. 378
17 Metaphysische Anfangsgriinde der Logik, p. 268
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in relation to the fundamental possibility of nothingness, of its ceasing to temporalise. ‘Der 
ekstatische Charakter der urspriinglichen Zukunft liegt gerade darin, dafi sie das Seinkdnnen 
schliefit, das heifit selbst geschlossen ist und als solche das entschlossene existenzielle 
Verstehen der Nichtigkeit ermdglicht. ’ 19 As we shall see more clearly below, this closure of 
the ecstase of the future, this finitude of Dasein's temporality, which grounds Dasein's 
relation to its own non-being, makes existentiality as such -  essentiality constituted as Sorge, 
concern for being -  first possible.
Having laid bare die way in which the composite structure of Sorge is grounded in the 
unity of temporality, Heidegger reiterates his analyses of the moments of being-in-the-world 
with the intention of demonstrating the particular way in which they are rooted in primordial 
temporality. We do not need to follow his recapitulation here. For our purposes it suffices to 
grasp more clearly the way in which existentiality is grounded in temporality. Temporality is 
die interplay of presence and absence. There are two ecstases of absence; one of presence. 
Crucially, however, absence is itself a mode of presence, and to this extent ancillary. ‘Auch 
das Vergangene und Zukunftige ist Anwesendes, n&nlich aufierhalb der Gegend der 
Unverborgenheit. Das imgegenwSrtig Anwesende ist das Ab-wesende. Als dieses bleibt es 
wesensmdfiig auf das gegenwSrdg Anwesende bezogen, insofem es entweder in die Gegend 
der Unverborgenheit hervorkommt oder aus ihr weggeht. Auch das Abwesende ist 
Anwesendes und, als Abwesendes aus ihr, in die Unverborgenheit anwesend. ’20
The possibility of existentiality is grounded in this presence-absence structure of 
temporality. Only in so far as there is this interplay, can presence be conceived ecstatically, 
that is, dynamically, can the movement of existentiality take its shape. Only in so far as the 
future is absent presence can there be an existential projection towards it. Only then can there 
be existential possibilities at all. The absent presence of the future constitutes, as it were, the 
gradient, down which projection rolls, the curvature of existential space which shapes 
Dasein's projections. Existentiality is only possible on the basis of temporality. Of course 
this means that temporality makes being-in-the-world first possible, and thus the presence of a
18 Metaphysische Anfangsgriinde der Logik, p. 273
19 Sein und Zeit, p. 330
20 Der Spruch des Anaximander, Holzwege, p. 320 The issue here is commonly the ground of much 
confusion and embarrassment on the part of the commentators (for example, Frederick Olafson, 
Heidegger and the Philosophy of Mind; Taylor Carman, “On Being Social: A Reply to Olafson”; 
William Blattner, Heidegger’s Temporal Idealism). Does Heidegger understand the meaning of being 
to be presence; or is that understanding precisely what he is setting out to overthrow? So let us state 
the matter clearly: ‘Sein heifit Anwesen.’ [Was Heifit Denken?, Vortrdge und Aufsdtze, p. 136] In so 
far as absence is itself a mode of presence, Heidegger in no sense undermines this understanding of 
being with Sein und Zeit. What he undermines, is a particular way of understanding being as presence, 
namely, as Vorhandenheit, as static (constant) or perhaps as mere presence, as presence not itself 
encompassing absence -  as presence not understood in terms of truth as un-concealment. Joseph 
Kockelmans puts it like this: ‘Heidegger wished to bring the one-sidedly accentuated “continuous 
present” back into the full, pluridimensional time, in order then to try to understand the meaning of 
Being from the thus originally experienced time. ’ [On the Truth of Being, p. 65]
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world: the “Dor” of Da-sein as such. Only on the basis of temporality is unconcealment 
possible at all. For time is the truth of being. And in so far as disclosure always involves the 
understanding of being, temporality must be the condition of possibility for understanding 
being at all.
Temporality and Historicity
Postponing further discussion of these issues for now, our next task is to ask about the 
connection between the temporality of Dasein and the possibility of history. 
[iGeschichtlichkeit is to be translated as “historicity”, and Historie as “historiography”.] Our 
guiding consideration is the question of how the history of being in its essential structures -  
which are still to be made clearer -  is first made possible by the temporality that is die 
ontological determination of die being of Dasein, and thus how Dasein is the ground of 
history as the history of being. The history of being is, for Heidegger, the most fundamental 
determination of history: history as the “holding sway” of being itself. He writes: ‘Die 
Geschichte ist Geschichte des Seyns und deshalb Geschichte der Wahrheit des Seyns’21 And: 
‘Geschichte ist Wesung der Wahrheit des Seyns. ’22 And even: ‘Das Er-eignis ist die
urspriingliche Geschichte selbst’23. But: ‘Der Weg zum Wesen der Geschichte, aus der 
Wesung des Seyns selbst begriffen, ist “fundamentalontologisch” vorbereitet durch die 
Grundung der Geschichtlichkeit auf die Zeitlichkeit. ’24 It is this grounding that is attempted 
in Sein und Zeit. ‘Die Analyse der Geschichtlichkeit des Daseins versucht zu zeigen, dafi 
dieses Seiende nicht “zeitlich” ist, weil es “in der Geschichte steht”, sondem dafi es 
umgekehrt geschichtlich nur existiert und existieren kann, weil es im Grunde seines Seins 
zeitlich ist. ’25 In what does this attempt consist?
What is it that makes the stone of an ancient Greek temple somehow historical when 
the rocks lying on the beach beside it, just as old, are not? The answer, Heidegger claims, is 
that the temple belonged to the world of a people of the past. Whilst the rocks played no 
significant role in their world, the temple did; the temple itself determined significances in 
their world. But world is an ontological determination of Dasein; it would appear that 
historicity has essentially to do with Dasein’s worldliness. Thus: ‘Geschehen der Geschichte 
ist Geschehen des In-der-Welt-seins. ’26 And: ‘Mit der Existenz des geschichtlichen In-der- 
Welt-seins ist Zuhandenes und Vorhandenes je schon in die Geschichte der Welt
21 Die Geschichte des Seyns, p. 93
22 Die Geschichte des Seyns, p. 98
23 Beitrdge zur Philosophie, p. 32
24 Beitrdge zur Philosophie, p. 33
25 Sein und Zeit, p. 376 Originally italicised.
26 Sein und Zeit, p. 388 Originally italicised.
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einbezogen. ’27 But what does it mean that the temple belongs to the world of a people of the 
past? Dasein is never itself simply past, so long as it still exists. Nevertheless, in so far as it 
is essentially determined by having-been, Dasein can be what Heidegger calls “da-gewesen”, 
“having-been-there”. Heidegger writes: ‘Die noch vorhandenen Altertumer haben einen 
“ Vergangenheits”- und Geschichtscharakter auf Grund ihrer zeughaften Zugehorigkeit zu und 
Herkunft aus einer gewesenen Welt eines da-gewesenen Daseins. ’28 But Dasein does not first 
become historical on the basis of the fact that it is da-gewesen. Rather, it can -  and must -  
become da-gewesen because its ontological constitution is already determined by historicity. 
But how is it that Dasein is capable of becoming da-gewesen? In what does the historicity of 
Dasein consist? In what sense is historicity included in the temporal determination of 
Dasein's being?
Dasein's being as Sorge is factical existence. It is essentially determined by the 
understanding projection onto possibilities of being. What these possibilities factically are, 
Heidegger insists, is not for the ontological-existential analysis to determine. Nevertheless, in 
so far as Dasein is geworfen into them, their horizon is determined in advance. The horizon 
that determines what counts as an existential possibility for Dasein is given over to it as a 
legacy [Erbe] from worlds of the past. In the mode of authenticity: ‘Die Entschlossenheit, in 
der das Dasein auf sich selbst zuruckkommt, erschliefit die jeweiligen faktischen 
MOglichkeiten eigentlichen Existierens aus dem Erbe, das sie als geworfene ubernimmt. ,29 
The determination of possibilities by the legacy given over to Dasein is the essential 
historicity of Dasein's factical existentiality, the essential historicity of Dasein's being as 
Sorge. In so far as temporality is the ecstatic unity of the Sorge-structure, this historicity -  
that is, the possibility of history as such -  is grounded in the temporality of Dasein.
The essence of history is thus the taking up of possibilities bequeathed as a legacy in 
a futural projection. This explains what might be called the continuity of history -  a history is 
structurally always continuous, the evolving unity of a single discourse.3031 But it might be
27 Sein und Zeit, p. 388 Originally italicised.
28 Sein und Zeit, pp. 380-381
29 Sein und Zeit, p. 383
30 At the beginning of his discussion of historicity in Sein und Zeit, Heidegger frames the issue in terms 
of the question of what he calls the Erstreckung [the “stretching-out”, or “extension”] of Dasein's life 
between birth and death. In order to account for the historicity of Dasein, it might be thought, one has 
to account for this stretching-out. Initially, this is understood in terms of the totality of a succession of 
experiences coming and going in time but through which a single self persists. These experiences 
have, of course, the mode of being of Vorhandenheit. But the being of Dasein, determined in terms of 
temporality, is never to be understood as anything vorhanden. The stretching-out of Dasein must 
rather be somehow constitutive of Dasein's existence. ‘Das Dasein fullt nicht erst durch die Phasen 
seiner Momentanwirklichkeiten eine irgendwie vorhandene Bahn und Strecke “des Lebens” auf, 
sondem erstreckt sich selbst dergestalt, dafi im vorhinein sein eigenes Sein als Erstreckung konstituiert 
ist. Im Sein des Daseins liegt schon das “Zwischen” mit Bezug auf Geburt und Tod. ’ [Sein und Zeit, p. 
374]
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objected that the fact that Dasein always already finds itself within a legacy means little more 
than that Dasein stands in history; not that history itself is constituted by Dasein’s mode of 
being. But this would be to mistake Heidegger’s ontological analysis for an ontical one. 
Whilst it is true of course that Dasein stands in history; this could only be possible in so far as 
its being is in advance essentially determined by historicity. And in so far as history is always 
the history of world, and world is an ontological determination of Dasein, Dasein's historicity 
must make history as such possible in the first place. For, as the history of world, history is 
the history of disclosure, that is, of unconcealment as such -  world being a determination of 
the Da. History is necessarily history of the truth of being, and in so far as Dasein is the site 
on which being opens itself up in its truth, there can be history only on the basis of Dasein: 
‘Inwiefem ist die Zeitlichkeit wesentlich fiir das Wesen der Geschichte? (vgl. “Sein und 
Zeit”) Nicht weil das “Geschehen” “in” der “Zeit” verlauft, sondem weil “Zeit” einen 
Wesensbezug zur Wahrheit des Seyns hat und Geschichte die Wesung dieser Wahrheit ist’32. 
Thus: ‘Der Grund der Geschichtlichkeit des Menschentums ist seine Zugewiesenheit in die 
Wahrheit des Seyns’3B. This is the reason why history in the West necessarily begins (at least 
first begins), when die first thinker experiences unconcealment as such: ‘dafi im Zeitalter des 
Griechentums das Sein des Seienden zum Denkwurdigen wird, ist der Beginn des 
Abendlandes, ist der verborgene Quell seines Geschiekes. ’3435
This is further to say that the “persistence of the self’ is grounded in the being of Dasein. The 
notion that the self s persistence must be sought for within the sum of the experiences that, added 
together, constitute a life stems from a conception of Dasein rooted in inauthenticty. The question 
concerning the stretching-out of a life is premised, claims Heidegger, on Dasein having already lost 
itself, having already been ontologically scattered across a multiplicity of experiences in time. 
Understood in terms of the authenticity of Dasein’s being, the stretching-out is already included in its 
ontological constitution. Ontologically, Dasein does not need to be put together again out of pieces 
that cumulatively form its life. Heidegger writes: ‘Die Entschlossenheit des Selbst gegen die 
Unst&ndigkeit der Zerstreuung ist in sich selbst die erstreckte Stimdigkeit, in der das Dasein als 
Schicksal Geburt und Tod und ihr “Zwischen” in seine Existenz “einbezogen” halt.’ [Sein und Zeit, pp. 
390-391] Understood according to the mode of being of authenticity, Dasein already is ontologically 
stretched out between birth and death; the self already has, in its ontological constitution, its 
persistence. The question concerning the scattering of Dasein across a life-span of experiences is, of 
course, grounded in the vulgar understanding of time.
31 Of course, history is usually understood in terms of a whole people or a culture. Heidegger writes: 
‘Wenn aber das schicksalhafte Dasein als In-der-Welt-sein wesenhaft im Mitsein mit Anderen existiert, 
ist sein Geschehen ein Mitgeschehen und bestimmt als Geschick. Damit bezeichnen wir das 
Geschehen der Gemeinschaft, des Volkes. Das Geschick setzt sich nicht aus einzelnen Schicksalen 
zusammen, sowenig als das Miteinandersein als ein Zusammenvorkommen mehrerer Subjekte 
begriffen werden kann.’ [Sein und Zeit, p. 384] Here, it would seem, the Geschick is grounded in the 
historicity of Dasein. But in this context it has not yet taken on its being-historical significance. See 
footnote 37 below.
32 Die Geschichte des Seyns, p. 98
33 Besinnung, p. 182
34 Logos, Vortrtige und Aufsatze, p. 219 See also the quote that opened chapter one.
35 According to Heidegger, the possibility of historiography is rooted in the historicity of Dasein. 
‘[D]ie historische Erschliefiung von Geschichte ist an ihr selbst, mag sie faktisch vollzogen werden 
oder nicht, ihrer ontologischen Struktur nach in der Geschichtlichkeit des Daseins verwurzelt. ’ [Sein 
und Zeit, p. 392] And: ‘“Geschichte” ist nicht nur “Gegenstand” der Historie, sondem Grund ihrer
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History, however, is the history of being; indeed: ‘Das Seyn als Er-eignis ist die 
Geschichte’36 -  but this in so far as it is the history of the holding sway of truth. If Dasein is 
the locality in which truth holds sway, then the structurality of the history of being must be 
grounded in the structurality of Dasein. At this stage in our considerations only a structural 
parallel need be drawn. This consists simply in the correlation between the two beginnings, 
which structure the history of being, and the two most basic modes of temporalisation which 
form the substructure of Dasein's ontological constitution: authenticity and inauthenticity. In 
subsequent chapters we shall explore the nature of the relations of grounding that pertain 
within this correlation.37
Authentic temporality is described in terms of the following characteristics: 
Vorlaufen as the ecstasy of the future; Augenblick as the ecstasy of the present; Wiederholung 
as the ecstasy of the past. Inauthentic temporality takes in contrast: Gewdrtigen as the ecstasy 
of the future; Gegenwdrtigen as the ecstasy of the present; Vergessen as the ecstasy of the
MOglichkeit. Nur was eigentlich Geschichtlich ist, kann historisch sein; der Mensch ist historisch, weil 
er geschichtlich ist, und er ist geschichtlich, weil er “zeitlich” ist.’ [Zur Auslegung von Nietzsches II 
unzeitgemdsser Betrachtung, p. 93] Historiography takes as its object the past, and is therefore only 
possible in so far as the past is already in some way accessible. Only in the Gewesenheit that grounds 
the historicity of Dasein!s being is the past first made accessible. The object of history is “da- 
gewesene” world. But historiography is not grounded in the historicity of the being of authentic 
Dasein. In other words, historiography understands history from out of the historicity of Dasein's 
inauthenticity. Corresponding to the vulgar understanding of time, historiography understands history 
in terms of a mere succession of past events or happenings -  rather than as the happening [Ereignis] of 
the truth of being as such. Therefore, it must be, according to later texts, overcome by the historicity of 
Dasein’s authenticity, which is historicity grounded in the truth of being: ‘Im Best&ndnis der Wahrheit 
des Seyns mussen wir jene urspriingliche Geschichtlichkeit erreichen, durch die alle Historie 
uberwunden ist.’ [Besirmtmg, p. 167] And: ‘Die Herrschaft der Historie wird nur durch die 
Geschichte, durch eine neue Entscheidung und erstmalige Erfragung der Wahrheit des Seyns 
uberwunden.’ [Besinnung, p. 169] For historiography is to be understood as an essential consequence 
of the structures of metaphysical thinking: ‘Im Wesen der Historie liegt, daC sie sich auf das Subjekt- 
Objeckt-Verh&ltnis grundet...Alle Historie endet im anthropologisch-psychologischen Biographismus.’ 
[Beitrdge zur Philosophie, p. 494]
Beitrdge zur Philosophie, p. 494
37 In Heidegger’s lecture Zeit und Sein from 1961 we find the following: ‘Weil man uberall das Seins- 
Geschick nur als Geschichte und dieses als Geschehen vorstellt, versucht man vergeblich, dieses 
Geschehen aus dem zu deuten, was in “Sein und Zeit” uber die Geschichtlichkeit des Daseins (nicht 
des Seins) gesagt ist. Dagegen bleibt der einzig mogliche Weg schon von “Sein und Zeit” her den 
sp&teren Gedanken uber das Seins-Geschick vorzudenken, das Durchdenken dessen, was in “Sein und 
Zeit” uber die Destruktion der ontologischen Lehre vom Sein des Seienden dargelegt wird.’ [Zur 
Sache des DenJcens, p. 9] Would this not seem to imply that we are on the wrong track in presuming to 
find the ground of the structure of the history of being in the existential analysis of Dasein? No, for, on 
the one hand, we are not grounding this structure in the historicity of Dasein, and are rather grounding 
both Dasein’s historicity and the structure of the history of being in the temporality that is the 
ontological determination of Dasein, and, on the other hand, we are not taking the Seins-Geschick in 
terms of a successive, chronological (and ontological) happening; rather, we are understanding it in 
terms of the unfolding of the structurality of the history of being. Nevertheless, only in so far as Da­
sein is essentially characterised by historicity can there be history as being’s Geschick. The 
deconstruction of the history of ontology is, of course, the first form that the philosophy of the history 
of being takes.
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past.38 Authentic temporality is a retrieval of the possibilities of the past in the clear sight of 
die Augenblick for the running ahead towards possibilities of the future; inauthentic 
temporality merely awaits the possibilities of the future to arrive for it, absorbed in those of 
the present, having forgotten those of the past.39
The distinction of these two modes of temporality is clear. It is most manifest 
perhaps in regards to the ecstasy of the present. The authentic present is the Augen-blick, the 
moment of sight, in which temporal being itself is “seen”, unconcealed in its truth. As the 
moment of truth, in which time itself as the truth of being is -  perhaps implicitly -  disclosed, 
the moment that is the Augenblick is in an important sense “beyond” or “outside” time -  
precisely by being authentically in time.40 Gegenwdrtigen, in contrast, carries all the 
reverberations of the metaphysical thinking of static objectivity (Vorhandenheit) and the 
absorption, the Verfallen of Dasein, in those beings immediately present to its concern. In 
Gegenwdrtigen only beings are disclosed, those things that stand across or opposite Dasein in 
the course of its dealings in the world; being as such, in its temporality, the truth of being, is 
accordingly assigned to oblivion. Furthermore it is essentially isolated from the inauthentic 
ecstases of past and future; time has broken up into distinct existences: the now consequently 
takes precedence in its inauthentic interpretation. The originary unity of projective 
temporality is covered over -  the past is forgotten, the future merely awaited. The modes of 
absence constitutive of presence are concealed. Being is constant presence. Only in the mode 
of authenticity does Dasein expressly maintain the temporal unity constitutive of its being, 
retrieving understandingly the existential possibilities handed down or given over to it in its 
facticity, and throwing them forward again with knowing resolution in its futural surge.41
38 Cf. Die Grundprobleme der Phdnomenologie, § 20, c) and Sein und Zeit, §6 8 , a). There is some 
confusion in the secondary literature concerning whether or not inauthentic temporality is captured by 
the vulgar concept of time. This cannot be the case, for inauthentic temporality is a mode of original 
temporality, whereas time in the vulgar sense is nothing temporal at all. Rather, the vulgar concept of 
time is the result of the inauthentic understanding -  which itself is inauthentic temporality -  
thematising time in terms of the categories of objects of the mode of being of Vorhandenheit.
39 And thus the legacy determined by Dasein’s historicity can either be explicitly taken over or 
forgotten.
40 Heidegger explicitly acknowledges Kierkegaard in connection to the concept of Augenblick. 
Kierkegaard’s word for what is arguably the same phenomenon is literally the same: ejeblik.
41 Another common confusion in the literature concerns whether original temporality is modally 
indifferent as regards authenticity and inauthenticity, or whether original temporality is the same as 
authentic temporality. Of course, both claims are right. On the one hand, the temporal structure that is 
the ontological constitution of Dasein can either take the form of authentic temporality or inauthentic 
temporality; but, on the other, the authentic mode of temporality is precisely original temporality as it 
authentically is, that is, without essential distortion in its temporal structure.
Michel Haar is confused by this issue throughout the first part of his Heidegger and the 
Essence of Man, and Blattner is particularly vexed by a passage in Sein und Zeit, which seems to 
suggest that original temporality is only authentic temporality: ‘Wenn daher die der Verstandigkeit des 
Daseins zug&ngliche “Zeit” als nicht urspriinglich und vielmehr entspringend aus der eigentlichen 
Zeitlichkeit nachgewiesen wird, dann rechtfertigt sich gemaB dem Satze, a potiori fit denominatio, die 
Benennung der jetzt ffeigelegten Zeitlichkeit als ursprungliche Zeit.’ [p. 329] Zeitlichkeit is here 
named twice, once taking the adjective eigentliche, once taking the adjective ursprungliche. Blattner
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professes to find ‘no way to reread it to help my interpretation’ viz. that original temporality is modally 
indifferent as regards authenticity and inauthenticity. But the passage should never have been read to 
contradict his thesis in the first place. For “eigentliche Zeitlichkeit’ is here being contrasted, not with 
uneigentliche Zeitlichkeit, but with the time accessible to Dasein’s (everyday) understanding, that is, 
time in the vulgar sense; thus eigentliche here does not have its nomenclatorial Heideggerian meaning. 
It functions as it ordinarily does in German usage -  it means actual, real, true, original, also genuine; it 
is not meant technically at all.
Von Herrmann is clear about this issue: ‘Die ganzheitliche Struktur des Auf-sich-zukommens- 
Auf-sich-zuriickkommens-Gegenw&rtigens ist die formal-indifferente existenzial-ontologische 
Zeitlichkeitsstruktur, indifferent gegeniiber dem existenzialen Unterschied von Eigentlichkeit und 
Uneigentlichkeit. Als solche liegt sie sowohl der eigentlichen als der uneigentlichen Zeitlichkeit 
zugrunde.’ [Subjekt und Dasein, p. 83]
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Chapter 8: 
Mortality
Death remained a central theme for Heidegger throughout his philosophical career. It 
plays not only an essential role in the existential analytic of Sein und Zeit', it is also of central 
importance to the later thinking, particularly in relation to the conceptuality of das Geviert, 
the fourfold, where it defines the being of man: die Sterblichen. The conception of death 
employed in these contexts, and, in particular, the role that it plays in regard to being as such, 
does not change. Indeed, as we shall see, the consideration of Heidegger’s understanding of 
death reveals very clearly the nature of the relation of the existential analysis to the later 
thinking of the truth of being.
To begin with we shall examine the concept of death in the context of the existential 
analysis. Here it is initially introduced in terms of an attempt to uncover a possible Ganzsein 
of die being of Dasein. With the oudining of the structure of Sorge, the structural totality of 
Dasein has been formulated -  the totality of those structures that, taken together, define its 
ontological constitution. This structure is, however, essentially temporal. Through the 
concept of the Ganzsein of Dasein Heidegger is looking for the ontological determination of 
the temporal totality of Dasein’s being. This would be to ontologically define the temporal 
finitude of Dasein. This becomes a problem because of the very structure of Sorge itself. We 
saw that the primary moment of Sorge is Sich-vorweg. This names the fact that, existing 
always for the sake of itself, Dasein is always already temporally related to a possibility of its 
being. ‘Dieses Strukturmoment der Sorge sagt doch unzweideutig, dafi im Dasein immer 
noch etwas aussteht, was als Seinkdnnen seiner selbst noch nicht “wirklich” geworden ist. Im 
Wesen der Grundverfassung des Daseins liegt demnach eine stdndige Unahgeschlossenheit. ’ 1 
So long as Dasein still is, it is always related to something still outstanding and is therefore 
“unfinished” or “incomplete”. How is it then possible to understand Dasein in the temporal 
completeness of its being? But Heidegger writes: ‘Das Gelingen der vorbereitenden
1 Sein und Zeit, p. 236
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Interpretation des Daseins, die Seinsstruktur des Daseins aus ihm selbst herauszuholen, 
grundet darin, daB von vomherein in der thematischen Ansetzung der Analyse dieses Seiende 
selbst -  Dasein in seiner Ganzheit -  gewonnen ist. ’2 Clearly, an understanding of death, of 
the finality of Dasein, is of die utmost importance here.
This is the problematic in terms of which Heidegger introduces the phenomenon of 
death to the existential analytic. Nevertheless, what is of relevance to our concerns is 
Heidegger’s phenomenological explication of death and the subsequent function that death 
plays in the existential analytic.
Death, mortality, is simply Dasein’s essential finitude. As an ontological 
determination of Dasein, death is to be considered as an existential. Heidegger is asking after 
the ontological meaning of death as a basic ontological possibility of the being of Dasein. He 
is therefore concerned to distinguish from the existential understanding of death other 
possible ways of understanding it. It is requisite also to ascertain the correct mode of access 
to the phenomenon. For securing an adequate understanding of death faces a basic problem, 
namely, that, in so far as Dasein precisely dies, the possibility of experiencing and 
interpreting death is, at the critical moment, taken away from it. Death is the loss of the 
“Da”. Dasein is, however, always in a world with others that also die. Does the death of 
other “Daseins” ground the possibility of an existential understanding of death? Heidegger 
answers negatively. To experience the death of another is not at all to experience the 
ontological “coming-to-the-end” as it determines the other himself. The death of Dasein is 
also not to be conceived according to the model of the death of living beings ontologically 
dissimilar to Dasein. The mode of death peculiar to plants and animals Heidegger terms 
Verenden, “perishing” .3
Death could nevertheless be considered to be the opposite of life. Life is researched 
through biology and psychology, both of which respectively have their own conception of 
death. These conceptions themselves are based upon a, perhaps implicit, ontology of life. 
But life, as a basic possibility of the being of Dasein, must, according to Heidegger, be 
determined in the first place from out of the ontological constitution of Dasein: being-in-the- 
world -  existentiality.4 The existential conceptualisation of death, understood as the 
conceptual opposite of life, cannot, therefore, be determined out of the biological or 
psychological conceptions; nor, claims Heidegger, can it be determined out of any
2 Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegrijfs, p. 424
3 To my knowledge, Heidegger never distinguishes the ontological determination of animals from that 
of plants, which, in light of the question of death, rather brings out the jejuneness of Heidegger’s 
speciesism -  animals surely do not bear essentially the same relation to their death as do plants.
4 And it is a very important question as to whether his structural analyses are rich enough to do justice 
to so plenteous a phenomenon as life, whether Dasein could ever really be alive before it essentially 
dies.
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ethnological or biographical conceptions. Outside of die existential analysis of death stands 
also any question about what might lie “after” death, as well as any theodicy of death.
Any characterisation of death, however, must attribute to it the character of an end, or 
an ending. Heidegger begins his analysis by attempting to fasten the categorial determination 
of end and the related concept of totality in their application to the death of Dasein. In so far 
as it is always temporally related to a possibility of its being, Dasein is, in terms of its 
ontological constitution, always already related to something still “outstanding”. In what way 
is this outstanding not-yet to be understood? In so far as it concerns the being of Dasein as 
existence, what is not-yet is not to be considered as something of the mode of being of 
Vorhandenheit. It is not to be considered as anything that Dasein is to simply become, in the 
way in which, to use Heidegger’s example, a fruit becomes ripe. Correspondingly, the end of 
Dasein that is its death cannot be conceived simply in terms of the completion or die finishing 
of something. These determinations are attributable only to a being of the mode of being of 
either Vorhandenheit or Zuhandenheit. Heidegger writes: ‘So wie das Dasein vielmehr 
stSndig, solange es ist, schon sein Noch-nicht ist, so ist es auch schon immer sein Ende. Das 
mit don Tod gemeinte Enden bedeutet kein Zu-Ende-sein des Daseins, sondem ein Sein zum 
Ende dieses Seienden. Der Tod ist eine Weise zu sein, die das Dasein ubemimmt, sobald es 
ist. ’ 5 And: ‘Als immer schon bevorstehend, gehdrt der Tod zum Dasein selbst auch dann, 
wenn es noch nicht ganz und noch nicht fertig ist, also nicht im Sterben ist. ’6
Dasein is always already, in so far as it still is, Sein zum Ende, being towards the end, 
being towards death. The attempt to grasp the phenomenon of this being towards death of 
Dasein in its ontological foundation must take the existence of Dasein for its starting point. 
As we have seen, the ontological constitution of existence is structured by Sorge. Being 
towards death must be shown to be essentially grounded in the being of Dasein as Sorge, 
which is formulated out of the constitutive structural moments of existentiality, facticity and 
Verfallen. In what way does the phenomenon of death belong essentially to the structure of 
Sorge?
Being towards death, grounded in the existentiality of Dasein, has the character of the 
temporal relating of Dasein to a possibility of its being. Death is a possibility of the being of 
Dasein; one, like all of its possibilities, that Dasein itself must take up. It is, however, also a 
possibility unlike any other: being-in-the-world as such is at stake in the possibility of death, 
the possibility of there no longer being possibilities for Dasein. In so far as it concerns the 
being of Dasein as such, it is the possibility of the being of Dasein that most specifically 
belongs to Dasein itself. 'Der Tod ist jeweilig der meine, d. h. er gehdrt zu mir, sofem ich
5 Sein und Zeit, p. 245
6 Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs, p. 432
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bin.*7 As Guignon suggests, the possibility of death is the only existential possibility which 
cannot in principle be taken up by anyone else.8 In the face of the possibility of death, 
therefore, Dasein is individuated [vereinzelt], claims Heidegger; that is, removed from the 
network of its relations to others. Death is also a unique possibility in that it is utterly 
ineluctable. Dasein can never elude the possibility of its death. It cannot be “bypassed” -  
and this, it must be remembered, is no proclamation concerning the biological necessity of 
death, or of die particularly parlous nature of existence; it is an ontological determination of 
death in so far as it is a possibility of the existentiality of Dasein. Putting these characteristics 
of the existential possibility of death together, Heidegger writes: ‘So enthiillt sich der Tod als 
die eigenste, unbeziigliche, uniiberholbare M&glichkeit. Als solche ist er ein ausgezeichneter 
Bevorstand. Dessen existenziale Mdglichkeit griindet darin, dafi das Dasein ihm selbst 
wesenhaft erschlossen ist und zwar in der Weise des Sich-vorweg. Dieses Strukturmoment 
der Sorge hat im Sein zum Tode seine ursprunglichste Konkretion. ’9
This is no arbitrary and incidental possibility of the being of Dasein; rather, in so far 
as Dasein is, it is always already geworfen into this possibility. Heidegger writes: ‘Die 
Geworfenheit in den Tod enthiillt sich ihm ursprunglicher und eindringlicher in der 
Beflndlichkeit da* Angst. Die Angst vor dem Tode ist Angst “vor” dem eigensten, 
unbeziiglichen und umiberholbaren Seinkdnnen. Das Wovor dieser Angst ist das In-der- 
Welt-sein selbst. Das Worum dieser Angst ist das Sein-kdnnen des Daseins schlechthin. ’ 10 
This Angst is no mere fear of death. It is the disclosure of the fact that Dasein always exists 
geworfen towards its death. The possibility of death is determined by the facticity of Dasein.
Of course, as we have seen, for the most part Dasein flees what the Beflndlichkeit of 
Angst discloses towards the familiarity of inner-worldly beings; it is essentially determined by 
Verfallen, by Sein-bei. In the flight of Angst, Dasein conceals its death from itself; indeed, 
die flight of Angst is henceforth to be essentially understood as the flight from the existential 
possibility of death. ‘In diesem verfallenden Sein bei... meldet sich die Flucht aus der 
Unheimlichkeit, das heifit jetzt vor dem eigensten Sein zum Tode. ' 11
Heidegger concludes that the ontological possibility of the death of Dasein is 
grounded in the structure of Sorge. Only a being with the ontological constitution of Sorge 
can be a being towards death. But on the other hand, being towards death completely 
determines the Sorge structure. Sorge -  existentiality -  and death are mutually implicatory. 
This is most apparent in so far as all existentiality can be conceived as reciprocation to the 
ubiquitous possibility of death. On the one hand, almost all our actions are carried out within
7 Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs, p. 429
8 Cf. Heidegger and the Problem of Knowledge, p. 135.
9 Sein und Zeit, pp. 250-251
10 Sein und Zeit, p. 251
11 Sein und Zeit, p. 252
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the parameters laid down by the most basic project of staying alive, from eating to driving, 
and even to participation in dangerous sports. On the other, our projections always more or 
less coincide with a basic life-projection that is determined by the knowledge that a life-span 
is only of such and such a length of time, that our sojourn in being is essentially limited. 12
In so far as being towards death is grounded in the structure of Sorge, it must 
essentially be determined by the two fundamental modes of being of Sorge: authenticity and 
inauthenticity. Indeed, we shall now see that authenticity and inauthenticity are precisely to 
be grasped in terms of existentiality’s “reaction” to the possibility of death.
The existentiality of being towards death is essentially to be conceived as a relation of 
Dasein to its self. In the mode of inauthenticity this self is, however, as we have seen, the self 
of das Man. Initially and for die most part it is das Man that dies. Heidegger writes: ‘Das 
Dasein sagt: “Man stirbt”, weil darin gesagt ist: “Niemand stirbt”, d. h. je nicht gerade ich 
selbst... Im “Man stirbt” ist der Tod von vomherein auf eine Seinsmdglichkeit nivelliert, die 
in gewissem Sinne niemandes Moglichkeit ist. Damit aber ist der Tod in dem, was er ist, von 
vomherein abgedrdngt. ’ 13 Death is not considered to be the peculiar possibility that precisely 
individuates Dasein in its being, but rather something that affects no one in particular. One 
knows of course that “one must die someday too”, as Heidegger expresses it, but for the 
moment death is a long way off and remains therefore unthreatening. Death is considered to 
be merely an event that takes place at some point within the world -  that is, as something 
vorhanden -, and consequently its character of possibility is stripped away. If the event of 
death is near at hand, however, it is feared. It is feared because inauthentic Dasein does not 
know the Beflndlichkeit of Angst; even though -  and, indeed, precisely because -  it is a 
fleeing from the possibility of death disclosed in Angst. Inauthenticity, grounded in Sorge, is 
to be understood as a flight before the ultimate finitude of existence. This flight conceals 
death as a possibility, but of course does nothing to change the fact that Dasein is, in its 
existential essence, always already being towards death.
Fundamentally, although certain that death will one day occur, inauthentic Dasein 
conceals the fact that death is at any moment a possibility. The fact that death is certain and 
yet is entirely indeterminate with regards to its “when”, is for Heidegger an essential 
characteristic of the possibility of death. The concealment of the indeterminacy of the 
possibility of death is what gives the mode of being of inauthenticity its particular “certainty” 
of death, and thus determines the disclosure of this possibility in this mode of being.
12 Of course, life-span is determined qualitatively by the circumstances of the body, which typically 
starts out young and capable before eventually becoming old and decrepit, and, of course, corporeal 
capacity is the ultimate arbiter of existential projection. Indeed, Dasein only dies -  that is, existentially 
dies, not just biologically dies -  only in so far as it is bodily. But Heidegger omits to mention 
corporeality in relation to the existential elaboration of death. See chapter 14 for more on this lacuna.
13 Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs, p. 435-436
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In the mode of being of authenticity, on the other hand, Dasein precisely does not 
attempt to flee and cover up die possibility of death. Instead, in the mode of authenticity, the 
possibility of death is hilly uncloaked for Dasein’s understanding in its character as 
possibility -  as the certain and indeterminate possibility of die impossibility of existence 
(although of course not in the first place conceptually). This is not to say that authentic 
Dasein “takes up” this possibility of death, that is, attempts to realise it -  although perhaps 
this first becomes a genuine option; rather, authentic Dasein relates itself to the possibility of 
death whilst preserving its character as mere possibility. ‘Die eigentliche Seinsmdglichkeit 
Tod ist nur dann ergriffen, wenn das Seinsverhaltnis zu dieser Mdglichkeit so ist, dafi sie 
dabei als eine Gewifiheit meines Seins verstanden wird, und zwar eine Gewifiheit vom 
Charakter des Unbestimmten und eine Gewifiheit des Seins, die meine ist. ’ 14 Heidegger terms 
such a relation towards the possibility of death a Vorlaufen [a “running forwards” or a 
“running on ahead”]. In Vorlaufen, Dasein as such is revealed to itself in so far as the 
possibility of its death is absolutely specific to it, and thus the possibility o f being 
authentically is revealed to Dasein. Here, it seems, there is a reciprocal relationship between 
authenticity and death. On the one hand, the mode of being of authenticity reveals the 
possibility of death for what it is, and, on the other, the possibility of death reveals the 
possible authenticity of Dasein’s being. To gain more clarity concerning this relationship 
Heidegger analyses further the meaning of Vorlaufen towards death.
As we saw above, ‘Der Tod ist eigenste Mdglichkeit des Daseins. Das Sein zu ihr 
erschliefit dem Dasein sein eigenstes Seinkdnnen, darin es um das Sein des Daseins 
schlechthin geht. ’ 15 Vorlaufen towards death discloses to Dasein its own-most existential 
possibility in so far as it discloses the being of Dasein itself, about which this possibility is 
concerned. In doing this it individuates Dasein, reveals to Dasein that for the most part it has 
lost itself to the self of das Man, tears Dasein out of the mode of being of inauthenticity and 
discloses the fact that it must itself take over its own-most possibility of being. Heidegger 
writes: ‘Das Vorlaufen zum Tode in jedem Augenblick des Daseins bedeutet das Sich- 
zuruckholen des Daseins aus dem Man im Sinne des Sich-selbst wShlens. ’ 16 Dasein is 
brought explicitly before its capacity to be its self. Disclosing the possibility of death as 
inexorable, Vorlaufen towards death extirpates the incidental possibilities offered up by other 
“Daseins” or by inner-worldly beings and frees Dasein for making a choice regarding its life 
as a whole. Heidegger writes: ‘Weil das Vorlaufen in die umiberholbare Mdglichkeit alle ihr 
vorgelagerten Mdglichkeiten mit erschliefit, liegt in ihm die Mdglichkeit eines existenziellen
14 Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs, p. 438
15 Sein und Zeit, p. 263
16 Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs, p. 440 Originally italicised.
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Vorwegnehmens des ganzen Daseins, das heifit die Mdglichkeit, als games Seinkdnnen zu 
existieren. ’ 17
Vorlaufen discloses death in its character as a certain but indeterminate possibility, 
the possibility of the an-wM-ation of Dasein's existence. As we have seen, the Beflndlichkeit 
which accompanies the disclosure of this possibility is Angst. But as Was ist Metaphysik? 
makes clear, Angst is the disclosure of “the nothing” [das Nichts] -  this is its essential 
determination. Thus Heidegger writes:
Die Befindiichkeit aber, welche die stdndige und schlechthinnige, aus dem eigensten 
vereinzelten Sein des Daseins aufsteigende Bedrohung seiner selbst offen zu halten vermag, ist die 
Angst. In ihr befindet sich das Dasein vor dem Nichts der mdglichen Unmoglichkeit seiner Existenz. 
Die Angst ftngstet sich um das Seinkdnnen des so bestimmten Seienden und erschliefit so die auBerste 
Mdglichkeit. Weil das Vorlaufen das Dasein schlechthin vereinzelt und es in dieser Vereinzelung 
seiner selbst der Ganzheit seines Seinkdnnens gewiB werden laBt, gehort zu diesem Sichverstehen des 
Daseins aus seinem Grunde die Grundbefindlichkeit der Angst. Das Sein zum Tode ist wesenhaft 
Angst.18
Authentic being towards death is disclosure of nothingness. 19 But: ‘Das Nichts ist die 
Ermoglichung der Offenbarkeit des Seienden als eines solchen fur das menschliche Dasein. ’20 
Thus death stands in a disclosive relation to the truth of being. Heidegger tells us evocatively 
that: ‘Der Tod ist der Schrein des Nichts, dessen n&mlich, was in aller Hinsicht niemals etwas 
blofi Seiendes ist, was aber gleichwohl west, sogar als das Geheimnis des Seins selbst. Der 
Tod birgt als der Schrein des Nichts das Wesende des Seins in sich. Der Tod ist als der 
Schrein des Nichts das Gebirg des Seins. ’21 Authentic being towards death, determined 
essentially by the basic Befindiichkeit of Angst, is the apophatic disclosure of the truth of 
being as such. Coming face to face with its possible non-being, Dasein is thrown back onto 
the simple fact that it is, bringing being itself to unconcealment. It is for this reason that the 
analysis of death is of the utmost importance to the existential analysis of Da-sein, the site in 
which the truth of being holds sway. ‘Die Einzigkeit des Todes im Da-sein des Menschen
17 Sein und Zeit, p. 264 We mentioned at the beginning of this chapter that the existential consideration 
of death belonged to the attempt to fasten the possibility of a Ganzsein of the being of Dasein. It was 
suggested that such a Ganzsein is ontologically impossible in so far as the being of Dasein is always 
already determined by a relation to a “not-yet” of its being. We can now see that, ‘In das Dasein, als 
das zu seinem Tod seiende, ist das ftufierste Noch-nicht seiner selbst, dem alle anderen vorgelagert 
sind, immer schon einbezogen.’ [Sein und Zeit, p. 259] Thus the possibility of a Ganzsein is already 
an ontological determinant of the being of Dasein, and the initial suggestion is therefore false.
18 Sein und Zeit, pp. 265-266
19 ‘Der Tod ist als das Aufierste des Da zugleich das Innerste seiner mOglichen volligen Verwandlung. 
Und darin liegt zugleich der Hinweis in das tiefste Wesen des Nichts.’ [Beitrdge zur Philosophie, p. 
325]
20 Was ist Metaphysik?, Wegmarken, p. 115
21 Das Ding, Vortrdge undAufsdtze, p. 171
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gehdrt in die ursprunglichste Bestimmung des Da-seins, namlich vom Seyn selbst er-eignet zu 
werden, um seine Wahrheit (Offenheit des Sichverbergens) zu griinden. ’22 Only in so far as 
Dasein is mortal, that is, only in so far as Dasein is finite, is there disclosure of being -  that is, 
disclosure as such -  at all.
To this extent death is of equal importance to the philosophy of the history of being. 
In particular it is related to the possibility of the other beginning: ‘Aber nicht jeder braucht 
dieses Seyn zum Tode zu vollziehen und in dieser Eigentlichkeit das Selbst des Da-seins zu 
iibemehmen, sondem dieser Vollzug ist nur notwendig im Umkreis der Aufgabe der Grund- 
legung der Frage nach dem Seyn, eine Aufgabe, die allerdings nicht auf die Philosophie 
beschrSnkt bleibt. Der Vollzug des Seins zum Tode ist nur den Denkem des anderen Anfangs 
eine Pflicht, aber jeder wesentliche Mensch unter den Kiinftig schaffenden kann davon 
wissen. ’23 And: ‘Der Tod kommt hier in den Bereich der grund-legenden Besinnung nicht, 
um “weltanschaulich” eine “Todesphilosophie” zu lehren, sondem um die Seinsfrage erst auf 
ihren Grund zu bringen’24. In so far as death grounds the disclosure of the truth of being it 
grounds the essential relation of man to the truth of being, and therefore the possibility of the 
other beginning. There can be another beginning to history only in so far as mankind exists, 
according to his essence, as mortal, sterblich. ‘Die Sterblichen sind die Menschen. Sie 
heifien die Sterblichen, weil sie sterben kdnnen. Sterben heifit: den Tod als Tod vermdgen. 
Nur der Mensch stirbt. ’25
For this reason the mortals play an essential role in Heidegger’s fourfold, the 
quaternion which at the advent of the other beginning gathers together as world, as the truth 
of the holding sway of being, and thus first enablesthings to be as they are, as things. Refusal 
of world, the age of modem technology, must persist until mankind enters into his essence as 
the mortal that he is. Only in so far as man exists as mortal can the holding sway of world 
come to pass.
But, we are told, ‘Der Mensch ist noch nicht der Sterbliche. ’26 He is not yet capable 
of death as death, of the mortal essence given over to him. He remains estranged from this 
essence until die inceptual eschaton, the Ereignis of the truth of being, comes to pass, until he 
is essentially appropriated for the safeguarding of being’s truth, his essential relationship to 
being as being.
Der Tod ist weder das leere Nichts, noch ist er nur der Ubergang von einem Seienden zu 
einem anderen. Der Tod gehdrt in das aus dem Wesen des Seyns ereignete Dasein des Menschen. So
22 Beitrdge zur Philosophie, p. 283
23 Beitrdge zur Philosophie, p. 285
24 Beitrdge zur Philosophie, p. 286
25 Das Ding, Vortrdge und Aufsdtze, p. 171; and word for word identical (but with “a/s” in the
penultimate sentence italicised): Bauen Wohnen Denken, Vortrdge und Aufsdtze, p. 144.
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birgt er das Wesen des Seyns. Der Tod ist das hochste Gebirg der Wahrheit des Seyns selbst, das 
Gebirg, das in sich die Verborgenheit des Wesens des Seyns birgt und die Bergung seines Wesens 
versammelt. Darum vermag der Mensch den Tod nur und erst, wenn das Seyn selbst aus der Wahrheit 
seines Wesens das Wesen des Menschen in das Wesen des Seyns vereignet. Der Tod ist das Gebirg 
des Seyns im Gedicht der Welt21
The connection between death and the truth of being can be brought out in another 
way. Death is a possibility of the structure of Sorge. The structure of Sorge first makes death 
as death possible. But the structure of Sorge is grounded in temporality. Being towards death 
is the utmost fiiturality of Dasein, death being the very last possibility of Dasein, and thus, 
whilst being towards death is only possible on the basis of original temporality, it is 
essentially determinative of it. Original temporality is essentially determined as finite. But as 
we noted in the previous chapter, temporality is to be conceived as the structural disclosure 
(unconcealment and concealment) which is the truth of being, and thus as the ground of 
man's relation to being. ‘Dafi der Tod in dem wesentlichen Zusammenhang der 
urspriinglichen Zukunftigkeit des Daseins in seinem fimdamentalontologischen Wesen 
entworfen ist, heifit doch zun&chst im Rahmen der Aufgabe von “Sein und Z e i t er steht im 
Zusammenhang mit der “Zeit”, die als Entwurfsbereich der Wahrheit des Seyns selbst 
angesetzt ist. Schon dieses ist ein Fingerzeig, deutlich genug fiir den, der mitfragen will, dafi 
hier die Frage nach dem Tod im wesentlichen Bezug steht zur Wahrheit des Seyns und nur in 
diesem Bezug’ .28
26 Die Gefahr, Bremer und Freiburger Vortrdge, p. 56
27 Die Gefahr, Bremer und Freiburger Vortrdge, p. 56
28 Beitrdge zur Philosophie, p. 284
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Chapter 9: 
Ek-sistentiality
How is disclosure possible at all? Our aim in this chapter is to outline Heidegger’s 
final answer to this question by further investigating his claim that temporality is the 
condition of possibility for understanding being in general. Thereafter we shall examine the 
particular conception of truth that is implicated therein, and its decisive being-historical role. 
Much of what follows has been anticipated in previous explications.
Temporality as horizontal
Heidegger works out his claim that temporality is the condition of possibility for any 
understanding of being whatsoever in the second half of his 1927 lecture course Die 
Grundprobleme der Phdnomenologie. What was delivered in this lecture course is the closest 
he ever came to publically articulating that which was originally planned as the third division 
of the first part of Sein und Zeil. “Zeit und Sein” . 1 Part of the basic project of working out the 
question of die meaning of being, the attempt to lay bare the possibility for any understanding 
and interpretation of being whatsoever, time -  or temporality -  was here to be outlined as the 
horizon onto which all understanding as such, and thus understanding of being, necessarily 
projects. This amounts to the claim that the temporality of the being of Dasein is the 
condition of possibility for disclosure as such. For, for Heidegger, on the one hand, all 
understanding is grounded in an understanding of being, and, on the other, understanding as 
such is not to be differentiated from disclosure as such.
Heidegger argues for his basic thesis in two different ways. On the one hand, he puts 
his case as follows: all understanding of something requires its projection [Entwurf] onto a 
horizon. Inner-worldly beings are understood in terms of their Zuhandenheit or
1 As Heidegger writes here: ‘Der Versuch [“Zeit und Sein”] ist vemichtet, aber sogleich auf mehr 
geschichtlichem Wege ein neuer Anlauf gemacht in der Vorlesung vom S. S. 1927 [Die 
Grundprobleme der Phdnomenologie].’ [Mein Bisheriger Weg, Besinnung, pp. 413-414]
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Vorhandenheit -  in terms of their Bewandtnis -  in so far as they are projected onto the 
horizon of an understanding of being. But in so far as being is understood, it must in turn be 
projected onto a horizon. Temporality, as the condition of possibility of any understanding at 
all, is what forms the horizon onto which the understanding of being projects. It is the 
horizon upon which being can be disclosed at all, that is, die horizon of disclosure as such.
On the other hand, he argues as follows: ‘Die Zeitlichkeit ist die Bedingung der 
Mdglichkeit der Seinsverfassung des Daseins. Zu dieser gehdrt aber Seinsverstdndnis, wenn 
anders das Dasein als existierendes zu Seiendem, das es nicht selbst und das es selbst ist, sich 
verh&lt. Sonach muB die Zeitlichkeit auch die Bedingung der Mdglichkeit des zum Dasein 
gehdrigen Seinsverstdndnisses sein. ’2
These two arguments are ostensibly different. The basic thought of the first is that 
temporality forms the horizon upon which being is projected in so far as it is understood, 
since temporality is die horizon of all possible understanding; the basic thought of the second 
is that temporality must be the condition of possibility of Dasein’s understanding of being in 
so far as it forms die ontological constitution of Dasein to which an understanding of being 
essentially belongs. Crucially these amount to the same thing: temporality forms the 
projective horizon for any understanding of being precisely in so far as it forms the 
ontological constitution of Dasein. This, however, allows us to understand Dasein as itself 
understanding-of-being, as that projective open region in which beings are first encounter able. 
Dasein is not a subject to which beings are subsequendy disclosed; Dasein is itself simply 
disclosure of beings as such, the clearing within which beings presence [an-wesen]. Dasein 
as temporal structurality itself is die horizon of presence [Anwesenheit\. This further means 
that understanding of being is understanding of Dasein, Dasein's understanding of its self.
‘ Weltverstdndnis [understanding of being] ist... wesenhaft Selbstverstdndnis, und 
Selbstverstflndnis ist Daseinsverstdndnis. ’3 In order to see this it is first important to 
understand the sense in which an understanding of being forms the horizon upon which all 
understanding of inner-worldly beings projects, and thereby the sense in which, for 
Heidegger, understanding something essentially requires a horizon.
We have seen that all understanding is projective upon possibilities of the being of 
Dasein. We have also seen that inner-worldly beings are only disclosed within the structures 
of the Bewandtnisganzheit that is constituted in this projection of Dasein onto possibilities. 
Inner-worldly beings are only disclosed in so far as Dasein projects itself onto possibilities of 
its being. These (existenzielle) possibilities are possibilities of existence (which is 
fundamentally to be determined as “being-possible” [mdglich-sein]) and thus existence -  that 
is, the being of Dasein -  must already be in a certain way disclosed to Dasein in so far as it
2 Die Grundprobleme der Phdnomenologie, p. 388
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projects itself upon them. ‘Sofem aber in diesem existenziellen Verstehen das Dasein als 
Seiendes auf sein Seinkdnnen entworfen ist, ist darin Sein im Sinne von Existenz verstanden. 
In jedem existenziellen verstehen ist ein Seinsverstdndnis von Existenz uberhaupt 
beschlossen. ’4 This means in the first place that inner-worldly beings are only disclosed to 
Dasein in so far as being -  existence -  is already disclosed to it in advance. ‘In allem 
Verhalten zu Seiendem, sei es spezifisch Erkennen, was man meist als theoretisch bezeichnet, 
sei es praktisch-technisch, liegt schon ein Verstdndnis von Sein. Denn nur im Lichte des 
Seinsverstdndnisses kann uns Seiendes als Seiendes begegnen. ’5 It means in the second place 
that, in so far as being is understood within a projection on possibilities of existence, a 
projection which in turn grounds the disclosure of inner-worldly beings, these inner-worldly 
beings are only disclosed within a prior horizon delineated or traced out by the understanding 
of being as the projection upon possibilities. Such projection demarcates the region, fixes 
those limits, within which beings can first show up.
Heidegger also expresses this thought in terms of what he calls the transcendence of 
Dasein. This word comes from die Latin transcendere, meaning to climb over or beyond, to 
surmount. Heidegger’s usage of it, ignoring its long philosophical heritage, is explicidy 
literal. For him: ‘Transzendenz bedeutet Uberstieg. ’6 “Uberstieg”, “climbing-over”, is a 
movement implicating both something which is climbed over and something towards which it 
is climbed over. In accordance with die aims of the existential analysis of Dasein, the 
Uberstieg does not have to do with the relation of a subjective sphere to an objective sphere. 
‘Die Transzendenz ist weder eine Beziehung zwischen einer Innensph&re und einer 
Aufiensphare, so dafi das, was in ihr uberschritten wtirde, eine zum Subjekt gehdrige 
Schranke ware, die das Subjekt von der Aufiensphare trennte. Die Transzendenz ist aber auch 
nicht primar die erkennende Beziehung eines Subjekts zu einem Objekt, die dem Subjekt als 
Zugabe zu seiner Subjektivitat eignete. ’7 Rather, it signifies that basic temporal dynamic by 
virtue of which beings can be disclosed for Dasein’s comportment within a world in the first 
place.
This happens insofar as Dasein transcends, climbs over, not towards objects or 
individual inner-worldly beings, but towards world. ‘Zur Transzendenz gehdrt Welt als das, 
woraufhin der Uberstieg geschieht. ’8 In transcendence towards world, in which world is first 
understood as such, world is opened up as the horizon within which inner-worldly beings can
3 Die Grundprobleme der PhOnomenologie, pp. 420-421
4 Die Grundprobleme der PhOnomenologie, p. 395 And further: ‘ZunSchst ist im existenziellen 
Verstehen das eigene Dasein als Seiendes erfahren und dabei das Sein verstanden.’ [Die 
Grundprobleme der Phtinomenologie, p. 396]
3 Die Grundprobleme der Phtinomenologie, p. 390
6 Vom Wesen des Grundes, Wegmarken, p. 137
7 Metaphysische Anfangsgriinde der Logik, pp. 210-211
8 Vom Wesen des Grundes, Wegmarken, p. 141
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first be constituted as inner-worldly beings (in terms of a Bewandtnisganzheit) and thus be 
encountered. ‘Die Transzendenz, das Uber-hinaus des Daseins, ermdglicht es, dafi es sich zu 
Seiendem, sei es zu Vorhandenem, zu Anderen und zu sich selbst, als Seiendem verh&lt. ’9 
Only in terms of the transcendence towards world, claims Heidegger, could there be 
something like “objects” available standing opposite a “subject”. Thus inner-worldly beings 
are themselves what transcendent Dasein “climbs over”.
Thus only on the basis of transcendence can something like the “there” be constituted 
as the site of disclosure within which beings can first be encountered. Transcendence itself, 
therefore, claims Heidegger, is to be considered as the basic ontological constitution of 
Dasein. If it is only on the basis of transcendence that Dasein can take up a position within a 
world comporting itself amidst inner-worldly beings and if this is definitive of the being of 
Dasein, then Heidegger is justified in equating the transcendence of Dasein with what we 
outlined above as being-in-the-world. Existence as such is transcendence. In so far as Dasein 
is, are beings already transcended -  and not merely this or that particular being, but beings in 
a whole, according to the constitution of world, as that towards which Dasein transcends. 
‘[D]ie Transzendenz ist nicht irgendein mftgliches Verhalten... des Daseins zu anderem 
Seienden, sondem die Grundverfassung seines Seins, auf deren Grunde es sich allererst zu 
Seiendem verhalten kann. ’ 10
We saw that the worldliness of the world is constituted by the projection of Dasein 
onto a possibility of its being -  a “for-the-sake-of-itself’ (Umwillen seiner). Dasein's 
existence is always and essentially for the sake of itself, which is the meaning of outlining the 
fundamental ontological constitution of Dasein as Sorge. The transcendence o f Dasein is 
accomplished as this projection upon a possibility o f its being. It is for this reason that the 
transcendence of Dasein is transcendence towards world: world is formed in the projection of 
Dasein onto a possibility of its being for the sake of which it is, according to which inner- 
worldly beings as a whole are first disclosed, constituted in terms of the corresponding totality 
of Bedeutsamheit. 11
We saw how being-in-the-world, as the ontological constitution of Dasein, is 
grounded in temporality. Temporality is thus also the ground or the inner possibility of the
9 Die Grundprobleme der PhOnomenologie, p. 426
10 Metaphysische Anfangsgriinde der Logik, p. 211
11 It is also precisely in this transcendence for the sake of itself that the self of Dasein is constituted in 
turn. Heidegger writes: ‘ Was Ubersteigen wird, ist gerade einzig das Seiende selbst, und zwar 
jegliches Seiende, das dem Dasein unverborgen sein und werden kann, mithin auch und gerade das 
Seiende, als welches “es selbst” existiert.Die transzendenz konstituiert die Selbstheit.Sofem aber 
das Dasein als Selbst existiert -  und nur insofem -  kann es “sich” verhalten zu Seiendem, das aber 
vordem uberstiegen sein muB.’ [Vom Wesen des Grundes, Wegmarken, p. 138] And further: ‘Nur 
Seiendes, zu dessen Seinsverfassung die Transzendenz gehOrt, hat die MOglichkeit, dergleichen wie ein 
Selbst zu sein. Die Transzendenz ist sogar die Voraussetzung dafur, daB das Dasein den Charakter
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transcendence of Dasein, in so far as this transcendence is only possible as the self- 
temporalisadon of temporality. ‘Der ekstatische Charakter der Zeit ermdglicht den 
spezifischen Uberschrittscharakter des Daseins, die Transzendenz und damit auch die 
Welt. ’ 12 The transcendence of Dasein is its world-constituting projection onto a possibility of 
its being for the sake of itself. This is only possible on the basis of the Sich-vor-weg as the 
temporal determination of the future, which, Heidegger claims, is the temporal ecstase out of 
which temporality primarily temporalises itself [zeitigt sich]. Only in so far as Dasein is 
futural in the very grounds of its being is something like a projection of itself onto a 
possibility of its being possible; that is, only in so far as Dasein is futural is transcendence 
possible and a world can be constituted. Only on the ground of the temporality of Dasein, 
then, can inner-worldly beings be disclosed at all. Only on the ground of temporality is 
something like understanding possible at all. Heidegger writes: ‘Das Transzendieren zur 
Welt, das In-der-Welt-sein zeitigt sich als Zeitlichkeit und ist nur so mdglich. Darin liegt: 
Welteingang geschieht nur, wenn Zeitlichkeit sich zeitigt. Und nur wenn das geschieht, kann 
Seiendes als Seiendes sich offenbaren. Sofem dieses aber nur moglich ist auf dem Grunde 
des Seinsverstdndnisses, mufi die mdglichkeit des Seinsverstdndnisses in der Zeitigung der 
Zeitlichkeit liegen. ’ 13 And only in so far as Dasein is futural in the grounds of its being can it 
exist for the sake of itself and thus be ontologically characterised as Sorge.
If ‘Seinsverstdndnis ist Transzendenz’14, then temporality must be the possibility of 
understanding being. Heidegger writes: ‘Wenn wir sagen: Im existenziellen Verstehen des 
Daseins ist Sein verstanden, und wenn wir beachten, dab Verstehen ein Entwerfen ist, so liegt 
in dem Verstdndnis von Sein wiederum ein Entwurf: Das Sein ist nur verstanden, insofem es 
seinerseits auf etwas hin entworfen ist.115 Temporality is the possibility of Seinsverstdndnis in 
so far as it forms the horizon onto which understanding projects being. In what sense exactly 
does temporality form a horizon?
Heidegger writes: ‘Horizont -  darunter verstehen wir den Umkreis des Blickfeldes. 
Aber Horizont, von 6 pi£*iv, ist gar nicht prim&r auf Blicken und Anschauen bezogen, sondem 
besagt einfach an sich das Eingrenzende, Umschliefiende, den Umschlufi...Nun sagen wir: 
jede Ekstase umschliefit sich selbst, und zwar gerade als ocaraai?.’16 Each ecstase is
eines Selbst hat. Die Selbstheit des Daseins grtindet in seiner Transzendenz’. [Die Grundprobleme der 
Phdnomenologie, p. 425] Dasein understands its self on the basis of world.
12 Die Grundprobleme der Phdnomenologie, p. 428
13 Metaphysische Anfangsgriinde der Logik, p. 274
14 Metaphysische A nfangsgriinde der Logik, p. 280
15 Die Grundprobleme der Phdnomenologie, p. 396 It is important to note again that the understanding 
of being mentioned here is not a conceptual understanding. Nor does it grasp being in any sense as an 
object. It is rather a non-objective, pre-conceptual [vorbegrifflich] and therefore pre-ontological 
understanding of being. But, of course, this pre-ontological understanding of being is the necessary 
condition for the possibility of ontology as a science.
16 Metaphysische A nfangsgriinde der Logik, p. 269
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essentially characterised by an ec-static structure, that is, a structural displacement, a 
directional “carrying-off’ [Entruckung], which, demarcating its own limit, delineates 
something like a light-giving (Helle gebenden17) horizontal (or perhaps “linear”) “enclosure”. 
‘Jede Ekstase als Entruckung zu...hat in sich zugleich und ihr zugehdrig eine Vorzeichnung 
der formalen Struktur des Wozu des EntrQckung. Wir bezeichnen dieses Wohin der Ekstase 
als den Horizont oder genauer das horizontale Schema der Ekstase.'1* The ecstase of the 
future first provides the original enclosure, thus the space and illumination [ErhellungJ9], 
within which something like possibility can first be encountered, and thus forms a horizon 
within which something like the Umwillen seiner is first possible.20 Thus, essentially 
entwined with the other two temporal ecstases, it provides the horizon within which the 
constitution of something like a world is first possible as the transcendence of Dasein, and 
thus grounds the possibility of Seinsverstdndnis. Temporality forms the horizon for 
understanding being in so far as it forms die enclosure within which something like a 
projection of Dasein onto a possibility of its being can take place, and thus within which 
something like existence can first be understood and with it world, and thus within which 
inner-worldly beings can first be illuminated. Temporality considered from this horizontal 
perspective Heidegger calls Temporalitdt: ‘Temporality ist die urspninglichste Zeitigung der 
Zeitlichkeit als solcher’21.
In §21 ofjGrundprobleme der Phdnomenologie Heidegger seeks to demonstrate this 
concretely in terms of the temporal ecstase of the present and the understanding of the mode 
of being of Zuhandenheit. The mode of being of Zuhandenheit characterises tools, the most 
familiar of beings encountered in the world. We saw that Heidegger gives the name 
Bewandtnis to die constitution of this mode of being. Any single tool is only ever 
encountered within a totality of tools structured by Bewandtnis relations. These relations are 
fundamentally to be characterised in terms of what Heidegger calls “Um-zu”, “in-order-to”. 
Tools are tools in order to do or make such and such. Heidegger writes: ‘Dergleichen 
Seiendes wie Zeug begegnet uns als das Seiende, das es an sich ist, wenn wir Bewandtnis, 
Bewandtnisbeziige und Bewandtnisganzheit im vorhinein verstehen. ’22 A tool can only be 
encountered as such in so far as it is projected in advance onto a network of Bewandtnis 
relations. ‘Das... Verstehen von Bewandtnis ist deijenige Entwurf, der dem Dasein allererst
17 Die Grundprobleme der Phdnomenologie, p. 402
18 Die Grundprobleme der Phdnomenologie, p. 429
19 Heidegger draws analogy to Plato’s itea ayadov -  that which illuminates the domain of the 
knowable. Cf Die Grundprobleme der Phdnomenologie, pp. 400 ff.
20 ‘[Die Entriickung gibt] als solche etwas vor: eben das Kunftige als solches, Kunftigkeit Oberhaupt, d. 
i. Mdglichkeit schlechthin. Die Ekstase produziert nicht aus sich ein bestimmtes Mdgliches, wohl aber 
den Horizont von Mdglichkeit uberhaupt, innerhalb dessen ein bestimmtes Mogliches etwa erwartet 
werden kann.’ \Metaphysische A nfangsgriinde der Logik, p. 269]
21 Die Grundprobleme der Phdnomenologie, p. 429
22 Die Grundprobleme der Phdnomenologie, p. 415
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das Licht gibt, in dessen Helle dergleichen wie Zeug begegnet. ’23 This is in turn only possible 
on the basis of Dasein's existence as Umwillen seiner. ‘[Dasein] versteht als existierendes 
dergleichen wie ein “umwillen seiner selbst”, weil sein eigenes Sein dadurch bestimmt ist, 
daB es dem Dasein als existierendem in seinem Sein um sein Seinkonnen geht. Nur sofern 
das Umwillen eines Seinkdnnens verstanden ist, wird dergleichen wie ein Um-zu 
(Bewandtnisbezug) enthhllbar. ’24
Thus Bewandtnis, as the ontological determination of Zuhandenheit, is fundamentally 
determined by the temporal ecstase of the future, within the horizon of which something like 
an Umwillen seiner is first possible. In accordance with the unity of the temporal ecstases it 
is also determined by the ecstase of the present (precisely in so far as Dasein is using the tool, 
and thus is always together with the tool in order to do or make such and such), and by the 
ecstase of the past (in so far as the tool is maintained [behalten] in its use). The 
understanding of Bewandtnis is, then, temporally constituted. This understanding is, of 
course, not at all a thematic understanding. In our use of tools we are precisely not focused 
on the tools themselves; nor, so Heidegger claims, are we focused upon the work to be 
completed.25 Rather, we simply move understandingly within the relations of “Um-zu”, the 
Bewandtnis relations. Bewandtnis is thus understood -  that is, the being of inner-worldly 
beings in the mode of Zuhandenheit is understood, which means that being as such is 
understood -, but this understanding is non-thematic, non-conceptual.
But how exactly does temporality, in terms of its horizontal structure, ground the 
disclosure, the presence of beings of the mode of being of Zuhandenheit, which constitutes 
this understanding?
Whilst inner-worldly beings are in general encountered entirely non-thematically in 
the course of Dasein ’s absorption in its inner-worldly possibilities, when they are broken or 
missing, or when they get in the way of the work, they become conspicuous as the tools that 
they are. Tools that are missing are tools that are not present -  tools that are absent. 
Zuhandenheit, as the ontological constitution of tools, is essentially determined by presence 
and absence. Heidegger names this fundamental determination of the mode of being of 
Zuhandenheit with a Latinate expression: Praesenz.
In what sense is Praesenz different from Gegenwart? Praesenz is not ecstatic. 
Praesenz is rather that upon which whatever is determined by the temporal ecstase of 
Gegenwart is projected. ‘Das Gegenwdrtigen... entwirft das, was es gegenwdrtigt, dasjenige, 
was mflglicherweise in und fiir eine Gegenwart begegnen kann, auf so etwas wie Praesenz...
23 Die Grundprobleme der Phdnomenologie, p. 416
24 Die Grundprobleme der Phdnomenologie, p. 418
25 Cf. Die Grundprobleme der Phdnomenologie, p. 416.
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Gegenwart entwirft sich in sich selbst ekstatisch auf Praesenz. ’26 As the whereunto of the 
displacement of Gegenwart, Praesenz is the horizontal determination or schema of the 
temporal ecstase of Gegenwart, in virtue of which Gegenwart is an openness for encountering 
inner-worldly beings as present, that is, in terms of Anwesenheit. Projection upon Praesenz is 
the condition of possibility of Anwesenheit; in virtue of it every being encountered in the 
Gegenwart is always already understood in terms of Anwesenheit (which includes, of course, 
beings that are precisely not present). Heidegger writes:
Als Entruckung zu... ist die Gegenwart ein Offensein fur Begegnendes, das somit im 
vorhinein auf Praesenz hin verstanden ist. Alles, was im Gegenwdrtigen begegnet, ist aufgrund des in 
der Ekstase schon entruckten Horizontes, Praesenz, als Anwesendes, d. h. auf Anwesenheit hin 
verstanden. Sofem Zuhandenheit und Abhandenheit so etwas wie Anwesenheit und Abwesenheit, d. h. 
so und so modifizierte und modifikable Praesenz bedeuten, ist das Sein des innerwehlich begegnenden 
Seienden praesential, und das heiBt grundsatzlich temporal entworfen. Sein verstehen wir demnach aus 
dem ursprunglichen horizontalen Schema der Ekstasen der Zeitlichkeit21
As the condition of possibility of Anwesenheit, presence, as such, temporality is the 
condition of possibility of the “Do”. ‘[Zeitlichkeit] ist als enthiillte da, weil sie das “Da” und 
seine Enthiilltheit tiberhaupt ermdglicht. ’28 Comportment among present and absent beings 
within a world is only possible on the basis of the praesential schema of temporality. 
Temporality is in itself the fundamental projection [Entwurf] as such, which, opening the open 
region, die clearing for presence, makes all understanding possible.
The concept of Temporalitdt can now be determined. Heidegger writes: ‘Die so
primfir auf die horizontalen Schemata der Zeidichkeit als Bedingungen der Mdglichkeit des
Seinsverstdndnisses hin genommene Zeitlichkeit macht den Gehalt des allgemeinen Begriffs 
der Temporalitdt aus. Temporalitdt ist Zeitlichkeit mit Riicksicht auf die Einheit der ihr 
zugehdrigen horizontalen Schemata'29.
If an understanding of being forms the horizon onto which the understanding of 
inner-worldly beings projects, and if Temporalitdt forms the horizon onto which the 
understanding of being projects, it might be wondered upon what the understanding of 
temporality itself projects. Heidegger gives the answer: ‘Weil die ekstatisch-horizontale 
Einheit der Zeidichkeit in sich der Selbstentwurf schlechthin ist, als ekstatische das Entwerfen 
auf... tiberhaupt ermdglicht und mit dem zur Ekstase gehdrigen Horizont die Bedingung der 
Mdglichkeit eines Woraufhin, Wozu-hinaus tiberhaupt darstellt, kann gar nicht mehr gefragt
26 Die Grundprobleme der Phdnomenologie, p. 435
27 Die Grundprobleme der Phdnomenologie, p. 436
28 Die Grundprobleme der Phdnomenologie, p. 437
29 Die Grundprobleme der Phdnomenologie, p. 436
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werden, woraufhin die Schemata ihrerseits entworfen seien, und so in infinitum. ’30 If 
Temporalitdt is the condition of possibility for all understanding as such, in so far as it makes 
possible projection in die first place, then there can be nothing more primordial upon which 
die understanding of Temporalitdt projects. The implication is that Temporalitdt itself forms 
the horizon for its own understanding.
Heidegger’s discussion here concerns only the mode of being of Zuhandenheit and 
only the temporal ecstase of the present, but nevertheless the conclusion that he wishes to 
draw is supposed to hold for all modes of being and for all three temporal ecstases. Does that 
in any way make it problematic? In the first place it can be pointed out that Heidegger has 
always insisted that the mode of being of Zuhandenheit is the mode of being of inner-worldly 
beings in so far as they are encountered “in themselves”. This is to say that the existentiality 
of Dasein is such that first and foremost, “always already”, beings are disclosed within the 
structures of existentiality in the mode of being of Zuhandenheit. This justifies Heidegger’s 
choice of Zuhandenheit in his attempt to demonstrate the temporality of all understanding of 
being. But in so far as he shows that all understanding has the character of a projection onto a 
horizon, and that, in so far as being is understood at all, this horizon must be temporality 
(Temporalitdt), he has justified the extension of his conclusions beyond merely the 
understanding of the mode of being of Zuhandenheit.
He writes: ‘Die Ekstase der Gegenwart ist fuhrend in der Zeitlichkeit des Umgangs 
mit dem Zuhandenen. ’31 The focus on the temporal ecstase of the present is therefore 
justified in so far as Heidegger is considering the understanding of the mode of being of 
Zuhandenheit. But this focus does not jeopardise the generality of the conclusions which 
Heidegger draws, since the three ecstases of temporality form a horizontal unity.
Of course the focus on the temporal ecstase of the present is nevertheless significant 
in so far as it allows Heidegger to draw explicitly, through the concept of Praesenz, the 
connection of Gegenwart and Anwesenheit. Heidegger’s basic thought here concerning the 
relation of time and being can be expressed simply as follows: being is (understood in terms 
of) Anwesenheit, but there can only be Anwesenheit in an ecstatic Gegenwart. Therefore time 
-  ecstatic temporality -  must be the ground of any understanding of being at all. This ground 
is to be construed in the form of a horizon due to the projective character of understanding, 
and thus time is the horizon for understanding being, the horizon for the meaning of being.
This thought connects this early attempt to demonstrate the relation between time and 
being with Heidegger’s subsequent thinking.
30 Die Grundprobleme der Phdnomenologie, p. 437
31 Die Grundprobleme der Phdnomenologie, p. 438 Why is this? Because Verfallen is the existential 
correlative of the ecstase of the present.
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Zeit-Raum
In later writings, most notably in Beitrdge zur Philosophic, Heidegger introduces the 
concept of Zeit-Raum [time-space]. What is this seemingly new conceptuality of time and 
how is it related to the earlier conceptuality of temporality?
One text which gives an expansive treatment of time-space is Heidegger's 1962 
lecture Zeit und Sein. The relation of this work to Sein und Zeit is made clear:
Der Titel “Zeit und Sein” kennzeichnet im Aufrifi der Abhandlung “Sein und Zeit” (1927) S. 
39 den dritten Abschnitt des ersten Teils der Abhandlung. Der Verfasser war damals einer 
zureichenden Ausarbeitung des im Titel “Zeit und Sein” genannten Themas nicht gewachsen. Die 
Verdffentlichung von “Sein und Zeit” wurde an dieser Stelle abgebrochen.
Was der jetzt nach dreiundeinhalb Jahrzehnten verfaBte Text des Vortrags enth&lt, kann nicht 
mehr an den Text von “Sein und Zeit” anschliefien. Zwar ist die leitende Frage die selbe geblieben, 
was jedoch nur heifit: Die Frage ist noch fragwiirdiger geworden und dem Zeitgeist noch fremder.32
Nevertheless, the lecture deals with the relationship between time and being, albeit 
ostensibly on a different horizon to Die Grundprobleme der Phdnomenologie. For it deals 
with the relation between time and being as such, rather than the relation between temporality 
-  as the being of Dasein -  and Dasein ’s understanding of being. Nevertheless, structurally 
considered, the essential thought remains exactly the same: ‘Sein heifit: Anwesen, Anwesen- 
1 as sen: Anwesenheit’, writes Heidegger on page 10, and then on page 11: ‘Aber Gegenwart 
besagt...Anwesenheit.’ Again, time and being are brought into relation to one another 
through the concept of Anwesenheit,33 There can only be Anwesenheit, of course, in so far as 
there are Menschen. ‘Anwesen geht uns an, Gegenwart heifit: uns entgegenweilen, uns -  den 
Menschen. ’34 Whilst we shall return to determine the relation of these later thoughts to the 
existential analysis more precisely, it is clear even on the surface that, in so far as Dasein, the 
site of presence, determines the being of man, there is no disparity here.
Time and being both mean Anwesenheit. But in the later lecture, time is to be 
understood in terms of the concept of time-space. In the first instance, this concept designates 
the way in which the interplay of the unity of the three temporal dimensions35 puts forth the
32 Zur Sache des Denkens, Hinweise, p. 91
33 And again Heidegger here affirms that both past and future are also to be understood in terms of 
Anwesenheit, namely, as modes of Ab-wesenheit. He writes: ‘[Das] nicht-mehr-Gegenw&rtige west in 
seinem Abwesen unmittelbar an, n&mlich nach der Art des uns angehenden Gewesen... Im Gewesen 
wird Anwesen gereicht.’ [p. 13] And: ‘[Das] Abwesen als das Anwesen des noch-nicht- 
Gegenw&rtigen [geht] uns immer schon auf irgendeine Weise an..., d. h. anwest, ebenso unmittelbar 
wie das Gewesen. In der Zu-kunft, im Auf-uns-Zukommen wird Anwesen gereicht.’ [p. 13]
34 Zur Sache des Denkens, p. 12
35 In this text Heidegger speaks of the dimensions of time rather than its ecstases. We shall follow his 
usage and shall not pursue the question of what hangs upon this substitution.
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open, spatial region of Anwesenheit: ‘Zeit-Raum nennt... das Offene, das im Einander-sich- 
reichen von Ankunft, Gewesenheit und Gegenwart sich lichtet. ’36 The mutual interrelating of 
the three temporal dimensions, their “reaching” to and fro within and between one another, 
first opens up, or brings forth, a clearing of openness which is in essence spatial; that is, 
opens up a fourth dimension. Time-space is in essence four-dimensional; but in contrast to 
four dimensional space-time, time-space has three temporal dimensions and one spatial 
dimension. Only in and as the unity, the essential interrelation of these four dimensions is the 
constitution of presence, unconcealment as such, first possible. Heidegger’s thinking here 
concerns the fact that the site of disclosure, the “there”, only possible on the basis of time, 
must be in essence spatial.37
“Dimension” here, however, must mean something radically new. The common 
conceptions of space and time are, according to Heidegger, derivative of time-space, and are 
rooted in metaphysical modes of thought. ‘Raum und Zeit, je fur sich vorgestellt und in der 
iiblichen Verbindung, entspringen selbst aus dem Zeit-Raum, der urspriinglicher ist als sie 
selbst und ihre rechenhaft vorgestellte Verbindung. ’38 Fundamentally, they amount to the 
“mathematicising” of time-space, in virtue of which time and space are independently 
numerically determined and their independent measurement and thus calculation becomes 
possible. This numeration is the origin of the mafhemafico-physical concept of dimension.39 
Heidegger’s point is that it is only in virtue of time-space that there is a clearing within which 
time and space can come to be dimensional in the first place. This is not to suggest that the 
traditional conceptions of time and space are false. Indeed, Heidegger would point out, they 
are correct. But correctness is not the primordial essence of truth. They are interpretations of 
a more original phenomenon than they themselves suggest; interpretations based on particular 
modes of thinking that have their essential origin in the ontological constitution of Dasein. 
They are essential historical consequences of the metaphysical thinking that is fundamentally 
grounded in the forgetting of the truth of being. Thus Heidegger insists that time-space can 
only be thought in the thinking which prepares the other beginning of the history of being, i. 
e. in a thinking which thinks otherwise than metaphyiscally.
36 Zur Sache des Denkens, pp. 14-15
37 One might presume that the difference between Heidegger’s thinking here and that of Sein und Zeit 
is therefore to be found in the incorporation of spatiality with temporality. However this incorporation 
is already made in the early work’s account of the spatiality of Dasein, which we have not undertaken 
to exposit. Just as the mutual interrelating of the three dimensions of time puts forth space -  conceived 
as the arena of comportment (Verhaltenheit [Die Verhaltenheit ist der Grund der Sorge. Die 
Verhaltenheit des Da-seins begriindet erst die Sorge als die das Da ausstehende Instfindigkeit.’ 
[Beitrdge zur Philosophie, p. 35]]), so the self-temporalisation of original temporality opens up the 
spatiality intrinsic to existentiality.
3 Beitrdge zur Philosophie, p. 372
39 This numeration is of course essential to the development of modem mathematical physics, and to 
the modem concept of nature in general. As such, it is essential to the development of modem 
technology.
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Indeed time-space itself claims Heidegger, belongs to die essence of truth. He 
writes, for example: ‘der Zeit-Raum ist nur die Wesensentfaltung der Wesung der 
Wahrheit. ’40 For presence [Anwesenheit] and unconcealment (the primordial determination of 
truth) belong together: ‘Im Hinblick auf das Anwesende gedacht, zeigt sich Anwesen als 
Anwesenlassen... Anwesenlassen zeigt darin sein Eigenes, dafi es ins Unverborgene bringt. 
Anwesen lassen heifit: Entbergen, ins Offene bringen. ’41 As the essential unfolding of the 
essence of truth, time-space is historical. It is the site into which the historical Geschick of 
being is sent.
Truth
Before drawing our discussion of the existential analysis of Dasein to its conclusion it 
is pertinent to give a more detailed account of Heidegger’s thoughts on truth, which have 
received only interspersed and desultory clarification in the course of proceedings heretofore. 
Truth is essential to the existential analysis and Heidegger gives a thorough treatment of it in 
§44 of Sein und Zeit, the fulcrum between its first and second divisions. It is of course not of 
less importance for the history of being, which can also be characterised as the history of 
truth. Most significant of all, perhaps, is the fact that Heidegger’s re-conceptualisation of 
truth is the pivot of that historical turning which is die overcoming of metaphysics. The 
Kehre can only be understood in the light of Heidegger’s re-conceptualisation of truth.
We have already seen that truth conceived in terms of correctness defines the essence 
of metaphysical thinking, and that this conception stems from the transformation of the 
essence of truth away from its inceptual sense -  AAr/deia. Whether of the proposition or of 
the representation, which in any case amount to the same thing, truth as correctness implies 
die subject-object schema. Correctness is thought in terms of the correspondence 
[adaequatio] of the subject [intellectus] and the object [res\. Heidegger’s overcoming of 
metaphysics fundamentally takes the form of re-conceiving the essence of truth beneath this 
framework to retrieve the inceptual sense preserved in its etymology. This is essential to the 
thinking of being, die other beginning of the history of being, and thus also to the question of 
being. It goes hand in hand with the introduction of Dasein and the existential analysis 
thereof.
Just as metaphysics is an essential possibility of the constitution of being of Dasein, 
so too is correctness an essential configuration of truth; Heidegger does not claim that it is 
simply false, as some commentator have assumed -  how could he? Rather, he attempts to 
show the derivative nature of this understanding of truth, derivative from original truth
40 Beitrdge zur Philosophie, p. 386
41 Zur Sache des Denkens, p. 5
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conceived in the binary form of unconcealment and concealment. In both §44 of Sein und 
Zeit and the lecture Vom Wesen der Wahrheit (first given in 1930) Heidegger presents an 
account of the derivative nature of truth as correctness.
In Sein und Zeit he points out that a proposition -  for example, about a painting 
hanging on a wall -  does not refer to any mental or psychological “image” or representation, 
no ideal content, but refers to the real painting. For otherwise the simple perception of the 
painting would not be capable of adjudicating as to whether the proposition is true or false. 
He writes: ‘Jede Interpretation, die hier irgend etwas anderes einschiebt, das im nur 
vorstellenden Aussagen soli gemeint sein, verf&lscht den ph&nomenalen Tatbestand dessen, 
woriiber ausgesagt wird. ’42 The proposition must be conceived as simply indicating the thing 
itself  ^ discovering [entdecken] it, plucking it out of concealment. For what proves the 
proposition is just the particular way in which the thing is discovered. Accordingly, 
Heidegger claims, ‘Die Aussage ist wahr, bedeutet: sie entdeckt das Seiende an ihm selbst. ’43 
The notion of discovering leaps over any need for a relation to creep into the determination of 
truth; truth is simply die discovering of the thing itself as it itself is.
Heidegger’s argument here responds to a familiar problem. If the concept of 
representation is allowed to determine the relation of correspondence, then the subject will 
never be in any position to verify or confirm die truth of his or her propositions, for he or she 
could then never step beyond the sphere of representations to get a good look at die things 
themselves that are the objects of judgement.44 But once propositions are conceived as 
discovering the things themselves as they are (or, are not, as the case may be), the way is open 
for the abandonment of the relational schema in favour of a simple notion of disclosure 
[Erschlossenheit].
In the lecture Vom Wesen der Wahrheit Heidegger further points out that the 
discovering of the proposition is only possible given a prior comportment towards beings. 
Such comportment always operates within an openness which first allows beings to be 
discovered. This comportment is, of course, to be conceived existentially. Beings can only 
be discovered in so far as they stand within existential structures; beings are always 
discovered within specific comportments, within the “directionality” of existentiality, that is,
42 Sein und Zeit, pp. 217-218
43 Sein und Zeit, p. 218
44 Ernst Tugendhat points out that Heidegger’s claim in this regard does not meet every correspondance 
theory of truth. Husserl’s, for example, where the relation of correspondance is held to pertain between 
two ideal contents, would be unaffected. Be this as it may, once Heidegger’s derivation of the 
traditional concept of truth from original truth as disclosure has been fully presented, the grounds 
which motivate Husserl’s transcendental reduction, upon which this conception of correspondance 
depends, are undermined.
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its structure as projection.45 This grounds Heidegger’s claim that the essence (i. e. the inner 
possibility) of truth -  still in die sense of correctness -  is freedom: "Die OffenstSndigkeit des 
Verhaltens als innere Ermdglichung der Richtigkeit griindet in der Freiheit. Das Wesen der 
Wahrheit, als Richtigkeit derAussage verstanden, ist die Freiheit.'*6
Now freedom, conceived here as ‘die Eingelassenheit in die Entbergung des Seienden 
als eines solchen’47, itself requires a prior openness, which is the disclosure that is Da-sein 
itself Consequendy, Heidegger designates disclosure the original truth. In Sein und Zeit he 
writes: ‘Mit und durch sie [die Erschlossenheit] ist Entdecktheit, daher wird erst mit der 
Erschlossenheit des Daseins das urspriinglichste PhSnomen der Wahrheit erreicht. ’48
It is this original disclosure that makes truth as correctness first possible. ‘Die 
Wahrheit als Richtigkeit des Vorstellens setzt, urn das sein zu kttnnen, was sie ist -  
Angleichung an den Gegenstand -, die Offenheit des Seienden voraus, wodurch das Seiende 
erst gegen-standsfhhig und das Vor-stellen zum Vermdgen wird, etwas als solches vor sich zu 
bringen. Diese Offenheit erwies sich damit als der Grand der Mdglichkeit der Richtigkeit. ’49 
The grounds for interpreting truth purely in terms of correctness, as a relation of 
correspondance between a subject and an object, lie, as we shall see in more detail below, in 
the constitution of Dasein itself, that temporal structure which first makes truth -  disclosure -  
possible. Dasein, we can briefly intimate here, initially understands the proposition as 
something of the mode of being of Zuhandenheit. In so far as it takes the being about which 
the proposition is uttered as similarly of the mode of being of Zuhandenheit or 
Vorhandenheit, it must also conceive of a relation between the two -  something of the mode 
of being of Vorhandenheit. This relation, rooted in original disclosure, comes to be 
understood in terms of correspondence, Ubereinstimmung, adaequatio. ‘Die Entdecktheit des 
Seienden riickt mit der Ausgesprochenheit der Aussage in die Seinsart des innerweltlich 
Zuhandenen. Sofem sich nun aber in ihr als Entdecktheit von... ein Bezug zu Vorhandenem 
durchhalt, wird die Entdecktheit (Wahrheit) ihrerseits zu einer vorhandenen Beziehung 
zwischen Vorhandenen (intellectus und res) . ’ 50 In the next chapter we shall show how this 
interpretation of die being of truth as Vorhandensein is grounded in the ontological 
constitution of Dasein as Verfallen.
45 A thought which is also expressed as follows: ‘Die Lichtung fur das Sichverbergen lichtet sich im 
Entwurf. Die Werfung des Entwurfs geschieht als Da-sein, und der Werfer dieser Werfung ist jeweils 
jenes Selbst-sein, in dem der Mensch instandlich wird.’ [Beitrdge zur Philosophie, p. 356]
46 Vom Wesen der Wahrheit, Wegmarken, p. 186
47 Vom Wesen der Wahrheit, Wegmarken, p. 189
48 Sein und Zeit, pp. 220-221
49 Grundfragen der Philosophie, p. 92 And again: ‘Die Wahrheit als Richtigkeit (o/Ltoitoot?) hat ihren 
Grand in der Wahrheit als Unverborgenheit QaX-qd^ ia)...Der Grand der Richtigkeit (opouuois) ist die 
aXrjdeia, die Unverborgenheit des Seienden.’ [Grundfragen der Philosophie, pp. 97-98]
50 Sein und Zeit, p. 225 Originally italicised.
I l l
Freedom is the standing out into the openness amidst beings, a standing out into the 
clearing [Lichtung], which can now be understood in terms of the interplay of the dimensions 
of time-space. This standing out into time-space amidst beings Heidegger calls Ek-sistenz 
[ek-sistence]: ‘Die in der Wahrheit als Freiheit gewurzelte Ek-sistenz ist die Aus-setzung in 
die Entborgenheit des Seienden als eines solchen.’51. He ascribes it to mankind. The ek- 
sistence of mankind is his taking up of his dwelling place, his abode, in Dasein. Mankind 
dwells within Dasein, the structural site of disclosure, only in so far as he ek-sists. The ek- 
sistence of man is the same as his history. Both begin at the same moment: that moment 
when, in ancient Greece, man first raises beings as a whole to unconcealment in his 
questioning. Ek-sistence is the standing out of man into the truth of being, into the site that is 
historical; that site at which time, truth, beings, being and man all combine to a focal point -  
the focal point that is Ereignis. It is thus essential to conceive of the clearing of truth as 
disclosure on analogy with a happening and not at all as a circumstance of the mode of being 
of Vorhandenheit.52
In so far as mankind's ek-sistence is historical, Heidegger can claim that history as 
such is determined by the way in which beings are opened, revealed, the way in which, as he 
puts it, truth holds sway [west] . 53 We have already seen that the Geschick, that which gives 
history its specific determination, is precisely to be conceived as a mode of revealing. This 
way in which beings are open is referred, in the lecture, to the notion of Stimmung, which we 
already introduced in relation to the Befmdlichkeit that co-constitutes the being of die 
“there”, disclosure. Heidegger writes: ‘Jedes Verhalten des geschichtlichen Menschen ist, ob 
betont oder nicht, ob begriffen oder nicht, gestimmt und durch diese Stimmung 
hineingehoben in das Seiende im Ganzen. ’ 54 Thus: ‘Das Verhalten des Menschen ist 
durchstimmt von der Offenbarkeit des Seienden im Ganzen. ’ 55 But if history is the history of 
unconcealment, nevertheless: ‘Ohne die Irre ware kein Verhaltnis von Geschick zu Geschick, 
ware nicht Geschichte...Jede Epoche der Weltgeschichte ist eine Epoche der Irre. ’ 56 Why is 
this?
Truth is ^-covering, ^w-closure, wn-concealment. Heidegger claims that to the 
essence of truth a corresponding covering, closure, concealment belongs. Truth is to be 
thought in terms of both concealment and unconcealment coequally. This marks Heidegger’s 
departure from the originary Greek conception of truth as aArjdeia, a departure which many
51 Vom Wesen der Wahrheit, Wegmarken, p. 189
52 ‘Unverborgenheit des Seienden, das ist nie ein nur vorhandener Zustand, sondem ein Geschehnis.’ 
[Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes, Holzwege, p. 41] And “Ereignis” was noted to the last word of this 
citation in Heidegger's own copy of the first edition (1950).
53 ‘Aus der Weise, wie das ursprtingliche Wesen der Wahrheit west, entspringen die seltenen und 
einfachenEntscheidungenderGeschichte.’ [Vom Wesen der Wahrheit, Wegmarken, p. 191]
54 Vom Wesen der Wahrheit, Wegmarken, p. 192
55 Vom Wesen der Wahrheit, Wegmarken, p. 193
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commentators have overlooked. Whilst the word "aXrjOeia expresses the experience of truth as 
unconcealment, it fails to capture the coequality of concealment. It does not yet fully 
articulate the duplicity of the way in which truth holds sway.57
In Sein und Zeit the concealment proper to the essence of truth is expressed in terms 
of the Un-wahrheit that belongs constitutively to die being of Dasein in so far as it is 
ontologically determined as Verfallen: ‘Das Dasein ist, weil wesenhaft verfallend, seiner 
Seinsverfassung nach in der “Unwahrheit” . ’58 The self of das Man and die accompanying 
publicness does not shut the disclosure of beings of£ but distorts it, disfigures it, and thus 
disguises it: ‘Das Entdeckte und Erschlossene steht im Modus der Verstelltheit und 
Verschlossenheit... Das Sein zum Seienden ist nicht ausgelbscht, aber entwurzelt. Das 
Seiende ist nicht v&llig verborgen, sondem gerade entdeckt, aber zugleich verstellt’59.
In the lecture, this concealment is initially thought in terms of the partiality of the 
disclosure of beings. In so far as only specific beings are disclosed within a particular 
comportment, other beings are closed off, and crucially, beings as a totality, as a whole, are 
closed off. Disclosure is always finite. Indeed what is concealed first and foremost is 
concealment itself, and thus its correlative unconcealment. This is again grounded in the 
constitution of the being of Dasein as Verfallen: Dasein initially and for the most part tarrys 
by individual inner-worldly beings -  what is unconcealed -  and forgets concealment and 
unconcealment as such. Heidegger refers to this as the /H-sistence belonging to Dasein. 
Dasein is in-si stent, however, only in so far as it is ek-sistent, a standing out into the openness 
of beings as such.
The in-sistence of Dasein {Dasein's being as Verfallen) is related, in the lecture, to 
what Heidegger calls error [Irre]. ‘Der Mensch int. Der Mensch geht nicht erst in die Irre. 
Er geht nur immer in der Irre, weil er ek-sistent in-sistiert und so schon in der Irre steht... die 
Irre gehdrt zur inneren Verfassung des Da-seins, in das der geschichtliche Mensch 
eingelassen ist. ’60 By error, Heidegger understands the essential opposite within the essence 
of truth: concealment. It is something that can manifest itself on as large a scale as the world- 
historical and on as small a scale as the simple, ordinary making of mistakes. Perhaps we can 
include here, most notably, the “wasting” of time. ‘Jedes Verhalten hat gem&B seiner 
Offenstdndigkeit und seinem Bezug zum Seienden im Ganzen je seine Weise des Irrens. Der 
Irrtum erstreckt sich vom gewdhnlichsten Sich-vertun, Sich-versehen und Sich-verrechnen bis 
zum Sich-verlaufen und Sich-versteigen in den wesentlichen Haltungen und
56 Der Spruch des Anaximander, Holzwege, p. 311
57 For example: ‘Wahrheit als die Lichtung fur die Verbergung ist... ein wesentlich anderer Entwurf als 
die aXr}0€ta, obzwar er gerade in die Erinnerung an diese gehdrt und diese zu ihm.’ [Beitrdge zur 
Philosophie, p. 350]
58 Sein und Zeit, p. 222 Originally italicised.
59 Sein und Zeit, p. 222
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Entscheidungen. ,61 Accordingly, falsity of judgement is only one, and, at that, a superficial 
form of error. Conceived historically, of course, error, in the sense of in-sistence, takes the 
form of metaphysical thinking, that is, of Seinsvergessenheit. As the clinging only to beings 
and the forgetting of unconcealment itself, error is the forgetting of being. But this implies 
that the metaphysical conception of the essence of truth -  as correctness -  concerns rather 
precisely the un-essence of truth.
The interrelation of concealment and unconcealment constitutes the structurally of 
truth. In later works this is often captured in the formula “clearing for self-concealing”: ‘Das 
Wesen der Wahrheit ist die Lichtung fur das Sichverbergen.,62 This structure contains within 
it, on the one hand, the moment of the withdrawal of being in its truth, Seinsverlassenheit, 
which grounds metaphysical thinking, and, on the other hand, the disclosure as such that is 
being itself as presence, as the “Da” of Da-sein: ‘Wahrheit ist also niemals nur Lichtung, 
sondern west als Verbergung ebenso ursprunglich und innig mit der Lichtung. Beide, 
Lichtung und Verbergung, sind nicht zwei, sondern die Wesung des Einen, der Wahrheit 
selbst. ’63 The structure of unconcealment and concealment is the same as the temporal 
structure of presence and absence. But this is no mere structural analogy. Precisely in so far 
as they are structurally identical, the structure of truth and the structure of time are the very 
same thing. Neither is more primordial than the other; neither makes the other possible. 
They are the same considered in different ways.
We can now see the sense in which time, for Heidegger, was always to be conceived 
as the truth of being. There is not first time and then being to subsequently inhabit its 
structures; nor is there first being and then time to “structuralise” it afterwards. Rather, being 
and time are the same -  the basic structure, also called truth, of concealment and 
unconcealment. They are both “given”, or rather ereignet, by Ereignis. Thus: ‘Das Wesen 
der Wahrheit ist die lichtende Verbergung des Ereignisses. ’64 The Ereignung of Ereignis is 
indeed, Heidegger tells us, Ereignis coming to truth: ‘Das Ereignis ereignet, sagt nichts 
anderes als: Es und nur es wird Wahrheit’65. It could possibly be said, if we are allowed to 
speak in this way, that concealment-unconcealment is die structure of Ereignis itself. It is 
also, of course, let it be noted, the great overarching structure -  the chronological structure -  
of that singular happening that is Western history.
In the lecture Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes the concealment proper to the essence 
of truth is cleaved in two. On the one hand, concealment takes the form of Versagen, perhaps
60 Vom Wesen der Wahrheit, Wegmarken, p. 196
61 Vom Wesen der Wahrheit, Wegmarken, p. 197
62 Beitrdge zur Philosophie, p. 348
63 Beitrdge zur Philosophie, p. 349
64 Beitrdge zur Philosophie, p. 344
65 Beitrdge zur Philosophie, p. 349
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best translated as “denial”: ‘Seiendes versagt sich uns bis auf jenes Eine und dem Anschein 
nach Geringste, das wir am ehesten treffen, wenn wir vom Seienden nur noch sagen konnen, 
dafi es sei. Die Verbergung als Versagen ist nicht erst und nur die jedesmalige Grenze der 
Erkenntnis, sondern der Anfang der Lichtung des Gelichteten. ’66 On the other hand, 
concealment takes the form of Vers tellen, well translated by “dissimulation”: ‘Seiendes 
• schiebt sich vor Seiendes, das eine verschleiert das andere, jenes verdunkelt dieses, weniges 
verbaut vieles, vereinzeltes verleugnet alles. Hier ist das Verbergung nicht jenes einfache 
Versagen, sondern: das Seiende erscheint zwar, aber es gibt sich anders, als es ist. ’67 This 
latter mode of concealment is die condition for our capacity to make mistakes, to get things 
wrong. In the language of metaphysics these could be expressed as determinations of the 
(eternal) finitude of knowledge.
In this lecture, as often elsewhere, the concealment proper to the essence of truth is 
characterised in terms of a refusal [Verweigem]. Versagen and Verstellen are the two 
essential forms of refusal. In the word Verweigem Heidegger wishes to be heard a turn away 
from unconcealment, understood in terms of a “strife” [Streit] between unconcealment and 
concealment. Heidegger names it the “Urstreif’ of die essence of truth, and accords it to 
Ereignis as such.68 The thought is that the clearing, within which beings come to presence, 
comes to be in the first place from out of die original strife of concealment and 
unconcealment. Truth opens itself reflexively, or, as Heidegger also puts it, sets itself up [sich 
einrichtet\ as and within this strife. This is the happening (or Ereignis) of truth. ‘Wahrheit 
geschieht nur so, dafi sie in dem durch sie selbst sich dfihenden Streit und Spielraum sich 
einrichtet. Weil die Wahrheit das Gegenwendige von Lichtung und Verbergung ist, deshalb
gehOrt zu ihr das, was hier die Einrichtung genannt sei.*69 And this happening is, of course,
historical.
There is a famous passage in Brief tiber den Humanismus in which Heidegger claims 
that in the lecture Vom Wesen der Wahrheit a certain insight is given into the thinking of the 
Kehre?0 We need not look far to identify this insight. Although we shall postpone a 
discussion of the so called Kehre attributed to Heidegger’s development for a subsequent 
chapter71, we can remark here that the Kehre is itself the turn in the essence of truth from 
correctness to concealment and unconcealment, as the turn that overcomes the metaphysical 
constellation of thinking and discloses the truth of being. Thus the lecture as a whole itself
66 Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes, Holzwege, p. 42
67 Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes, Holzwege, p. 42
68 In a note added to Heidegger’s own copy of the Reclam edition of 1960.
69 Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes, Holzwege, p. 49 I have pursued the intimate relation that Heidegger 
draws out between truth and art, grounded on this notion of the strife between concealment and 
unconcealment, which is intended to lead to the overcoming of traditional aesthetics, in Heidegger and 
Metaphysical Aesthetics, BSA Postgraduate Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 1, No. 1.
70 Cf. Brief tiber den Humanismus, Wegmarken, pp. 327-328.
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marks the turn. Heidegger puts it like this in a note added to the end of the second publication 
of the lecture in 1949: ‘Die Antwort auf die Frage nach dem Wesen der Wahrheit ist die Sage 
einer Kehre innerhalb der Geschichte des Seyns. ’72 The implication is that in Sein und Zeit 
die Kehre is still not yet effected, that the essence of truth is there still not thought entirely 
beyond the boundaries of metaphysics. In so far as truth as discoveredness, disclosure is 
presented in terms of, and made intelligible through, truth as correctness, the purview of the 
philosophy of die subject, which is to say its language, has still not yet been decisively 
abandoned. Nevertheless, in Sein und Zeit the first essential steps are made that prepare the 
ground for the Kehre. Indeed, as we shall see in more detail later, the turn to the third 
division of Sein und Zeit, “Zeit und Seiri” was originally intended to effect the Kehre out of 
metaphysics. What this reversal might mean can be seen more clearly when we consider 
Heidegger’s claim: ‘Die Frage nach dem Wesen der Wahrheit frndet ihre Antwort in dem 
Satz: das Wesen [being] der Wahrheit [time] ist die Wahrheit [time] des Wesens [being] . ’73 
“Wesen”, Heidegger tells us, is to be understood as a verb: to hold sway. The metaphysical 
question concerning the essence of truth becomes the question concerning the truth of the 
holding sway, the truth of being. This is a question set apart from metaphysics, one whose 
perspective is the history of being, in which metaphysics, taken up into its historical essence, 
is overcome.
Before concluding our consideration of Heidegger’s concept of truth, we shall attend 
to two important and related objections brought against it by, amongst others, Ernst 
Tugendhat. In his book Der Wahrheitsbegrijf bei Husserl und Heidegger Tugendhat points 
out, in relation to §44 of Sein und Zeit, that Heidegger’s concept of discovering contains an 
essential ambiguity and that it is only on the basis of this ambiguity that he is able to draw his 
conclusion that die most original determination of truth is disclosure, Erschlossenheit. On the 
one hand, discovering means the simple showing of the entity itself; on the other hand, it 
means the showing of the entity itself as it is, as opposed to how it is not. Tugendhat’s 
thought is that only the second meaning of discovering can function as a determination of 
truth for the first meaning allows no room for false discovering, that is, en-covering, and the 
word truth can only receive a determination at all in so far as it is essentially contrasted with 
falsehood. Tugendhat asks how it is, then, that one can call die first meaning of discovering -  
which turns out to be the concept of disclosure as such -  truth at all, as, it seems, Heidegger is 
worft to do. Simply sliding from one to the other, from the second to the first, without any 
acknowledgement whatsoever renders Heidegger’s supposed derivation of the traditional 
concept of truth spurious. The two objections are thus, on the one hand, that Heidegger’s
71 Cf. Chapter 12.
72 Vom Wesen der Wahrheit, Wegmarken, p. 201
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concept of truth allows no room for falsity, and, on the other, that it does not warrant being 
called truth because, as far as Heidegger has shown, it is unrelated to the traditional meaning 
of this term.
Can we defend Heidegger’s concept of truth from these charges? As to the second 
point, it is not clear at all that in §44 Heidegger is moving between different concepts of 
discoveredness. The two different meanings which Tugendhat distinguishes are not to be 
conceived as refering to two different “levels” of truth; rather, they both refer simply to the 
process of dis-covering as such. It is the process of discovering that is all Heidegger is 
interested in in this section, and this process can only be conceived in one way. In so far as 
Heidegger shows that the possibility of the proposition being true is that it discovers the being 
itself that it refers to -  no matter for the “how” of this discovering -  then he is in a position to 
affirm that discoveredness as such, the process of coming to presence, of emergence from 
unconcealment, is original truth. The discovering-fiinction of the proposition is not 
something that rests on the deeper layer of the disclosure that is Da-sein; rather, this dis­
closure and this dis-covering are the very same -  the non-static (ecstatic) revealing operation 
that is the happening of unconcealment.
But can this truth as discovering support the weight of an adequate concept of 
falsehood? Tugendhat argues that a false proposition precisely does not discover its object -  
as it is -  but rather the opposite: it covers it up: ‘Die falsche Aussage verbirgt in der Tat, aber 
was und wie? Man wird doch wohl sagen mussen: sie verdeckt das Seiende, wie es selbst ist, 
und zwar dadurch, dab sie es in einem anderen Wie entdeckt, n&nlich so wie es nicht selbst 
ist. ’74 But the employment of the qualifications “wie es selbst ist” and “wie es nicht selbst 
ist” entails the concession of Heidegger’s point, for it means that Tugendhat accepts that the 
false proposition discovers the being itself just as much as the true one, and thus that 
propositional truth and falsity are to be understood in terms of discovering. Indeed, one can 
only make sense of the notion of falsity as the oppugnant opposite of truth in so far as both 
are conceived as unconcealing the matter itself. The proposition “the picture on the wall does 
not hang crooked” can only be false in so far as it discovers the picture itself As Heidegger 
writes: ‘Das Seiende ist nicht vdllig verborgen, sondern gerade entdeckt, aber zugleich 
verstellt; es zeigt sich -  aber im Modus des Scheins. ’75
Tugendhat cannot see how Heidegger’s original truth, disclosure as such, can 
incorporate any notion of falsehood whatsoever. This is because he malforms Heidegger’s 
concept of truth by separating it into two layers, peeling that dimension in which falsity first 
makes sense away from Heidegger’s original determination of truth. In doing this he employs
73 Vom Wesen der Wahrheit, Wegmarken, p. 201 Also: ‘Die Frage nach dem Wesen der Wahrheit ist 
zugleich und in sich die Frage nach der Wahrheit des Wesens. ’ [Grundfragen der Philosophie, p.47]
74 Der Wahrheitsbegriff bei Husserl und Heidegger, p. 334
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two different ultimately static notions of revealing. Once the layers coalesce into one again, 
and truth as disclosure is understood ecstatically and unitarily, the way in which falsehood 
belongs to original truth as disclosure becomes clear. Indeed, as we have seen, Heidegger is 
only too greatly at pains to emphasise the way in which untruth belongs to truth, the way in 
which truth and untruth jointly and equally, without hierarchy, configure the structure of dis­
closure, un-concealment, a-Aydeia.
Lastly, to return to the question of whether Heidegger is entitled to call disclosure as 
such “truth”, this receives its affirmation again in reference to the history of truth. If it is the 
case that original truth metamorphosises into the traditional concept of truth through an 
essential deformation, as Heidegger tries to show in his essay on Plato’s doctrine of truth, 
then both “truths” are truth. We have to do with what is ultimately the same phenomenon 
here. As we have seen, the thinking concerning this structural transfiguration remains 
untainted by Heidegger’s supposed retraction of his essay late in life.
However, coupled together with this retraction is apparently the claim that original 
truth, now expressed simply “AAiyflcia”, cannot, after all, be called truth: ‘Die Frage nach der 
AArfdeta, nach der Unverborgenheit als solcher, ist nicht die Frage nach der Wahrheit. Darum 
war es nicht sachgem&B und demzufolge irrefuhrend, die AArjdeia im Sinne der Lichtung 
Wahrheit zu nennen. ’76 Again, however, Heidegger’s ostensible recantation here serves 
sooner as a confirmation of his former views than as abjuration. We find this conditional on 
the preceeding page:
Sofem man Wahrheit im uberlieferten “natUrlichen” Sinn als die am Seienden ausgewiesene 
Ubereinstimmung der Erkenntnis mit dem Seienden versteht, aber auch, sofern die Wahrheit als die 
Gewiflheit des Wissens vom Sein ausgelegt wird, darf die AArjdeia, die Unverborgenheit im Sinne der 
Lichtung, nicht mit der Wahrheit gleichgesetzt werden. Vielmehr gew&hrt die AA-qOcia, die 
Unverborgenheit als Lichtung gedacht, erst die Mdglichkeit von Wahrheit. Denn die Wahrheit kann 
selbst ebenso wie Sein und Denken nur im Element der Lichtung das sein, was sie ist.
The structural connective between AA^Oeia and the traditional concept of truth here 
advocated has not shifted in any degree. Heidegger had never implied that they were the very 
same. The issue here is merely verbal; not philosophical at all.
75 Sein und Zeit, p. 222
76 Zur Sache des Denkens, p. 77
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Part III:
The Question of Being
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Chapter 10: 
Inauthenticity and Metaphysics
The aim of this chapter is to demonstrate the way in which the structures of 
metaphysical thinking and the historical epoch of metaphysics in general, as regards its 
essential structural characteristics, are grounded in the mode of existence that Heidegger 
names inauthenticity. What does Heidegger mean by inauthenticity?
We have already answered this question above in die context of our discussion of 
selfhood. Inauthenticity is the mode of Dasein’s being in which Dasein has lost its own self 
and has taken on the self that Heidegger calls das Man. It may be wondered how Dasein is 
capable of losing its self, what “losing” in this context means. Fundamentally, the losing of 
its self, or the process of losing its self, is to be understood in terms of what we called a flight 
of Dasein from itself: the flight of Verfallen. The flight of Verfallen is the flight of Dasein 
away from its self and towards inner-worldly beings. Heidegger writes: ‘[Verfallen]...soil 
bedeuten: das Dasein ist zun&chst und zumeist bei der besorgten “Welt” . ’ 1 The ground of this 
flight, which is a fundamental existential determination of Dasein, is the basic Befindlichkeit 
of Angst. In Angst the being of Dasein as being-in-the-world is disclosed to Dasein. More 
precisely, the being of Dasein is disclosed to it as given over to itself, as factical existence, as 
responsible freedom. The flight of Dasein from itself is the flight away from the meaning of 
existence, from existential responsibility as the truth of the being of Dasein. Dasein is, as it 
were, lucifugous.
Dasein flees its self towards inner-worldly beings. As a flight from itself as Da-sein, 
Heidegger also characterises inauthenticity as Weg-sein? It takes the form of Dasein 
understanding its possibilities, and thus understanding itself, from the inner-worldly beings 
that it encounters. ‘Das Dasein versteht sich zun&chst und zumeist aus den Dingen...Das 
Dasein versteht sich aus dem Seinkdnnen, das durch das Gelingen und MiBlingen, durch die
1 Sein und Zeit, p. 175
2 Cf., for example, Beitrdge zur Philosophie, pp. 323 ff.
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Tunlichkeit und Untunlichkeit seines Umgangs mit den Dingen bestimmt ist. Das Dasein 
kommt so aus den Dingen her auf sich zu. ’3 For this reason, Heidegger tells us, inauthentic 
Dasein is distracted [zerstreut -  from zerstreuen, to disperse, scatter] by or amidst inner- 
worldly beings. Dasein does not take up possibilities grounded in the truth of its finite 
existence, Dasein does not take up its “own-most” possibilities, but rather takes up 
possibilities suggested to it by things and, it is important to highlight, by other “Daseins” 
together with it in the world. Dasein understands its possibilities out of the world that das 
Man has already constituted in its understanding projection. This self is not individuated 
because it does not take up its own-most possibilities, but instead takes up the possibilities of 
die “anyone”. It is thus the self of “averageness” [.Durchschnittlichkeit] and the neutrality of 
“publicness” [Offentlichkeit]. Das Man has always already made the decisions and 
judgements of the average publicness, and therefore inauthentic Dasein is ostensibly 
exonerated from all responsibility. ‘Weil das Man jedoch alles Urteilen und Entscheiden 
vorgibt, nimmt es dem jeweiligen Dasein die Verantwortlichkeit ab. ’4
This flight of Dasein characterises its mode of being, Heidegger tells us, initially and 
for the most part, and thus inauthenticity is to be understood as identical to what we 
introduced at the outset of our discussion of the existential analysis as Dasein's everydayness 
[Alltdglichkeit].5 Initially and for die most part Dasein is in the mode of inauthenticity 
because, in so far as it is always already existing in a world, it has always already understood 
itself out of inner-worldly beings. ‘Weil wir als Existierende im vorhinein schon Welt 
verstehen, kdnnen wir uns st&ndig in bestimmter Weise aus dem begegnenden Seienden als 
innerweldichem verstehen und begegnen. ’6 Verfallen is, of course, an essential structural 
determination of the being of Dasein. It is not at all to be understood as a mere proclivity of 
human weakliness, as it so often is assumed to be by Heidegger’s commentators.7 ‘Das
3 Die Grundprobleme der Phdnomenologie, pp. 409-410
4 Sein und Zeit, p. 127
5 This thought often vexes the commentators, the majority of which see a distinction here. (For 
example: Zimmerman, Ellipse of the Self pp. 44 j f  Blattner, Heidegger's Temporal Idealism, p. 76; 
Dreyftis, Being-in-the-World, pp. 225 ff.) However, everydayness is merely the name for the same 
phenomenon in the course of the first turn of the hermeneutic wheel.
Die Grundprobleme der Phdnomenologie, p. 243
7 Dreyfus contends that there are two senses of Verfallen in Sein und Zeit, one structural, one 
psychological. We can be certain, of course, that there is no psychological sense of Verfallen at 
play in Sein und Zeit -  that would make a mockery of Heidegger’s most basic intentions. Rather, 
Dreyfus fails to see that the two senses he purports to distinguish are the very same -  a structural sense. 
It is of course true that Heidegger discusses Verfallen existentially, which ultimately means in relation 
to Dasein's essential finitude. As such it takes on a different determination as, for example, its 
structural temporal correlative -  the present. Ecstatic-horizontal temporal structure alone cannot 
account for the movement of Verfallen, even if temporality itself is essentially finite. To make sense of 
it as Dasein's concemful flight of Angst before its own finitude, before the groundlessness of its being, 
requires the existential foundation of Sorge. But an existential account is so far removed from being a 
psychological account as to be ultimately incompatible with one.
121
Verfallen enthullt eine wesenhafte ontologische Struktur des Daseins selbst’8. And it must 
not be forgotten that, in the last place, inauthenticity is to be understood as one of the two 
basic modes of temporalisation.
Inauthenticity and the Structure of Metaphysical Thinking
We saw in the course of our schematic outline of the history of being that the epoch 
of metaphysics is characterised by a particular way of thinking, a particular conceptuality. 
This thinking revolves around the categorial schema of the subject-object relation, and thus 
the conception of truth as correctness.9 This schema itself is possible only given an 
understanding of the being of beings (being-ness) determined primarily by the mode of being 
that Heidegger names Vorhandenheit. Vorhandenheit is the mode of being of those beings 
disclosed as removed from ecstatic structurality. How does the mode of being of 
Vorhandenheit become paradigmatic for Dasein’s understanding of the being of beings for 
reasons that lie in the constitution of Dasein itself?
We have seen that in the course of its dealings in the world Dasein encounters beings 
for the most part in the mode of Zuhandenheit. This is the mode of being that corresponds to 
Dasein’s use of inner-worldly beings for the sake of possibilities of its own being. In the 
course of their use, however, diese inner-worldly beings themselves are not thematically 
disclosed to Dasein at all; they remain in-explicit. They only become explicidy disclosed to 
Dasein in the mode of Dasein's “theoretical” comportment, in which Dasein engages with 
them more or less “cognitively”. This mode of Dasein’s being, as we have seen, corresponds 
to the mode of being of inner-worldly beings of Vorhandenheit. Beings are thus only 
thematically disclosed to Dasein in so far as they are vorhanden. The mode of being in which 
beings are thematically disclosed will, of course, inevitably take precedence over other modes 
of being in the theoretical thematisation of the being of beings. Thus beings in general will 
come to be understood in terms of Vorhandenheit, and the being-ness of beings will be 
interpreted accordingly.
This is no less true of the being that Dasein itself is. The being of the being that 
theoretically cognises beings is itself, for the same reasons, understood in terms of the mode 
of being of Vorhandenheit'. the “subject”, standing to other beings of the mode of
8 Sein und Zeit, p. 179 An allusion to the theological doctrine of original sin seems undeniable here. 
Indeed, the theological tone of many of the concepts employed by Heidegger in characterising Dasein 
is remarkable. In this, as in all other cases, Heidegger interdicts the theological interpretation: ‘Das 
Verfallen ist ein ontologischer Bewegungsbegriff. Ontisch wird nicht entschieden, ob der Mensch “in 
der Siinde ersoffen”, im status corruptionis ist, ob er im status integritatis wandelt oder sich in einem 
Zwischenstadium, dem status gratiae, befmdet. ’ [Sein und Zeit, p. 180]
9 ‘Die Richtigkeit als Auslegung des Offenen wird der Grund der Subjekt-Objekt-Beziehung.’ 
[Beitrdge zur Philosophie, p. 316]
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Vorhandenheit (objects) in a cognitive relation that comes to be understood in terms of 
representation [Vorstellung]. Correspondingly -  and most importantly of all truth comes to 
be understood in terms of Vorhandenheit as the correctness of representation. Thus the basic 
categorial schema of metaphysical thinking is bom. It is grounded in the thematisation of 
being in general in terms of the mode of being of Vorhandenheit, which is itself a 
fundamental possibility of the structural constitution of the being of Dasein. But in what 
sense is this metaphysical understanding of being and the categories of thought that it 
underlies grounded in an inauthentic mode of the being of Dasein?
We have seen that inauthenticity is precisely a flight from the essence of existence as 
such towards inner-worldly beings, die flight of Verfallen. In the mode of being of 
inauthenticity, therefore, existence itself, as the basic constitution of the being that is 
inauthentic, is precisely not brought to disclosure, but rather covered up. In inauthenticity, in 
the flight of Verfallen towards inner-worldly beings, Dasein conceals -  and this is precisely 
its flight -  its existence from itself. Now, the metaphysical subject -  a being of the mode of 
being of Vorhandenheit -  does not exist, in Heidegger’s sense; for him, existence constitutes 
only die being of Dasein; precisely not the being of beings of the mode of Vorhandenheit. 
The metaphysical subject is rather the upshot of Dasein ’s interpretation of its own being in so 
far as its essence as existence is concealed from it, that is, in so far as it interprets its own 
being according to the mode of being of the inner-worldly beings that it encounters in its 
flight from existence. 10 If the concealment of Dasein’s essence as existence is precisely what 
Heidegger means by the mode of being of inauthenticity, and if the metaphysical subject and 
thus the categories of metaphysical thinking in general are only possible given the 
concealment of existence from Dasein itself, then metaphysical thinking must be 
fundamentally grounded in the mode of being of inauthenticity.
As we have seen, the ontological constitution of existence is ecstatic temporality. 
Fleeing the disclosure of existence, and thus covering the phenomenon of ec-static 
temporality over, metaphysical thinking interprets time statically -  as an irreversible 
succession of “nows”. But the interpretation of being in general in terms of Vorhandenheit is 
only possible on the basis of this static interpretation of time, since beings in the mode of 
Vorhandenheit are precisely those beings which have been plucked out of the ecstatic 
structures that otherwise determine the being of inner-worldly beings in so far as they are 
constituted as what they are in relation to a temporal projection of Dasein onto a possibility of 
its being for the sake of itself. Indeed, the nows themselves have the mode of being of 
Vorhandenheit: ‘Die Zeit, die man als das Jetzt und als eine Mannigfaltigkeit und Abfolge
10 ‘Das alhflgliche Dasein schopft die vorontologische Auslegung seines Seins aus der n&chsten 
Seinsart des Man. Die ontologische Interpretation folgt zun&chst dieser Auslegungstendenz, sie
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von Jetzt kennt, ist eine vorhandene Folge. Die Jetzt geben sich als innerzeitig. Sie kommen 
an und verschwinden wie Seiendes, sie vergehen wie Vorhandenes zum Nicht-mehr- 
vorhandenen. ’ 11
The interpretation of being in general according to the static model of Vorhandenheit 
underlies, Heidegger tells us, all of the successive metaphysical interpretations of being-ness. 
Beneath the understanding of being in terms of substance, absolute position (Kant), absolute 
subjectivity (Hegel), the will-to-power (Nietzsche) lies the unifying metaphysical experience 
of being as constant presence [bestdndige Anwesenheit], The interpretation of the being-ness 
of beings as constant presence is founded on the model of Vorhandenheit, for, whilst being is 
here indeed understood in terms of time -  presence -, a constant presence is one bereft of 
ecstasy. Indeed, the nows themselves are to be grasped in terms of constant presence even 
though they come and go. For this reason, whilst temporality is primarily futural, the 
inauthentic, metaphysical understanding grasps time primarily out of the present: ‘Die 
ekstatisch-horizontale Zeitlichkeit zeitigt sich primdr aus der Zukunft. Das vulgSre 
ZeitverstSndnis hingegen sieht das Gnmdphanomen der Zeit im Jetzt..., das man 
“Gegenwart” nennt. ’ 12
Crucially, for die metaphysical understanding, grounded in the mode of being of 
Verfallen, time is infinite, whereas, as we have seen, ecstatic temporality is essentially finite. 
The supposed infinity of time is precisely a consequence of its interpretation as a succession 
of nows. Such a succession is necessarily, even as a matter of logic (although paradoxically, 
as Kant pointed out), endless in both “directions”. In this way the vulgar understanding 
conceals the existential phenomenon of death that is so intimately connected with the 
possibility of the authentic mode of Dasein’s being. This understanding of time as infinite is 
no arbitrary consequence of Dasein’s understanding in the mode of being of Verfallen; rather, 
it belongs to the essence of this inauthentic mode of being to precisely cover up its essential 
finitude, grounded in the basic phenomenon of original temporality, as the angst-ridden flight 
from its own death. ‘In der besorgten Flucht liegt die Flucht vor dem Tode, das heiBt ein 
Wegsehen von dem Ende des In-der-Welt-seins. Dieses Wegsehen von... ist an ihm selbst 
ein Modus des ekstatisch zukunfiigen Seins zum Ende. Die uneigentliche Zeitlichkeit des
versteht das Dasein aus der Welt her und findet es als innerweltlich Seiendes vor.’ [Sein und Zeit, p. 
130]
11 Die Grundprobleme der Phdnomenologie, p. 385 This metaphysical interpretation of time being 
also, of course, grounded in Verfallen: ‘Die Verdeckung der spezifischen Strukturmomente der 
Weltzeit, die Verdeckung ihres Ursprungs aus der Zeitlichkeit und die Verdeckung dieser selbst hat 
ihren Grund in der Seinsart des Daseins, die wir das Verfallen nennen.’ [Die Grundprobleme der 
Phdnomenologie, p. 384] It is the only one possible once ecstatic temporality has been concealed.
12 Sein und Zeit, pp. 426-427
124
verfallend-alltSglichen Daseins muB als solches Wegsehen von der Endlichkeit die eigentliche 
Zukunftigkeit und damit die Zeitlichkeit iiberhaupt verkennen. ’ 13
Inauthenticity as Seinsvergessenheit
We saw that Heidegger characterises the epoch of the history of being of metaphysics 
as the epoch of Seinsvergessenheit: being itself is forgotten; a precedency of beings 
establishes itself. In so far as metaphysical thinking is grounded in the structures of Dasein 
but is to be essentially determined as Seinsvergessenheit, the possibility of Seinsvergessenheit 
must itself lie within the structures of Dasein. We saw that Seinsvergessenheit is grounded on 
something more primordial, Seinsverlassenheit, which is to be characterised as the withdrawal 
[Entzug] of being in its truth. Being forsakes beings.
As we saw already in the first part, the possibility of the withdrawal of being belongs 
to the essence, or better, the structure, of truth. Truth is to be understood in terms of the twin 
structural concepts of unconcealment and concealment. To this structure belongs both 
unconcealment itself and that which is unconcealed; that is, both presence as such and that 
which presences. This conformation grounds the possibility of the withdrawal of being. 
Being -  that which grounds beings as beings -  withdraws in favour of the beings themselves; 
presence withdraws in favour of that which presences. This is to say that being, presence, 
unconcealment itself, remains concealed whilst beings, that which presences, are 
unconcealed. ‘Das Sein selbst west als die Unverborgenheit, in der das Seiende anwest. Die 
Unverborgenheit selbst jedoch bleibt als diese verborgen...Das Sein selbst bleibt aus.'14 How 
is this to be understood?
We have seen that Dasein is the structural possibility of disclosure as such, that is, the 
structural possibility of truth as unconcealment. The fundamental structure of Dasein is 
temporality. The ecstatic-horizontal character of temporality makes presence and absence 
first possible; it constitutes, to use the later Heidegger’s phrase, the truth of being. To the 
ontological constitution of the being of Dasein as Sorge -  precisely in so far as Dasein is a 
factical projection on possibilities -  belongs the moment which Heidegger calls Verfallen. As 
Verfallen, Dasein is always already distrait, absorbed in a world amidst inner-worldly beings. 
This means that Dasein always first and foremost understands itself -  that is, its possibilities -  
from out of the beings that it encounters, rather than from out of the essence of its own finite 
existence. Inner-worldly beings are disclosed, but being as such is concealed. The dynamic 
structural moment of the being of Dasein of Verfallen is that which, from the opposite 
direction, as it were, Heidegger calls the withdrawal of being; that which grounds the
13 Sein und Zeit, p. 424
14 Nietzsche II, p. 318
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forgetting of being for a precedence of beings. Heidegger gives confirmation of this in the 
letter on humanism: ‘Das Vergessen der Wahrheit des Seins zugunsten des Andrangs des im 
Wesen unbedachten Seienden ist der Sinn des in “S. u. Z.” genannten “Verfallens” . ’ 15 
Dasein, as the structural possibility of unconcealment as such, to whose being Verfallen 
constitutively belongs, is itself the ground of the concealment of being, the priority of the 
unconcealment of beings, and thus of Seinsverlassenheit and the Seinsvergessenheit grounded 
therein, and therefore of the epoch in the history of being essentially determined by these. 16 
Again: ‘Der Entzug...ist des Da-seins. ’ 17 Put another way: the structure that makes truth first 
possible is the ground of the primacy of what is unconcealed over unconcealment as such; and 
put another way again: in so far as Verfallen is the existential correlative of the temporal 
ecstasy of the present, the forgetting of being is fundamentally grounded -  made possible and 
necessary -  by the ecstatic-horizontal structure of primordial temporality.
But Verfallen is the essential determination of the predominant mode of inauthenticity 
of the being of Dasein. Thus inauthenticity is the ground o f the possibility o f 
Seinsvergessenheit.
In so far as the withdrawal of being is grounded in disclosure as such, it has always 
already happened as soon as beings are drawn into unconcealment. Thus as long as there has 
been philosophy -  that is, metaphysics -  has there been Seinsverlassenheit.
Inauthenticity and Modem Technology
At the completion of the epoch of metaphysics modem technology comes to hold 
sway. ‘Die Technik ist der hochste und umfangreichste Triumph der abendl&ndischen 
Metaphysik, sie ist diese selbst in ihrer Ausbreitung durch das Seiende im Ganzen. ’ 18 Being 
the result of millennia of metaphysical thinking, technological ek-sistentiality is inseparable 
from metaphysical modes of thought -  the interpretation of being in general in terms of 
Vorhandenheit and thus of man as the subject of knowledge. ‘Denn mit der sich 
vollendenden Metaphysik der Subjektivitat, die dem &ufiersten Entzug der Wahrheit des Seins
13 Brief uber den Humanismus, Wegmarken, p. 332 Cf. also this passage: ‘Der Mensch ist in diesem
Geschehnis des Ausbleibens des Seins selbst in die Loslassung des Seienden aus der sich entziehenden
Wahrheit des Seins geworfen. Er verffcllt, das Sein im Sinne des Seienden als solchen vorstellend, auf 
das Seiende, um aus dem Seienden her, ihm verfallende, sich selbst als den Seienden aufzurichten, der 
vorstellend-herstellend sich des Seienden als des Gegenstandlichen bemachtigt.’ [Nietzsche II, p. 342]
16 In so far as Seinsverlassenheit is to be determined as the essence of nihilism, it can further be pointed 
out that Dasein contains within itself the tendency towards nihilism. Nihilism is an essential structural 
possibility of the constitution of being of Dasein, and thus an essential possibility of the historical 
structures determined by this being.
17 Beitrtige zur Philosophie, p. 293 Also expressed as follows: ‘Das “Da” meint jene Lichtung, in der 
jeweils das Seiende im Ganzen steht, so freilich, daB in diesem Da das Seyn des offenen Seienden sich 
zeigt und zugleich entzieht. ’ [Grundfragen der Philosophie, p. 213]
18 Besinnung, p. 176
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entspricht, indem sie ihn bis zur Unkennbaikeit verdeckt, beginnt die Epoche der unbedingten 
und vollstSndigen Vergegenst&ndlichung von allem, was ist. ’ 19 And: ‘Seiendheit als 
Vorgestelltheit meint: V ergegenst&ndli chung des “Wirklichen” (Wirkenden) zur
Wirksamkeit. Wesentlich gehdrt in diese VergegenstSndlichung als ihr Wahrheitswesen die 
Technik. ’20 The essence of modem technology is Ge-stell, according to which beings are 
disclosed as Bestand. Ge-stell is the Geschick of being which reigns at the culmination of die 
epoch of metaphysics as the utmost Seinsvergessenheit. In so far as Seinsvergessenheit is 
made possible by the inauthenticity grounded in the structural constitution of Dasein’s being, 
Ge-stell -  and therefore the basic possibility of modem technology as such -  is also to be 
conceived as grounded in die inauthentic mode of Dasein's being.
Being is forgotten in so far as Verfallen essentially determines the being of Dasein; 
beings take priority in so far as Dasein is always already absorbed among them. 
Inauthenticity is the mode of die existentiality of Dasein correlative with this absorption -  
Dasein understands its possibilities, and thus its own self, from out of the world, from out of 
the inner-worldly beings among which it is absorbed. This existentiality has forgotten the 
truth of existence, has forgotten being as such. Modem technology -  founded on the mode of 
the revealing of beings that is the utmost Seinsvergessenheit: beings revealed as Bestand -  is 
to be understood correspondingly in terms of the ek-sistentiality of historical man to whom 
beings are in this way revealed. In this context, rather than speak of existentiality Heidegger 
often uses the word Verhaltenheit, comportment.
Beings revealed as Bestand are beings revealed purely and simply as regards their 
use, or usability. Beings determined by this mode of revealing, which is grounded in 
Seinsvergessenheit, and thus ultimately in Seinsverlassenheit, are therefore concealed as 
regards their being as such. The existential comportment of historical man towards beings 
revealed purely and simply as regards their use -  an existential determination of beings -  is 
therefore inauthentic. The existentiality of modem technology is consequently grounded 
primarily in the temporal ecstasy of the present (Verfallen-sein-bei); to the future, as to the 
past, it is blind. This can be seen in concrete terms, on the one hand, in the general lack of 
concern for sustainability in the development of modem technologies, and on the other, in the 
general lack of regard for the legacy of the past. The inauthentic existentiality of modem 
technology shows itself also in its irresoluteness21. The possibilities of modem technology 
are not in general determined by a consideration of the essence of historical mankind as such, 
nor by a consideration of the possibilities essential to modem technology itself as a 
development of historical mankind determined within a particular history (that of the West);
19 Nietzsche II, p. 350
20 Die Geschichte des Seyns, p. 26
21 See the discussions of Heidegger’s concept of Entschlossenheit below.
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rather, the possibilities of modem technology are in general determined by economic factors 
and are thus contingent on the possibilities of particular economic systems. Not grounded in 
the truth of being, these possibilities are in an important sense arbitrary, essentially without 
ultimate purpose -  they are realised as a drive towards always more efficient solutions for no 
reason other than to procure still more efficient solutions.
Represented objects have objective extant properties that can be measured. Modem 
science develops grounded in the conception of truth as correctness -  or, better, as certainty -  
and in the mathematical projection of nature.22 Heidegger writes: ‘Weil die neuzeitliche 
“Wissenschaft” (Physik) mathematisch (nicht empirisch) ist, deshalb ist sie notwendig 
experimented im Sinne des messenden Experimentes... Gerade der Entwurf der Natur im 
mathematischen Sinne ist die Voraussetzung fur die Notwendigkeit und Mttglichkeit des 
“Experimentes” als des messenden. ’23 Modem science is essentially metaphysical, for 
Heidegger -  grounded in Seinsverlassenheit. The development of modem technology and the 
development of the exact sciences are, as we noted above, reciprocal^ and intrinsically 
interrelated. Modem technology -  as a mode of the manipulation of beings grounded on their 
mathematical interpretation and scientific investigation -  is first made possible by the basic 
mathematioo-scientific structures of metaphysical thinking.
Grounded on an interpretation of being as Vorhandenheit, which forms the core of the 
conceptuality of metaphysics and out of which both mathematics and modem science stem, 
technology, in its modem manifestations and essence, is the expression of an inauthentic ek- 
sistentiality.
22 ‘[D]as Mathematische -  das GewiBsein -  kennzeichnet die Grundart des Seins als der Vor- 
cestelltheit.’ [Metaphysik und Nihilismus, p. 156]
BeitrOge zur Philosophie, p. 163 On the being-historical determination of modem science cf. 
Beitrage zur Philosophie, §§73-80. We shall however omit detailed discussion of this important issue 
and the way in which it relates to modem technology and metaphysical thinking more generally.
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Chapter 11: 
Authenticity and the Truth of Being
The aim of this chapter is twofold. In the first place the essential connection between 
the mode of die being of Dasein of authenticity and the disclosure of the truth of being must 
be drawn. It must then be shown, in the second place, how the temporal-existential structures 
of Dasein demand of Dasein the mode of being of authenticity. Once these two aims have 
been accomplished we will be finally in a position to fully understand the relationship 
between the existentiality of Dasein and the history of being. We will consequently be in a 
position to fully understand three further elements of Heidegger’s thought: firsdy, what 
Heidegger means by the Not [need] of Seinsverlassenheit; secondly, why Heidegger thinks 
modem technology to be a danger and what this danger amounts to (as we have seen, this 
danger is not at all grounded in the destructive capacities of modem technology); and thirdly, 
and most importantly, we will be in a position to fully understand the motivation for raising 
the question of being and thus the fundamental (philosophical) motivation of Heidegger’s 
entire philosophical enterprise.
Authenticity
Heidegger’s word is Eigentlichkeit. What is meant by it? It is important to 
understand it in immediate connection to three further concepts of the existential analysis: 
Selbstheit, Verlorenheit and Jemeinigkeit. As we have seen, the being of Dasein is essentially 
characterised by Selbstheit: ‘Selbstheit entspringt als Wesung des Da-seins aus dem Ursprung 
des Da-seins’ 1 We have also seen that ‘der Ursprung des Selbst ist das Eigen-tum’2 This 
means, on the one hand, that Dasein can lose its self (Verlorenheit, inauthenticity), and, on 
the other, that Dasein’s existentiality is essentially characterised by mine-ness, Jemeinigkeit 
[“always my own”, “in each case mine”]. In the mode of being of authenticity, Dasein’s self
1 Beitriige zur Philosophie, p. 319
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is its own, Dasein owns its self -  in so far as it has found itself. Self-owning (as finding- 
one’s-self) is the meaning of Heidegger’s expression Eigentlichkeit, deriving etymologically, 
of course, from eigen. ‘[Das Dasein ist] seinem Wesen nach mogliches eigentliches, das heifit 
sich zueigen...Die beiden Seinsmodi der Eigentlichkeit und Uneigentlichkeit...griinden darin, 
daB Dasein iiberhaupt durch Jemeinigkeit bestimmt ist. ’3
It is very important to emphasise that Dasein’s ontological constitution as Sorge is 
essentially determined by Verfallen. It cannot be the case then that the mode of being of 
authenticity is an essential alternative to Verfallen-, rather, it amounts to only a particular 
modification of the Verfallen that characterises the being of Dasein initially and for the most 
part (everydayness). Heidegger writes: ‘die eigentliche Existenz [ist] nichts, was iiber der 
verfallenden Alltfiglichkeit schwebt, sondem existenzial nur ein modifiziertes Ergreifen 
dieser. ’4 And: ‘die Uneigentlichkeit gehftrt zum Wesen des faktischen Daseins. 
Eigentlichkeit ist nur eine Modifikation and keine totale Ausstreichung der 
Uneigentlichkeit. ’5
Resoluteness
The mode of being of authenticity is essentially determined and primarily 
characterised by what Heidegger calls Entschlossenheit [resoluteness]. Dasein, existing as its 
self is resolute. The term resoluteness here is in the first place to be taken in the vernacular. 
It describes the Dasein that is determined, single-minded, tenacious in relation to its 
projection onto the particular factical possibility. Such tenacity is possible, Heidegger is 
suggesting, only in so far as Dasein is in possession of its self, has found its self, and thus is 
capable for the first time of purposefully directing its self by projecting its self onto the 
possibilities of being that concern it, as an individual, most of all.
First and foremost, Heidegger characterises resoluteness as a mode of disclosure-. 
‘Die Entschlossenheit ist ein ausgezeichneter Modus der Erschlossenheit des Daseins. ’6 It is 
the authentic mode of disclosure, and thus: ‘Nunmehr ist mit der Entschlossenheit die 
urspriinglichste, weil eigentliche Wahrheit des Daseins gewonnen. ’7 In the disclosure of 
resoluteness the whole disclosure of being-in-the-world is modified -  although not of course 
as regards its “content”. That is not to say that Dasein is removed from, taken out of the 
world; rather, as resolute, Dasein first is in-the-world authentically. ‘Die Entschlossenheit
2 Beitrdge zur Philosophie, pp. 319-320
3 Sein und Zeit, pp. 42-43
4 Sein und Zeit, p. 179
5 Die Grundprobleme der Phdnomenologie, p. 243
6 Sein und Zeit, p. 297
7 Sein und Zeit, p. 297
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lost als eigentliches Selbstsein das Dasein nicht von seiner Welt ab, isoliert es nicht auf ein 
freischwebendes Ich. Wie sollte sie das auch -  wo sie doch als eigentliche Erschlossenheit 
nichts anderes als dasIn-der-Welt-sein eigentlich ist. ’8
The particular possibility onto which resolute Dasein projects is, of course, for the 
existential analysis, indeterminable. It is only disclosed, claims Heidegger, within the 
resolute projection itself. "Entschlossenheit “existiert” nur als verstehend-sich-entwerfender 
EntschluB. Aber woraufhin entschlieBt sich das Dasein in der Entschlossenheit? Wozu soil 
es sich entschlieBen? Die Antwort vermag nur der EntschluB selbst zu geben. ’9 Resoluteness 
itself, of course, is precisely determined; it is determined out of its disclosure of what 
Heidegger calls the Situation. ‘Die Situation ist das je in der Entschlossenheit erschlossene 
Da, als welches das existierende Seiende da ist. ’ 10 The Situation, as a mode of the presence of 
beings, is grounded on the particular ecstatic present that belongs to the temporality of 
authenticity -  der Augenblickr. ‘Der Augenblick ist ein Gegenwdrtigen von Anwesendem, das 
zum EntschluB gehOrig die Situation erschliefit, in die hinein die Entschlossenheit sich 
entschlossen hat. ’ 11
It is important to remember that in so far as Verfallen is an essential moment of the 
structure of Sorge, the existential projection of resoluteness, resting as it does on the mode of 
being of authenticity, is merely an exceptional variation of the irresoluteness that 
characterises the predominant mode of being of inauthenticity. ‘Die Entschlossenheit 
bedeutet Sich-aufrufenlassen aus der Verlorenheit in das Man. Die Unentschlossenheit des 
Man bleibt gleichwohl in Herrschaft, nur vermag sie die entschlossene Existenz nicht 
anzufechten. ’ 12
Now, Heidegger claims that the authenticity of this mode of being is testified to 
[bezeugt\ by die existential constitution of Dasein itself. This is to say that Dasein itself calls 
[rufi] itself to, demands [fordert] of itself, an authentic mode of being.
Conscience
The existential call to authenticity, claims Heidegger, is that phenomenon named by 
the vulgar understanding “conscience”. Initially and for the most part Dasein is lost in the 
self of das Man. Becoming authentic, he tells us, is accompanied by a clearing away of the 
concealings and obscurings of this inauthentic mode of being. 13 The call of conscience
8 Sein und Zeit, p. 298
9 Sein und Zeit, p. 298
10 Sein und Zeit, p. 299
11 Die Grundprobleme der Phdnomenologie, p. 407
12 Sein und Zeit, p. 299
13 ‘Wenn das Dasein die Welt eigens entdeckt und sich nahebringt, wenn es ihm selbst sein eigentliches 
Sein erschlieBt, dann vollzieht sich dieses Entdecken von “Welt” und ErschlieBen von Dasein immer
131
performs the function of initiating this clearing away by, in the first place, testifying to the 
possibility of the authentic mode of the existentiality of Dasein. Accordingly, the analysis of 
the phenomenon of conscience that Heidegger presents is an existential one, as differentiated 
from a psychological or a theological one. Conscience, for Heidegger, does not have the 
mode of being of Vorhandenheit, it is not a capacity or faculty of the soul or of the will, for 
example; rather, it is an existential, an existential structure of Dasein.14
Heidegger claims that conscience has to do with the understanding of something and 
is therefore to be conceived in terms of the disclosure of Dasein. Disclosure is constituted by 
understanding and Beftndlichkeit, as we have seen, but also by speech [Rede] and Verfallen. 
Conscience is phenomenally concrete as a call, and therefore is, according to Heidegger, as a 
mode of speech, fundamentally disclosive. Conscience calls into Dasein's lostness in das 
Man disclosing the possibility of the authenticity of being its self.
Thus that which is called to is Dasein in so far as it is lost. This is ontologically 
possible in so far as it belongs essentially to the being of Dasein that it always already has 
disclosed itself, always already, however unthematically, and however in authentically, 
understood itself. ‘Der Ruf trifft das Dasein in diesem alltaglich-durchschnittlich 
besorgenden Sich-immer-schon-verstehen. Das Man-selbst des besorgenden Mitseins mit 
Anderen wird vom Ruf getroffen. ’ 15 And Dasein is called to its own self. ‘Auf das Selbst 
wird das Man-selbst angerufen. ’ 16 That which calls the call of conscience is also of course 
Dasein itself. ‘Das Dasein raft im Gewissen sich selbst. ’ 17 Thus: Conscience, Dasein itself, 
demands o f  Dasein the mode o f being o f authenticity -  it does not merely testify to the 
possibility of this mode of being but not at all, or at least not necessarily, intentionally. 
Usually, indeed, precisely the reverse is the case: conscience calls against the “will”. The call 
o f conscience is rather grounded structurally in the existential conformation o f Dasein. In 
what sense?
Dasein is a factical existence, as we have seen. As factical it is characterised by what 
Heidegger calls Geworfenheit. Dasein is thrown into its that-it-is, and in such a way that it is 
responsible for it in having to be it. The Geworfenheit of Dasein and its correlative 
responsibility is always in some way disclosed to Dasein, but not initially and for the most 
part expressly. For the most part Dasein rather flees the explicit uncanny disclosure of its 
factical existence into the familiarity of das Man. In the basic Beftndlichkeit of Angst,
als Wegr&umen der Verdeckungen und Verdunkelungen, als Zerbrechen der Verstellungen, mit denen 
sich das Dasein gegen es selbst abgeriegelt.’ [Sein und Zeit, p. 129]
14 As with the other existentials, the vulgar understanding of conscience is subordinated to the 
phenomenological ontological-existential interpretation that Heidegger himself gives and subsequently 
grounded in it as the understanding of conscience appropriate to the predominant inauthenticity of 
Dasein.
13 Sein und Zeit, p. 272
16 Sein und Zeit, p. 273
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however, Dasein’s factical existence, its “dafi es ist und als das Seiende, das es ist, 
seinkdnnend zu sein hat’ is expressly disclosed. It is from out of the uncanny angst-ridden 
nakedness of its that-it-is-and-/ias-fo-he, from out of the disclosure of its ontological structure 
as factical existence, that Dasein calls the call of conscience, calling itself out of its lostness 
in das Man. It is in this sense that the call is grounded structurally.
For this reason Heidegger determines conscience as the call of Sorge:
Das Gewissen offenbart sich als Ruf der Sorge: der Rufer ist das Dasein, sich dngstigend in 
der Geworfenheit (Schon-sein-in...) um sein Sein-kOnnen. Der Angerufene ist eben dieses Dasein, 
aufgerufen zu seinem eigensten Seinkonnen (Sich-vorweg). Und aufgerufen ist das Dasein durch den 
Anruf aus dem Verfallen in das Man (Schon-sein-bei der besorgten Welt). Der Ruf des Gewissens, das 
heiBt dieses selbst, hat seine ontologische Mdglichkeit darin, daB das Dasein im Grunde seines Seins 
Sorge ist.18
The call itself consists of no discourse. The call of conscience calls nothing. "Der 
Ruf sagt nichts aus, gibt keine Auskunft viber Weltereignisse, hat nichts zu erz&hlen. ’ 19 
Rather, the call is silent: ‘Das Gewissen redet einzig und stAndig im Modus des 
Schweigens. ’20 This does not make the call indeterminate; what the call discloses is clear and 
distinct, although particular existentiell possibilities are not for conscience or the existential 
analysis to specify. The call silently discloses the uncanny individualisation of the factical 
existence of Dasein. In spite of its silence, however, what is decisive, Heidegger insists, is 
the particular way in which the call is heard.— 21
Now conscience is traditionally thought to be associated with guilt. Heidegger’s 
analysis confirms this association but turns it upside down. Rather than conscience being the 
call to innocence, conscience becomes the call to authentic being guilty. Dasein is guilty in 
the grounds of its being, claims Heidegger. ‘Das Dasein ist als solches schuldig’22. It is 
guilty in so far as it is always responsible for the non-being, i. e. for the nothingness of 
projects and possibilities that it has not chosen, and in so far as it is not responsible for its 
own factical existence. Verfallen is precisely a flight from this ontological being-guilty of 
Dasein, and thus the call of conscience, as the call out of the being of das Man, is the call to 
authentic being-guilty. The call precisely discloses this original ontological guilt. ‘Der
17 Sein und Zeit, p. 275 Originally italicised.
18 Sein und Zeit, pp. 277-278
19 Sein und Zeit, p. 273
20 Sein und Zeit, p. 273 Originally italicised.
21 As Rosen points out (p. 96, The Question of Being), thinking in general, for the later Heidegger, is 
understood on the model of hearing in contrast to the metaphysical model of thinking as seeing (visible
, p. 285 Originally italicised.
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vormfende Riickruf des Gewissens gibt dem Dasein zu verstehen, dafi es...aus der 
Verlorenheit in das Man sich zu ihm selbst zuruckholen soil, das heiBt schuldig ist. ’23
The proper hearing of the call of conscience is its understanding. Such understanding 
is chosen. Heidegger writes: ‘Im Anruf...wird das Man-selbst auf das eigenste Schuldigsein 
des Selbst angerufen. Das Rufverstehen ist das Wahlen -  nicht des Gewissens, das als 
solches nicht gew&hlt werden kann. GewShlt wird das Gewissen-Ziahe/i als Freisein fUr das 
eigenste Schuldigsein. Anrufverstehen besagt: Gewissen-haben-wollen. ,24
‘Gewissen-haben-wollen ist als Sich-verstehen im eigensten SeinkOnnen eine Weise 
der Erschlossenheit des Daseins’25, writes Heidegger again. The mode of Befindlichkeit that 
corresponds to this disclosure is, as we have seen, the basic Beftndlichkeit of Angst; the mode 
of speech that corresponds to this disclosure is -  corresponding to the call itself -  silence; and 
the mode of understanding that corresponds to this disclosure is of course Dasein's existential 
projection onto its being-guilty. Thus Heidegger can conclude:
Die im Gewissen-haben-wollen liegende Erschlossenheit des Daseins wird demnach 
konstituiert durch die Befindlichkeit der Angst, durch das Verstehen als Sichentwerfen auf das eigenste 
Schuldigsein und durch die Rede als Verschwiegenheit. Diese ausgezeichnete, im Dasein selbst durch 
sein Gewissen bezeugte eigentliche Erschlossenheit -  das verschwiegene, angstbereite Sichentwerfen 
auf das eigenste Schuldigsein -  nennen wir die Entschlossenheit,26
As we noted above then: resoluteness is a mode of disclosure, namely, that mode of 
disclosure in which the truth of the existence of Dasein is disclosed. It is, we now see, 
precisely that mode of disclosure demanded by the call of conscience. And this call of 
conscience is itself grounded structurally in those structures that constitute the being of 
Dasein, the possibility of disclosure.
Death
If resoluteness is the authenticity of the being of Dasein then it must stand in some 
sort of fundamental connection with what we characterised earlier as the authentic being 
towards death [ Vorlaufen zum Tode] of Dasein as the temporal totality of its being. 
Heidegger claims that resoluteness itself tends to being towards death. How is this so?
As we have seen, Dasein is guilty in the very grounds of its being, that is, whether it 
has concealed it or not, Dasein is always already guilty. Resoluteness is precisely the explicit
23 Sein und Zeit, p. 287
24 Sein und Zeit, p. 288
25 Sein und Zeit, p. 295
26 Sein und Zeit, pp. 296-297
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projection upon this ontological being-guilty, and therefore the projection onto a constant 
being-guilty. Projection onto a constant being-guilty already contains the notion of an “until 
the end” of Dasein and thus already the indication of the phenomenon of death:
Im eigenen Sinne der Entschlossenheit liegt es, sich auf dieses Schuldigsein zu entwerfen, als 
welches das Dasein ist, solange es ist. Die existenzielle Ubemahme dieser “Schuld” in der 
Entschlossenheit wird demnach nur dann eigentlich vollzogen, wenn sich die Entschlossenheit in ihrem 
Erschliefien des Daseins so durchsichtig geworden ist, dafi sie das Schuldigsein als stdndiges versteht. 
Dieses Verstehen aber ermoglicht sich nur dergestalt, dafi sich das Dasein das Seinkonnen “bis zu 
seinem Ende” erschliefit. Das Zu-Ende-se/w des Daseins besagt jedoch existenzial: Sein zum Ende. 
Die Entschlossenheit wird eigentlich das, was sie sein kann, als verstehendes Sein zum Ende, d. h. als 
Vorlaufen in den Tod.27
Thus: ‘[Die Entschlossenheit] birgt das eigentliche Sein zum Tode in sich als die 
mogliche existenzielle Modalitdt ihrer eigenen Eigentlichkeit. ’28
Heidegger presents two further considerations to phenomenally demonstrate this 
connection. The first is as follows. Being-guilty characterises existence. It is not then some 
property of something of the mode of being of Vorhandenheit; it is rather a possibility of 
being, albeit one that determines eveiy specific factical projection. Dasein can, however, in 
authenticity, project itself onto this possibility of being, or, in inauthenticity, not do so. 
Projection in the mode of being of authenticity is, as we have already seen, determined by the 
projection onto die utmost possibility of Dasein's death. Thus resoluteness, as the projection 
on being-guilty, is to be “qualified” as being towards death.
The second is as follows. Being-guilty is, for Heidegger, to be characterised in terms 
of non-being. But the possibility of death is the possibility of the non-being of Dasein pure 
and simple. Thus only as being towards this possibility is the non-being that determines 
being-guilty revealed for what it is. ‘Die das Sein des Daseins urspriinglich durchherrschende 
Nichtigkeit [ontological being-guilty] enthiillt sich ihm selbst im eigentlichen Sein zum 
Tode. ’29 As the projection upon being-guilty, resoluteness therefore stands in connection to 
being towards death.
As final confirmation of this, Heidegger demonstrates the connection between 
resoluteness and the various structural moments of being towards death. We saw that death is 
“die eigenste, unbeziigliche, uniiberholbare Mdglichkeif which is certain but nevertheless 
indeterminate. Understanding the call of conscience hauls Dasein back out of its lostness in 
das Man to its own-most [eigenste] possibility of being its self. It also precisely individuates
27 Sein und Zeit, p. 305
28 Sein und Zeit, p. 305 Originally italicised.
29 Sein und Zeit, p. 306
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Dasein to its non-relational [unbeztigliche] possibility of being. In so far as being-guilty 
ontologically determines the being of Daseint projection upon it reveals that it is not by- 
passable [unilberholbar].
We have seen that resoluteness is to be considered as the truth of existence. 
Belonging to this truth there is a corresponding certainty. Heidegger writes: ‘Die 
urspriingliche Wahrheit der Existenz verlangt ein gleichursprungliches Gewifisein als Sich- 
halten in dem, was die Entschlossenheit erschliefit. ’30 This is the being certain of one’s 
existentiell projection onto possibilities in what Heidegger describes as the Situation. This is 
precisely to not allow the falling back into the lostness of das Man. Finally, the basic 
indeterminacy of the resolute existentiell projection of Dasein is fully revealed, so Heidegger 
tells us, only in being towards death. ‘Die Unbestimmtheit des eigenen, obzwar im EntschluB 
je gewiB gewordenen SeinkOnnens offenbart sich aber erst ganz im Sein zum Tode. ’31 We 
saw that the indeterminacy of death is disclosed in die basic Befindlichkeit of Angst. Angst is 
at the same time precisely the Befindlichkeit that determines the disclosure of 
Entschlossenheit. In Angst the ontological guilt of Dasein’s being, its being fundamentally 
determined by nothingness, is revealed, just as is revealed the nothingness of the utmost 
possibility of Dasein's death.
Thus Heidegger concludes:
Die Analyse enthiillte der Reihe nach die aus dem eigentlichen Sein zum Tode als der 
eigensten, unbezuglichen uniiberholbaren, gewissen und dennoch unbestimmten Moglichkeit 
erwachsenden Momente der Modalisierung, darauf die Entschlossenheit aus ihr selbst tendiert. Sie ist 
eigentlich und ganz, was sie sein kann, nur als vorlaufende Entschlossenheit32
Clearly being towards death first reaches its full determinacy also through its being 
brought into connection with resoluteness, and thus the authentic “Ganzseinkdnnen” of 
Dasein is only now first fully characterised. We introduced this earlier as a methodological 
issue. At this point, in contrast, Heidegger tells us that ‘Die Frage nach dem Ganzseinkonnen 
ist eine faktisch-existenzielle. Das Dasein beantwortet sie als entschlossenes. ’33 It is thus the 
basic question of the existenziell meaning of the totality of the existence of Dasein; and only 
therefore does it receive its methodological significance.
30 Sein und Zeit, p. 307
31 Sein und Zeit, p. 308
32 Sein und Zeit, p. 309
33 Sein und Zeit, p. 309 Originally italicised.
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Authenticity and the History of Being
We have seen how the epoch of metaphysics, the only identifiable epoch of the 
history of being, is rooted in the inauthenticity of Dasein. The epoch of metaphysics is that of 
a historically embedded inauthenticity. We have seen how the end of this epoch is prepared 
by the raising of the question of being, and thus by the explicit drawing of being in its truth to 
unconcealment. This is the preparation of the turn [Kehre], salvation from danger, that event 
which ends the history of being, in which man enters into an essential relationship to the truth 
of being and thereby into his essence in so far as he becomes the guardian, the custodian 
[Hiiter, Wdchter], even the shepherd of being. But this essential relationship to the truth of 
being is precisely the authenticity of Dasein.—
That it is the essence of man to be the shepherd of being is grounded in the 
ontological constitution of Dasein as Sorge. ‘Der Mensch ist der Hirt des Seins. Darauf 
allein denkt “Sein und Zeit” hinaus, wenn die ekstatische Existenz als “die Sorge” erfahren 
ist. ’ 34 And: ‘die “Sorge” -  die Wachterschaft der Not des Seyns. ’35 For, Dasein exists for the 
sake of its being -  it exists as care for being. “TJmwillen seiner”, d. h. rein als Wahrung und 
WSchterschaft des Seins’ .36
The essential relationship to the truth of being is grounded in the disclosure of being 
as such. As we have seen, for Heidegger, the mode of being of authenticity is characterised 
by the mode of disclosure of resoluteness. Resoluteness is that mode of disclosure in which 
being as such -  in the sense of existence -  is disclosed in its essence. This can be made fully 
clear by three considerations:
Firstly, conscience calls Dasein to its being-guilty, that is, to its self as responsible for 
its self, its existence, in having to be it. Dasein is called to authenticity. In calling Dasein to 
authenticity, the call of conscience precisely discloses the essence of the existence of Dasein 
as delivered over to itself, it discloses the truth about Dasein’s existence. Secondly, the 
disclosure of the call of conscience is characterised, so Heidegger tells us, by die basic 
Befindlichkeit of Angst. As we saw previously, however, the basic Befindlichkeit of Angst 
discloses the existence of Dasein in its responsibility for itself, its “dafi es ist und als das 
Seiende, das es ist, seinkdnnend zu sein hat”, that is, the existence of Dasein in its truth. 
Thirdly, resoluteness has by its own essence a tendency to being towards death, that is, is only 
authentically itself what it is in so far as it is resolute being towards death. The possibility of 
death, however, disclosed by the Befindlichkeit of Angst, is precisely that possibility in which 
is disclosed Dasein's existence in its authenticity; that is, as “die eigenste, unbezugliche, 
unaberholbare M6glichkeif\ in the possibility of death is disclosed the ontological character
34 Brief iiber den Humanismus, Wegmarken, p. 331
35 Besinnung, p. 100
36 Beitrdge zur Philosophie, p. 302
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of Dasein's being, albeit non-conceptually. As Heidegger insists in Beitrdge zur Philosophie, 
the possibility of death apophatically grounds the disclosure of the truth of being. 
Resoluteness, then, is that mode of disclosure in which the truth of being as such is disclosed.
The mode of being of authenticity, characterised by the mode of disclosure of 
resoluteness, is therefore a disclosive relationship to the truth of being. In so far as it is 
demanded by the existential structures that ground its possibility, it is also an essential 
relationship to the truth of being, that is, one which properly accords with the essence of 
Dasein. This is what we mean when we say that authenticity constitutes the essentiality of 
Dasein's existence. Dasein only exists in its essence in so far as it is authentic, that is, in so 
far as it has disclosed being in its truth.
The claim that the authenticity of Dasein is to be conceived as the essential 
relationship to the truth of being and the claim that this mode of being is structurally 
demanded by the being of Dasein itself complete the chart of the grounds that underlie the 
thought which has guided us throughout our exposition of Heidegger’s philosophy: that the 
history of being is grounded in the structures unearthed by the existential analysis of Dasein. 
As the possibility of disclosure as such, the structures of Dasein are the possibility of man’s 
standing in the truth of being. These structures are temporal structures. As such, they are 
wholly determinative of the history of man’s standing in the truth of being, that is, of the 
history of being.
Dasein is structured by two distinct temporalities, or existentialities: that of 
inauthenticity and that of authenticity. As the prevailing mode of temporality, inauthenticity 
determines the single epoch of the history of being, that of metaphysics. The mode of 
temporality of authenticity, which, for essential reasons, is the exceptional mode of 
existentiality, is the mode of being in which Dasein exists according to its essence; that is, in 
an essential relation to the truth of being. Thus this mode of temporality determines the 
history of being beyond the epoch of metaphysics, where historical mankind, existing 
according to his essence, stands in an essential relation to the truth of being.37 But it is also 
that mode of temporality demanded by the very structures of Dasein itself. Thus this new 
beginning of the history of being is itself demanded of historical mankind by the very 
structures that make his history first possible. Mankind existing according to his essence in 
an essential relationship to the truth of being constitutes the only being-historical alternative 
to the inauthenticity of metaphysical thinking, and therefore effectively constitutes the end of 
the history of being. Determined according to the structures of Dasein, the history of being 
can only consist of two possible beginnings, perhaps two possible periods; in any case, one
37 We cannot understand this new beginning as of a new epoch, for in it being does not any longer 
withhold itself in its truth.
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possible epoch. It cannot consist of an indefinite succession of essentially disparate epochs or 
periods.
The other beginning of the history of being is that which Heidegger intends to prepare 
by raising the question of being, that is, by raising being as such to its truth. In this other 
beginning being as such in its truth -  and in its history -  is disclosed to historical mankind. 
Thus the real significance of the raising of the question of being is clear: the raising of the 
question of being is the attempt to respond to the demand of the structure of the truth of being, 
and thus of history itself, to historically inaugurate the other beginning into the new and final 
authentic period of the history of being and thereby overcome the historically embedded 
inauthenticity of metaphysics.38
Upon this basis the full significance of other key concepts of the philosophy of the 
history of being also becomes clear. What we introduced under the name of the Kehre is now 
to be understood as the turn out of the inauthenticity of the epoch of metaphysics into the 
authenticity of a new beginning characterised by the essential relationship of man and being. 
We can now see why that which Heidegger calls Seinsverlassenheit grounds a need [No/]. 
This need is the need of an essential relation of man and being, of man existing in his essence, 
of authenticity, taken in a historical context. It is the need of being itself, affirms Heidegger, 
the need of being’s Unterkunft [dwelling place] amidst mankind, the need of being’s
38 This account of the question of being contrasts, to take just one example, with the influential one of 
Dreyfus. For Dreyfus, the question of being amounts to the attempt ‘to make sense of our ability to 
make sense of things’ [Being-in-the-World, p. 1 0], where being is understood as ‘the intelligibility 
correlative with our everyday background practices.’ In the first place “being” for Heidegger never 
means simply “intelligibility”. On the one hand, that would import a metaphysical subject, for which it 
was intelligible -  intelligibility presumably requiring intelligence. But being, for Heidegger, -  
presence -  is never presence to...; rather, it is presence as such. On the other hand, Dreyfus’ account 
distorts the purpose of the first division of Sein und Zeit. The existential analyses contained therein are 
not intended simply to lay bare the socially shared background in which Dasein is ontologically 
enmeshed, they do not propound a pragmatist philosophy, but rather they are intended first and 
foremost to unearth the projective structure constitutive of disclosure in order to lay the ground for its 
subsequent temporal determination.
Herman Philipse [in Heidegger ’s Philosophy of Being] objects to Dreyfus’ interpretation of 
the question of being as “unitarian”. He claims that ‘there is no unique substantial meaning of the 
question of being’ [p. 75] and proposes in contrast what he calls a ‘pluralist or pentafold’ account, 
according to which the question of being comprises five fundamental themes or “leitmotifs” that are 
‘multifariously interwoven in Heidegger’s texts’ [p. 211], although he admits that a common formal 
structure defines each of the five. This admission ends up somewhat undermining his initial 
hypothesis, for from this formal structure a unique and substantial meaning of the question of being can 
indeed be derived; namely, the one we have proposed: the question of being is the raising of being to 
its truth as the returning of mankind to his essence. This may be no semantically substantial question, 
for it is, after all, in the traditional sense, no question at all (and this is where Philipse stumbles). But 
for Heidegger, it must be remembered, ‘das Fragen ist die Frommigkeit des Denkens’ [Die Technik und 
die Kehre, p. 36]. Philipse’s approach to interpreting Heidegger fails, not because the fundamental 
themes that he picks out are not identifiably present in Heidegger’s thinking (although he seems to 
confuse methodologies with the contentful philosophical thinking premised on them), but because these 
themes themselves point to a greater unity in Heidegger’s thinking in accordance with which it can be 
understood as a whole. On the other hand, his approach inexorably askews his understanding of certain 
elements of Heidegger’s thinking, including the Kehre.
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needfulness of mankind in order that it come to presence at all. It is made possible by the 
structure of truth -  just as, as we have seen, Seinsverlassenheit is made possible by this 
structure -  and thus by the structures of Dasein. Historical mankind is in need precisely in so 
far as he exists outside his essence, that is, in so far as he has not disclosed being in its truth. 
The need o f Seinsverlassenheit is the need o f  inauthenticity, the need for Dasein to exist in an 
essential, that is, authentic, relation to the truth of being.
But: ‘Im AuBersten wird die Not des Seins zur Not der Notlosigkeit. ’39 In so far as 
the truth of being remains concealed, the need of being is also concealed and this concealment 
is never experienced as a need. ‘Innerhalb der Unverborgenheit des Seienden als solchen, als 
welche die Geschichte der Metaphysik das Grundgeschehen bestimmt, kommt die Not des 
Seins nicht zum Vorschein. Das Seiende ist und erweckt den Anschein, als sei das Sein ohne 
die Not. ’40 Needlessness holds sway, and the need itself becomes the need for the experience 
of the need. This experience is that which Heidegger’s texts themselves try to awaken in 
attempting to think die self-withdrawal of being that grounds the need. He writes: ‘Der Not 
der Notlosigkeit entsprechen, kann nur heifien: vor allem anderen erst einmal zur Erfahrung 
der Nodosigkeit als der wesenden Not selbst verhelfen. Dazu ist notwendig, in das Not-lose 
der Not zu weisen, was verlangt: das Auslassen des Ausbleibens des Seins selbst erfahren. ’41
We can also now fully understand why, corresponding to this need, modem 
technology constitutes a danger, according to Heidegger; a danger that has nothing to do with 
any of technology’s destructive capabilities. The danger of modem technology consists 
simply in the fact that the mode of the revealing of beings that forms the essence of modem 
technology {Ge-stell) is the utmost concealment of the truth of being, for as such it is the 
greatest threat to the disclosure of being in its truth, that is, the greatest threat to the 
possibility of historical mankind existing according to his essence in essential disclosive 
relationship to the truth of being. The danger is thus ultimately, writes Heidegger, the danger 
of the annihilation [Vemichtung] of mankind’s essence.
It is the greatest threat to the inauguration of the outer beginning of the history of 
being. It is all the more threatening in so far as it precisely conceals its nature as a threat (as 
the essential tendency towards the concealment of concealment that is grounded in the 
structure of Dasein). But precisely as this utmost and essential danger, it sounds what 
Heidegger calls an Anklang, an echo, of being itself. It itself grounds the thinking of 
Ereignis, of the essential sway of being, the thinking [Besinnung] which is to prepare the other
39 Nietzsche II, p 355
40 Nietzsche II, p. 354
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beginning. The danger itself cultivates salvation.
41 Nietzsche II, pp. 355-356
Chapter 12: 
The Unity of Heidegger’s Project
We have attempted to demonstrate the way in which the structures of the history of 
being are grounded in the homologous existential structures of Dasein. Dasein, it is to be 
remembered, is the structural possibility of disclosure as such and therefore that which makes 
history first possible. We showed how the two phases of the history of being are grounded in 
the two basic modes of the being of Dasein, inauthenticity and authenticity. We are not at all 
reading into Heidegger’s philosophy something that is not expressly there already. Here he 
makes explicitly the connections we have advocated in the last two chapters:
Die Eigentlichkeit ist trotz alles vordergriindlichen moralischen Anscheins und gemafi dem 
einzigen Fragen in “Sein und Zeit” nach der Wahrheit des Seins ausschlieBlich und je zuvor auf diese 
hin zu begreifen als “Weise”, das “Da” zu sein, in der sich die Er-eignung des Menschen in die 
Zugehorigkeit zum Sein und seiner Lichtung (“Zeit”) ereignet.
“Eigentlichkeit” ist eine die Metaphysik als solche iiberwindende Bestimmung, entsprechend 
der Un-eigentlichkeit, die “existenzial” auf die Seinsfrage hin und aus ihr her gedacht die Verlorenheit 
an das Seiende meint, d. h. die Vormacht des Seienden selbst und seiner Uberschattung des Seins, so 
zwar, daB die Not der Frage nach der Wahrheit des Seins ausbleiben muB.1
And again:
Das Wort [Verfallen] meint nicht einen “moralphilosophisch” verstandenen und zugleich 
s&kularisierten Sundenfall des Menschen, sondem nennt ein wesenhaftes Verhaltnis des Menschen zum 
Sein innerhalb des Bezugs des Sein zum Menschenwesen. DemgemaB bedeuten die Pr&ludierend 
gebrauchten Titel “Eigentlichkeit” und “Uneigentlichkeit” nicht einen moralisch-existenziellen, nicht
1 Besinmmg, p. 145
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einen “anthropologischen” Unterschied, sondem den allerst einmal zu denkenden weil der Philosophie 
bisher verborgenen, “ekstatischen” Bezug des Menschenwesens zur Wahrheit des Seins.2
In so far as these connections hold, the relation between the earlier existential 
analysis and the later philosophy of the history of being must be characterised as one of 
grounding', the philosophy of the history of being is grounded in the existential analysis. This 
means: the existential analysis determines the necessary conceptual horizon for the 
philosophy of the history of being, it opens and delimits that conceptual domain in which the 
philosophy of the history of being must be unfolded, thereby first making it possible. This 
implies, in the first place, that the philosophy of the history of being cannot stand 
independently of its foundation in the existential analysis and be at the same time fully 
understood. It implies, in the second place, that Heidegger did not at all renounce or dispense 
with the existential analysis as he developed the philosophy of the history of being. The 
existential analysis remains integral to the conceptuality of the history of being. It implies, in 
the third place, that the existential analysis cannot be fully understood without an appreciation 
of the philosophy of the history of being. The existential analysis was never intended to be a 
finished philosophy standing alone; that Sein und Zeit is only a fragment of a much larger 
project of course testifies to this, and attention can again be drawn to the fact that the 
“Grundzuge einer phdnomenologischen Destruktion der Geschichte der Ontologie am 
Leitfaden der Problematik der Temporalitdf\ which was intended to supplement it, was later 
pointed to by Heidegger himself as the precursor of the explicit development of certain 
concepts of the history of being. As we already cited:
Weil man uberall das Seins-Geschick nur als Geschichte und dieses als Geschehen vorstellt, 
versucht man vergeblich, dieses Geschehen aus dem zu deuten, was in “Sein und Zeit” iiber die 
Geschichtlichkeit des Daseins (nicht des Seins) gesagt ist. Dagegen bleibt der einzig mOgliche Weg, 
schon von “Sein und Zeit” her den sp&teren Gedanken iiber das Seins-Geschick vorzudenken, das 
Durchdenken dessen, was in “Sein und Zeit” iiber die Destruktion der ontologischen Lehre vom Sein 
des Seienden dargelegt wird.3
The existential analysis was intended from the outset to form the groundwork for a 
consideration of die essence of the history of philosophy, which for Heidegger was the history 
of the West as such. A full understanding of the existential analysis cannot, therefore, forbear 
a grasp of its ultimately historical horizon of inquiry.
2 Brief iiber den Humanismus, Wegmarken, pp. 332-333 To the word “Eigentlichkeit’ in the fourth line 
is appended to the edition of 1949 the note: ‘aus dem Eignen des Er-eignens zu denken.’
3 Zur Sache des Denkens, p. 9
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But the unequivocal goal of the existential analysis was to raise the question of being. 
We can now see the sense in which the horizon of this programme was essentially historical. 
Heidegger emphasised more than once that Sein und Zeit was written out of the basic 
experience of Seinsvergessenheit.4 The attempt to raise the question of being was the attempt, 
in Heidegger's words, ‘keine neuen Vorstellungen vom Seienden zur Kenntnis zu bringen, 
sondem das Menschsew in die Wahrheit des Seyns zu griinden und diese Grundung im 
Erdenken des Seyns und des Da-seins vorzubereiten. ’5 This grounding and its preparation 
was to be understood as something essentially historical, having to do with mankind in his 
essential historicity. It is to be understood, as we have seen, as the grounding of an essential 
relation between man and being, and thus as the grounding of historical mankind in his 
essence. The true depth of Sein und Zeit, the ultimate significations and implications of its 
analyses, cannot be appreciated independently of this historical horizon.
Indeed, without an understanding of the history of being the reason why it is 
necessary to raise the question of being at all, that is, why Heidegger’s philosophical project 
is a valid one, cannot be properly apprehended, nor why it should take, in the first place, the 
rarefied form of an existential analysis of “Dasein” -  on the face of it a rather recondite and 
recherche concept to say the least. Those who never read Heidegger beyond the final pages 
of Sein und Zeit will have trouble accounting for the philosophical programme that motivates 
the “existential turn” of our ontological understanding inaugurated by Sein und Zeit.
The raising of the question of being remained Heidegger’s sole philosophical project: 
‘Die Frage nach dem “Sinn”, d. h. nach der Erl&uterung in “Sein und Zeit” die Frage nach der 
Griindung des Entwurfsberei chs, kurz nach der Wahrheit des Seyns ist und bleibt meine Frage 
und ist meine einzige, denn sie gilt ja  dem Einzigsten.’6 Thus the two phases of Heidegger’s 
thinking must be understood to be unified under a single project. In so far as they are related 
to one another in the way demonstrated, they cannot be conceived to be two different and 
ultimately separate attempts to realise the same project; rather, they constitute two 
complementary parts of the same project.
The philosophy of the history of being advances a claim on historical mankind, a 
claim for the historical grounding of a new relation to the truth of being. This claim, 
however, if it is itself to claim ultimate validity, must be transcendentally (not employed here 
according to Heidegger’s usage) -  that is, in an important sense, a-historically -  grounded. 
And this is precisely what the existential analysis intends, employing the a-historical 
methodology of phenomenology. Phenomenology gives Heidegger an entry point into history 
from which can be grounded a transcendental claim on historical mankind, that is, on history
4 Cf. in particular Brief iiber den Humanismus, Wegmarken, p. 328.
5 Beitrdge zur Philosophie, p. 8 6
6 Beitrdge zur Philosophie, p. 10
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as such. Paradoxically it seems, the temporalisation of ontology, which the existential turn 
accomplishes, is attached to an a-temporal, a-historical validity point. The complex issues 
surrounding the question of the consistency of this thought with Heidegger’s philosophical 
commitments, as well as the question of the ultimate status to be attributed to Heidegger’s 
claims, will be briefly returned to in the next part.
Thus the philosophical project of the raising of the question of being, the project of 
grounding a new relation of historical mankind to the truth of being, has necessarily two 
phases: The elaboration of the historical structures within which such a new relation is 
claimed or demanded, and the grounding of this claim or demand in the transcendental 
structures which make history (being necessarily the history of the truth of being) possible in 
the first place.
But some commentators have professed to have found more than two phases in 
Heidegger’s thinking. Usually a third and final phase is added to capture the very late and 
purportedly disparate thinking of die fourfold, the attempt to think the holding sway of being 
in its pure truth, without recourse to beings. On some criteria of differentiation such a 
division is acceptable, indeed even necessary, but obfuscates the fact that once Heidegger had 
reached the philosophical horizon of the history of being he never again left it. This is shown 
most acutely perhaps by the very late lecture Zeit und Sein (1961), but even more obviously 
by the fact that the very thematisation of the fourfold in the later texts always takes place 
within the context of a critique of technology and thus of metaphysical thinking, both of 
these, as we have seen, functioning as central and essential concepts of the philosophy of the 
history of being. There are only two essentially contrastive phases in Heidegger’s thought, 
and they are the two necessary parts of his single philosophical project.
Heidegger’s "Kehre*
What, then, are we to make of Heidegger’s so called “turn” [Kehre], for the sake of 
which so much commentary has gone to press? Is there a turn between the two phases of 
Heidegger’s thinking, which we have identified, and, if so, in what sense exactly?
In the first place, it should be noted that more than one application of Kehre can be 
identified within Heidegger’s writings. As we have already seen, in the eponymous lecture, 
the Kehre refers unambiguously to a historical turn in the history of being, to what Heidegger 
had previously called the other beginning. It is a turn out of the danger and the need of 
Seinsverlassenheit into the truth of being. In the Brief iiber den Humanismus Heidegger 
mentions the Kehre in relation to Sein und Zeit and his lecture Vom Wesen der Wahrheit:
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[B]ei der Veroffentlichung von “Sein und Zeit” [wurde] der dritte Abschnitt des ersten Teiles, 
“Zeit und Sein”...zuruckgehalten (vgl. “Sein und Zeit” S. 39). Hier Kehrt sich das Ganze um. Der 
fragliche Abschnitt wurde zuriickgehalten, weil das Denken im zureichenden Sagen dieser Kehre 
versagte und so mit Hilfe der Sprache der Metaphysik nicht durchkam. Der Vortrag “Vom Wesen der 
Wahrheit”, der 1930 gedacht und mitgeteilt, aber erst 1943 gedruckt wurde, gibt einen gewissen 
Einblick in das Denken der Kehre von “Sein und Zeit” zu “Zeit und Sein”. Diese Kehre ist nicht eine 
Anderung des Standpunktes von “Sein und Zeit”, sondem in ihr gelangt das versuchte Denken erst in 
die Ortschafl der Dimension, aus der “Sein und Zeit” erfahren ist, und zwar erfahren in der
nGrunderfahrung der Seinsvergessenheit.
We have already mentioned the way in which the lecture Vom Wesen der Wahrheit 
gives an insight into this Kehre. As an interrogation of the essence of truth, it belongs to the 
overcoming of metaphysics. This is a second meaning of the Kehre. In so far as it was 
projected at the very outset of Sein und Zeit it must be conceived to be something wholly 
internal to that project’s architectonic.
The majority of Heidegger’s commentators mean by the Kehre something different 
again: a quasi-biographical turn that took place in the early thirties, which may or may not 
have had to do with an alliance with National Socialism, and one which involved 
fundamentally an abandonment of the thematic of Sein und Zeit -  an abandonment 
precipitated by the perception of various failures alleged to be immanent to the very project of 
Sein und Zeit -  for a more or less radically new basic philosophical conception, horizon, 
thematic, etc. Put like this, one can only conclude that this turn is a fiction, as our lengthy 
exegesis has shown. Nevertheless, there is certainly in some sense an identifiable turn at least 
in Heidegger’s philosophical formulation that took place relatively shortly after the 
publication of Sein und Zeit -  we find no new existential analyses, on the face of it anyway; 
lectures and essays take precedence over book length treatise^ there is an increasing emphasis 
on poetry; die philosophical methodology appears to change -  and all this is ostensibly 
accompanied by an evolution of thematics.
We have therefore at least three possible candidates for a Kehre in relation to 
Heidegger’s philosophy.8 We claim that all of these are ultimately the same; they all name 
the same Kehre, the same event -  a de-cisive event in the history of being. This is to say that 
the other beginning, the overcoming of metaphysics and the raising of the question of being 
are fundamentally -  that is, in terms of their structure and in terms of the antipodes of their 
rotations -  all of them the same. This is the case even though the raising of the question of
7 Brief iiber den Humanismus, Wegmarken, pp. 327-328
8 A further, fourth meaning for the Kehre might point to the existential turn, about which we have 
heard previously -  the turn towards an existential horizon for the analysis of understanding. This turn 
would already have been accomplished by the end of the published part of Sein und Zeit.
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being and the overcoming of metaphysics are preparatory for the other beginning, and even 
though metaphysical thinking, in all its ramifications, cannot be overcome until the other 
beginning comes to pass.
To understand this we might say that these three meanings of Kehre point to the same 
happening, but in different degrees of focus. The other beginning names a world-historical 
event; the overcoming of metaphysics points to this event in so far as it is a turn within 
thinking (that is, within man’s relationship to being); and Heidegger’s step beyond the 
existential analytic is the coming to pass of the truth of being for an individual thinker.
Now, in accordance with our initial premise -  which we have now established -, 
there are essentially two phases in Heidegger’s thinking: the existential analysis of Dasein 
and the philosophy of the history of being. In so far as Heidegger’s turn can be characterised 
as the turn out of the horizon of the existential analysis (the third meaning of Kehre above), it 
is to be anticipated that it can be characterised more incisively as the turn between these two 
phases of thought. How are we to understand the Kehre once it is expressed in this way, and 
what light is thence thrown onto the other two meanings of the turn that we have identified?
At the surface level, the turn from die existential analysis to the philosophy of the 
history of being can be portrayed simply as the historicisation of the structures of disclosure: 
Dasein -  the exposition of the way in which they make possible and determine all history as 
such.9 The moment at which this occurs in Heidegger’s writings can be precisely pin-pointed 
to the sudden eruption of the category of history in the lecture Vom Wesen der Wahrheit}0
A deeper excavation reveals, however, something more. The concept of Dasein 
illuminates the path out of the metaphysical constellation of thinking; it is essential to the 
overcoming of the philosophy of the subject. It is this factor which explains why the 
historicisation of die structures of Dasein is nothing incidental nor arbitrary, but already 
implied within their very first description: Dasein is employed precisely in order to overcome 
the historical tradition of metaphysics. The thinking of the truth of being is only possible in 
so far as the categories of metaphysics have been broken down beforehand. The concept of 
Dasein accomplishes this in so far as it names the clearing within which being presences, in 
so far as it grounds the concept of truth as disclosure, whilst nevertheless employing, in doing 
this, concepts essential to the tradition, such as, most importantly perhaps, that of 
understanding. Thus the concept of Dasein, indeed the very project of the existential 
analysis, is always essentially ambiguous, duplicitous perhaps, employing traditional concepts
9 Cf. Der Spruch des Anaximander, Holzwege, pp. 311-312: ‘Der ekstatische Charakter des Da­
seins... ist die fur uns zun&chst erfahrbare Entsprechung zum epochalen Charakter des Seins. Das 
epochale Wesen des Seins ereignet das ekstatische Wesen des Da-seins. Die Ek-sistenz des Menschen 
steht das Ekstatische aus und wahrt so das Epochale des Seins, zu dessen Wesen das Da und somit das 
Da-sein gehort.’
10 Wegmarken, pp. 189-190
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in order, precisely thereby, to overcome them. ‘Das Da-sein steht in “Sein und Zeit” noch im 
Anschein des “Anthropologischen” und “Subjektivistischen” und “Individualistischen” u.s.f., 
und doch ist von allem das Gegen-teil im Blick’11. And: ‘Fundamentalontologie [ist] das 
UbergSngliche. Sie begrundet und uberwindet alle Ontologie, muB aber notwendig vom 
Bekannten und Gel&ufigen ausgehen, und deshalb steht sie immer im Zwjelicht. ’ 12 Conceived 
both from the perspective of subjectivism and anthropology, from the conception of man as 
animal rationale, and from the perspective of the other beginning as the ‘Entweifung der 
Wahrheit des Seyns’, Dasein is what Heidegger calls die ‘Wendungspunkt in der Kehre des 
Ereignisses’13, the fulcrum around which the turn in the history of being takes place, around 
which the entire structure of the history of being pivots. As Heidegger also puts it: ‘Das Da­
sein ist die Kris is zwischen dem ersten und dem anderen Anfang’14. But Dasein is 
structurally determinative of the history of being precisely in so far as it is itself the coming to 
truth of this history.
However, in so far as the phenomenological introduction and exposition of the 
concept of Dasein constitutes the existential turn, it amounts to a “deconstruction” of the 
tradition in the light of the truth of being; that is, it presents a genealogy of the central 
metaphysical concepts, showing the way in which they are grounded in an essential distortion 
of the truth of being.
But all this means that the existential analytic is not simply to be left behind, 
jettisoned as we move onto the horizon of the later philosophy of the history of being; the 
ladder is not to be cast away beneath us, to use Wittgenstein’s metaphor; for it remains 
essential to the project of overcoming metaphysics, which is the definitive theme of the 
philosophy of the history of being.
Perhaps most importantly of all, this means that the Kehre is something wholly 
immanent to Heidegger’s initial project; it is not at all something that that project itself goes 
through, nor something imposed on it from outside; in other words, the Kehre is not at all a 
change in Heidegger’s philosophical intent, or horizon of questioning; not even a change in 
philosophical perspective:
Das Denken der Kehre ist eine Wendung in meinem Denken. Aber diese Wendung erfolgt 
nicht auf grund einer Anderung des Standpunktes oder gar der Preisgabe der Fragestellung in “Sein und 
Zeit”. Das Denken der Kehre ergibt sich daraus, daB ich bei der zu denkende Sache geblieben bin, d. h. 
nach der Hinsicht gefragt habe, die schon in “Sein und Zeit” (S. 39) unter dem Titel “Zeit und Sein” 
angezeigt wurde.
11 Beitrdge zur Philosophic, p. 295
12 Beitrdge zur Philosophic, p. 305
13 Beitrdge zur Philosophie, p. 311
14 Beitrdge zur Philosophie, p. 295
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Die Kehre ist in erster Linie nicht ein Vorgang im fragenden Denken; sie gehort in den durch 
die Titel “Sein und Zeit”, “Zeit und Sein” genannten Sachverhalt selbst.15
It cannot then be biographically understood, nor developmentally; indeed, nor 
chronologically if we are to grasp the way in which the existential analysis remains retained 
within the philosophy of the history of being. Rather, the Kehre is an internal structurality of 
Heidegger’s thought as such, a fundamental configuration of its architectonic, which, not for 
incidental reasons, itself mirrors the structure of truth. ‘Die Kehre spielt in Sachverhalt 
selbst. ’ 16
Commentators are wrong to suggest, then, that the Kehre is in any sense a process of 
abandonment. 17 That it is, is, of course, the usual story, peddled even by such subtle 
commentators as William J. Richardson himself. He writes: ‘the transformation of Heidegger 
I into Heidegger II [that is, the early Heidegger into the later Heidegger -  although the gross 
simplification and, let it be said, functionalisation introduced by using such labels is 
respectively somewhat absurd and wholly antithetical to Heidegger’s thinking] is bom out of 
a necessity imposed by the original experience of Being as finite (negative). For the shift of 
focus from There-being [Dasein] to Being (which, as far as we can see, characterizes the 
decisive difference between die two periods) was demanded by the exigencies of the 
hermeneutic analysis itself  ^ as soon as it became clear that the primacy in the Being-process 
belongs to Being itself. ’ 18 We take this to imply quite straightforwardly that, whether or not 
for reasons internal to the project of the existential analytic, Heidegger was forced, 
unforeseen, at a certain point, to move onto a new horizon, and that therefore the Kehre, as it 
in actual fact took place, was not projected already at the outset of that project. 19
15 Letter to Richardson, p. xvii-xix This directly contradicts Kockelmans’ assessment on page 53 of his 
On the Truth of Being-. ‘In Being and Time, Heidegger had tried to approach the relationship between 
man and Being from the perspective of man. In his later works he tried to think the same relationship 
from the perspective of Being.’
16 Letter to Richardson, p. xix
17 David Farrell Krell is a notable exception. See his Intimations of Mortality, Chapter 6 .
18 Richardson, Through Phenomenology to Thought, p. 624
19 Here are two further examples of this misunderstanding. In his article “Interrupting truth” (in 
Heidegger Toward the Turn, ed. Risser), John Sallis argues that at least one fundamental determination 
of the Kehre is the fact that, whilst in Sein und Zeit truth is thematised merely as disclosure 
[Erschlossenheit], in later texts untruth or concealment is thought as part of the essence of truth, and 
thus that the analyses of Sein und Zeit were deficient in some decisive respect. But we have shown not 
merely that untruth was already thought as the essence of truth in Sein und Zeit through the ontological 
determination of Dasein as Verfallen, but further that this determination of Dasein grounds the later 
thinking of the concealment essential to truth.
In his contribution to The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger (“The Unity of Heidegger’s 
Thought”) Olafson argues that the horizon of Sein und Zeit was abandoned because it evoked an 
unassailable dichotomy between the plurality of Daseins and the singularity of being. But this is to 
make the usual mistake of taking the meaning of Dasein to be “human individual” or “subject”. 
Although it is of course true that, as he himself admits, Heidegger sometimes articulates himself in Sein 
und Zeit and the lectures of the period as if this were the case, our account has shown that Dasein is
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But then it might be wondered: if the Kehre amounts to no abandonment, why was it 
that Heidegger withheld the third division of the first part of his original project of raising the 
question of being? The answer has already been given in the above citation from Brief tiber 
den Humanismus: ‘Der fragliche Abschnitt wurde zuruckgehalten, weil das Denken im 
zureichenden Sagen dieser Kehre versagte und so mit Hilfe der Sprache der Metaphysik nicht 
durchkam.’ [My italics.] The problem was the saying of the Kehre; the problem was that 
Heidegger could not decisively overcome metaphysics until he had developed a non­
metaphysical language™ This he had not yet accomplished in Sein und Zeit itself -  perhaps 
it receives its first attempted articulation in Beitrdge zur Philosophie.21 For it required a leap 
[Sprung] to be taken, 22 a leap in thinking, and apparently, during the initial formulation of
merely a structurality, merely the structure of disclosure as such, and that in consequence it is of no 
lesser generality, structurally speaking, than being itself.
20 Also suggested here: ‘denn das Ungeniigende des zuruckgehaltenen Stvickes [“Zeit und Sein” being 
one of these] war nicht eine Unsicherheit der Fragerichtung und ihres Bereiches, sondem nur die der 
rechten Ausarbeitung.’ [Mein Bisheriger Weg in Besinnung, p. 414] Robert Bemasconi corroborates 
our claim that the Kehre is primarily to be understood in terms of language: ‘It is in an experience to be 
undergone with language that Heidegger...seeks to introduce us to the turning (Kehre).' [The Question 
of Language in Heidegger's History of Being, p. 74]
2 But is it possible at all? For is it not the case that the metaphysical schema of subject and object is so 
intricately bound up with subject-predicate semantics that genuine propositions are not possible beyond 
the boundaries of metaphysical thought, indeed beyond the boundaries of truth conceived as 
correctness? It would surely then be ultimately impossible to articulate the truth of being. As 
Heidegger himself writes: ‘Das Schwierige liegt in der Sprache. Unsere abendl&ndischen Sprachen 
sind in je verschiedener Weise Sprachen des metaphysischen Denkens. Ob das Wesen der 
abendl&ndischen Sprachen in sich nur metaphysisch und darum endgiiltig durch die Onto-Theo-Logik 
gepragt ist, oder ob diese Sprachen andere Mdglichkeiten des Sagens und d. h. zugleich des sagenden 
Nichtsagens gew&hren, muB offen bleiben.’ [Identitdt und Differenz, p. 6 6 ] Might the articulation of 
the truth of being -  “das sagende Nichtsagen” -  amount ultimately to silence -  albeit a peculiarly 
pregnant silence? Is this also the meaning of those loaded words with which Heidegger closes the 
lecture Zeit und Sein: ‘Ein Hindemis . bleibt auch das Sagen vom Ereignis in der Weise eines 
Vortrags. Er hat nur in Aussagesfltzen gesprochen. ’ [Zur Sache des Denkens, p. 25] Bemasconi sees 
this as essentially connected to the fact that ‘Ereignis is not a word for being. Ereignis is the word that 
arises from the experience of the lack of a word for being. ’ [The Question of Language in Heidegger’s 
History of Being, p. 8 6 ] It is intended to radically contrast with the various metaphysical names for 
being hitherto employed. Beyond metaphysics being cannot be named -  that is, it cannot be said. But 
this is not to suggest, Bemasconi notes, that the remembrance of metaphysics, the dialogue with the 
essential thinkers, which must needs make use of the language of metaphysics, has not already moved 
beyond metaphysics -  precisely in order to disclose the truth of metaphysics. Metaphysical language 
can already speak non-metaphysically, and this is because the issue here is not one of a simple 
opposition.
But what sense is to be made of the thought that thinking must speak silently? Heidegger 
explains: ‘Supremely thoughtful utterance does not consist simply in growing taciturn when it is a 
matter of saying what is properly to be said; it consists in saying the matter in such a way that it is 
named in nonsaying. The utterance of thinking is a telling silence. Such utterance corresponds to the 
most profound essence of language, which has its origin in silence.’ [NI, pp. 471-472 This citation 
and its reference is taken from Bemasconi’s book. I have been unable to locate it in Heidegger’s 
writings.]. See Rosen’s The Question of Being (Chapters 5, 8 and passim) for the view that no sense 
can be made of this.
22 Cf. Beitrdge zur Philosophie, §§115-167. The leap is necessary because mere opposition can never 
decisively break free from what it opposes. As Pattison notes in regard to the overcoming of 
metaphysics: ‘we cannot argue our way out, since all forms of argument we could possibly use are 
familiar to the tradition. We cannot argue our way out, we can only leap’. [The Later Heidegger, p.
17]
150
Sein und Zeit, Heidegger had not correctly estimated quite how far he would have to leap -  
perhaps he wondered whether a bridge could not be built. But: ‘Es gibt hier keine Brucke, 
sondem nur den Sprung. ’23 But in any case, the development of a new non-metaphysical 
language -  or rather, as Heidegger himself insists, the transformation of our relationship to 
the old language -  is so far from being the abandonment of the original project that it is rather 
precisely the culmination of it. In the last place, then, the Kehre is to be understood as 
something linguistic; as the development of a radically new philosophical language adequate 
to the saying of the truth of being.
What “is" Ereignis?
Before moving onto the critical part of our engagement with Heidegger, we should 
like, in the light of all that has gone before, to consider the meaning of what is perhaps the 
key word of Heidegger’s later philosophy. As we shall see, it illuminates in a particularly 
striking way the figure of thought which is to occupy us in the following chapters.
Heidegger’s exposition of the concept of time-space in the lecture Zeit und Sein, to 
which we have already referred, occurs within the context of a discussion of the way in which 
time and being hold sway. Heidegger writes: ‘Wir sagen nicht: Sein ist, Zeit ist, sondem: Es 
gibt Sein und es gibt Zeit. ’24 The German “es gibt’ is translated into English as “there is” or 
“there are”, but literally means “it gives”. In what way, Heidegger asks, are time and being 
given? He answers: ‘Das Geben im “Es gibt Sein” zeigte sich als Schicken und als Geschick 
von Anwesenheit in ihren epochalen Wandlungen. Das Geben im “Es gibt Zeit” zeigte sich 
als lichtendes Reichen des vierdimensionalen Bereiches. ’25 And what is the “it” that gives 
time and being? In response to this question Heidegger writes: ‘Im schicken des Geschickes 
von Sein, im Reichen der Zeit zeigt sich ein Zueignen, ein Ubereignen, ngmlich von Sein als 
Anwesenheit und von Zeit als Bereich des Offenen in ihr Eigenes. Was beide, Zeit und Sein, 
in ihr Eigenes, d. h. in ihr Zusammengehdren, bestimmt, nennen wir: das Ereignis.'26 Thus: 
‘Der Zeit-Raum ist als Fugimg der Wahrheit ursprimglich die Augenblicks-St&tte des 
Ereignisses. ’27
But we must be careful in simply equating Ereignis with the “Es” in “Es gibt', since
it is imperative that we are not to take it as something that in any sense “is”. This would be,
given what Heidegger has previously said about being, to take it as an Anwesende when it is 
precisely Anwesenheit itself which it is supposed to “explain”. Heidegger is clear that we are
23 Was Heifit Denken?, pp. 4-5
24 Zur Sache des Denkens, p. 5
25 Zur Sache des Denkens, p. 17
26 Zur Sache des Denkens, p. 20
27 Beitrdge zur Philosophie, p. 30
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neither able to explain Ereignis: ‘Es gibt nichts anderes, worauf das Ereignis noch 
zuriickfuhrt, woraus es gar erklSrt werden konnte’28; nor able to immediately express what 
Ereignis means in a propositional form. Ereignis cannot function as the subject of a 
proposition in the necessary way. If it cannot be said, nevertheless Ereignis “is” that which 
itself grounds all saying. ‘Im Er-eignis schwingt das Wesen dessen, was als Sprache spricht, 
die einmal das Haus des Seins genannt wurde. ’29 And: ‘Haus des Seins ist die Sprache, weil 
sie als die Sage die Weise des Ereignisses ist. ’30 Indeed: ‘Ereignis ist sagend. ’31 However a 
few things can be said about the way in which Heidegger intends Ereignis to be understood.
In his own words: ‘Er-eignen heifit urspriinglich: er-fiugen, d. h. erblicken im Blicken 
zu sich rufen, an-eignen. Das Wort Ereignis soil jetzt, aus der gewiesenen Sache her gedacht, 
als Leitwort im Dienst des Denkens sprechen. Als so gedachtes Leitwort lafit es sich sowenig 
iibersetzen wie das griechische Leitwort Aoyos und das chinesische Tao. ’32
Can it not be said about Ereignis simply that it is being itself? After all, in Beitrdge 
zur Philosophie it is described as the first answer to the Seinsfrage. In any case it is not to be 
understood, in the metaphysical sense, as just one more interpretation in the histoiy of 
philosophy of what being is or means. Indeed, Ereignis, as the “if’ that “gives” historically in 
the form of the Geschick, itself is what first makes different interpretations of being 
historically possible.33 Ereignis is the ground o f is, all history: ‘Das Ereignis ist die 
ursprungliche Geschichte selbst. ’34
28 Unterwegs zur Sprache, p. 258
29 Identitdt und Differenz, p. 28
30 Unterwegs zur Sprache, p. 267
31 Unterwegs zur Sprache, p. 263
32 Identitdt und Differenz, p. 25 Of course, Heidegger’s words have not been heeded here and Ereignis 
has found many different renderings into English. Typically these translations do not grasp the 
etymology of the word. As Heidegger writes here, and as the Kluge Etymologische Wdrterbuch 
confirms, Ereignis derived originally from er-dugen, meaning “to put before the eyes” (i. e. to make 
present), not simply from the German root eigen. The recent English translation of Beitrdge zur 
Philosophie makes a very obvious error, then, when it translates the word as merely a prefixation and 
substantivisation of the German verb “to own”: “enowning”. This in itself would not necessarily be so 
bad had the translators given so much as a justification of their choice and marked their etymological 
discrepancy. However in the preface to their translation they show no awareness at all of the fact that 
Ereignis is not directly etymologically related to eigen. Heidegger, of course, uses the word in close 
connection to other words which clearly are related to the verb eigen, and obviously intends in this use 
a relation to eigen to be heard. He writes for example: ‘Ereignis ist eignende Er-&ugnis.’ [Die Technik 
und die Kehre, p. 44] The problem simply is that in this use something like er-dugen comes much 
more to the fore than something like eigen. Rather than merely a belongingness of man to being, an 
owning generalised absolutely, Ereignis primarily indicates the “Einblitz” -  the “giving” of being and 
time -  in virtue of which presence as such is constituted. This primordial presence is the ground of the 
belongingness of man to being in so far as there can only be presence for man.
33 In this sense, as is noted on page 44 of Zur Sache des Denkens, in the ‘Protokoll zu einem Seminar 
fiber den Vortrag “Zeit und Sein’”, with the thinking of Ereignis that is attempted here, the 
Seinsgeschichte, comes to an end. ‘Die Metaphysik ist die Geschichte der Seinspragungen, d. h. vom 
Ereignis her gesehen, die Geschichte des Sichentziehens des Schickenden zugunsten der im Schicken 
gegebenen Schickungen eines jeweiligen Anwesenlassens des Anwesenden. Die Metaphysik ist 
Seinsvergessenheit und d. h. die Geschichte der Verbergung und des Entzugs dessen, das Sein gibt. 
Die Einkehr des Denkens in das Ereignis ist somit gleichbedeutend mit dem Ende dieser Geschichte
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It is rather the case that being is ereignet in Ereignis by Ereignis itself. The same 
holds for time in so far as being and time are one in Anwesenheit. Heidegger writes: Tn der 
Wendung: “Sein als das Ereignis” meint das “als” jetzt: Sein, Anwesenlassen geschickt im 
Ereignen, Zeit gereicht im Ereignen. Zeit und Sein ereignet im Ereignis. ’35 In Beitrdge zur 
Philosophie Heidegger characterises Ereignis as the “Wesung”, the “holding sway” of being, 
as the way in which being holds sway. He writes for example: ‘Das Seyn west als das 
Ereignis. ’36 As the holding sway of being, as that which determines being and time in their 
belonging together, Ereignis is to be thought as the law of presence and absence, as the law of 
all presencing and absencing, as that which determines the way in which all that holds sway 
holds sway. ‘[Ereignis] erbringt das An- und Abwesende in sein jeweilig Eigenes’37. As such 
it is nothing “over and above” what is, nothing “over and above” beings as a whole; rather it 
is their immanent principle, that which determines all that is in coming to be and passing 
away, in presence and absence. It is that law which first makes presence and absence what 
they are, which presences presence and absences absence, which therefore makes being -  and 
time, and being as time -  first possible.
But as this principle it is to be thought of as fundamental history. It is what 
determines history in its epochal structurality as the history of “constellations” of being. It is 
the law of being’s constellations. As such, a withdrawal, an “Entzug” belongs essentially to 
it. In so far as it gives, Ereignis withdraws itself in its truth. ‘Das Ereignis ist in ihm selber 
Enteignis’38. The Anwesenheit withdraws in favour of the Anwesende. Its withdrawal 
grounds history as the Geschick. The Schickende itself holds itself back, making epochal 
history first possible. The histoiy of being is ultimately the history of the self-withdrawal of 
Ereignis. But this self-withdrawal of Ereignis, which, in regard of time-space, is 
determinable as the refusal of Anwesenheit belonging essentially to the temporal dimensions 
of past and future, is the same as the withdrawal of being in its truth that grounds the history 
of metaphysics, the history of Seinsverlassenheit. And in so far as Ereignis is already the 
principle and the structurality of history, the other beginning, the Kehre out of the epoch of 
Ge-stell into die truth of being -  the “Einblick in das was ist” -, is to be understood as nothing 
but the Ereignis of Ereignis, the cosmic principle coming to its own truth. ‘Einblick in das
des Entzugs.’ Being is thought in its truth, rather than being thought in merely one more metaphysical 
determination; that is, being itself is finally thought without respect to beings. This is to say that the 
ontological difference has finally been made. Ereignis, as the ground of all history, is not one more 
historical interpretation of being. It is itself beyond all history; it is non-historical. Heidegger writes: 
‘Dieses aber, das Schickende als das Ereignis, ist selbst ungeschichtlich, besser geschicklos.’ [Zur 
Sache des Denkens, p. 44] This means that the end of the history of being is at the same time the turn 
into the other beginning. On this historical logic cf. Michel Haar’s Preface to The Song of the Earth.
34 Beitrdge zur Philosophie, p. 31
35 Zur Sache des Denkens, pp. 22-23
36 Beitrdge zur Philosophie, p. 30
37 Unterwegs zur Sprache, p. 258
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was ist, ist das Ereignis selber, als welches die Wahrheit des Seins zum wahrlosen Sein sich 
verhalt und steht. ’39
Thus, finally, the following can be said of Ereignis : that man belongs essentially to it:
Im Sein als Anwesen bekundet sich der Angang, der uns Menschen so angeht, daB wir im 
Vernehmen und Ubemehmen dieses Angangs das Auszeichnende des Menschseins erlangt haben. 
Dieses Ubemehmen des Angangs von Anwesen beruht aber im Innestehen im Bereich des Reichens, 
als welche uns die vierdimensionale eigentliche Zeit erreicht hat.
Sofem es Sein und Zeit nur gibt im Ereignen, gehdrt zu diesem das Eigentumliche, daB es den 
Menschen als den, der Sein vemimmt, indem er innesteht in der eigentlichen Zeit, in sein Eigenes 
bringt. So geeignet gehdrt der Mensch in das Ereignis.40
In so far as thinking essentially characterises man, and thinking is always in one sense 
the thinking of being, man and being must belong in some way together. Nevertheless, we 
are not to understand this belonging together as founded on the representational thinking of 
metaphysics; rather, man and being belong together in so far as being can only presence given 
man. Heidegger writes: ‘Sein west und wShrt nur, indem es durch seinen Anspruch den 
Menschen an-geht. Denn erst der Mensch, offen fur das Sein, l&Bt dieses als An-wesen 
ankommen. Solches An-wesen braucht das OfFene einer Lichtung und bleibt so durch dieses 
Brauchen dem Menschenwesen iibereignet. ’41 And: ‘Das Sein selbst aber gehdrt zu uns; denn 
nur bei uns kann es als Sein wesen, d. h. an-wesen. ’42 And even: ‘Das Ereignis ereignet den 
Menschen in den Brauch fur es selbst. ’43
In so far as Ereignis needs mankind, it is to be conceived as the law of mankind’s 
relation to being, to the truth of being; that is, as the normativity that stands behind the 
structure of history, the structure of Dasein, the structure of truth. Ereignis -  (in a far deeper 
sense than time) structure as such perhaps -  is the law which we might call “onto- 
normativity”. As Heidegger puts it:
Das Ereignis verleiht den Sterblichen den Aufenthalt in ihrem Wesen, daB sie vermdgen, die 
Sprechenden zu sein. Verstehen wir unter dem “Gesetz” die Versammlung dessen, was jegliches in 
seinem Eigenen anwesen, in sein Gehoriges gehoren laBt, dann ist das Ereignis das schlichteste und 
sanfteste aller Gesetze... Das Ereignis ist freilich nicht Gesetz im Sinne einer Norm, die irgendwo 
iiber uns schwebt, ist keine Verordnung, die einen Verlauf ordnet und regelt.
38 Zur Sache des Denkens, p. 44
39 Die Technik und die Kehre, p. 44
40 Zur Sache des Denkens, pp. 23-24
41 Identittit und Differenz, p. 19
42 Identitat und Differenz, p. 20
43 Unterwegs zur Sprache, p. 261
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Das Ereignis ist das Gesetz, insofem es die Sterblichen in das Ereignen zu ihrem Wesen 
versammelt und darin halt.44
It is, of course, the mortal’s essence to dwell in disclosive relation to the truth of
being.
In the following chapters we examine the possibility of this onto-noimativity of 
Ereignis according to the contours with which Heidegger shapes it.
44 Unterwegs zur Sprache, p. 259
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Part IV: 
Onto-Normativity
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Chapter 13:
Conscience
The raising of die question of being is motivated by grounds that Heidegger’s 
philosophy itself attempts to justify through developing an account of being which makes the 
raising of the question of being a historical necessity for the essence of mankind; that is, 
necessary for mankind to exist according to his essence. 1 For, according to Heidegger, it is 
the essence of mankind to exist as the protector, guardian, even shepherd of being, and thus to 
have disclosed being as such in its truth. As later texts affirm, this essence is grounded in the 
ontological constitution of Dasein as Sorge, care: care for being. The analysis of Dasein, of 
those structures that make disclosure possible at all, of those structures which ground the 
belonging together of man and being, is intended ultimately to show that this is the case. We 
may note in passing that in so far as philosophy is essentially the thinking of being, Heidegger 
is here giving a transcendental account of the necessity of philosophy, and thereby a 
transcendental justification for the existentiality of philosophical thinking to which he himself 
committed his life.
But in this fourth and final part we aim, in the first place, to present a fundamental 
critique of the claim that it accords with the essence of mankind to disclose being in its truth. 
In doing this we will be undermining the claimed necessity of the question of being and thus 
the basic philosophical motivation for Heidegger’s philosophical engagement as such. Our 
critique is, in an important sense, immanent to the Heideggerian philosophy, to the extent that 
we aim to impose upon it no considerations beyond its own concerns. We aim instead merely 
to present further phenomenological analysis of two of its key themes: conscience and 
resoluteness. If our critique is successful, the whole edifice of Heidegger’s philosophy will 
fall. Fragments of exceptional philosophical importance may remain; but the foundation will 
have been removed from their original architectonic.
1 ‘Die philosophische Frage muB ihre Notwendigkeit in sich selbst tragen, sie muB -  hinreichend 
entfaltet -  diese Notwendigkeit selbst sichtbar machen.’ [Grundfragen der Philosophie, pp. 106-107]
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For Heidegger, as we have seen, conscience is a call to authenticity grounded in the 
structure of Sorge. It is the call to authenticity as the silent but determined call calling Dasein 
out of its lostness in das Man to being its self as essentially being-guilty. Dasein itself, as 
Sorge, is its caller. The call of conscience is disclosive. The mode of Befindlichkeit 
corresponding to the disclosive call of conscience is Angst, as that Befindlichkeit in which the 
essence of Dasein’s factical existence as such is disclosed to Dasein. The proper 
understanding of the call of conscience Heidegger names Gewissen-haben-wollen. This has 
its own mode of disclosure -  determined by the Befindlichkeit of Angst, by understanding as 
the projection upon the own-most possibility of being, and by the mode of speech of silence -  
and this is resoluteness [Ent-schlossenheit]. Resoluteness itself is disclosed in the call of 
conscience in so far as die call of conscience precisely calls Dasein to this mode of disclosure, 
which is die same as to say, to the mode of being of authenticity.
Conscience is a call to resoluteness. This claim we do not wish to deny. However we 
wish to understand it differently to Heidegger; for we wish to understand both conscience and 
resoluteness differentiy.
What is conscience? For Heidegger, it is grounded in the structure of Dasein as 
Sorge -  as we already emphasised, it is a structural call. But what does this mean? It does 
not mean that conscience is a voice that speaks out, in the mode of silence, upon the collision, 
as it were, of two or more of the structural components that constitute Dasein. For conscience 
is merely the ever present, but for the most part covered over, disclosure of the being of 
Dasein {Dasein’s pre-thematic understanding of its own being: ‘Zum Dasein gehdrt aber 
wesenhaft, daB es mit der Erschlossenheit seiner Welt ihm selbst erschlossen ist, so daB es 
sich immer schon versteht.'2) become thematic -  although, of course, not necessarily 
conceptual -  in the basic Befindlichkeit of Angst, that Befindlichkeit in which the essence of 
Dasein’s factical existence as such -  its “dafi es ist und als das Seiende, das es ist, 
seinkdnnend zu sein hat’ -  is disclosed. The call of conscience is the disclosure of the 
factical existence of Dasein as such, that is, the disclosure of the structure of Dasein’s being. 
It is in this sense, and in this sense alone, that it is a structural call.
But as it is commonly understood, conscience is not merely disclosive: it also presses 
a demand of some sort, a “should” or an “ought”; it makes a normative claim on 
existentiality. The fundamental philosophical question about conscience concerns the origin, 
the grounding of this “should”. According to Heidegger, the “should” is expressed as the 
demand for an authentic mode of existence: ‘Der vorrufende Ruckruf des Gewissens gibt dem 
Dasein zu verstehen, daB es... aus der Verlorenheit in das Man sich zu ihm selbst zuruckholen
2 Sein und Zeit, p. 272
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soil'3. On his account of conscience, however, the origin or ground of this “should” is not 
immediately clear. Why does the mere disclosure of the factical existence of Dasein, and thus 
the possibility of the authenticity of Dasein's being -  and hence of the lostness of Dasein in 
das Man - , constitute, without further ado, this “should” of Dasein’s authentic mode of 
being?
We have been told, however, that the call of conscience discloses Dasein ’s being- 
guilty; that is, that Dasein is guilty. The concept of guilt is, of course, intrinsically connected 
to a “should” -  the “should” of innocence. If the call of conscience discloses that Dasein is 
guilty, then surely it thereby also discloses a corresponding “should”. Within Heidegger’s 
conceptuality, however, this line of thought will not work, since he affirms that Dasein is 
guilty in the grounds of its being, that is, is ontologically guilty, and that it is this ontological 
guilt which the call of conscience discloses. There is, then, no possible innocent mode of 
being to which Dasein can be called -  innocence in this ontological sense is not a possibility 
for a being of the structure of Sorge -  and therefore there can be no “should” to correspond to 
it. Heidegger writes: ‘Dieses Seiende [das Dasein] braucht sich nicht erst durch Verfehlung 
oder Unterlassung eine “Schuld” aufzuladen, es soli nur das “schuldig” -  als welches es ist -  
eigentlich sein.'4 Dasein should authentically be the being-guilty that it as such is. This begs 
again the question: what is the ground (in the constitution of being of Dasein) of this “should” 
of authentically being-guilty?
Heidegger has already emphasised the significance of the way in which the call is 
apprehended, or better: heard. Perhaps the ground of the “should” of the call of conscience is 
to be understood in terms of the particular way in which the call is heard. As we have seen, 
the call discloses the possibility of the authentic mode of Dasein's being. Heidegger writes: 
‘Das rechte HOren des Anrufs kommt dann gleich einem Sichverstehen in seinem eigensten 
Seinkbnnen, das heiBt dem Sichentwerfen auf das eigenste eigentliche 
SchuldigwerdenkOnnen. ’5 The proper -  that is, genuine, bona fide -  hearing of the call is 
already, claims Heidegger, the projection of Dasein onto its own-most possibility of being. 
But then, rather than the origin of the “should” being accounted for, the phenomenon seems to 
be simply dissolved, since, if the proper hearing of the call of conscience, the call to an 
authentic mode of being, is already the understanding self-projection within this mode of 
being then there does not seem to be any ontological room for the “should”. And we may 
also wonder why it is the case that the proper hearing of the call, the angst-fill disclosure of 
the factical existence of Dasein, is already a projection onto Dasein's own-most possibility of 
being. Heidegger gives us no additional clues concerning this crucial claim.
3 Sein und Zeit, p. 287 My italics.
4 Sein und Zeit, p. 287
5 Sein und Zeit, p. 287
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Further, the call of conscience is supposedly for the most part not properly heard; we 
have been told that for the most part Dasein flees the disclosure of the call. Yet it is precisely 
in this mode of flight that the full weight of the “should” disclosed by the call of conscience 
surely comes to bear. The possibility of the “should”, and thus the proper understanding of 
the call, must be intelligible upon the horizon of the prevailing mode of flight of Dasein and 
therefore this understanding cannot already be a projection upon Dasein's own-most 
possibility of being. Accordingly, it might be argued that if the proper hearing of the call is 
to be taken as already the projection upon Dasein’s own-most possibility of being, then, the 
“should” of the call of conscience must concern this proper hearing itself, rather than flee the 
disclosure of the call of conscience, Dasein should be properly attentive to it. But this has, of 
course, not explained the origin of die “should”. Why should Dasein be properly attentive to 
the call of conscience and not flee its disclosure? What would then define the proper hearing 
of the call in the first place?
Perhaps one could turn at this point to a norm of truth. Dasein should listen to the 
call correctly since that would lead to authentic, that is, true disclosure. Unfortunately, 
however, this cannot be Heidegger’s own strategy, since if the “should” is itself supposed to 
be disclosed by the call of conscience, and we have seen that it is, it cannot apply beforehand 
to the way in which the call is heard. Further, since the proper hearing of the call is supposed 
to be the same as Dasein’s projection onto its own-most possibility of being, which is itself 
characterised as Gewissen-haben-wollen, the “should” of conscience apparently remains even 
after the call has been properly understood.
One might think that perhaps our question is disingenuous or unfair. Perhaps 
Heidegger does not attempt to provide grounds for the existential “should” that he advocates; 
perhaps he simply appeals to the phenomenology of an irreducible experience, which, as he 
puts it, “testifies” to Dasein’s authentic mode of being. Whilst he is certainly appealing to the 
phenomenology of a particular mode of disclosure, he has, in previous analyses, 
hermeneutically grounded such phenomenology in the constitution of Dasein’s being. Thus 
the phenomenology of Angst, for example, was supposed to be understood as arising from the 
ontological concern Dasein bears both for and about its being. It would be surprising were 
the phenomenology of conscience not to be similarly conceived.
In fact, for Heidegger, the structural origin of the “should” of the call of conscience is 
the disclosure of the self-relation of the Sorge structure. He writes: ‘Sofem es dem Dasein -  
als Sorge -  um sein Sein geht, ruft es aus der Unheimlichkeit sich selbst als faktisch- 
verfallendes Man auf zu seinem SeinkOnnen. ’6 The “should” of the call of conscience is 
grounded in the concern that Dasein has for its own being: Dasein calls itself to the mode of
6 Sein und Zeit, p. 287
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being of authenticity in so far as, ontologically determined as Sorge, it cares about its being as 
such and as a whole, which self-concemful call is experienced in the sense of a “should”. 
Thus: ‘Der Ruf ist Ruf der Sorge. ’7
However, this account of the grounds of the ontological “should” of authenticity 
cannot be satisfactory for several interrelated reasons: In the first place, it can be simply 
pointed out that this would mean that the “should” only becomes thematically disclosed, 
precisely when it does not need to be, namely, when Dasein is already in an authentic mode 
of being. As we enunciated already above: the “should” must be precisely intelligible for 
inauthentic Dasein; it cannot function as the “should” of authenticity, as a call to an authentic 
mode of being, if it is only ever effectively disclosed within that mode of being.8
In the second place, we must remember that to the structure of Sorge belongs the 
moment of Ve/fallen, Dasein ’s flight from its uncanny existence into the familiarity of beings 
in the world. This flight is grounded by the basic Befindlichkeit of Angst, in which the 
essence of Dasein’s existence is expressly disclosed to it. Rather than disclose its factical 
finite existence for what it is, Dasein absorbs itself, submerges itself in the average world of 
the everyday in which such disclosure is levelled off. This flight is itself grounded by the 
structure of Sorge, Dasein’s concern for its own being. Concerned for its own being, Dasein 
flees the uncanny reality revealed in the disclosure of the Befindlichkeit of Angst and thus of 
the call of conscience. But this means that mere concern for its being, the structure of Sorge, 
taken alone, cannot ground a call to authenticity, to the express disclosure of factical 
existence, for it would sooner ground the opposite: a call to //lauthenticity. How are we to 
understand the possibility of the self-concerned flight of Dasein if the Befindlichkeit of Angst 
precisely grounds a call out of this mode of being? Surely this removes the ground of 
Verfallen. How can the very same disclosure ground at the very same time both this flight 
and this contrary “should”.
Finally: how in any case exactly is Dasein's disclosure of its being supposed to 
ground a normative demand? It is no ontic concern, with which we are dealing here; it is 
merely an ontological one. The mere disclosure that its being is given over to itself and that it 
is lost amidst the possibilities of the everyday still leaves ontological room for an existential 
indifference towards an authentic mode of being -  not merely an existentiell indifference.
7 Sein und Zeit, p. 286
8 A related objection, and a proposed solution, is developed in detail by Stephen Mulhall in his 
commentary on Sein und Zeit. (Cf. Heidegger and Being and Time pp. 130-136.) Mulhall argues that 
Heidegger’s account leaves unintelligible how it is that conscience can call in the first place, since in 
the everyday mode of inauthenticity the authentic self that is the caller of conscience is totally covered 
over. It is thus inexplicable how Dasein is able to become authentic at all. Beneath Mulhall’s 
consideration of this lies the more general issue of what we might call existential “spontaneity”.
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Why should Dasein be authentic and not inauthentic? Why should this be a matter of 
Dasein's concern? 9
If the “should” of die call of conscience is to be given an existential ontological 
grounding, a grounding that leaves no ontological room for indifference to it, then this 
grounding must be found other than in the mere disclosure of the structural self-concern that 
characterises Dasein. -  Or, alternatively, the “should” of the call of conscience is not to be 
construed as a call to authenticity.—
As an appendix to his positive elaboration of the existential foundation of the 
phenomenon of conscience Heidegger includes a discussion of the vulgar understanding of 
conscience and of the way in which an advocate of this understanding might respond to his 
own existential interpretation. As with the other existentials, the vulgar understanding of 
conscience is rooted in the Verfallen of Dasein’s ontological constitution and die 
consequential interpretation of being always according to Vorhandenheit. Conscience is 
interpreted as something objectively present, usually as a faculty of the will, soul, etc. Of 
course, the vulgar understanding of conscience has its own justification; it is not simply false; 
rather, it has distorted the phenomenal facts in accordance with an essential distortion of the 
being of the being who interprets those facts. Heidegger, therefore, does not aim to disprove 
the vulgar interpretation of conscience; he aims rather to show the way in which it is 
grounded in the mode of being of inauthenticity, and therefore die way in which it belies the 
more original understanding that he himself presents.
One claim that Heidegger attributes to the vulgar understanding of conscience reads 
as follows: ‘Das Gewissen spricht je relativ auf eine bestimmte vollzogene oder gewollte 
Tat. ’ 10 We could express this within the horizon of the existential analysis as follows: 
Conscience calls only with regard to particular projections. Heidegger himself, of course, 
wishes to deny this. The ontological conscience cares not for particular projections, but 
concerns itself with the mode of Dasein’s being as such. Heidegger does not, however, wish 
to deny the everyday experience in which the call of conscience is always related to particular 
deeds. He writes: ‘DaB der Ruf haufig in solcher Ruftendenz erfahren wird, kann...nicht 
geleugnet werden. Die Frage bleibt nur, ob diese Ruferfahrung den Ruf sich vbllig 
“ausrufen” lafit. ’ 11 Does the everyday experience of conscience listen to the full content of its 
call? Is it perhaps only a partial hearing?
9 At this point we might also wonder whether the disclosure of Dasein’s being is sufficient to ground 
the flight of Dasein. This is a flight away from existential responsibility; but has Heidegger told us 
exactly why, merely on the basis of self-concern, such responsibility is to be fled from? Ontically such 
a flight would be understandable; responsibility represses our freedom, which we hold dear to
ourselves. But why is responsibility so awful on the ontological level? And why is inauthenticity
existentially so attractive?
10 Sein und Zeit, p. 290
11 Sein und Zeit, p. 293
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Heidegger, it has been argued, fails to ground the “should” of the call of conscience 
conceived as a call to authenticity. No ground for a “should”, according to which, by the very 
structurality of its being, Dasein should haul itself out of its lostness in das Man and into its 
own-most possibility of being, has been identified. The call to authenticity, to self-owning, 
however, is absent from the vulgar understanding of conscience. For the vulgar 
understanding, conscience concerns projections, or possible projections, without regard to the 
mode of being in which they are projected. For the vulgar understanding, conscience 
concerns inauthentic projections, not inauthenticity as such. The question can thus be rather 
turned on Heidegger: what reason is there to accept that conscience is originally a call to 
authenticity, a call out of lostness in das Man? What possible ground for a “should” could 
there be when conscience is conceived in this way? In what sense is there more to be heard in 
die call of conscience than its concern for particular deeds?
For Heidegger, as we have seen, conscience is fundamentally disclosive; indeed, for 
him, it is not anything other than a simple disclosive function. Whilst anything that might be 
perceived to be phenomenologically lacking on this account is supposed to be contributed by 
the special way in which the call is heard, conscience itself is merely the Angst-fill disclosure 
of the truth of Dasein’s being as factical existence, thrown project. The disclosure of the call 
of conscience does not therefore differentiate itself from the disclosure of the basic 
Befindlichkeit of Angst. Now the “should” of the conscience call is nothing more than a 
structural relation within existentiality. It can therefore only be grounded, and thus made 
intelligible, within a system of structural relations. Our case against Heidegger’s analysis of 
conscience might thus be distilled like this: Mere disclosure taken alone -  nothing here 
hanging on what is disclosed -  is not structural; therefore it cannot ground the structural 
phenomenon of the “should”. And this means that it cannot successfully function alone as an 
account of conscience, to the very concept of which a “should” belongs.
We can hear an echo here of the traditional is/ought distinction. The “ought”, 
whether hypothetical or transcendental-categorical, always expresses a relational structure: I 
ought to do such and such if I want such and such; I ought to do such and such rather than 
such and such. As such it can only be grounded as some sort of structural relation, whether 
this is conceived existentially or in terms of pure practical reason. A brute fact alone can 
never provide the structural relation required for an “ought” and thus contain within itself a 
prescription for action.
Nevertheless, we have been told that Dasein is the structural possibility of disclosure. 
Within this structure, we claim, is to be found the ground of a “should” which determines its 
essentiality. Demonstrating this requires, however, that we move beyond Heidegger’s own 
analyses.
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Dasein is primarily a being-possible [Seinkdnnen\. It is as a projection onto a 
possibility of its being for the sake of which it is. Projection is to be conceived in terms of the 
relation of existentiality and facticity. Dasein is this (structural) relation in the ground of its 
being. It is this structural relation that grounds the possibility o f the “should ”, and thus o f 
the existential-ontological phenomenon o f conscience. To see this it is helpful to return to 
Heidegger’s analysis of guilt.
Heidegger determines the basic meaning of guilt to be: ilGrundsein einer Nichtigkeif ’ 
and he characterises the being of Dasein as essentially being-guilty. Now Dasein is, as we 
have seen, geworfen; that is, Dasein is its “that it is” without having chosen to be it: 
‘Existierend kommt es nie hinter seine Geworfenheit zurack, so daB es dieses “daB es ist und 
zu sein hat” je eigens erst aus seinem selbstsem entlassen und in das Da fuhren kfinnte. ’ 12 
And this is the basic meaning of the facticity of Dasein. Dasein is, not in virtue of its own 
doing. Thus this facticity of Dasein is essentially determined by a negativity: 'Nicht durch es 
selbst, sondem an es selbst entlassen aus dem Grande, um als dieser zu sein. ’ 13 The 
existentiality of Dasein is also essentially determined by a negativity. As the finite projection 
upon particular existentiell possibilities, Dasein is always in the state of not having projected 
onto particular existentiell possibilities -  possibilities that it has not chosen. ‘Das Dasein ist 
sein Grand existierend, das heifit so, daB es sich aus Mfiglichkeiten versteht und dergestalt 
sich verstehend das geworfene Seiende ist. Darin liegt aber: seinkdnnend steht es je in der 
einen oder anderen Mdglichkeit, stSndig ist es eine andere nicht und hat sich ihrer im 
existenziellen Entwurf begeben. Der Entwurf ist nicht nur als geworfener durch die 
Nichtigkeit des Grundseins bestimmt, sondem als Entwurf selbst wesenhaft nichtigf4
Existentiality and facticity are both determined by negativity. Heidegger concludes: 
‘In der Struktur der Geworfenheit sowohl wie in der des Entwurfs liegt wesenhaft eine 
Nichtigkeit... Die Sorge selbst ist in ihrem Wesen durch und durch von Nichtigkeit durchsetzt. 
Die Sorge -  das Sein des Daseins -  besagt demnach als geworfener Entwurf: Das (nichtige) 
Grund-sein einer Nichtigkeit. Und das bedeutet: Das Dasein ist als solches schuldig, ’ 15
However, contrary to what Heidegger claims here, the negativity essential to 
existentiality, to projection, cannot be grounded in the mere fact that Dasein does not choose 
however many possibilities each time it projects itself. On the one hand, since these 
possibilities are potentially infinite that would leave Dasein's guilt wholly indeterminate at 
any time (that is ontically indeterminate, not merely ontologically indeterminate), and, on the 
other, it equivocates being-guilty with freedom, which is to say with being responsible as
12 Sein und Zeit, p. 284
13 Sein und Zeit, pp. 284-285
14 Sein und Zeit, p. 285
15 Sein und Zeit, p. 285
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such. 16 Further, the negativity essential to facticity, to Geworfenheit, cannot be limited to the 
mere fact of not having chosen to exist. Rather, the negativity here, the not-having-chosen, is 
carried over into every current projection, in so far as, for example, it is the projection of a 
particular not-chosen body, out of a particular not-chosen family background, against 
particular not-chosen obstacles in the world, etc. Indeed: the essential negativity of facticity 
only makes sense in so far as it is considered in reference to projection, whilst the essential 
negativity of existentiality only makes sense -  as we shall now see -  in so far as it is 
considered in reference to Geworfenheit. This is because the negativity that determines the 
phenomenon of guilt is grounded in the relation of existentiality to facticity, that is, in the 
relation of projection to Geworfenheit.
The negativity of guilt concerns the “not” of die possibility projected upon but not 
accomplished, that is, real-ised.—Thus not just any possibility that is not projected upon. 
Dasein is guilty in so far as it does not realise, that is, fails to realise, a possibility that it 
projects itself upon. Such failure -  failure of existentiality -  is made ontologically possible 
only by the relation of existentiality to facticity. In so far as Dasein is factical, its projection 
is finite, that is, subject to possible failure. Facticity is precisely the determination of the 
finitude of Dasein’s existentiality, that is, of its freedom -  and nothing more than this.
Guilt, instantiated as the negativity of the failure of projection, is grounded in the 
relation of existentiality and facticity, but only within the structure o f the individual project. 
Of course, as a being-possible, Dasein has always already projected itself onto a possibility of 
its being for the sake of which it is; Dasein is always already engaged with existentiell 
projects.
It might be argued at this point that we are confusing the ontic or existentiell with the 
ontological or existential: whilst Heidegger is concerned with an ontological guilt, we have at 
the very most affirmed that Dasein can be ontically guilty. But we have already pointed out 
the incoherence of an ontological guilt on the horizon of a consideration of the phenomenon 
of conscience. Heidegger’s ontological guilt is no different from existential responsibility in 
general. But this existential responsibility is precisely the ontological fundament of the fact 
that Dasein can be ontically guilty. Guilt and its correlative, innocence, must be understood 
as ontic phenomena, no matter for their grounding in deeper ontological structures. If not, 
then the phenomenon of conscience is inexplicable. It is Heidegger who is confusing the 
ontic and ontological levels. Indeed, he even admits in regard to his analysis of guilt: ‘Die 
gemeinte Nichtigkeit gehftrt zum Freisein des Daseins filr seine existenziellen
16 A point brought out by Gunter Figal in his Martin Heidegger: Phctnomenologie der Freiheit, p. 239 
ff. The problem here is that guilt has to be different from existential responsibility in general if we are 
to make sense of the phenomenon of the “should” of the call of conscience.
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Mdglichkeiten. ’ 17 The essential negativity of guilt belongs to the existentiell level of 
projection.
The relation of existentiality to facticity within the individual project grounds the 
possibility of the guilt of Dasein. Dasein is guilty in so far as it fails to realise what it 
projects. But this claim needs to be qualified. Guilt is “Grundsew einer Nichtigkeit”. Failing 
to realise its project, Dasein is guilty in so far as it itself is the ground of its failure. Being the 
ground of its failure implies that Dasein “could have” realised its project, that is, that no 
circumstance in the world made the possibility an impossibility. Guilt concerns Dasein’s 
being as Seink&tmcn.
If the (ontic) being-guilty of Dasein is grounded in the relation of existentiality to 
facticity within the structure of the individual projection, so is also too the conscience-call and 
the accompanying “should”. Conscience is not a call to authentic being-guilty; conscience is 
a call to not being-guilty, that is, to the realisation of projections onto possibilities, which 
Dasein has chosen. 18 Only once understood in this way can sense be made of the “should” 
that determines the call of conscience. The structurality that determines the possibility of the 
“should” is the relation of existentiality to facticity within the individual projection. 
Existentiality is the projection onto a possibility of being; facticity is the finitude of this 
projection, its susceptibility to failure. The “should” concerns this “failure”. Only where 
there is a projection can there be a failure; and only then where this projection is finite. The 
“should” always contains some explicit content. This content concerns the particular 
projection itself. The “should” therefore corresponds to the projection as such in so far as it is 
endangered by facticity. If existentiality were infinite, there would be no “should” only a 
“will”. Kant had seen this already: his categorical imperative determines what a finite or 
imperfecly rational being “ought” to do, and therefore what an infinite or perfectly rational 
being -  that is, a holy or divine being -  “would” do.19 Only within the structure of a factical 
existential projection can there be something like an ontologically founded “should”.
For Heidegger, conscience is essentially disclosive. For him, the call of conscience is 
no more than the disclosure of the Befindlichkeit of Angst. As such, conscience is the 
disclosure of the truth of the being of Dasein -  as thrown projection -  and thereby of the 
possibility of its authentic mode of being. As we have now seen, however, such a conception 
of conscience not only misses the phenomenological facts; it leaves the phenomenon
17 Sein und Zeit, p. 285
18 The account of conscience developed here avoids the charge levelled by Mulhall against Heidegger’s 
conception and the related objection we articulated earlier. It is easily explicable how conscience calls 
when it is understood as simply the structurality of factical projection. Not embedded in an 
authenticity-inauthenticity dichotomy, conscience does not get covered over; rather, it is simply 
initialised structurally in the factical failure of existentiality.
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essentially unexplained. Nevertheless, conscience -  at least in so far as we conceive it as a 
call -  must be disclosive of something. Given our analysis of guilt, we can see that rather 
than conscience being disclosive of the truth of Dasein’s being, it is disclosive of the chosen 
individual ontic projection onto the possibility of being that at any time determines Dasein 
existentielly. This does not make conscience on our account a phenomenon with a purely 
ontic explanation; in so far as conscience concerns the fundamental relation of existentiality 
to facticity, it is to be understood ontologically.
But, one might object, don’t conscience and guilt have ultimately to do with 
morality? If we are going to talk about conscience and guilt at the ontic level, what sense 
does this make outside of some sort of ethical framework? Whilst many contemporary 
writers identify “ethics” with “being-with-others”, this is an identification not made by many 
of the great ethicists of the Western tradition. If one understands the most basic ethical 
question as “How should I live?” rather than “How should I live with others?”, where the 
latter question is subsumed into the former, then our claims concerning conscience and guilt 
are able to be understood as ethical claims. Heidegger himself was asked on occasion why he 
never wrote “an ethics” .20 His reply would point out that the question is mis-guided: he was 
concerned with fundamental ontology, which comes before any ethics. However there seems 
to be no reason why ethics, if one is to take it in its broadest signification -  indeed, in its 
inceptual signification -, should necessarily be an ontic endeavour. In a very important sense 
Sein und Zeit already constitutes an ethics and not merely the ontological groundwork for one. 
It constitutes an ontological-existential ethics of authenticity, of the essential relation to the 
truth of being as the essentiality of human life. As Heidegger writes: 'Soil nun gemgfi der 
Grundbedeutung des Wortes Jjdos der Name Ethik dies sagen, daB sie den Aufenthalt des 
Menschen bedenkt, dann ist dasjenige Denken das die Wahrheit des Seins als das anf&ngliche 
Element des Menschen als eines eksistierenden denkt, in sich schon die urspriingliche 
Ethik. ’21
At this point we might return to deconstruct Heidegger’s account of the origin of the 
“should” of the call of conscience in the light of our own account. Heidegger’s thought is that 
Dasein’s concern for its being as a whole is sufficient to ground something like the pivotal 
“should” between the modes of being of authenticity and inauthenticity. We can see now in 
what sense this is the case: if Dasein projects itself onto a possibility of being a whole -  a 
career, an ethical principle, etc -  then such a projection, like any other projection, will
19 ‘Therefore no imperatives hold for the divine will, and in general for a holy will; the ought is here 
out of place, because the would is already of itself necessarily in agreement with the [moral] law.’ 
Grounding for the Metaphysics of morals, 414
20 Cf. Brief iiber den Humanismus, Wegmarken, pp. 353 jf.
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structurally ground a “should”, and this “should” will, in at least one respect, concern the 
possibility of authenticity as against inauthenticity in that it will be essentially related to the 
mortality of Dasein. But -  and this is what Heidegger misses the projection must already 
be made for the “should” to be grounded. Heidegger has argued that inauthentic Dasein does 
not expressly exist as being towards death. Thus inauthentic Dasein does not concern itself 
with its being as a whole. Why then should it concern itself with pulling its self back together 
out of its dispersion in das Man? It seems that Heidegger's view implies paradoxically that 
conscience has always already been understood before it has been heard, that is, understood. 
And this is tantamount to saying that Heidegger leaves the phenomenon of conscience 
unexplained.
21 Brief iiber den Humanismus, Wegmarken, p. 356 Haar insists (cf. p. 90, The Song of the Earth) that 
Heidegger’s reflections on how it is possible to live authentically within a technological world most 
certainly amount to an ethics.
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Chapter 14:
Resoluteness
We do not wish to deny Heidegger’s claim that conscience is a call to resoluteness; 
but we understand and explicate these phenomena in a contrastive way. Conscience is the 
structural call of existentiality and facticity. Resoluteness, it may be expected, must also 
concern the structurality of existentiality and facticity.
Projection within the factical world is always subject to possible failure. The ground 
of any such failure can lie with factors in the world over which Dasein has no influence, that 
means, for which Dasein bears no existential responsibility. It can also lie with Dasein itself, 
particularly in so far as Dasein is determined by Befindlichkeit and, perhaps most importantly 
of all, by a body -  which can tire, become ill, etc. Dasein itself can be the ground of the 
failure of its projections. The dividing line here is, of course, for essential reasons, not clearly 
defined and will, in any particular case, and on the basis of all manner of factors, be subject to 
interpretation. But it is not important to present here criteria of definition or such like, were 
that possible; for our purposes suffices merely the recognition that the two states of affairs are 
both conceivable.
Resoluteness is to be understood in terms of Dasein's accomplishment, or better, 
realisation of its project in the face of factors over which it has influence -  for which it bears 
existential responsibility -  and which are potential grounds of the failure of its project. Such 
resoluteness is demanded by the call of conscience. Conscience is the structural call of 
existentiality and facticity; it has to do with the interrelation of the bifold configuration of 
existentiality and facticity. Central to the understanding of this call is the notion of guilt -  
Grundsein einer Nichtigkeit. The Nichtigkeit here is the failure of the existential projection. 
Such failure is necessarily rooted in the facticity that determines existentiality, the finitude 
that determines projection. Dasein is guilty in so far as it is the ground of the failure of its 
existential projection. Conscience, as a call to not being guilty, is thus a call to resoluteness, 
as the determination of the existentiality of Dasein whereby Dasein does not, to put it in the
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vernacular, “give in” to its facticity, does not surrender its projection to its finitude, but is the 
ground of the realisation of its projection.
We saw that Heidegger defined resoluteness as a mode of disclosure {Ent- 
schlossenheitl); namely, that mode of disclosure in which the essence of Dasein’s being as 
Sorge, as factical existence lost in das Man, is revealed to Dasein. Such disclosure, we are 
told, has within it the essential tendency to concern itself with the utmost possibility of the 
non-being of Dasein, of its death, and thus the essential tendency to Vorlaufen towards death. 
The disclosure of resoluteness, essentially tending to authentic being towards death, is thus, 
for Heidegger, the disclosure of the truth of being as such. In contrast to this claim we 
maintain that resoluteness is not the disclosure of the truth of being as such. But it is, 
nevertheless, a mode of disclosure.
If resoluteness is to be understood in terms of the relation of existentiality and 
facticity within a particular project, it amounts, as a form of projective understanding, to a 
mode of the disclosure of that project. Resoluteness is thus a mode of die disclosure of 
particular, that is, individual projects. It is not the disclosure of factical existence as such; it is 
rather merely the disclosure of the particular facticity as Geworfenheit and the particular 
existentiality as projection [Ent-wurf] that together determine a particular project as such.
The ontological constitution of Dasein is Sorge, the structural configuration of 
existentiality, facticity and Verfallen. Resoluteness and conscience concern the relation that 
holds between existentiality and facticity, that is, are essential determinations of this relation 
which pertains at Dasein ’s structural nucleus. The call of conscience is grounded structurally 
by the relating of existentiality to facticity; it is a call to resoluteness. Therefore resoluteness 
defines what we are entided to call the essential relation of existentiality and facticity. Just as 
for Heidegger as for us, conscience is a call to essentiality, to the essentiality of the relation of 
existentiality and facticity. But the structural relation of existentiality and facticity forms the 
ontological constitution of Dasein. Thus conscience is the call to the essentiality o f Dasein; 
that is, the call calling Dasein to exist according to its essence. This essentiality is to be 
understood as resoluteness.
In all of this we agree with Heidegger, only we understand conscience and 
resoluteness -  thus the call to essentiality and this essentiality itself -  differendy. Crucially,
1 The prefix “ent-u in German can either negate the word it prefixes (as in ent-decken) or imply an 
intensification. Charles E. Scott claims, in an article concerning the question of ethics in Heidegger’s 
thought (Chapter 10 of Heidegger toward the Turn, ed. Risser), that this ambiguity allows Heidegger to 
change the meaning of Entschlossenheit from “closure” to openness. In fact this is false, since the 
original meaning of Entschliefien was Aufschliefien, to unlock. We can see this in the English 
resoluteness too, which comes from the Latin resolutus, past participle of resolvere, to unbind, loosen, 
open. However, the phenomenology of the matter in question could lead one to emphasise either 
meaning. If one is resolute no doubt one closes off all possibilities other than that resolved upon, but 
on the other hand one no doubt therefore also opens up that possibility, or opens oneself up for it, 
unlocks it for existential projection.
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for us, conscience and resoluteness are not to be defined on the horizon of the distinction 
between authenticity and inauthenticity as the two fundamental modes of existence. For 
Heidegger, resoluteness is the essential determination of authenticity, of Dasein existing as its 
self. For him, Dasein is structurally determined ontologically such that, initially and for the 
most part, it exists in the mode of inauthenticity, absorbed among inner-worldly beings, lost 
to the self of das Man. This, it must be remembered, belongs to its determination as original 
temporality. Verfallen -  the ground of inauthenticity -  corresponds to the temporal ecstasy of 
the present. Temporality can, of course, also be authentic; but this amounts merely to a 
modification of the Verfallen which Dasein always already is, not to its jettisoning or 
overcoming. The authentic present is, as we have seen, the Augenblick. It discloses the 
(inner-worldly) Situation. We want to say that Dasein can be equally resolute in the mode of 
being of inauthenticity. For resoluteness has to do merely with the structure of the individual 
projection, not with whether that projection is a projection onto Dasein's own-most possibility 
or not. This is not to say that in general Dasein will be resolute in the mode of being of 
inauthenticity; only that there is in principle this possibility. No doubt, if we accept 
Heidegger’s analyses in this respect, Dasein is likely to project resolutely onto its own-most 
possibility precisely because it understands this possibility as such and it is concerned about 
its being, and thus in general authenticity and resoluteness will tend to come together. But 
this is no necessity of the ontological constitution of Dasein. Dasein can equally well project 
irresolutely in the mode of being of authenticity. This is possible because resoluteness does 
not have to do with the disclosure of Dasein’s finite being as such, but rather with the 
disclosure of the individual project. Inauthentic projection can be resolute; authentic 
projection can be irresolute.
That this is in fact the case can be made transparently clear by illustration. My own- 
most possibility of being -  or one of my own-most possibilities of being -  might, for 
example, expressly concern my physical fitness. Despite this possibility being understood as 
such and being expressly projected upon in the light of my finite existence, I can still fail to 
remain as physically fit as I want to, purely out of laziness, that is, out of grounds that are, in 
the last instance, determined by me. Equally, I can project myself resolutely onto a 
possibility of being determined by the self of das Man: that of winning a running race in order 
to impress friends could be an example.
From this perspective our internal critique of Heidegger’s philosophy can be 
understood as an attack on the thought that authenticity, as the disclosure of finite existence as 
such, is the determination of the essence of Dasein. The essence, or rather, the essentiality of 
Dasein, does consist in its resoluteness -  that is necessary given the structure of its 
ontological constitution -, but resoluteness does not map directly onto an authentic mode of 
being, and this is because it is not ontologically grounded in an authentic mode of being.
171
Having said this, however, it might be argued that in so far as Dasein's being is 
essentially determined by Verfallen, any sort o f existentiell projection in the mode o f being o f 
authenticity is impossible. Disclosure in the mode of being of authenticity is determined by 
the basic Befindlichkeit of Angst. In the Befindlichkeit of Angst, world is disclosed -  
understood -  as being without Bedeutsamkeit, that is, as meaningless. Heidegger writes:
Das Wovor der Angst ist kein innerweltliches Seiendes. Daher kann es damit wesenhaft keine 
Bewandtnis haben.. Das Wovor der Angst ist vollig unbestimmt. Diese Unbestimmtheit lfiBt nicht nur 
faktisch unentschieden, welches innerweltliche Seiende droht, sondem besagt, daB iiberhaupt das 
innerweltliche Seiende nicht “relevant” ist. Nichts von dem, was innerhalb der Welt zuhanden und 
vorhanden ist, fungiert als das, wovor die Angst sich angstet. Die innerweltlich entdeckte 
Bewandtnisganzheit des Zuhandenen und Vorhandenen ist als solche iiberhaupt ohne Belang. Sie sinkt 
in sich zusammen. Die Welt hat den Charakter vOlliger Unbedeutsamkeit.2
If the world is without meaning, Dasein is without projective understanding onto a 
possibility of its being. If the disclosure of the mode of being of authenticity is determined by 
the Befindlichkeit of Angst, therefore, it is unclear how Dasein could project at all in this 
mode of being, let alone project resolutely.3 That the world is meaningless precisely implies 
that Dasein does not project, since projection, for Heidegger, is what founds and structures 
meaning. Projection is just the meaning-structure of the world. Meaning is always in relation 
to a for-the-sake-of-which. The projected possibility of the being of Dasein structures the 
world in terms of Bewandtnis relations. This is what Heidegger intends by characterising the 
existential of understanding as projective. In the absence of meaning, there is no projection. 
But in the absence of projection, there is certainly no resolute projection.
Verfallen is the flight of Angst, we have been told; is grounded by Angst. Dasein 
flees the uncanny disclosure of its being into the familiarity of the world. As such, Verfallen 
is itself the ground o f the structure o f the world as Bedeutsamkeit. It is therefore also the 
ground of the understanding of Dasein, of Dasein’s existential projection. Ultimately, it is die 
ground of the determination of Dasein as being-w-the-world. It is also the existential 
corresponding to the temporal ecstasy of the present. The mode of being of authenticity, then, 
can, it would seem, no less be determined by Verfallen than the mode of being of 
inauthenticity. As we cited above, ‘die eigentliche Existenz [ist] nichts, was iiber der 
verfallenden Alltaglichkeit schwebt, sondem existenzial nur ein modifiziertes Ergreifen
2 Sein und Zeit, p. 186
3 A point also noted by Michel Haar in his Heidegger and the Essence of Man (pp. 24 and 49-50), 
where the solution is to claim that the loss of meaning only affects the self das Man. This flatly 
contradicts the texts. Loss of meaning is integral to the Befindlichkeit of Angst, only on this basis can it 
be supposed to function as the disclosure of the truth of being.
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dieser. ’4 Our complaint would then be that therefore it cannot be based upon the uncanny 
disclosure of Angst.
Of course, Heidegger recognises that authentic projection cannot be detached from 
the world. He writes for example:
Die Entschlossenheit ldst als eigentliches Selbstsein das Dasein nicht von seiner Welt ab, 
isoliert es nicht auf ein freischwebendes Ich. Wie sollte sie das auch -  wo sie doch als eigentliche 
Erschlossenheit nichts anderes als das In-der-Welt-sein eigentlich ist. Die Entschlossenheit bringt das 
Selbst gerade in das jeweilige besorgende Sein bei Zuhandenem und stoBt es in das fiirsorgende 
Mitsein mit den Anderen.5
And:
Auch der EntschluB bleibt auf das Man und seine Welt angewiesen. Das zu verstehen, gehort 
mit zu dem, was er erschlieBt, sofem die Entschlossenheit erst dem Dasein die eigentliche 
Durchsichtigkeit gibt. In der Entschlossenheit geht es dem Dasein um sein eigenstes Seinkonnen, 
das als geworfenes nur auf bestimmte faktische Moglichkeiten sich entwerfen kann. Der entschluB 
entzieht sich nicht der “Wirklichkeit”, sondem entdeckt erst das faktisch MOgliche, so zwar, daB er 
es dergestalt, wie es als eigenstes Seinkonnen im Man moglich ist, ergreift.6
If we accept that the authentic mode of disclosure is determined by the Befindlichkeit 
of Angst, which uncovers the world as ultimately without existentiell meaning, these remarks 
would appear incoherent.
What we have touched on here is in fact a network of problems at the heart of 
Heidegger’s distinction between the authentic and the inauthentic modes of being. Given that 
Dasein’s being is ontologically determined by an absorption in the world, which itself 
delineates its basic structure as temporality, it is hard to see in what sense the authentic mode 
of being can amount to the disclosure of the truth of Dasein’s factical existence to itself. 
Essentially determined as Verfallen, how can Dasein retreat the necessary distance for the 
world as such to come into view? And if it can, hasn’t it then shed all its existentiality, that is, 
its projective understanding? In any case, the possibility of resoluteness, the essentiality of 
the ontological constitution of Dasein as Sorge, the structural unity of existence, facticity and 
Verfallen, does not rest on the disclosure of die truth of the being of Dasein.
Now, this implies that there is no claim [Anspruch], no demand [Forderung], 
grounded in the ontological structure of Dasein, calling Dasein to an essential relation to the
4 Sein und Zeit, p. 179 My italics.
5 Sein und Zeit, p. 298
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truth of being, where this essential relation is to be conceived in terms of the disclosure of the 
truth of being, of the thinking or Besinnung of the truth of being, of the unconcealment of the 
truth of being. If resoluteness, as the essentiality of the being of Dasein, is to be conceived as 
a relation to being -  and we will leave this thought out of focus -, then it is not to be 
conceived as a relation of disclosure, i. e. it is not to be conceived as a relation to the truth of 
being. Lacking express disclosure of the truth of being, Dasein can nevertheless resolve. 
Such resolution can be understood as a mode of disclosure, but only as a mode of disclosure 
of a particular project. Resoluteness concerns the way in which an individual project is 
understood.
Closely related to the disclosure of the truth of being is, however, for Heidegger, the 
existential phenomenon of death. We have seen the sense in which this is the case. We have 
also seen the way in which he associates resoluteness with authentic being towards death. 
Resoluteness is only authentically and completely what it is in so far as it is Vorlaufen 
towards death and therefore holds the tendency to authentic being towards death within itself: 
‘Die Entschlossenheit wird eigentlich das, was sie sein kann, als verstehendes Sein zum Ende, 
d. h. als Vorlaufen in den Tod. Die Entschlossenheit “hat” nicht lediglich einen 
Zusammenhang mit dem Vorlaufen als einem anderen ihrer selbst. Sie birgt das eigentliche 
Sein zum Tode in sich als die mdgliche existenzielle Modalitdt ihrer eigenen Eigentlichkeit. 
Crucially, this implies that die call of conscience is not merely to be understood as a call to 
authenticity, but also as a call to Vorlaufen towards death. ‘Das Vorlaufen “ist” nicht als 
freischwebende Verhaltung, sondem mufl begriffen werden als die in der existenziell 
bezeugten Entschlossenheit verborgene und sonach mitbezeugte Mdglichkeit ihrer 
Eigentlichkeit. Das eigentliche “Denken an den Tod” ist das existenziell sich durchsichtig 
gewordene Gewissen-haben-wollen. ’8 And thus the call of conscience is to be understood as 
a call to an essential disclosive relation to the truth of being.
In chapter 12 we oudined the grounds of the connection that Heidegger draws 
between death and resoluteness. In denying that resoluteness is the disclosure of the truth of 
being it is incumbent upon us to sever this connection. For us, resoluteness does not stand in 
the relation to death that Heidegger advocates.
Heidegger argues that resoluteness is essentially the projection onto a constant being- 
guilty, which, implying an “until the end” of Dasein, is thus to be understood as tending to 
Vorlaufen towards death, and that this is so in so far as resoluteness is the disclosive 
understanding of the truth of Dasein’s finite existence. On our analysis, in contrast, 
resoluteness is merely the disclosive understanding of the particular possibility onto which
6 Sein und Zeit, p. 299
7 Sein und Zeit, p. 305
8 Sein und Zeit, p. 309
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Dasein has resolutely projected itself, whether this is grounded in the disclosure of the truth 
of existence or not. For this account resolute projection can only be conceived as a projection 
upon an “until the end” if this is envisaged in terms of the individual project, rather than in 
terms of Dasein's existence as such. In fact, resoluteness is certainly a projection “until the 
end” -  and Heidegger has seen something essential here -, but this end is not the end of 
Dasein itself; it is merely the end of the particular project onto which Dasein has resolutely 
projected -  that is, its realisation.
Heidegger also argues that since resoluteness is authentic projection upon being- 
guilty and since authentic projection is essentially determined by Vorlaufen towards death as 
the utmost possibility of Dasein, the resolute projection upon being-guilty must be qualified 
as Vorlaufen towards death. However, is it the case that resoluteness is a projection upon 
being-guilty? As we have seen, guilt is not to be conceived as an ontological determination of 
Dasein if indeed it is to be distinguished from responsibility or freedom. The guilt involved 
in Dasein’s resolute projection concerns, rather, merely the possibility of die failure of the 
particular projection. Resoluteness is not a projection upon being-guilty but upon a particular 
factical possibility of the being of Dasein, and this projection can be determined as either 
authentic or inauthentic.
Heidegger further argues that it is only with the possibility of death, the possibility of 
the non-being of Dasein, that the non-being, the nothingness that is the essence of Dasein’s 
being as being-guilty is revealed for what it is. Dasein could then only fully understandingly 
project itself upon its being-guilty, that is, resolve, in so far as it is Vorlaufen towards death. 
But, on the one hand, as we have just pointed out, resoluteness is not to be conceived as a 
projection upon being-guilty, and on the other, the nothingness that concerns guilt, the 
possibility of the failure of a particular projection, is essentially different from the 
nothingness of being towards death as the possible non-being of Dasein. There is no reason 
to suppose that the nothingness of the individual factical project, which is after all only to be 
determined as nothingness relative to the realisation of the individual factical project, is only 
revealed for what it is in the light of the absolute nothingness of the non-being of Dasein in 
death.
In terms of its existential structure death is to be conceived as “die eigenste, 
unbeziigliche, uniiberholbare Mdglichkeit’ which is certain but nevertheless indeterminate. 
We have seen Heidegger claim that resoluteness tends to authentic being towards death in so 
far as it correlates with this structure of the possibility of death. We can now show how this 
is not the case. Resoluteness does not concern the individuation of Dasein out of the self of 
das Man, since the call of conscience, as the call to resoluteness, is not the call to authenticity, 
but merely to the resolute projection upon a factical possibility. It does not therefore 
correspond to the “own-most”, “non-relational” possibility of death. However, whilst the call
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of conscience does not disclose an ontological being-guilty of Dasein, and therefore, at the 
same time its un-by-passability, as Heidegger claims, it does disclose the un-by-passability of 
the demand that the call of conscience places on the factical existentiality of Dasein. But this 
is not enough to ground any significant correlation with the existential structure of the 
possibility of death.
As far as certainty and indeterminacy are concerned, in so far as they characterise the 
possibility of death, any parallel to resolute projection can be dismissed straightway, since, on 
the one hand, the certainty of the possibility of death, the certainty that Dasein will die, is not 
at all the same as the possible existential certainty of Dasein's existentiell projection, the 
certainty that it has projected itself upon the “right” possibility, and, on the other hand, the 
indeterminacy of the possibility of death, the indeterminacy of when Dasein will die, is not at 
all the same as the basic indeterminacy of the existentiell projection of Dasein, the 
indeterminacy of what Dasein is to project upon, contrary to what Heidegger claims.
Resoluteness does not stand in the particular essential connection to the possibility of 
death which Heidegger advocates. By Heidegger’s lights, this implies that it does not stand in 
essential relation to the truth of being.9
Now it could be argued that symptomatic of Heidegger’s mis-construal of 
resoluteness is his failure to adequately incorporate corporeality into his ontology. 10 This is a 
delicate point that needs to be treated carefully and we have little space to do that here. 
Whilst Heidegger admits that Dasein is corporeal, the meaning and implications of this issue 
are nowhere pursued. 11 In what sense is Dasein corporeal?
9 One might claim that in so far as we deny the intrinsic relation of resoluteness to the possibility of 
death we make inexplicable how resoluteness can determine ontic projections, for, is it not requisite for 
ontic projections to matter, that is, be resolved upon, that they stand in the light, so to speak, of death? 
We deny this last dependency: for ontic projections to matter requires only that they be projected upon. 
Mattering is intrinsic to projection, that is, existentiality; there cannot be projection in the absence of 
mattering; but nevertheless there is projection in the absence of disclosure of the existential possibility 
of death. It may be true that projection upon a particular project concerning the whole life-time of the 
individual will be made in the light of this possibility, but this would be merely a special case. There 
are no grounds for generalisation from this particular instance to all projection as such. Mattering 
comes essentially independently of the possibility of death.
10 For further discussion of this oft-raised issue see in particular Michel Haar’s examination in The 
Song of the Earth; also: Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception, Part 1; Jean-Paul 
Sartre’s Being and Nothingness, Part 3, Chapter 2. The relation of Sartrean freedom to the concept of 
resoluteness is especially problematic, something which causes Sartre’s theory to effectively unravel. 1 
have discussed this issue elsewhere (Will-power in Sartre's Theory of Freedom, UCLA Undergraduate 
Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 1).
This issue is also closely related to Heidegger’s rejection of what one might call the animality 
of mankind. Is it really acceptable to purge corporeal mankind of his animality to the extent that he 
becomes separated from animals by an “abyss of essence”? Is mankind really closer to the gods? 
Caputo brings this objection out well in his Demythologizing Heidegger, pp. 1 22 ff. For him it is a 
question of discrimination against the animal (amongst other things). See also Derrida’s Of Spirit, 
Chapter 6 .
11 See, for example, Sein und Zeit, p. 108 where Heidegger notes that the corporeality of Dasein points 
to problematics with which he is not concerned.
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Dasein is never a mere body of the mode of being of Vorhandenheit.12 Its 
corporeality is wholly determined by existentiality. To use Sartre’s phrase, Dasein exists its 
body. But Dasein is the structurality that first makes disclosure possible. The body is 
implicated in this structurality, not only as the site of disclosure, its locality, and also not 
simply -  in so far as disclosure is always spatial -  as the determination of its perspective; it is 
also, of course, the seat of our sensory being-in-the-world. Levinas complains that Dasein 
doesn’t have any eyes. We might also query whether Dasein is genuinely capable of pain. Or 
perhaps of fatigue. Indeed, we might finally ask whether Dasein is actually capable of living, 
of being alive? -  Would not this bear on its essential determination of the possibility of death? 
For Heidegger does not treat these determinations; they play no role in his existential analysis. 
This would apparently be because he does not, in the last analysis, consider the body to be an 
existential.—
However, corporeality seems to be the primary expression of Dasein's facticity. 13 
Whilst the body is the vehicle of all action, of all existentiality, it is also its primary 
limitation. The body hurts, gets tired, ill, broken. It is perhaps the most basic dimension of 
Dasein's Befindlichkeit. But in so far as disclosure is only possible within the structurality of 
the relation of existentiality to facticity, corporeality must function as a condition of 
possibility of disclosure, and must surely therefore be categorised as an existential.
12 Despite being so etymologically concerned, Heidegger does not pursue the obvious corporeal 
associations of his central twin categories Zuhandenheit and Vorhandenheit. Given that the latter at 
least is, so we are told, the basic determination of the metaphysical understanding of being, is its 
connection to “Hand' not of the utmost importance? Does it not ground the idea that Dasein's 
engagement in the world is determined wholly by its corporeality? In so far as beings show up only 
within structures of usefulness, and usefulness stands in much more than an etymological connection to 
corporeality, does it not ground the claim that beings can be disclosed for Dasein only in so far as 
Dasein is bodily? As a condition of the possibility of disclosure, the body would surely then have to be 
conceived as an existential.—
(But note this passage about hands: ‘ Allein das Wesen der Hand l&Bt sich nie als ein leibliches 
Greiforgan bestimmen oder von diesem her erklaren. Greiforgane besitzt z. B. der Affe, aber er hat 
keine Hand. Die Hand ist von alien Greiforganen: Tatzen, Krallen, Fangen, unendlich, d. h. durch 
einen Abgrund des Wesens verschieden. Nur ein Wesen, das spricht, d. h. denkt, kann die Hand haben 
und in der Handhabung Werke der Hand vollbringen. ’ [ Was Heifit Denken?, p. 51 ]
13 With this claim we are at odds with Haar’s conclusion. He claims that: ‘The body is nothing but one 
manifestation among others of facticity or Geworfenheit, “thrownness”.’ [The Song of the Earth, p. 
36] But is it not rather the case that the body is, as it were, the very embodiment of facticity? 
Existentiality and facticity stand in relation to one another in the same way as the traditional categories 
of soul and body, freedom and nature (the latter dichotomy providing the title for an important book 
from Paul Ricoeur on precisely this issue). The body is the locus, the gathering point of facticity, as 
the channel of existentiality. Haar also claims that ‘transcendence like the other existentials such as 
attunement (Stimmung) and “thrownness” (Geworfenheit) -  both permeated with transcendence -  are 
structures more original than the body.' [The Song of the Earth, p. 35] What “more original” might 
mean in this context is unclear. Transcendence, the opening up of the world, ek-sistence, after all 
clearly has corporeality as its locus in that Dasein can only occupy a “position” in the world at all in so 
far as it is a body. Must not corporeality at least be equi-primordial [gleichurspriinglich] with 
transcendence? Is it going too far to say that the body is what makes existentiality and facticity 
possible in the first place?
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In so far as resoluteness denotes the essentiality of this structural relation, however, it 
must fundamentally implicate bodily being. Indeed, corporeality grounds the possibility of 
something like resolute existentiality in so far as projection is fundamentally and primarily 
limited by the finitude of the body. This is perhaps most clearly seen in the context of the 
existentiality of athletics, which is precisely to be determined in terms of the basic project of 
minimising corporeal limitation. 14 In so far as corporeality is basic to the proper 
thematisation of resoluteness we are justified in pointing out that Heidegger’s hiatus stands in 
direct correlation with his misrepresentation of the phenomenon of resoluteness.
To end this chapter we wish to draw attention to one of the more significant 
consequences of the conception of resoluteness that we have here outlined. We noted in the 
last chapter that conscience and guilt are usually understood to have a moral application, and 
we suggested that even their role within the existential analysis of fundamental ontology can 
be understood to be an ethical one -  as long as “ethical” here is understood in sufficient 
breadth. But conscience and guilt, we saw, receive their sense in relation to projection, in 
relation to resoluteness. Can resoluteness also be understood ethically?
Implicated in the phenomena of conscience and guilt, resoluteness is at least to be 
understood normatively. Resoluteness is demanded by the structures that make resoluteness 
possible. Indeed, as the normativity attaching to the structures which themselves constitute 
the arena within which something like normativity is first possible, the norm of resoluteness 
undercuts every other form of normativity, that is, every other moral imperative, whether that 
be of universalisation, of utility, or of the infinite “height” of the “Other”. Since resoluteness 
is demanded by the structures that first constitute the moral agent, the moral agent is always 
in the first place bound to this demand before any other normative principle -  
universalisation, for example -  can get a normative grip, so to speak. The relationship to 
Kant’s thinking is interesting since Kant too understood that normativity must be constituted 
by the structures that comprise the moral agent. In the demand for resoluteness, however, 
there is no further demand for universalisation or treating others as ends in themselves; that is, 
there is no implicated demand of reason. This connection to Kant’s moral theory is pursued 
further in the following chapter.
It cannot be denied that understanding normativity in this way leads to an extreme 
form of relativism: every normative demand -  at least at the existential level -  is constituted 
relative to the particular projection of the individual. Importantly, though, this is not to say
14 That the phenomenon of sport has yet to become an important theme of social theory let alone of the 
central areas of contemporary philosophy is lacunar, especially when one considers that arguably sport 
-  at least in the modem sense -  was developed by the Greeks at the very beginning of Western history. 
That sport, and the related concept of competition, was of such importance to Greek culture is, of 
course, no arbitrary fact. Sport belonged essentially to the Greek world, as Heidegger might have 
expressed it.
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that there is no existential normativity at all. If we want to understand ethics in general in this 
way then norms of inter-subjectivity will have to be grounded on this basic form of 
normativity, which means that deeds involving others will only be ethically evaluable in 
terms of the individual’s particular projection. Such a radical relativism constitutes the basis 
of no argument against the conception of existentiality developed here; indeed, it could just as 
well count to its favour given the apparent absence within our globalised society of a 
concurrence of normative demands at a general level.
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Chapter 15: 
Deciding the Destiny of Historical Humanity
The aim of our final chapter is to draw out the consequences of our critique of the 
existential analysis, both for Heidegger’s philosophy as a whole and more generally. We 
have shown how Heidegger’s philosophy revolves around, and is premised upon, an onto- 
normativity,; a normativity that pertains just in so far as the structures of being pertain, a 
normativity that pertains to die structures of being themselves. We have seen what colossal 
weight Heidegger lays to rest on this onto-normativity: the essence of historical mankind as 
such. And thus we have glimpsed the vertiginous depth and the massive scale of Heidegger’s 
philosophical motivation. But we have also seen how, by its own lights, Heidegger’s attempt 
to ground this onto-normativity falters. Disclosure of the truth of being cannot be the 
ontological imperative; rather, the demand of being stretches only so far as the particular 
existential projection. The force of this demand is thereby not at all lost; only its claim is 
concentrated, focused; its extent is contracted.
It might be wondered whether we are entitled to use the term “normativity” within 
this context? We can do so only by analogy. An onto-normativity is not at all the same as 
what has been traditionally understood as an ethical normativity. We do not want to say that 
it has to do with the moral categories of good-bad/evil, right-wrong, even though it may, upon 
further analysis, form the ground for an ethical investigation. Nor is it at all the same as any 
normativity of political law or any other preceptive dimension. But nevertheless a demand, a 
claim, we might even say an order, pertains to it in a way analogous to that considered to 
pertain to mere ethical or political normativity. Of course, it functions at a deeper level than 
these. For its ground is the abyss, the Ab-grund, the groundlessness that is being itself. Its 
claim, then, is ultimate, final, absolute. His own ontological constitution stands as a legislator 
over mankind.
1 Zimmerman calls it a “cosmic obligation”. Eclipse of the Self, p. xxx
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In the foregoing exposition we have sometimes run together three semantically 
different claims of Heidegger’s: firstly, the claim that the demand of being concerns the 
essence, or, better, the essentiality of historical mankind; secondly, the claim that it concerns 
the disclosure of the truth of being; thirdly, the claim that it concerns the essential relation to 
being as such in its truth. Of course, these three claims amount to the same for Heidegger. 
To exist in essential relation to the truth of being, to exist as the guardian, the shepherd of 
being, amounts simply to die disclosure -  grounded in Sorge -  of being as such. And the 
essentiality of historical mankind consists, for Heidegger, precisely in this essential relation to 
the truth of being. We, of course, wish to deny the claim that being demands a disclosive 
relation to its truth on the part of mankind. The structurality of the relation of man and being 
that Heidegger outlines as his analysis of Dasein, the site wherein that relation subsists, does 
not ground such a claim. Nevertheless, we do not wish to deny that the demand of being is 
precisely a call to esse-nce. Ontological normativity is tautologically the demand to exist 
within essentiality. Essentiality, that is, being within essence, could not amount to something 
other than that which an onto-normativity demands. Resoluteness is the essentiality of the 
structures of existence.
We shall now proceed to outline the consequences of our objection. In so far as it is 
taken as an objection constituted internally to Heidegger’s philosophy such consequences will 
concern only that philosophy itself. But our claims can also be conceded beyond the horizon 
of Heidegger’s thinking and their repercussions will accordingly be of wider import. We 
should report, however, that we do not take ourselves to have tilled enough philosophical 
ground around Heidegger’s edifice to legitimate an external reading. Nevertheless, were such 
a reading legitimated, its consequences would be found interesting.
In die first place: what is to become of the history of being? The crucial concepts of 
the danger, of the need, and thus of the other beginning are without foundation in the absence 
of an onto-normative demand for the disclosure of the truth of being. For the danger threatens 
the essence of mankind only in so far as it is his essence to exist in disclosive relation to being 
as such. Accordingly, the need amounts to no need at all, no need of the essence of mankind. 
And on what basis can the other beginning be hoped for if there is no claim of being to 
inaugurate it? Technology, then, despite all its horrors and uncertainties, does not threaten the 
essence of man. -  Rather: mankind himself, and the environment in which he dwells, is all 
that the capacities of technology threaten. And we might think that that is dangerous enough! 
At least it is a danger more tangible; one about which something might actually be done; a 
danger that mankind himself can take responsibility for.
Further, the overcoming of metaphysics turns out to be unmotivated. In the absence 
of an onto-normative grounding, the turn away from metaphysical thinking beyond the limits 
of metaphysical language towards the mute Besinnung of Ereignis appears unjustified. If no
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grounds are presented for the wholesale abandonment of the conceptuality of metaphysics 
apart from those pertaining to a misconstrued essentiality of historical mankind then we are 
left with no incentive to take such a historical leap. But without the overcoming of 
metaphysics, without the other beginning, the bipartite structure of the history of being 
collapses. And apart from this structure, what ground is there to understand history as the 
history of being?—
History can only be justifiably understood as the history of being in so far as it is 
constituted by the movements of being, by the story [Geschichte] of being, by being’s 
withdrawal from, and eschatological return to, mankind. If there is no other beginning to 
hope for, no return of being, if being must always veil itself from man, if there is no 
dynamism to the relationship of man and being, no Seinsverlassenheit and therefore no 
Seinsvergessenheit, if the metaphysical epoch is the one unending epoch, then it is with no 
justification that we can describe history as the history of being. In this case, technological 
history is only attributable to man. Man alone is accountable. But that does not imply that 
there could be any alternative to such history if the structures of metaphysical thinking prove 
finally unassailable.2
2 This thought connects up with a number of interrelated objections, two of which we have mentioned 
before. In the first part we noted that Guzzoni points to an ambiguity within Heidegger’s philosophy of 
the history of being as to whether it is merely preparatory, and therefore provisional, or whether it is 
supposed to amount to the thinking of being as such, in which case the other beginning would seem to 
have already taken place. We have also seen that questions surround the possibility of a non­
metaphysical language capable of saying the truth of being; Heidegger seems to admit that saying the 
truth of being amounts to silence, a non-saying. These two points have to do with the basic question as 
to whether, by his own lights, Heidegger is able to think the truth of being at all. Two further forms of 
this worry are as follows. On the one hand, there is an existential version, to which we have also 
already alluded, that queries whether, if Dasein’s understanding is always projective onto possibilities 
of its being, an understanding of the truth of being is possible at all; for what sort of projection would it 
amount to? Heidegger apparently admits that in the Befindlichkeit of Angst, that Befindlichkeit which 
is supposed to accompany disclosure of the truth of being, all existential meaning -  and thus surely 
understanding -  dissolves. On the other hand, there is a hermeneutic version. Here the thought is that 
since Heidegger has given an account of the conditions of understanding which emphasises its essential 
facticity, situatedness, finitude, any ultimate claims about reality are ruled out from the start. But what 
is the thinking of the truth of being if not an ultimate claim about reality?
Considering these in reverse order, it is not difficult to see that the hermeneutic version 
assesses Heidegger according to the standard of truth as correctness, and therefore begs the question 
concerning metaphysical modes of thought. That understanding is always partial -  in both senses of 
the word -  does not mean that the truth of being is inaccessible, even if it does mean that some ultimate 
description of reality is impossible. For the truth of being concerns the truth of our Dasein, our 
existence, the essentiality of our being; Heidegger never thought that he was giving some sort of final 
description of how things actually are beyond our representations of them.
The existential version is not so easily dismissed. It is tied to the fact that Heidegger is unable 
to provide us with authentic existentiell directives for comportment. If all understanding is projective, 
then all understanding is, at one level, existentiell; but how can the disclosure of the truth of being be 
projective in this sense. Existentiality cannot be uprooted from the particularity of projection. This, of 
course, connects with the primary objection that we have developed. We take it to point to an 
ineradicable tension within Heidegger’s existentialism.
As to the linguistic version, this only amounts to an objection of inconsistency if one takes 
Heidegger to be giving a final account of the truth of being, rather than merely being suggestive, 
poetic, evocative. He always insisted, after all, that he was only unterwegs, on the way. The final
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Finally, what is to become of the raising of the question of being? According to 
Heidegger, we are to attribute historical necessity to such an undertaking, but only in so far as 
such necessity is onto-normatively grounded. In the absence of such grounding, the whole 
enterprise is philosophically unmotivated. But, of course, Heidegger’s entire philosophy 
understands itself as purely the raising of the question of being. The most significant task of 
Sein und Zeit, undoubtedly, was to demonstrate the onto-normative grounds for this world- 
historical event. But if no such grounding is possible then the whole venture proves arbitrary 
-  by its own lights. We take this to be a finally decisive objection against the entire 
Heideggerian enterprise. With his invocation of a more primordial truth Heidegger has even 
denied himself the normativity that pertains to correctness. Beyond the truth of metaphysical 
thinking there does not appear to be any arbiter for philosophy at all.
In the case of the existential analysis, the phenomenological investigation into the 
structure of being, the analytical concepts themselves to a certain extent survive despite the 
collapse of the architectonic within which they will perform such an important role. As the 
prolegomenon to the raising of the question of being, the existential analysis contains much 
that is, at least in principle, conceptually severable from that project. The conclusion that 
time is reducible to the temporality that constitutes existentiality, for example, might be 
thought to be a consequential philosophical result in its own right; as might the devolution of 
metaphysical categories such as the will and the understanding into existential structuralities. 
Nevertheless the significance with which Heidegger himself invests these outcomes is wholly 
enmeshed with the attempt to ground the basic project of raising the question of being and 
thus they cannot be simply plucked out of Heidegger’s texts without undergoing essential 
alteration.
In the first place, the substructural co-ordinating concept of Dasein can fulfil no 
function beyond the horizon of the question of being. For its meaning as the site of the
destination was, we may suppose, unreachable in principle. But a more important objection underlies 
this one. Is the truth of being even thinkable? Is there any way we can operate outside the boundaries 
of metaphysical thinking in such a way as to not be caught up in nonsense? How can we even be 
evocative where the subject-predicate schema is wholly divorced from the subject-object constellation? 
It is not, of course, as if Heidegger did not attempt to address these worries; only that any response he 
makes as to the possibility of non-metaphysical thinking, non-metaphysical discourse, if it is not 
straightway to be dismissed as nonsense, pre-supposes his conclusion.
Finally, as to Guzzoni’s charge of ambiguity within the philosophy of the history of being, it 
must be remembered that the supposed grounds of Heidegger’s thinking of the truth of being are 
apophatic; as Heidegger insists: the experience of Seinsvergessenheit, the forgottenness of being, is 
what grounds the project of raising the question of being, raising being to its truth. But there is nothing 
within the conceptuality of the history of being which would occlude such an experience of 
Seinsvergessenheit; indeed, Heidegger explicitly accounts for this possibility in so far as he shows that 
the danger of modem technology, that all that is become mere Bestand, precisely cultivates salvation as 
the coming to thinking of Seinsvergessenheit. We have also seen that Heidegger does not only assume 
to be preparatory for the Kehre; the raising of the question of being, as the overcoming of metaphysics, 
is the Kehre. We must avoid the temptation to conceive of this in purely chronological terms. That the 
Kehre has been initiated decides nothing as to the chronology of the end of technology.
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meeting point of being and man, taken as such, cannot function apart from the project of 
grounding the disclosure of being in its truth. The concept of Dasein, rigorously opposed to 
the subject-object dichotomy, is one essentially foreign to the conceptuality of metaphysical 
thinking and cannot be simply reinstated within a metaphysical horizon.
But what are we to make of Heidegger’s reconceptualisation of the essence of truth? 
Whilst he writes that: ‘Die Frage nach der Wesung der Wahrheit ist...die ursprunglich 
geschichtliche, Geschichte-grundende Frage’3, it remains nevertheless the case that 
Heidegger’s conception of truth can be made intelligible and indeed plausible beyond the 
horizon traced out by an onto-normative history. However, in the absence of such a history, 
the necessity of asking the question of truth, of putting truth up for interrogation, the necessity 
for endorsing a conception of truth other than that which grounds the history of the West as a 
technological discourse, falls away. After all, no grounds can be proposed for accepting one 
conception of truth over another without begging the question unless they are taken from 
beyond the purview of that conception itself, namely, from an alternative normativity. 
Consequently, whilst truth conceived as disclosure is not itself rendered untenable by the 
unraveling of Heidegger’s architectonic, nevertheless it is left, as it were, philosophically 
naked: unmotivated and defenseless.
The above are the most significant of the consequences our internal critique effects 
for Heidegger’s philosophy. Read externally, however, our critique has much broader 
ramifications. These can all be understood as consequences of the denial of any general onto- 
normativity; any onto-normativity with extension beyond the individual projection. In the 
first place, this rules out all onto-normative meta-narratives, to borrow a phrase from 
Lyotard.4 Not only does Heidegger’s history of being belong here, but also the Hegelian 
history of Geist, and perhaps Nietzsche’s historical discourse of the Ubermensch. Related to 
this point is die question of politics. We have delicately side-stepped the debate concerning 
Heidegger’s political involvement, to which we wish to provide no contribution. It can 
nevertheless be pointed out at this stage that the onto-normative dimension of the political 
would not survive our critique in any generalisable form.
In regard to ethics the issue is more complicated. Whilst not all of the ethical theories 
put forward in the course of the history of Western philosophy have any recognisable onto- 
normative dimension to them, some do. Kant’s ethical theory is one that might be thought to 
have such a dimension, in so far as it is, for him, an essential determination of man to be 
rational, the practical application of his reason being morality. The relation of our existential 
considerations to Kant’s theory is particularly illuminating:
3 Grundfragen der Philosophic, p. 201
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An objection commonly put against Kantian ethics is that it is entirely formulaic and 
therefore that its moral prescriptions are empty. There are various different versions of this 
claim. Kant is at pains to emphasise that, in so far as morality has to do with reason, and in so 
far as our natural inclinations are to be essentially opposed to our rational nature, for an action 
to have moral worth it must be done out of a sense of duty, that is, out of a respect for 
reason’s legislation, and not at all on the basis of any inclination. We might wonder what this 
might mean and whether it is in the last analysis possible. Given the prior respect, it may 
seem unproblematical that one can act out of a sense of duty. But surely respect in this case 
must be taken to be some contentful motivation, that is, to use Kant’s terminology, eine 
Neigung, an inclination. In the absence of such respect, in the case of someone who simply 
does not care what his duty might be, in what sense can a mere appeal to duty provide a 
motivation? This implies that all action is based upon a contentful motivation and that 
therefore Kant is wrong to draw a distinction between motivation on the basis of inclination 
and motivation on the basis of pure reason. Perhaps the distinction he wanted was between 
motives that spring from the practical application of reason -  motives of prudence -  and those 
that do not.—
This would be one way of putting the objection that Kant’s ethics is formulaic. On 
die other hand, one could put the objection as follows. In the first formulation of the 
categorical imperative Kant makes an illegitimate jump between the universality of the 
structure of practical law and its universalisability. The first formulation of the categorical 
imperative demands that our maxims be capable of becoming universal law; but Kant jumps 
to this conclusion from the claim that, in so far as the moral will is devoid of content, merely 
the pure form of the law, of practical reason, which is necessarily universal across all rational 
being, must be that which grounds moral action. This argumentative structure would 
correspond to the following: the traffic laws are the same for everyone; therefore the traffic 
laws precisely permit that which can be done by everyone without internal contradiction. But 
in this case driving on the right-hand side of the road (in Great Britain) would be permissable, 
since that can be done by everyone without internal contradiction. But (in Great Britain at 
least) it is illegal to drive on the right-hand side of the road, despite the laws being the same 
for everyone. The mere universality of the structure of law does not mean, in the absence of 
any further premise, that universality is itself the law. Again, Kant is here to be convicted of 
being formulaic since universalisation could never function as a contentful principle of action, 
whereas the mere universality of a moral principle itself does not contain such an implication.
4 The Post-modern Condition: a Report on Knowledge. Lyotard defines post-modernism as 
“incredulity toward metanarratives” (p. xxiv), which would make Heidegger a staunch modernist and 
our response perhaps post-modernist.—
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If these objections are allowed to delimit the Kantian moral enterprise, and if the 
ethical framework itself has been dismantled, then Kant’s analysis of practical reason ends up 
proposing a version of the onto-normativity which we have put forward. Practical reason as 
such is normatively prior to inclination, just as existentiality is normatively prior to facticity. 
Resoluteness denotes this fact. But practical reason here is not taken to be contentless; it is 
taken to be full of the aims, goals and ambitions that define what might once have been called 
the rational nature of man, the existentiality of reason. And universalisability plays no role in 
the constitution of its normativity. What is demanded is particular to the given projection.
Now one might object to our critique of Heidegger’s thinking by claiming that it 
relies too heavily upon a very specific interpretation of that thinking. It might be pointed out 
that Heidegger seems no longer to employ the concepts of conscience and resoluteness on the 
thought-scape that opens up beyond Sein und Zeit. And it may then appear disingenuous to 
criticise the whole of Heidegger’s philosophical enterprise using such a small point for 
leverage. In response it can, in the first place, be pointed out that these concepts are 
absolutely crucial to the existential analysis of Dasein, and that the concept of Dasein 
performs such a significant role for the later Heidegger that the history of being is not 
understandable without it. The latter point is testified to by the place Heidegger accords 
Dasein in die most important text of his later thinking: Beitrtige zur Philosophie. And there is 
no reason at all to suppose that it does not there cany the same meaning it bears in Sein und 
Zeit and every reason to suppose that it does.
It is of course true that in texts post-dating Sein und Zeit we never find another 
analysis of conscience, nor of guilt, and find only scant mention of resoluteness. In the case 
of conscience and guilt, this is no doubt because of the theological remnant which these terms 
carry; \hoo-logy, as Heidegger was later to point out, being only possible upon a metaphysical 
horizon. Heidegger may have abandoned the terminology, but did he abandon the phenomena 
which it was employed to evoke? It must always be bome in mind, after all, that the concept 
of truth with which Heidegger is working is not one of correspondence; it is one of disclosure, 
of unconcealment, one having purely to do with the way in which phenomena show 
themselves. What Heidegger writes is true in so far as it evokes, dis-covers the phenomena as 
they present themselves. The phenomenon to which Heidegger applied the archaic term 
“conscience” never recedes beneath Heidegger’s philosophical horizon. He later calls it the 
voice [Stimme] or the call [Ruf\ o f beingf; that which calls thinking. Historical mankind, we 
are told, is called by being to dwell as the guardian of its truth. Nevertheless, the “voice of 
being” was all that “conscience” meant in Sein und Zeit. Dasein was called by itself, by its 
own being, back to that being. Nothing at all hangs on the fact that being in this context was
5 Cf., in particular, Einleitung zu: “Was ist Metaphysik?”, Wegmarken.
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understood in terms of existence: ‘Dasein...heiBt: Sorge des in ihr ekstatisch erschlossenen 
Seins des Seienden als solchen, nicht nur des menschlichen Seins. ’6
Resoluteness also finds fiesh articulation. In the first place, Heidegger refers back to 
it, as it functions in Sein und Zeit, a number of times. The Einfiihrung in die Metaphysik tells 
us that: ‘Die Entschlossenheit verschiebt nichts, druckt sich nicht, sondem handelt aus dem 
Augenblick und unausgesetzt. Ent-schlossenheit ist kein blofier BeschluB zu handeln, 
sondem der entscheidende, durch alles handeln vor- und hindurchgreifende Anfang des 
Handelns... [DJas Wesen der Ent-schlossenheit hegt in der Ent-borgenheit des menschlichen 
Daseins fur die Lichtung des Seins und keineswegs in einer Kraftspeicherung des 
“Agierens” . ’7 Der Urspriing des Kunstwerkes, originally from the same year (1935)8, adds 
that ‘Die in “Sein und Zeit” gedachte Ent-schlossenheit ist nicht die decidierte Aktion eines 
Subjekts, sondem die Erdffhung des Daseins aus der Befangenheit im Seienden zur Offenheit 
des Seins.*9 And die dialogue which Heidegger wrote on the concept of Gelassenheit10 
(1944/45) suggests that ‘Man muBte dann z. B. das Wort “Entschlossenheit” so denken, wie 
es in “Sein und Zeit” gedacht ist: als das eigens ubemommene Sichdfinen des Daseins fur das 
Offene...Dann ware das Wesen des Denkens, namlich die Gelassenheit zur Gegnet, die 
Entschlossenheit zur wesenden Wahrheit. ’ 11
Resoluteness becomes re-articulated in terms of Gelassenheit, and in general in terms 
of die opening up of Dasein to the truth of being, that is, in terms of the essential relationship 
between man and being, man’s answering response to the call of being. As should by now 
have become clear, it means exacdy this and nothing else also in Sein und Zeit. Michael 
Zimmerman is therefore correct to claim in his book The Eclipse o f the Self that resoluteness 
becomes in the later writings Gelassenheit}2 He is wrong, however, to assume that there is 
some fundamental shift of meaning between them, and to base an interpretation of the Kehre 
thereon. Zimmerman claims that whilst the early concept of resoluteness was voluntaristic, 
the later concept of Ge-lassen-heit was rather the opposite, and that it was precisely
6 Einfiihrung in die Metaphysik, p. 22
7 Einfiihrung in die Metaphysik, p. 16
8 The first delivery of the lecture Der Ur sprung des Kunstwerkes (November 1935) postdates the 
summer semester lecture course, although Heidegger already refers to Van Gogh’s shoes in the latter in 
a way similar to the November lecture. Cf. p. 27, Einfiihrung in die Metaphysik.
9 Holzwege, p. 55
10 Which we shall make no attempt to translate. It is simple to appreciate its meaning, though, as long 
as the Ge-lassen is allowed to resonate fully.
11 Gelassenheit, p. 59
12 Paul Ricoeur also agrees with this assessment: ‘The basic difference, perhaps, between the later 
Heidegger and Heidegger I would be that the self no longer finds its authenticity in freedom unto death, 
but in Gelassenheit, which is the gift of the poetical life.’ [The Critique of Subjectivity and Cogito in 
the philosophy of Heidegger, Heidegger and the Quest for Truth, ed. Frings] As does Stanley Rosen: 
‘Not long after his resignation as chancellor of the University of Freiburg, Heidegger underwent a well- 
publicized and frequently mystified “turn” (Kehre) which may here be described very briefly as 
acceptance of Gelassenheit’. [The Question of Being, p. xix]
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Heidegger’s dissatisfaction with the voluntaristic and thus subjectivistic character of the 
existential analysis which precipitated the Kehre. We have already given an account of the 
Kehre, according to which Zimmerman’s view is wrong. Phenomenologically, Sein und Zeit 
is not in the least subjectivistic, 13 and the concept of resoluteness developed there has nothing 
to do with volition, with the will14, and already everything to do with lassen.
How has Sein und Zeit already overcome the metaphysical category of the will? By 
the exposition of the temporal structure o f projection. Temporal projection structures the 
world, forms gradients of meanings, of possibilities, and thus of actions. It is this projective 
world-contouring which replaces the ancient category of will. Rather than talk about a 
curious force within man, we need recourse, in giving an account of his behaviour, merely to 
the structural profile of his world, to the shape of the particular configuration of structural 
relations cast as, or carved out by, his projection. It is rather like the advance that General 
Relativity made over Newton’s laws concerning the theory of gravity. To account for the 
motion of heavenly bodies, one need not refer to some enigmatic force, but only -  
metaphorically, of course -  to the curvature of space-time.
Entschlossenheit thus precisely overcomes the metaphysical category of the will. 
And Heidegger already intends it to be understood in terms of the lassen central to Ge-lassen- 
heit. Not only is he at pains to emphasise this in all three of die quotes above, he also 
emphasises it in Sein und Zeit itself: ‘Das eigentliche Rufverstehen charakterisierten wir als 
Gewissen-haben-wollen. Dieses In-sich-handeln-lassen des eigensten Selbst aus ihm selbst in 
seinem Schuldigsein repr&sentiert phenomenal das im Dasein selbst bezeugte eigentliche 
Seinkdnnen. ’ 15 And a few pages later: ‘Die Entschlossenheit bedeutet Sich-aufrufen-lassen 
aus der Verlorenheit in das Man. ’ 16 And even more strongly in the essay Vom Wesen der 
Wahrheit written very shortly afterwards (1930): ‘Die Freiheit ist als das Seinlassen des 
Seienden in sich das entschlossene, d. h. das sich nicht verschliefiende Verhaltnis. ’ 17 And: 
‘Das Seinlassen des Seienden vollzieht sich im offenstdndigen Verhalten. Das Seinlassen des 
Seienden als eines solches im Ganzen geschieht aber wesensgerecht erst dann, wenn es 
zuweilen in seinem anfhnglichen Wesen ubemommen wird. Dann ist die Ent-schlossenheit
13 For example: Tmmer ist hier der Mensch das Subjectum, dem eine Weise und Art zugesprochen 
wird. Aber von all dem ist die Nennung des Da-seins in “Sein und Zeit” und sp&ter durch eine 
briickenlose Kluft getrennt.’ [Besinnung, p. 143]
14 “Voluntary” is derived from Latin voluntarius, from voluntas, meaning “will”. I take it then that in 
arguing that Entschlossenheit is voluntaristic, Zimmerman is in effect claiming that it has to do with the 
will. Correspondingly, he seems to understand inauthenticity in terms of egoism and selfishness; for 
example: ‘To care for something inauthentically would be to manipulate it for selfish purposes.’ 
[Eclipse of the Self, p. 44] This couldn’t be further from Heidegger’s intentions: ‘Die Un-eigentlichkeit 
wird als Verfallen [Verlorenheit] an das Seiende begriffen’ [Besinnung, p. 324], ‘d. h. die Vormacht 
des Seienden selbst und seiner Uberschattung des Seins, so zwar, dafi die Not der Frage nach der 
Wahrheit des Seins ausbleiben muB.’ [Besinnung, p. 145]
15 Sein und Zeit, p. 295
16 Sein und Zeit, p. 299
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zum Geheimnis unterwegs in die Irre als solche. ’ 18 This should not come as any surprise in so 
far as a Lassen (as in also too Bewendenlassen) is for Heidegger the necessary prerequisite for 
beings to emerge into die open region at all. It is a comportment towards them, and Ent­
schlossenheit, resoluteness, as that mode of comportment that allows for the first time beings 
to emerge into die open region in their truth (“unterwegs in die Irre als solche”), is thus in 
fact die pre-eminent Sein-lassen}9 Ent-schlossenheit is already Ge-lassen-heit. The language 
changes, but the phenomenology does not.
It might be objected that there is nevertheless a fundamental difference between Sein 
und Zeit and the later texts regarding the normativity that we have identified, since although 
historical mankind is called to his essence [Wesen], mention of essentia and Wesen is 
systematically avoided in Sein und Zeit. Of course, this latter claim is not entirely true. In 
both Beitrdge zur Philosophie and the Einleitung zu: “Was ist Metaphysik?” Heidegger 
returns to his formulation: ‘Das “Wesen” des Daseins liegt in seiner Existenz. ’20 The double 
quotation marks here apparently indicate that we have to do with the language of the tradition, 
even though Heidegger was later to appropriate this word as his own. But what then is 
“existence” if it is the “essence” of Dasein? Existence means the same as Ek-sistence, means 
die same as the ec-stasy of temporality: openness to the truth of being. ‘Was bedeutet 
“Existenz” in S. u. Z.? Das Wort nennt eine Weise des Seins, und zwar das Sein desjenigen 
Seienden, das offen steht fur die Offenheit des Seins, in der es steht, indem es sie aussteht. 
Dieses Ausstehen wird unter dem Namen “Sorge” erfahren. ’21 But openness to the truth of 
being is subsequentiy determined as Ent-schlossenheit. Are we not justified, then, in 
declaring resoluteness to be the essentiality of the essence of Dasein as existence?
But one way of expressing our objection against Heidegger would be to deny his 
essentialism.22 The danger is supposed to threaten the essence of man. But the particularity 
of resoluteness that we have advocated is too dun, too ephemeral to support the weight of an 
essence. One could only say that the essence of man is to have no essence. Understood in 
this way it becomes apparent that the critique we have developed of Heidegger’s philosophy 
is not at all new; indeed, it appears in various different manifestations in the commentary.
17 Wegmarken, p. 194
18 Wegmarken, p. 198
19 Which makes a nonsense of Haar’s rash claim that: ‘In Being and Time there was no way in which 
resoluteness could mean being open to the openness of being, that is, to the primacy of the truth or 
unfolding of being over all human thought, understanding or action.’ [Heidegger and the Essence of 
Man, p. 56]
20 Sein und Zeit, p. 42 Originally italicised.
21 Einleitung zu “Was ist Metaphysik? ”, Wegmarken, p. 374
22 Caputo brings out very strongly these “essentializing tendencies” of Sein und Zeit in 
Demythologizing Heidegger, pp. 78 f f  and passim. The final assessment of (at least the later) 
Heidegger’s work which Caputo formulates in this book can be understood to be equivalent to our 
conclusion -  only where we have produced a detailed grounding for this out of the depths of 
Heidegger’s thinking, Caputo proceeds in the spirit of pathos.
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We, however, have given a systematic exposition of it, and one grounded on a close 
interpretation of Heidegger’s texts.
If, then, we were asked to supply a diagnosis with our critique, we would say that 
Heidegger failed to draw sufficiently radical conclusions from his existential analysis. He 
failed to pursue the consequences of his analyses into the fluvial, fluxible terrain beyond the 
horizon of the concepts of authenticity and inauthenticity. Whilst the existential analysis 
grounds the philosophy of the history of being, it also undermines it. Beyond the collapse of 
all metaphysical principles, in the pure phenomenological light of the complex structures of 
human existence, there cannot be any essential need at all, and therefore no essential danger, 
for there can be no durable essence to face the danger. To say that ‘Das “Wesen” des Daseins 
liegt in seiner Existenz’ is to endorse this precisely, since existence is that concept which 
admits of no fixity, no generality, only particularity. Heidegger’s words here therefore 
amount to contradiction -  the essence of Dasein is that it has no essence -, and is it not for 
this reason that Wesen appears in double quotation marks? But in so far as the existential turn 
is intended to instigate the overcoming of the tradition by destabling the categories of 
constant presence, of fixity, with temporal ecstasy, Heidegger can finally be convicted of 
remaining, in perhaps the very most important respect, entrapped by the metaphysics he 
professed to have left to itself.
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